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ELEMENTS 



LOGIC. 



COMPRISING 



THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE 



ENCYCLOPAEDIA METROPOLITANA 

WITH ADDITIONS, &c. 



BY 

RICHARD WHAT ELY, D.D. 

PRINCIPAL OF ST. ALBAN'S HALL, AND LATE FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEG1 

OXFORD. 



FOURTH EDITION, REVISED. 

LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR 

B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE STREET. 
iSSl, 



JH5 



LONDON 
PRINTED BY R. CLAY, BREAD-STREET-HILL. 



^ 



TO 
THE RIGHT REVEREND 

EDWARD COPLESTON, D. D, 

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF, 

8fc. 8fc. 



My dear Lord, 

To enumerate the advantages I have 
derived from your instructions, both in 
regular lectures and in private conversation, 
would be needless to those acquainted with 
the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting. 
My object at present is simply to acknow- 
ledge how greatly I am indebted to you in 
respect of the present Work ; not merely as 
having originally imparted to me the prin- 
ciples of the Science, but also as having 

a 2 



IV DEDICATION. 

contributed remarks, explanations, and illus- 
trations, relative to the most important points, 
to so great an amount that I can hardly 
consider myself as the Author of more than 
half of such portions of the treatise as are not 
borrowed from former publications. I could 
have wished, indeed, to acknowledge this 
more explicitly, by marking with some note 
of distinction those parts which are least my 
own. But I found it could not be done. In 
most instances there is something belonging 
to each of us ; and even in those parts where 
your share is the largest, it would not be fair 
that you should be made responsible for any 
thing that is not entirely your own. Nor 
is it possible, in the case of a Science, to 
remember distinctly how far one has been, in 
each instance, indebted to the suggestions of 
another. Information, as to matters of fact, 
may easily be referred in the mind to the 
person from whom we have derived it : but 
scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced, 
become much more a part of the mind, as it 



DEDICATION. 



were ; since they rest, not on the authority 
of the instructor, but on reasoning from data 
which we ourselves furnish : they are scions 
engrafted on the stems previously rooted in 
our own soil ; and we are apt to confound 
them with its indigenous productions. 

You yourself also, I have reason to be- 
lieve, have forgotten the greater part of the 
assistance you have afforded in the course 
of conversations on the subject; as I have 
found, more than once, that ideas which I 
distinctly remembered to have received from 
you, have not been recognized by you when 
read or repeated. As far, however, as I can 
recollect, though there is no part of the 
following pages in which I have not, more or 
less, received valuable suggestions from you, 
I believe you have contributed less to the 
Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise on 
Fallacies, and more, to the subjoined Dis- 
sertation, than to the rest of the Work. 

I take this opportunity of publicly de- 
claring, that as, on the one hand, you are 



vi DEDICATION. 

not responsible for any thing contained in 
this Work, so, on the other hand, should 
you ever favour the world with a publication 
of your own on the subject, the coincidence 
which will doubtless be found in it with many 
things here brought forward as my own, is 
not to be regarded as any indication of 
plagiarism, at least on your side. 

Believe me to be, 

My dear Lord, 
Your obliged and affectionate 
Pupil and Friend, 
RICHARD WHATELY. 



PREFACE. 



The following Treatise contains the sub- 
stance of the Article " Logic " in the Ency- 
clopaedia Metropolitana. It was suggested 
to me that a separate publication of it might 
prove acceptable, not only to some who are 
not subscribers to that work, but also to 
several who are ; but who, for convenience 
of reference, would prefer a more portable 
volume. 

I have accordingly revised it, and made 
such additions, chiefly in the form of Notes, 
as I thought likely to increase its utility. 

I have taken without scruple whatever 
appeared most valuable from the works of 
former writers ; especially the concise, but in 
general accurate, treatise of Aldrich : but 
while I acknowledge my obligations to my 
predecessors, of whose labours I have largely 
availed myself, I do not profess to be alto- 
gether satisfied with any of the treatises that 
have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly 
judged it any unreasonable presumption to 



Vll! PREFACE. 

point out what seem to me the errors they 
contain. Indeed, whatever deference an 
Author may profess for the authority of those 
who have preceded him, the very circum- 
stance of his publishing a work on the same 
subject, proves that he thinks theirs open to 
improvement. In censuring, however, as I 
have had occasion to do, several of the doc- 
trines and explanations of logical writers, and 
of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be 
understood that this is not from my having 
formed a low estimate of the merits of the 
Compendium drawn up by the Author just 
mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its 
deserved popularity, — from the impossibility 
of noticing particularly all the points in 
which we agree, — and from the consideration 
that errors are the more carefully to be 
pointed out in proportion to the authority 
by which they are sanctioned. 

In the later editions I have introduced,, in 
the Appendix, under the word "Person," an 
extract from the theological works of my 
illustrious predecessor in the teaching of 
Logic, Dr. Wallis, Professor of Geometry in 
this University. 

I have also to acknowledge assistance 
received from several friends who have at 
various times suggested remarks and alte- 



PREFACE. ix 

rations. But I cannot avoid particularizing 
the Rev. J.Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, 
who actually composed a considerable por- 
tion of the work as it now stands, from 
manuscripts not designed for publication, and 
who is the original author of several pages. 
Some valuable illustrations of the importance 
of attending to the ambiguity of the terms 
used in Political-Economy, were furnished 
by the kindness of my friend and former 
pupil, Mr. Senior, of Magdalen College and 
of Lincoln's Inn, late Professor of Political- 
Economy at Oxford, and now, at King's 
College, London. They are printed in the 
Appendix. But the friend to whom it is 
inscribed has contributed far more, and that, 
in the most important parts, than all others 
together ; so much, indeed, that, though 
there is in the treatise nothing of his which 
has not undergone such expansion or modifi- 
cation as leaves me solely responsible for the 
whole, there is not a little of which I cannot 
fairly claim to be the Author. 

The present edition has been revised with 
the utmost care. But though the work has 
undergone not only the close examination of 
myself and several friends, but the severer 
scrutiny of determined opponents, I am 
happy to find that no material errors have 



x PREFACE. 

been detected, nor any considerable altera- 
tions found necessary. Some small additions 
have, however, been introduced into the 
third and fourth editions ; and also a change 
in the arrangement, which I trust will some- 
what lighten the student's labour. I have 
removed into an Appendix a considerable 
portion of what was in the first two editions 
placed in Part I. (now Chap, i.) of the 
Compendium ; as being (though highly im- 
portant, not only from its connexion with 
the reasoning process, but for other purposes, 
yet) not necessary, after the perusal of the 
Analytical Outline, for the understanding of 
the Second and Third Chapters. It may be 
studied, at the learner's choice, either before 
or after the Compendium. 

On the utility of Logic many writers have 
said much in which I cannot coincide, and 
which has tended to bring the study into 
unmerited disrepute. By representing Logic 
as furnishing the sole instrument for the 
discovery of truth in all subjects, and as 
teaching the use of the intellectual faculties 
in general, they raised expectations which 
could not be realized, and which naturally 
led to a re-action. The whole system, whose 
unfounded pretensions had been thus bla- 
zoned forth, has come to be commonly 



PREFACE. XI 

regarded as utterly futile and empty : like 
several of our most valuable medicines, which, 
when first introduced, were proclaimed, each, 
as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite 
disorders ; and which consequently, in many 
instances, fell for a time into total disuse ; 
though, after a long interval, they were 
established in their just estimation, and em- 
ployed conformably to their real proper- 
ties. 

To explain fully the utility of Logic is what 
can be done only in the course of an expla- 
nation of the system itself. One preliminary 
observation only (for the original suggestion 
of which I am indebted to the same friend to 
whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth 
while to offer in this place. If it were in- 
quired what is to be regarded as the most 
appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, 
as man, what would be the answer ? The 
Statesman is engaged with political affairs ; 
the Soldier with military; the Mathemati- 
cian, with the properties of numbers and 
magnitudes ; the Merchant, with commercial 
concerns, &c. ; but in what are all and each 
of these employed ? — employed, I mean, as 
men; for there are many modes of exercise 
of the faculties, mental as well as bodily, 
which are in great measure common to us 



Xll PREFACE. 



with the lower animals. Evidently, in Rea- 
soning, They are all occupied in deducing, 
well or ill, Conclusions from Premises ; each, 
concerning the Subject of his own particular 
business. If, therefore, it be found that the 
process going on daily, in each of so many 
different minds, is, in any respect, the same, 
and if the principles on which it is conducted 
can be reduced to a regular system, and if 
rules can be deduced from that system, for 
the better conducting of the process, then, it 
can hardly be denied that such a system and 
such rules must be especially worthy the 
attention, not of the members of this or that 
profession merely, but of every one who is 
desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To 
understand the theory of that which is the 
appropriate intellectual occupation of Man 
in general, and to learn to do that well, which 
every one will and must do, whether well or 
ill, may surely be considered as an essential 
part of a liberal education. 

Even supposing that no practical improve- 
ment in argumentation resulted from the 
study of Logic, it would not by any means 
follow that it is unworthy of attention. The 
pursuit of knowledge on curious and interest- 
ing subjects, for its own sake, is usually 
reckoned no misemployment of time ; and is 



PREFACE. xiii 

considered as, incidentally, if not directly, 
useful to the individual, by the exercise thus 
afforded to the mental faculties. All who 
study Mathematics are not training them- 
selves to become Surveyors or Mechanics : 
some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry 
is even expected in a man liberally educated, 
though without any view to his practising 
Surgery or Medicine. The investigation of 
a process which is peculiarly and universally 
the occupation of Man, considered as Man, 
can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical 
pursuit than those just instanced. 

It has usually been assumed, however, in 
the case of the present subject, that a theory 
which does not tend to the improvement of 
practice is utterly unworthy of regard ; and 
then, it is contended that Logic has no such 
tendency, on the plea that men may and do 
reason correctly without it : an objection 
which would equally apply in the case of 
Grammar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, &c, 
in all of which systems the practice must 
have existed previously to the theory. 

But many who allow the use of systematic 
principles in other things, are accustomed 
to cry up Common-Sense as the sufficient 
and only safe guide in Reasoning. Now by 
Common - Sense is meant, I apprehend, 



XIV PREFACE. 

(when the term is used with any distinct 
meaning,) an exercise of the judgment un- 
aided by any Art or system of rules; such 
an exercise as we must necessarily employ in 
numberless cases of daily occurrence : in 
which, having no established principles to 
guide us, — no line of procedure, as it were, 
distinctly chalked out, — we must needs act 
on the best extemporaneous conjectures we 
can form. He who is eminently skilful in 
doing this, is said to possess a superior de- 
gree of Common-Sense. But that Common- 
Sense is only our second-best guide — that 
the rules of Art, if judiciously framed, are 
always desirable when they can be had, is 
an assertion, for the truth of which I may 
appeal to the testimony of mankind in gene- 
ral; which is so much the more valuable, 
inasmuch as it may be accounted the testi- 
mony of adversaries. For the generality 
have a strong predilection in favour of Com- 
mon-Sense, except in those points in which 
they, respectively, possess the knowledge of 
a system of rules ; but in these points they 
deride any one who trusts to unaided Com- 
mon-Sense. A Sailor, e.g. will, perhaps, 
despise the pretensions of medical men, and 
prefer treating a disease by Common-Sense : 
but he would ridicule the proposal of navi- 



PREFACE. \v 

gating a ship by Common-Sense, without 
regard to the maxims of nautical art. A 
Physician, again, will perhaps contemn Sys- 
tems of Political Economy,* of Logic, or 
Metaphysics, and insist on the superior wis- 
dom of trusting to Common -Sense in such 
matters ; but he would never approve of 
trusting to Common -Sense in the treatment 
of diseases. Neither, again, would the Archi- 
tect recommend a reliance on Common-Sense 
alone in building, nor the Musician in music, 
to the neglect of those systems of rules, 
which, in their respective arts, have been 
deduced from scientific reasoning aided by 
experience. And the induction might be 
extended to every department of practice. 
Since, therefore, each gives the preference to 
unassisted Common-Sense only in those cases 
where he himself has nothing else to trust to, 
and invariably resorts to the rules of art, 
wherever he possesses the knowledge of them, 
it is plain that mankind universally bear 
their testimony, though unconsciously and 
often unwillingly, to the preferableness of 
systematic knowledge to conjectural judg- 
ments. 

There is, however, abundant room for the 

* See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political-Economy, 



XVI PREFACE. 

employment of Common -Sense in the appli- 
cation of the system. To bring arguments, 
out of the form in which they are expressed 
in conversation and in books, into the 
regular logical shape, must be, of course, 
the business of Common-Sense, aided by 
practice ; for such arguments are, by sup- 
position, not as yet within the province of 
Science ; else they would not be irregular, 
but would be already strict syllogisms. To 
exercise the learner in this operation, I have 
subjoined, in the Appendix, some examples, 
both of insulated arguments, and (in the last 
two editions) of the analysis of argumentative 
works. It should be added, however, that a 
large portion of what is usually introduced 
into Logical treatises, relative to the finding 
of Arguments, — the different kinds of them, 
&c, I have referred to the head of Rheto- 
ric^ and treated of in a work on the Elements 
of that Art. 

It was doubtless from a strong and deli- 
berate conviction of the advantages, direct 
and indirect, accruingjrom an acquaintance 
with Logic, that the University of Oxford, 
when re-modelling their system, not only 
retained that branch of study, regardless of 
the clamours of many of the half-learned, 
but even assigned a prominent place to it, 



PREFACE xvii 

by making it an indispensable part of the 
Examination for the first Degree. This last 
circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, 
in a great degree, produced an effect opposite 
to what was designed. It has contributed to 
lower instead of exalting, the estimation of 
the study ; and to withhold from it the earnest 
attention of many who might have applied 
to it with profit. I am not so weak as to 
imagine that any System can ensure great 
proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either 
in all students, or in a very large proportion 
of them : u we sow many seeds to obtain a 
few flowers \" but it might have been ex- 
pected (and doubtless was expected) that a 
majority at least of successful candidates 
would derive some benefit worth mentioning 
from their logical pursuits ; and that a 
considerable proportion of the distinguished 
candidates would prove respectable, if not 
eminent logicians. Such expectations I do 
not censure as unreasonable, or such as 1 
might not have formed myself, had I been 
called upon to judge ^t that period when our 
experience was all to come. But that ex- 
perience has shown that those expectations 
have been very inadequately realized. The 
truth is, that a very small proportion, 
even of distinguished students, ever become 

h 



XV111 PREFACE. 

proficients in Logic ; and that by far the 
greater part pass through the University 
without knowing anything at all of the subject. 
I do not mean that they have not learned by 
rote a string of technical terms ; but that 
they understand absolutely nothing whatever 
of the principles of the Science. 

I am aware that some injudicious friends 
of Oxford will censure the frankness of this 
avowal. I have only to reply that such is the 
truth ; and that I think too well of, and 
know far too well, the University in which I 
have been employed in various academical 
occupations above a quarter of a century, to 
apprehend danger to her reputation from 
declaring the exact truth. With all its de- 
fects, and no human institution is perfect, 
the University would stand, I am convinced, 
higher in public estimation than it does, were 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
in all points respecting it, more fully known. 
But the scanty and partial success of the mea- 
sures employed to promote logical studies is 
the consequence, I apprehend, of the univer- 
sality of the requisition. That which must he 
done by every one, will, of course, often be 
done but indifferently ; and when the belief 
is once fully established, which it certainly 
has long been, that anything which is 



PREFACE. xix 



indispensable to a testimonial, has little or 
nothing to do with the attainment of honors,* 
the lowest standard soon becomes the esta- 
blished one in the minds of the greater num- 
ber ; and provided that standard be once 
reached, so as to secure the candidate from 
rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any 
such branch of stud) 7 is regarded as a matter 
of indifference, as far as any views of acade- 
mical distinction are concerned. 

Divinity is one of these branches ; and to 
this also most of what has been said con- 
cerning Logic might be considered as equally 
applicable ; but, in fact, there are several 
important differences between the two cases. 
In the first place, most of the students who 
are designed for the Church, and many who 
are not, have a value for theological know- 
ledge, independently of the requisition of the 
schools; and on that ground do not confine 
their views to the lowest admissible degree of 
proficiency : whereas this can be said of very 
few in the case of Logic. And moreover, 
such as design to become candidates for holy 
Orders, know that another examination in 
Theology awaits them. But a consideration, 

* In the last-framed Examination-statute an express declara- 
tion has been inserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have 
weight in the assignment of honors. 

h2 



XX PREFACE. 

which is still more to the present pur- 
pose, is, that Theology, not being a Science, 
admits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from 
that which is within the reach of a child, up 
to the highest that is attainable by the most 
exalted genius ; every one of which degrees 
is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If 
any one understands tolerably the Church- 
catechism, or even the half of it, he knows 
something of divinity ; and that something is 
incalculably preferable to nothing. But it 
is not so with a Science : one who does 
not understand the principles of Euclid's 
demonstrations, whatever number of ques- 
tions and answers he may have learnt by 
rote, knows absolutely nothing of geometry : 
unless he attain this point, all his labour is 
utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he 
is led to believe that he has learnt something 
of a Science, when, in truth, he has not. 
And the same is the case with Logic, or any 
other Science. It does not admit of such 
various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. 
Of course I am far from supposing that all 
who understand anything at all of Logic 
stand on the same level ; but I mean, what 
is surely undeniable, that one who does not 
embrace the fundamental principles, of that, 
or any other Science, whatever he may have 



PREFACE. XXI 

taken on authority, and learned by rote, 
knows, properly speaking, nothing of that 
Science. And such, I have no hesitation 
in saying, is the case with a considerable 
proportion even of those candidates who ob- 
tain testimonials, including many who gain 
distinction There are some persons, (pro- 
bably not so many as one in ten, of such as 
have in other respects tolerable abilities,) 
who are physically incapable of the degree 
of steady abstraction requisite for really 
embracing the principles of Logic or of any 
other Science, whatever pains may be taken 
by themselves or their teachers. But there 
is a much greater number to whom this is 
a great difficulty, though not an impossi- 
bility ; and who having, of course, a strong 
disinclination to such a study, look naturally 
to the very lowest admissible standard. And 
the example of such examinations in Logic 
as must be expected in the case of men of 
these descriptions, tends, in combination 
with popular prejudice, to degrade the study 
altogether in the minds of the generality. 

It was from these considerations, perhaps, 
that it was proposed, a few years ago, to 
leave the study of Logic altogether to the 
option of the candidates ; but the suggestion 
was rejected ; the majority appearing to 



XX11 PREFACE. 

think (in which opinion I most fully coin- 
cide) that, so strongly as the tide of popular 
opinion sets against the study, the result 
would have been, within a few years, an 
almost universal neglect of that Science. 
Matters were accordingly left, at that time, 
in respect of this point, on their former foot- 
ing ; which I am convinced was far prefer- 
able to the proposed alteration. 

But a middle course between these two 
was suggested, which I was persuaded would 
be infinitely preferable to either ; a persua- 
sion which I had long entertained, and 
which is confirmed by every day's observa- 
tions and reflections ; of which, few persons, 
I believe, have bestowed more on this sub- 
ject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, 
be made optional to those who are merely 
candidates for a degree, but indispensable to 
the attainment of academical honours ; and 
the consequence would be, that it would 
speedily begin, and progressively continue, 
to rise in estimation and to be studied with 
real profit. The examination might then, 
it was urged, without any hardship, be made 
a strict one ; since no one could complain 
that a certain moderate degree of scientific 
ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain 
prescribed study, should be the conditions of 



PREFACE. xxiii 

obtaining distinction. The far greater part 
would still study Logic ; since there would 
be (as before) but few who would be willing 
to exclude themselves from the possibility of 
obtaining distinction ; but it would be studied 
with a very different mind, when ennobled, 
as it were, by being made part of the pass- 
port to University honors, and when a pro- 
ficiency in it came to be regarded generally 
as an honorable distinction. And in pro- 
portion as the number increased of those 
who really understood the Science, the num- 
ber, it was contended, would increase of 
such as would value it on higher and better 
grounds. It would in time come to be 
better known and better appreciated by all 
the well-informed part of society : and lec- 
tures in Logic at the University would then, 
perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an 
explanation of the mere elements. This 
would be necessary indeed for beginners ; 
but to the more advanced students, the tutors 
would no more think of lecturing in the bare 
rudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin or 
Greek Grammar ; but, in the same manner 
as they exercise their pupils in Grammar, by 
reading with them Latin and Greek authors 
with continual reference to grammar-rules, 
so, they would exercise them in Logic by 



XXIV PREFACE. 

reading some argumentative work, requiring 
an analysis of it on Logical principles. 

These effects could not indeed, it was 
acknowledged, be expected to show them- 
selves fully till after a considerable lapse of 
time ; but that the change would begin to 
appear, (and that, very decidedly) within 
three or four years, was confidently antici- 
pated. 

To this it was replied, that it was most de- 
sirable that no one should be allowed to 
obtain the Degree of B. A. without a know- 
ledge of Logic. This answer carries a plau- 
sible appearance to those unacquainted with 
the actual state of the University ; though in 
fact it is totally irrelevant. For it goes on 
the supposition, that hitherto this object has 
been accomplished ; — that every one who 
passes his examination does possess a know- 
ledge of Logic ; which is notoriously not the 
fact, nor ever can be, without some impor- 
tant change in some part of our system. The 
question therefore is, not, as the above ob- 
jection would seem to imply, whether a real, 
profitable knowledge of Logic shall be strictly 
required of every candidate for a Degree, 
(for this in fact never has been done) but 
whether, in the attempt to accomplish this 
by requiring the form of a logical examina- 



PREFA< B. XXV 

tion from every candidate without exception, 
we shall continue to degrade the Science, 
and to let this part of the examination be 
regarded as a mere form, by many who might 
otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and 
with advantage : — whether the great majority 
of candidates, and those too of a more pro- 
mising description, shall lose a real and im- 
portant benefit, through the attempt, (which, 
after all, experience has proved to be a vain 
attempt) to comprehend in this benefit a very 
small number, and of the least promising. 

Something of an approach to the proposed 
alteration, was introduced into the Examina- 
tion-statute passed in 1830; in which, per- 
mission is granted to such as are candidates 
merely for a testimonial, to substitute for 
Logic a portion of Euclid. I fear, however, 
that little or nothing will be gained by this ; 
unless indeed the Examiners resolve to make 
the examinations in Logic far stricter than 
those in Euclid. For since every one who 
is capable of really understanding Euclid 
must be also capable of Logic, the alteration 
does not meet the case of those whose in- 
aptitude for Science is invincible ; and these 
are the very description of men whose (so 
called) logical-examinations tend to depress 
the Science. Those few who really are 



XXVI PREFACE, 

physically incapable of scientific reasoning, 
and the far greater number who fancy them- 
selves so, or who at least will rather run a 
risk than surmount their aversion and set 
themselves to study in earnest, — all these 
will be likely, when the alternative is pro- 
posed, to prefer Logic to Euclid ; because 
in the latter, it is hardly possible, at least not 
near so easy as in Logic, to present the sem- 
blance of preparation by learning questions 
and answers by rote : — in the cant phrase of 
undergraduates, by getting crammed. Ex- 
perience has proved this, in the case of the 
Responsive-examinations, where the alterna- 
tive of Logic or Euclid has always been pro- 
posed to the candidates ; of whom those 
most averse to Science, or incapable of it, 
are almost always found to prefer Logic* 

The determination may indeed be formed, 
and acted on from henceforth, that all who 
do in reality know nothing, properly speak- 
ing, of any Science, shall be rejected : all I 
know is, that this has never been the case 
hitherto. 

Still, it is a satisfaction to me, that atten- 
tion has been called to the evil in question, 

* Since this was written, the experiment has been tried. In 
the Examination-list for the present Term (Easter, 1831) of 
125 candidates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty- 
jive present Euclid for their examination, and one hundred Logic I 



PREFACE; wvii 

and an experimental measure adopted for its 
abatement. A confident hope is thus af- 
forded, that in the event (which I much fear) 
of the failure of the experiment, some other 
more effectual measure may be resorted to. 

I am sensible that many may object, that 
this is not the proper place for such remarks 
as the foregoing : what has the public at 
large, they may say, to do with the statutes 
of the University of Oxford ? To this it 
might fairly be replied, that not only all who 
think of sending their sons or other near re- 
latives to Oxford, but all likewise who are 
placed under the ministry of such as have 
been educated there, are indirectly con- 
cerned, to a certain degree, in the system 
there pursued. But the consideration which 
had the chief share in inducing me to say 
what I have, is, that the vindication of Logic 
from the prevailing disregard and contempt 
under which it labours, would have been 
altogether incomplete without it. For let it 
be remembered that the science is judged of 
by the Public in this country, in a very great 
degree, from the specimens displayed, and 
the reports made, by those whom Oxford 
sends forth. Every one, on looking into the 
University Calendar or Statute Book, feels 
himself justified in assuming, that whoever 



XXVlll PREFACE. 

has graduated at Oxford must be a Logician : 
not, indeed, necessarily a first-rate Logician; 
but such as to satisfy the public examiners 
that he has a competent knowledge of the 
Science. Now, if a very large proportion of 
these persons neither are, nor think them- 
selves at all benefited by their (so called) 
logical education, and if many of them treat 
the study with contempt, and represent it as 
a mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon, 
which it is a mere waste of time to attend to, 
let any one judge what conclusions respect- 
ing the utility of the study, and the wisdom 
of the University in upholding it, are likely 
to be the result. 

That prejudices so deeply-rooted as those 
I have alluded to, and supported by the au- 
thority of such eminent names, especially 
that of Locke, and (as is commonly, though 
not very correctly supposed) Bacon, should 
be overthrown at once by the present trea- 
tise, I am not so sanguine as to expect ; but 
if I have been successful in refuting some of 
the most popular objections, and explaining 
some principles which are in general ill- 
understood, it may be hoped that in time 
just notions on the subject may gain ground : 
especially if, as I have some reason to hope, 



PREFACE. X\i\ 

a more able advocate of the same cause 
should be induced to step forward. 

It may be permitted me to mention, that 
as I have addressed myself to various classes 
of students, from the most uninstructed tyro, 
to the furthest-advanced Logician, and have 
touched accordingly both on the most ele- 
mentary principles, and on some of the most 
remote deductions from them, it must be 
expected that readers of each class will find 
some parts not well calculated for them. 
Some explanations will appear to the one 
too simple and puerile ; and for another 
class, some of the disquisitions will be at first 
too abstruse. If to each description some 
portions are found interesting, it is as much 
as I can expect. 

With regard to the style, I have con- 
sidered perspicuity not only, as it always 
must be, the first point, but as one of such 
paramount importance in such a subject, as 
to justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity 
of explanation, — homeliness in illustration, — 
and baldness of expression, I have regarded 
as blemishes not worth thinking of, when any- 
thing was to be gained in respect of clearness. 

Of the correctness of the fundamental 
doctrines maintained in the work, I may be 
.allowed to feel some confidence ; not so 



XXX PREFACE. 

much from the length of time (about eigh- 
teen years) that I have been more or less 
occupied with it, enjoying at the same time 
the advantage of frequent suggestions and 
corrections from several judicious friends, as 
from the nature of the subject. In works of 
taste, an author cannot be sure that the 
judgment of the public will coincide with his 
own ; and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails 
of his sole or most appropriate object. But 
in the case of truths which admit of Scientific 
demonstration, it is possible to arrive by 
reasoning at as full an assurance of the just- 
ness of the conclusions established, as the 
imperfection of the human faculties will 
admit; and experience, accompanied with 
attentive observation, and with repeated 
trials of various methods, may enable one 
long accustomed to tuition, to ascertain with 
considerable certainty what explanations are 
the best comprehended. Many parts of the 
detail, however, may probably be open to 
objections ; but if (as experience now autho- 
rizes me the more confidently to hope) no 
errors are discovered, which materially affect 
the substantial utility of the work, but only 
such as detract from the credit of the author, 
the object will have been attained which I 
ought to have had principally in view. 



prefacl:. xx xi 

No credit, I am aware, is given to an 
author's own disclaimer of personal motives, 
and profession of exclusive regard for public- 
utility ; since even sincerity cannot, on this 
point, secure him from deceiving himself; 
but it may be allowable to observe that one 
whose object was the increase of his repu- 
tation as a writer, could hardly have chosen 
a subject less suitable for his purpose than 
the present. Though the interest in it has 
greatly exceeded what I had anticipated, it 
still can hardly be called a popular subject, 
or one likely to become so, in any consi- 
derable degree at least during the lifetime 
of a writer of the present day. Ignorance, 
fortified by prejudice, opposes its reception, 
even in the minds of those who are consi- 
dered as both candid and well-informed. 
Besides that a great majority of readers not 
only know not what Logic is, but have no 
curiosity to learn, the greater part of those 
who imagine that they do know, are wedded 
to erroneous notions of it. The multitude 
never think of paying any attention to the 
correctness of their reasoning ; and those 
who do, are usually too confident that they 
are already completely successful in this 
point, to endure the thought of seeking 
instruction upon it. 



XXxii PREFACE. 

And as, on the one hand, a large class 
of modern philosophers may be expected to 
raise a clamour against " obsolete preju- 
dices;" " bigoted devotion to the decrees of 
Aristotle ;" " confining the human mind in 
the trammels of the Schoolmen/' &c, so on 
the other hand, all such as really are thus 
bigoted to everything that has been long 
established, merely because it has been long 
established, will be ready to exclaim against 
the presumption of an author, who presumes 
to depart in several points from the track of 
his predecessors. 

There is another circumstance, also, which 
tends materially to diminish the credit of a 
writer on this and some other kindred sub- 
jects. We can make no discoveries of 
striking novelties: the senses of our readers 
are not struck, as with the return of a Comet 
which had been foretold, or the extinction of 
a taper in carbonic-acid gas : the materials 
we work upon are common and familiar to 
all, and, therefore, supposed to be well 
understood by all. And not only is any 
one's deficiency in the use of these materials, 
such as is generally unfelt by himself, but 
when it is removed by satisfactory explana- 
tions — when the notions, which had been 
perplexed and entangled, are cleared up by 



PREFACE. XXXM 



the introduction of a few simple and appa- 
rently obvious principles, he will generally 
forget that any explanation at all was needed, 
and consider all that has been said as mere 
truisms, which even a child could supply to 
himself. Such is the nature of the funda- 
mental principles of a Science — they are so 
fully implied in the most evident and well- 
known truths, that the moment they are 
fully embraced, it becomes a difficulty to 
conceive that we could ever have been not 
aware of them. And hence, the more simple, 
clear, and obvious any principle is ren- 
dered, the more likely is its exposition to 
elicit those common remarks, " of course ! of 
course!" " no one could ever doubt that;" 
" this is all very true, but there is nothing 
new brought to light; — nothing that was not 
familiar to every one;" " there needs no 
ghost to tell us that." I am convinced that 
a verbose, mystical, and partially obscure 
way of writing on such a subject, is the most 
likely to catch the attention of the multitude. 
The generality verify the observation of 
Tacitus, " omne ignotum pro mirifico :" and 
when anything is made very plain to them, 
are apt to fancy that they knew it already ; 
so that the explanations of scientific truths 
are likely, for a considerable time at least, 

c 



XXXiv PREFACE. 

to be, by most men, underrated the more, the 
more perfectly they accomplish their object. 

A very slow progress, therefore, towards 
popularity is the utmost that can be expected 
for such a treatise as I have endeavoured to 
make the present. I have felt myself bound, 
however, not only as a member of Society, 
but more especially as a minister of, the 
Gospel, to use my endeavours towards pro- 
moting an object which to me appears highly 
important, and what is much more, whose 
importance is appreciated by very few be- 
sides. The cause of Truth universally, and 
not least, of religious Truth, is benefited by 
every thing that tends to promote sound 
reasoning and facilitate the detection of 
fallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would, 
I am convinced, have been on many occa- 
sions more satisfactorily answered, and would 
have had fewer openings for cavil, had a 
thorough acquaintance with Logic been a 
more common qualification than it is. In 
lending my endeavours, therefore, whether 
with greater or less success, towards this ob- 
ject, I trust that I am neither uselessly nor 
unsuitably employed. 

I have seen in several writers, a sort of 
sneering allusions to " Logic ;" and also to 
" Truth," (the latter, in reference, I presume, 



PREFACE. XXXV 

to an Essay on that subject) which I cannot 
but feel to be consolatory and even flattering. 
If such expressions had been accompanied by 
an attempt to refute the fundamental prin- 
ciples I have endeavoured to maintain, it 
would have been understood that such im- 
plied censure was meant to be directed 
against false pretensions. But as it is, such 
writers seem to admit that it is Truth as 
Truth, and Logical reasoning, as such, that 
they dislike. And certainly any who wish to 
propagate errors, or to defend abuses, are 
perfectly right in disliking the cultivation of 
Logic, though they may not be prudent in 
avowing this feeling. The clear day-light 
could not be more unwelcome to the " Chil- 
dren of the Mist/' than the establishment 
and diffusion of accurate principles of rea- 
soning, to the advocates of what they are 
aware is unsound. 

Many indeed whose opinions on various 
points are opposed, are sincerely convinced 
of the truth of what they maintain : but all 
of these ought to feel a full confidence that 
truth, wherever it may lie, will be best ascer- 
tained and best supported, by a system of 
sound reasoning. 

Those who are engaged in, or designed for 
the Sacred Ministry, and all others who are 



XXXVI PREFACE. 

sensible that the cause of true Religion is not 
a concern of the Ministry alone, should re- 
member that this is no time to forego any of 
the advantages which that cause may derive 
from an active and judicious cultivation of 
the faculties. Among the enemies of Chris- 
tianity in the present day, are included, if I 
mistake not, a very different description of 
persons from those who were chiefly to be 
met with a century, or even half a century 
ago : what were called " men of wit and 
pleasure about town ;" — ignorant, shallow, 
flippant declaimers, or dull and powerless 
pretenders to Philosophy. Among the ene- 
mies of the Gospel now, are to be found men 
not only of learning and ingenuity, but of 
cultivated argumentative powers, and not 
unversed in the principles of Logic. If the 
advocates of our Religion think proper to 
disregard this help, they will find, on careful 
inquiry, that their opponents do not. And let 
them not trust too carelessly to the strength 
of their cause : Truth will, indeed, prevail, 
where all other points are nearly equal ; but 
it may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if 
hasty assumptions, unsound arguments, and 
vague and empty declamation, occupy the 
place of a train of close, accurate, and lumi- 
nous reasoning. 



PREFACE. XXXvil 

It is not, however, solely or chiefly for 
polemical purposes that the cultivation of 
the reasoning faculty is desirable ; in per- 
suading, and investigating, in learning, or 
teaching, — in all the multitude of cases in 
which it is our object to arrive at just con- 
clusions, or to lead others to them, it is most 
important. A knowledge of logical rules 
will not indeed supply the want of other 
knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by 
any one who really understood this Science, 
to substitute it for any other; but it is no 
less true that no other can be substituted for 
this : that it is valuable in every branch of 
study ; and that it enables us to use the 
knowledge we possess to the greatest advan- 
tage. It is to be hoped, therefore, that 
those academical bodies, who have been wise 
enough to retain this Science, will, instead of 
being persuaded to abandon it, give their 
attention rather to its improvement and more 
effectual cultivation. 



CONTENTS. 



PACK 

Introduction 1 



BOOK I. 

Analytical Outline of the Science 18 

BOOK II. 

Synthetical Compendium 54 

Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms ib. 

Chap. II.— Of Propositions 61 

Chap. III.— Of Arguments 73 

Chap. IV. — Supplement to Chap. Ill 95 

Chap. V. — Supplement to Chap. 1 122 

BOOK III. 

Of Fallacies 14(5 

BOOK IV. 

Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning 226 

Chap. I.— Of Induction 228 

Chap. II. — On the Discovery of Truth 235 

Chap. III.— Of Inference and Proof 266 

Chap. IV.— Of Verbal and Real Questions . . . .275 

Chap. V.— Of Realism 282 



xl CONTENTS. 



Appendix. 

page 
No. I. — On certain Terms which are peculiarly liable to 

be used ambiguously 298 

No. II. — Miscellaneous Examples for the exercise of 

Learners 358 

No. III. — Example of Analysis 374 

Index 385 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 



INTRODUCTION. 
LOGIC, in the most extensive sense which Definition or 

Logic. 

the name can with propriety be made to bear, 
may be considered as the Science, and also 
as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the 
principles on which argumentation is con- 
ducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind 
from error in its deductions. Its most appro- 
priate office, however, is that of instituting an 
analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning; 
and in this point of view it is, as has been 
stated, strictly a Science : while, considered in 
reference to the practical rules above men- 
tioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning. 
This distinction, as will hereafter appear, has 
been overlooked, or not clearly pointed out 
by most writers on the subject ; Logic having 
been in general regarded as merely an Art ; 
and its claim to hold a place among the Sciences 
having been expressly denied. 

B 



2 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

Prevailing Considering how early Logic attracted the 
52JJf. Ung attention of philosophers, it may appear sur- 
prising that so little progress should have been 
made, as is confessedly the case, in developing 
its principles, and perfecting the detail of the 
system ; and this circumstance has been brought 
forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility 
of the study. But a similar argument might 
have been urged with no less plausibility, at 
a period not very remote, against the study of 
Natural Philosophy; and, very recently, against 
that of Chemistry. No science can be expected 
to make any considerable 1 progress, which is not 
cultivated on right principles. Whatever may 
be the inherent vigour of the plant, it will nei- 
ther be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with 
a suitable soil and culture : and in no case is the 
remark more applicable than in the present ; 
the greatest mistakes having always prevailed 
respecting the nature of Logic, and its pro- 
vince having in consequence been extended by 
many writers to subjects with which it has no 
proper connexion. Indeed, with the exception 
of Aristotle, (who is himself not entirely ex- 
empt from the errors in question,) hardly a 
writer on Logic can be mentioned who has 
clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view 
throughout, its real nature and object. Before 
his time, no distinction was drawn between 
the science of which we are speaking, and that 



riters 
on Logic. 



INTRODUCTION. 3 

which is now usually called Metaphysics ; a 
circumstance which alone shows how small was 
the progress made in earlier times. Indeed, 
those who first turned their attention to the 
subject, hardly thought of inquiring into the 
process of Reasoning itself, but confined them- 
selves almost entirely to certain preliminary 
points, the discussion of which is (if logically 
considered) subordinate to that of the main 
inquiry. 

Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts re-Earjyw 
present as the earliest systematic writer on the 
subject of Logic, or, as it was then called, 
Dialectics, divided his work into three parts ; 
the first of which (upon consequences) is cen- 
sured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen.~\ for ob- 
scurity and confusion. In his second part, 
however, he furnished that interrogatory me- 
thod of disputation [epdrrjais] which Socrates 
adopted, and which has since borne his name. 
The third part of his work was devoted to 
what may not be improperly termed the art of 
wrangling [epummi], which supplied the dis- 
putant with a collection of sophistical ques- 
tions, so contrived, that the concession of some 
point which seemed unavoidable, immediately 
involved some glaring absurdity. This, if it 
is to be esteemed as at all falling within the 
province of Logic, is certainly not to be re- 
garded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly 

b2 



4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

represented it) as its principal or proper busi- 
ness. The Greek philosophers generally have 
unfortunately devoted too much attention to 
it; but we must beware of falling into the 
vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have 
regarded as a serious and intrinsically impor- 
tant study, that which in fact they considered 
as an ingenious recreation. The disputants 
diverted themselves in their leisure hours by 
making trial of their own and their adversary's 
acuteness, in the endeavour mutually to per- 
plex each other with subtle fallacies; much in 
the same way as men amuse themselves with 
propounding and guessing riddles, or with the 
game of chess ; to each of which diversions 
the sportive disputations of the ancients bore 
much resemblance. They were closely analo- 
gous to the wrestling and other exercises of the 
Gymnasium; these last being reckoned con- 
ducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the 
former were to habits of intellectual acuteness : 
but the immediate object in each was a 
sportive, not a serious contest; though doubt- 
less fashion and emulation often occasioned 
an undue importance to be attached to suc- 
cess in each. 
zeno. Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any 

further a logician than as to what respects his 
erotetic method of disputation ; a course of 
argument constructed on this principle being 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

properly an hypothetical Sorites, which may 
easily be reduced into a series of syllogisms. 

To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Eociid and 

° Antislhenes 

Antisthenes ; both pupils of Socrates. The 
former of these prosecuted the subject of the 
third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is 
said to have been the author of many of the 
fallacies attributed to the Stoical school. Of 
the writings of the latter nothing certain is 
known; if, however, we suppose the above- 
mentioned sect to be his disciples in this study, 
and to have retained his principles, he cer- 
tainly took a more correct view of the subject 
than Euclid. The Stoics divided all \efcra, 
every thing that could be said, into three 
classes : 1st, the simple Term ; 2d, the Pro- 
position ; 3d, the Syllogism ; viz. the hypo- 
thetical ; for they seem to have had little 
notion of a more rigorous analysis of argu- 
ment than into that familiar form. 

We must not here omit to notice the merits 
of Archytas, to whom we are indebted for the Archyt^. 
doctrine of the Categories. He, however, (as 
well as the other writers on the subject) appears 
to have had no distinct view of the proper 
object and just limits of the science of Logic ; 
but to have blended with it metaphysical 
discussions not strictly connected with it, and 
to have dwelt on the investigation of the 
nature of terms and propositions, without 



6 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

maintaining a constant reference to the prin- 
ciples of Reasoning; to which all the rest 
should be made subservient. 
Arhtotie. The state, then, in which Aristotle found 

the science (if indeed it can properly be said 
to have existed at all before his time) appears 
to have been nearly this : the division into 
Simple Terms, Propositions, and Syllogisms, 
had been slightly sketched out ; the doctrine 
of the Categories, and perhaps that of the 
Opposition of propositions, had been laid 
down; and, as some believe, the analysis of 
Species into Genus and Differentia, had been 
introduced by Socrates. These, at best, were 
rather the materials of the system, than the 
system itself; the foundation of which indeed 
he distinctly claims the merit of having laid, 
and which remains fundamentally the same 
as he left it. 

It has been remarked, that the logical system 
is one of those few theories which have been 
begun and perfected by the same individual. 
The history of its discovery, as far as the main 
principles of the science are concerned, pro- 
perly commences and ends with Aristotle ; and 
this may perhaps in part account for the sub- 
sequent perversions of it. The brevity and 
simplicity of its fundamental truths (to which 
point indeed all real science is perpetually 
tending) has probably led many, to suppose 



INTRODUCTION. 7 

that something much more complex, abstruse, 
and mysterious, remained to be discovered. 
The vanity, too, by which all men are prompted 
unduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led 
unphilosophical minds, not in this case alone, 
but in many others, to extend the boundaries 
of their respective sciences, not by the patient 
development and just application of the prin- 
ciples of those sciences, but by wandering into 
irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment 
of numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly 
foreign to arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest 
instance of the kind. A more curious and 
important one is the degeneracy of Astronomy 
into judicial Astrology ; but none is more 
striking than the misapplication of Logic, by 
those who have treated of it as "the art of 
rightly employing the rational faculties," or 
who have intruded it into the province of Na- 
tural Philosophy, and regarded the Syllogism 
as an engine for the investigation of nature : 
while they overlooked the boundless field that 
was before them within the legitimate limits of 
the science; and perceived not the importance 
and difficulty of the task, of completing and 
properly filling up the masterly sketch before 
them. 

The writings of Aristotle were not only abso- 
lutely lost to the world for about two centuries, 
but seem to have been but little studied for a 



8 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

long time after their recovery. An art, how- 
ever, of Logic, derived from the principles 
traditionally preserved by his disciples, seems 
to have been generally known, and to have 
been employed by Cicero in his philosophical 
works ; but the pursuit of the science seems to 
have been abandoned for a long time. Early 
in the Christian era, the Peripatetic doctrines 
experienced a considerable revival ; and we 
Gaien, meet with the names of Galen and Porphyry 

Porphyry. L J J 

as logicians : but it is not till the fifth century 
that Aristotle's logical works were translated 

Boethius. into Latin by the celebrated Boethius. Not 
one of these seems to have made any consi- 
derable advances in developing the theory of 
reasoning. Of Galen's labours little is known ; 
and Porphyry's principal work is merely on the 
predicables. We have little of the science till 
the revival of learning among the Arabians, by 
whom Aristotle's treatises on this as well as on 
other subjects were eagerly studied. 

Passing by the names of some Byzantine 
writers of no great importance, we come to 

schoolmen, the times of the Schoolmen, whose waste of 
ingenuity and frivolous subtilty of disputation 
need not be enlarged upon. It may be suf- 
ficient to observe, that their fault did not lie 
in their diligent study of Logic, and the high 
value they set upon it, but in their utterly 
mistaking the true nature and object of the 



INTRODUCTION. \) 

science ; and by the attempt to employ it for 
the purpose of physical discoveries, involving 
every subject in a mist of words, to the ex- 
clusion of sound philosophical investigation. 
Their errors may serve to account for the 
strong terms in which Bacon sometimes ap- Bacon. 
pears to censure logical pursuits ; but that 
this censure was intended to bear against the 
extravagant perversions, not the legitimate 
cultivation of the science, may be proved from 
his own observations on the subject, in his 
Advancement of Learning. 

His moderation, however, was not imitated 
in other quarters. Even Locke confounds in Locke. 
one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory, 
with the absurd misapplications and perver- 
sions of it in later years. His objection to the 
science, as unserviceable in the discovery of 
truth (which has of late been often repeated), 
while it holds good in reference to many (mis- 
named) logicians, indicates that, with regard 
to the true nature of the science itself, he had 
no clearer notions than they have, of the pro- 
per province of Logic, viz. Reasoning ; and of 
the distinct character of that operation from 
the observations and experiments which are 
essential to the study of nature. 

An error apparently different, but substan- 
tially the same, pervades the treatises of Watts wmu. 
and other modern writers on the subject. 



10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic 
theory to the vast purposes to which others 
had attempted to apply it, he still craved after 
the attainment of some equally comprehensive 
and all-powerful system ; which he accordingly 
attempted to construct, under the title of The 
Right Use of Reason, — which was to be a 
method of invigorating and properly directing 
all the powers of the mind : — a most magni- 
ficent object indeed, but one which not only 
does not fall under the province of Logic, but 
cannot be accomplished by any one science or 
system that can even be conceived to exist. 
The attempt to comprehend so wide a field, is 
no extension of science, but a mere verbal 
generalization, which leads only to vague and 
barren declamation. In every pursuit, the 
more precise and definite our object, the more 
likely we are to attain some valuable result ; 
if, like the Platonists, who sought after the 
avrdyaOov, — the abstract idea of good, — we 
pursue some specious but ill-defined scheme 
of universal knowledge, we shall lose the sub- 
stance while grasping at a shadow, and be- 
wilder ourselves in empty generalities. 

It is not perhaps much to be wondered 
at, that in still later times several ingenious 
writers, forming their notions of the science 
itself from professed masters in it, such as have 
just been alluded to, and judging of its value 



INTRODUCTION. 1 1 

from their failures, should have treated the 
Aristotelic system with so much reprobation 
and scorn. Too much prejudiced to bestow 
on it the requisite attention for enabling them 
clearly to understand its real character and 
object, or even to judge correctly from the 
little they did understand, they have assailed 
the study with a host of objections, so totally 
irrelevant, and consequently impotent, that, 
considering the talents and general information 
of those from whom they proceed, they might 
excite astonishment in any one who did not 
fully estimate the force of very early prejudice. 
Logic has usually been considered by these incorrect 

. . views of the 

objectors as professing to furnish a peculiar nati,re of the 

J Jl o l science. 

method of reasoning, instead of a method of 
analyzing that mental process which must 
invariably take place in all correct reasoning ; 
and accordingly they have contrasted the ordi- 
nary mode of resoning with the syllogistic, and 
have brought forward with an air of triumph 
the argumentative skill of many who never 
learned the system ; a mistake no less gross 
than if any one should regard Grammar as a 
peculiar Language, and should contend against 
its utility, on the ground that many speak 
correctly who never studied the principles of 
grammar. For Logic, which is, as it were, the 
Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward 
the regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of 



12 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

argumentation, designed to be substituted for 
any other mode ; but as the form to which all 
correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced ; 
and which, consequently, serves the purpose 
(when we are employing Logic as an art) of 
a test to try the validity of any argument ; in 
the same manner as by chemical analysis we 
develop and submit to a distinct examination 
the elements of which any compound body is 
composed, and are thus enabled to detect any 
latent sophistication and impurity. 

Complaints have also been made that Logic 
leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and 
those which are the sources of the chief errors 
in reasoning ; viz. the ambiguity or indistinct- 
ness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the 
degrees of evidence in various Propositions : an 
objection which is not to be removed by any 
such attempt as that of Watts to lay down 
" rules for forming clear ideas, and for guiding 
the judgment;" but by replying that no art 
is to be censured for not teaching more than 
falls within its province, and indeed more than 
can be taught by any conceivable art. Such 
a system of universal knowledge as should in- 
struct us in the full meaning or meanings of 
every term, and the truth or falsity, — certainty 
or uncertainty, — of every proposition, thus 
superseding all other studies, it is most unphi- 
losophical to expect, or even to imagine. And 



INTRODUCTION. 13 

to find fault with Logic for not performing 
this, is as if one should object to the science of 
Optics for not giving sight to the blind ; or as 
if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a 
story in his Div. Leg.) one should complain of 
a reading-glass for being of no service to a 
person who had never learned to read. 

In fact, the difficulties and errors above 
alluded to are not in the process of Reasoning 
itself (which alone is the appropriate province 
of Logic) but in the subject-matter about which 
it is employed. This process will have been 
correctly conducted if it have conformed to the 
logical rules, which preclude the possibility of 
any error creeping in between the principles 
from which we are arguing, and the conclusions 
we deduce from them. But still that conclu- 
sion may be false, if the principles we start 
from are so. In like manner, no arithmetical 
skill will secure a correct result to a calcula- 
tion, unless the data are correct from which we 
calculate : nor does any one on that account 
undervalue Arithmetic ; and yet the objection 
against Logic rests on no better foundation. 

There is in fact a striking analogy in this 
respect between the two sciences. All Num- 
bers (which are the subject of Arithmetic) must 
be numbers of some things, whether coins, per- 
sons, measures, or any thing else ; but to intro- 
duce into the science any notice of the things 



14 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

respecting which calculations are made, would 
be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its 
scientific character : we proceed therefore with 
arbitrary signs representing numbers in the 
abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on 
the validity of a regularly-constructed argu- 
ment, equally well, though arbitrary symbols 
may have been substituted for the terms; and, 
consequently, without any regard to the things 
signified by those terms. And the possibility 
of doing this (though the employment of such 
arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected 
to, even by writers who understood not duly 
Arithmetic but Algebra) is a proof of the 
strictly scientific character of the system. But 
many professed logical writers, not attending 
to the circumstances which have been just 
mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on 
various branches of knowledge ; disquisitions 
which must evidently be as boundless as human 
knowledge itself, since there is no subject on 
which Reasoning is not employed, and to 
which, consequently, Logic may not be applied. 
The error lies in regarding every thing as the 
propei* province of Logic to which it is appli- 
cable. A similar error is complained of by 
Aristotle, as having taken place with respect 
to Rhetoric ; of which, indeed, we find speci- 
mens in the arguments of several of the inter- 
locutors in Cic. de Oratore. 



INTRODUCTION. 15 

From what has been said, it will be evident 
that there is hardly any subject to which it is 
so difficult to introduce the student in a clear 
and satisfactory manner, as the one we are now 
engaged in. In any other branch of know- 
ledge, the reader, if he have any previous 
acquaintance with the subject, will usually be 
so far the better prepared for comprehending 
the exposition of the principles; or if he be 
entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to 
the study with a mind unbiassed, and free from 
prejudices and misconceptions: whereas, in the 
present case, it cannot but happen, that many 
who have given some attention to logical pur- 
suits (or what are usually considered as such) 
will have rather been bewildered by funda- 
mentally erroneous views, than prepared, by 
the acquisition of just principles, for ulterior 
progress ; and that not a few who pretend not 
to any acquaintance whatever with the science, 
will yet have imbibed either such prejudices 
against it, or such false notions respecting its 
nature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their 
study of it. 

There is, however, a difficulty which exists 
more or less in all abstract pursuits; though 
it is perhaps more felt in this, and often oc- 
casions it to be rejected by beginners as dry 
and tedious ; viz. the difficulty of perceiving 
to what ultimate end, — to what practical or 



16 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 

interesting application — the abstract principles 
lead, which are first laid before the student; 
so that he will often have to work his way 
patiently through the most laborious part of 
the system before he can gain any clear idea 
of the drift and intention of it. 

This complaint has often been made by che- 
mical students, who are wearied with descrip- 
tions of oxygen, hydrogen, and other invisible 
elements, before they have any knowledge 
respecting such bodies as commonly present 
themselves to the senses. And accordingly 
some teachers of chemistry obviate in a great 
degree this objection, by adopting the ana- 
lytical instead of the synthetical mode of pro- 
cedure, when they are first introducing the 
subject to beginners ; L e. instead of syntheti- 
cally enumerating the elementary substances, — 
proceeding next to the simplest combinations 
of these, — and concluding with those more 
complex substances which are of the most 
common occurrence, they begin by analyzing 
these last, and resolving them step by step 
into their simple elements ; thus at once pre- 
senting the subject in an interesting point of 
view, and clearly setting forth the object of 
it. The synthetical form of teaching is in- 
deed sufficiently interesting to one who has 
ma^e considerable progress in any study ; and 
being more concise, regular, and systematic, 



INTRODUCTION. 17 

is the form in which our knowledge naturally 
arranges itself in the mind, and is retained by 
the memory : but the analytical is the more 
interesting, easy, and natural kind of intro- 
duction ; as being the form in which the first 
invention or discovery of any kind of system 
must originally have taken place. 

It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by 
giving a slight sketch, in this form, of the 
logical system, before we enter regularly upon 
the details of it. The reader will thus be pre- 
sented with a kind of imaginary history of the 
course of inquiry by which that system may be 
conceived to have occurred to a philosophical 
mind. 



18 [Book I. 



BOOK I. 
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE. 

§ I- 

In every instance in which we reason, in 
the strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of 
arguments, whether for the sake of refuting 
an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of 
satisfying our own minds on any point, what- 
ever may be the subject we are engaged on, a 
certain process takes place in the mind, which 
is one and the same in all cases, provided it 
be correctly conducted. 

Of course it cannot be supposed that every 
one is even conscious of this process in his own 
mind ; much less, is competent to explain the 
principles on which it proceeds. This indeed 
is, and cannot but be, the case with every 
other process respecting which any system has 
been formed ; the practice not only may exist 
independently of the theory, but must have 
preceded the theory. There must have been 
Language before a system of Grammar could 
be devised ; and musical compositions, previous 
to the science of Music. .„ This, by the way, 



§ 1.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 19 

will serve to expose the futility of the popular 
objection against Logic, that men may reason 
very well who know nothing of it.* The 

* Locke has a great deal to this purpose ; e. g. in chap, 
xvii. " on Reason," (which, by the way, he perpetually 
confounds with Reasoning.) He says, in § 4, "If syllo- 
gisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of 
reason and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before 
Aristotle there was not one man that did or could know 
any thing by reason ; and that since the invention of syl- 
logisms there is not one in ten thousand that doth. But 
God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely 
two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them 
rational, i. e. those few of them that he could get so to 
examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above 
threescore ways that three propositions may be laid toge- 
ther, there are but fourteen wherein one may be sure that 
the conclusion is right," fyc. tyc. "God has been more 
bountiful to mankind than so : He has given them a mind 
that can reason without being instructed in methods of 
syllogizing," fyc. fyc. All this is not at all less absurd than 
if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern 
chemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the 
process by which it is conducted through a boiler into the 
water, which it converts into a gas of sufficient elasticity 
to overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, $c 9 should 
reply, " If all this were so, it would follow that before the 
time of these chemists no one ever did or could make any 
liquor boil." 

In an ordinary, obscure, and trifling writer, all this con- 
fusion of thought and common-place declamation might 
as well have been left unnoticed ; but it is due to the 
general ability and to the celebrity of such an author as 
Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed. 

He presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle, 
in which he is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for the 
"invention of syllogisms ;"' to which he certainly had no 

c 2 



20 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

parallel instances adduced, show that such an 
objection might be applied in many other cases, 
where its absurdity would be obvious ; and that 
there is no ground for deciding thence, either 
that the system has no tendency to improve 
practice, or that even if it had not, it might 
not still be a dignified and interesting pursuit. 
One of the chief impediments to the attain- 
ment of a just view of the nature and object of 
Logic, is the not fully understanding, or not 
sufficiently keeping in mind, the sameness of 
the reasoning process in all cases. If, as the 
ordinary mode of speaking would seem to in- 
dicate, mathematical reasoning, and theologi- 
cal, and metaphysical, and political, 8?c. were 
essentially different from each other, i. e. dif- 
ferent kinds of reasoning, it would follow, that 
supposing there could be at all any such science 
as we have described Logic, there must be so 
many different species, or at least different 
branches of Logic. And such is perhaps the 

more claim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants and 
animals ; or Hervey, to the praise of having made the blood 
circulate; or Lavoisier, to that of having formed the atmo- 
sphere we breathe. And the utility of this invention con- 
sists, according to him, in the great service done against 
" those who were not ashamed to deny anything;" a service 
which never could have been performed, had syllogisms 
been an invention of Aristotle's ; for what sophist could 
ever have consented to restrict himself to one particular 
kind of arguments, dictated by his opponent ? 



process simi- 
lar in all sub- 



§ I.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 21 

most prevailing notion. Nor is this much to 
be wondered at ; since it is evident to all, that 
some men converse and write, in an argumen- 
tative way, very justly on one subject, and very 
erroneously on another, in which again others 
excel, who fail in the former. This error may Reasoning 
be at once illustrated and removed, by consi- ] ec{ 
dering the parallel instance of Arithmetic ; in 
which every one is aware that the process of a 
calculation is not affected by the nature of the 
objects whose numbers are before us : but that 
(e.g.) the multiplication of a number is the 
very same operation, whether it be a number of 
men, of miles, or of pounds ; though neverthe- 
less persons may perhaps be found who are 
accurate in calculations relative to natural 
philosophy, and incorrect in those of political- 
economy, from their different degrees of skill in 
the subjects of these two sciences ; not surely 
because there are different arts of Arithmetic 
applicable to each of these respectively. 

Others again, who are aware that the simple 
system of Logic may be applied to all subjects 
whatever, are yet disposed to view it as a 
peculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is, 
a method of unfolding and analyzing our rea- 
soning : whence many have been led (e. g. the 
author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk 
of comparing Syllogistic reasoning with Moral 
reasoning ; taking it for granted that it is 



22 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boqk I. 

possible to reason correctly without reasoning 
logically ; which is, in fact, as great a blunder 
as if any one were to mistake grammar for a 
peculiar language, and to suppose it possible to 
speak correctly without speaking grammatically. 
They have in short considered Logic as an art 
of reasoning ; whereas (so far as it is an art) it 
is the art of reasoning ; the logician's object 
being, not to lay down principles by w T hich one 
may reason, but, by which all must reason, even 
though they are not distinctly aware of them: 
— to lay down rules, not which may be followed 
with advantage, but which cannot possibly be 
departed from in sound reasoning. These mis- 
apprehensions and objections being such as lie 
on the very threshold of the subject, it would 
have been hardly possible, without noticing 
them, to convey any just notion of the nature 
and design of the logical system. 

§ 2. 

Supposing it then to have been perceived 
that the operation of reasoning is in all cases 
the same, the analysis of that operation could 
not fail to strike the mind as an interesting 
matter of inquiry. And moreover, since (appa- 
rent) arguments which are unsound and incon- 
clusive, are so often employed, either from error 
or design ; and since even those who are not 
misled by these fallacies, are so often at a loss 



§2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 23 

to detect and expose them in a manner satisfac- 
tory to others, or even to themselves ; it could 
not but appear desirable to lay down some 
general rules of reasoning, applicable to all 
cases ; by which a person might be enabled the 
more readily and clearly to state the grounds 
of his own conviction, or of his objection to the 
arguments of an opponent ; instead of arguing 
at random, without any fixed and acknowledged 
principles to guide his procedure. Such rules 
would be analogous to those of Arithmetic, 
which obviate the tediousness and uncertainty 
of calculations in the head ; wherein, after 
much labour, different persons might arrive at 
different results, without any of them being 
able distinctly to point out the error of the rest. 
A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, in- 
stead of deserving to be called the art of wrang- 
ling, be more justly characterised as the " art 
of cutting short wrangling," by bringing the 
parties to issue at once, if not to agreement; 
and thus saving a waste of ingenuity. 

In pursuing the supposed investigation, ifc Anaiysu <* 
will be found that every conclusion is deduced, 
in reality, from two other propositions ; (thence 
called Premises;) for though one of these may 
be, and commonly is, suppressed, it must never- 
theless be understood as admitted ; as may 
easily be made evident by supposing the denial 
of the suppressed premiss, which will at once 



24 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

invalidate the argument: e.g. if any one, from 
perceiving that " the world exhibits marks of 
design/' infers that " it must have had an in- 
telligent author/' though he may not be aware 
in his own mind of the existence of anv other 
premiss, he will readily understand, if it be 
denied that " whatever exhibits marks of design 
must have had an intelligent author/' that the 
affirmative of that proposition is necessary to 
the validity of the argument. An argument 
thus stated regularly and at full length, is 
called a Syllogism ; which therefore is evidently 
not a peculiar kind of argument, but only a 
peculiar form of expression, in which every 
argument may be stated. 

When one of the premises is suppressed 
(which for brevity's sake it usually is) the 
argument is called an Enthymeme. And it 
may be worth while to remark, that when the 
argument is in this state, the objections of an 
opponent are (or rather appear to be) of two 
kinds ; viz. either objections to the assertion 
itself, or objections to its force as an argument. 
E. G. In the above instance, an atheist may be 
conceived either denying that the world does 
exhibit marks of design, or denying that it 
follows from thence that it had an intelligent 
author. Now it is important to keep in mind 
that the only difference in the two cases is, that 
in the one the expressed premiss is denied, in the 



J 2.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 25 

other the suppressed; for the force as an argument 
of either premiss depends on the other premiss : 
if both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately 
connected with them cannot be denied. 

It is evidently immaterial to the argument 
whether the conclusion be placed first or last; 
but it may be proper to remark, that a premiss 
placed after its conclusion is called the Reason* 
of it, and is introduced by one of those con- 
junctions which are called causal ; viz. " since," 
" because," fyc. which may indeed be employed 
to designate a premiss, whether it came first 
or last. The illative conjunctions, " therefore," 
fyc. designate the conclusion. 

It is a circumstance which often occasions 
error and perplexity, that both these classes 
of conjunctions have also another signification, 
being employed to denote, respectively, Cause 
and Effect, as well as Premiss and Conclusion : 
e. g. If I say, " this ground is rich, because the 
trees on it are flourishing," or " the trees are 
flourishing, and therefore the soil must be rich," 
I employ these conjunctions to denote the con- 
nexion of Premiss and Conclusion ; for it is 
plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not 
the cause of the soil's fertility, but only the 
cause of my knowing it. If again I say, " the 
trees flourish, because the ground is rich,'* 

* The Major-premiss is often called the Principle; and 
the word Reason is then confined to the Minor, j 



26 - ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

or (< the ground is rich, and therefore the trees 
flourish/' I am using the very same conjunctions 
fau° S e! and *° denote the connexion of cause and effect; for 
in this case, the luxuriance of the trees, being 
evident to the eye, would hardly need to be 
proved, but might need to be accounted for. 
There are, however, many cases, in which the 
cause is employed to prove the existence of its 
effect ; especially in arguments relating to 
future events ; as e. g. when from favourable 
, weather any one argues that the crops are 
likely to be abundant : * the cause and the 
reason, in that case, coincide. And this con- 
tributes to their being so often confounded 
together in other cases. 

§3. 

In an argument, such as the example above 
given, it is, as has been said, impossible for any 
one, who admits both premises, to avoid ad- 
mitting the conclusion. But there will be fre- 
£E". tar " quently an apparent connection of premises with 
a conclusion which does not in reality follow 
from them, though to the inattentive or un- 
skilful the argument may appear to be valid : 
and there are many other cases in which a doubt 
may exist whether the argument be valid or not; 
i. e. whether it be possible or not to admit the 

* See Appendix, No. I. art. Reason, See also Bhetoric, 
Part I. ch. %. § ii. 



,. § 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 27 

premises, and yet deny the conclusion. It is of 
the highest importance, therefore, to lay down 
some regular form to which every valid argu- 
ment may be reduced, and to devise a rule 
which shall show the validity of every argument 
in that form, and consequently the unsoundness 
of any apparent argument which cannot be 
reduced to it : — e. g. if such an argument as this 
be proposed, " every rational agent is account- 
able; brutes are not rational agents; therefore 
they are not accountable :" or again, " all wise 
legislators suit their laws to the genius of their 
nation ; Solon did this ; therefore he was a wise 
legislator :" there are some, perhaps, who would 
not perceive any fallacy in such arguments, 
especially if enveloped in a cloud of words ; 
and still more, when the conclusion is true, or 
(which comes to the same point) if they are dis- 
posed to believe it : and others might perceive 
indeed, but might be at a loss to explain, the 
fallacy. Now these (apparent) arguments ex- 
actly correspond, respectively, with the follow- 
ing, the absurdity of the conclusions from which 
is manifest : " every horse is an animal ; sheep 
are not horses ; therefore they are not animals :" 
and, "all vegetables grow; an animal grows; 
therefore it is a vegetable." These last exam- 
ples, I have said, correspond exactly (considered 
as arguments) with the former ; the question 
respecting the validity of an argument being, 



28 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

not whether the conclusion be true, but whether 
it follozvs from the premises adduced. This 
mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward 
a similar one whose conclusion is obviously 
absurd, is often, and very advantageously, re- 
sorted to in addressing those who are ignorant 
of Logical rules;* but to lay down such rules, 
and employ them as a test, is evidently a safer 
and more compendious, as well as a more 
philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain 
these, it would plainly be necessary to analyze 
some clear and valid arguments, and to observe 
in what their conclusiveness consists. 

Let us suppose, then, such an examination 
to be made of the syllogism above mentioned : 
" whatever exhibits marks of design had an 
intelligent author ; the world exhibits marks of 
design ; therefore the world had an intelligent 
author." In the first of these premises we find 

* An exposure of some of Hume's fallacies in his 
" Essay on Miracles" and elsewhere, was attempted, on 
this plan, a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published ano- 
nymously, as the nature of the argument required, but 
which I see no reason against acknowledging) entitled 
" Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte ;" in 
which it was shown that the existence of that extraordi- 
nary person could not, on Hume's principles, be received 
as a well-authenticated fact ; since it rests on evidence less 
strong than that which supports the Scripture-histories. 

For a clear development of the mode in which this last 
evidence operates on most minds, see " Hints on Inspira- 
tion," p. 30 — 46. 



§ 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 29 

it assumed universally of the class of " things 
which exhibit marks of design/' that they had 
an intelligent author ; and in the other premiss, 
" the world " is referred to that class as com- 
prehended in it : now it is evident, that what- i 
ever is said of the whole of a class, may be said 
of any thing comprehended in that class ; so 
that we are thus authorized to say of the 
world, that " it had an intelligent author." 
Again, if we examine a syllogism with a nega- 
tive conclusion, as, e. g. " nothing which exhi- 
bits marks of design could have been produced 
by chance : the world exhibits, fyc. ; therefore 
the world could not have been produced by 
chance :" the process of Reasoning will be 
found to be the same ; since it is evident, that 
whatever is denied universally of any class may 
be denied of any thing that is comprehended 
in that class. 

On further examination it will be found, that 
all valid arguments whatever may be easily 
reduced to such a form as that of the fore- 
going syllogisms ; and that consequently the 
principle on which they are constructed is the 
UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning. 
So elliptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of 
expression, even of those who are considered 
as prolix writers, — i. e. so much is implied and 
left to be understood in the course of argu- 
ment, in comparison of what is actually stated, 



30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

(most men being impatient, even to excess, of 
any appearance of unnecessary and tedious 
formality of statement) that a single sentence 
will often be found, though perhaps considered 
as a single argument, to contain, compressed 
into a short compass, a chain of several distinct 
arguments. But if each of these be fully deve- 
loped, and the whole of what the author in- 
tended to imply be stated expressly, it will be 
found that all the steps even of the longest and 
most complex train of reasoning, may be re- 
duced into the above form. ~ 

It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely 
worthy of notice, had not so many, even 
esteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that 
Aristotle and other logicians meant to propose 
that this prolix form of unfolding arguments 
should universally supersede, in argumentative 
discourses, the common forms of expression ; 
and that, " to reason logically," means, to state 
all arguments at full length in the syllogistic 
form : and Aristotle has even been charged with 
inconsistency for not doing so. It has been said, 
that " in his Treatises of Ethics, Politics, fyc, 
he argues like a rational creature, and never 
attempts to bring his own system into prac- 
tice." * As well might a chemist be charged 
with inconsistency for making use of any of 
the compound substances that are commonly 

* Lord Karnes. 



§4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 31 

employed, without previously analyzing and 
resolving them into their simple elements ; as 
well might it be imagined that, to speak gram- 
matically, means, to parse every sentence we 
utter. The chemist (to pursue the illustration) 
keeps by him his tests and his method of 
analysis, to be employed when any substance is 
offered to his notice, the composition of which 
has not been ascertained, or in which adultera- 
tion is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly be 
compared to some adulterated compound ; " it 
" consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and 
" falsehood, so entangled, — so intimately blend- 
" ed,— that the falsehood is (in the chemical 
" phrase) held in solution : one drop of sound 
" logic is that test which immediately disunites 
"them, makes the foreign substance visible, 
u and precipitates it to the bottom." * 

§ 4. - 
But to resume the investigation of the prin- 
ciples of reasoning : the maxim resulting from 
the examination of a syllogism in the foregoing 
form, and of the application of which, every 
valid argument is in reality an instance, is, 
" that whatever is predicated (i. e. affirmed or 

* This excellent illustration is cited from a passage in an 
anonymous pamphlet, "An Examination of Rett's Logic." 
The author displays, though in a hasty production, great 
reach of thought, as well as knowledge of his subject. 



Aristotle' 
dictum. 



32 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

denied) universally, of any class of things, may 
be predicated, in like manner, (viz. affirmed 
or denied) of any thing comprehended in that 
class." This is the principle, commonly called 
the dictum de omni et nullo, for the establish- 
ment of which we are indebted to Aristotle, 
and which is the keystone of his whole logical 
system. It is not a little remarkable that 
some, otherwise judicious writers, should have 
been so carried away by their zeal against that 
philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule 
of this principle, on account of its obviousness 
and simplicity ; though they would probably 
perceive at once, in any other case, that it is 
the greatest triumph of philosophy to refer 
many, and seemingly very various, phenomena 
to one, or a very few, simple principles ; and 
that the more simple and evident such a prin- 
ciple is, provided it be truly applicable to all 
the cases in question, the greater is its value 
and scientific beauty. If, indeed, any prin- 
ciple be regarded as not thus applicable, that 
is an objection to it of a different kind. Such 
an objection against Aristotle's dictum, no one 
has ever attempted to establish by any kind 
of proof; but it has often been taken for 
granted; it being (as has been stated) very 
commonly supposed, without examination, that 
the syllogism is a distinct kind of argument, 
and that the rules of it accordingly do not 



§ 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 33 

apply, nor were intended to apply, to all 
reasoning whatever. Under this misappre- 
hension, Dr. Campbell # labours with some in- 
genuity, and not without an air of plausibility, 
to show that every syllogism must be futile 
and worthless, because the premises virtually 
assert the conclusion : little dreaming, of 
course, that his objections, however specious, 
lie against the process of reasoning itself, 
universally ; and will therefore, of course, 
apply to those very arguments which he is 
himself adducing. 

It is much more extraordinary to find ano- 
ther eminent authorf adopting, expressly, the 
very same objections, and yet distinctly admit- 
ting (within a few pages) the possibility of 
reducing every course of argument to a series 
of syllogisms. 

The same writer brings an objection against 
the Dictum of Aristotle, which it may be worth 
while to notice briefly, for the sake of setting 
in a clearer light the real character and object 
of that principle. Its application being, as 
has been seen, to a regular and conclusive 
syllogism, he supposes it intended to prove 
and make evident the conclusiveness of such 
a syllogism ; and remarks how unphilosophical 
it is to attempt giving a demonstration of a 

* " Philosophy of Rhetoric." 
f Dugald Stewart : Philosophy, vol. ii. 
D 



34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

demonstration. And certainly the charge 
would be just, if we could imagine the logi- 
cian's object to be, to increase the certainty 
of a conclusion which we are supposed to have 
already arrived at by the clearest possible mode 
of proof. But it is very strange that such an 
idea should ever have occurred to one who had 
even the slightest tincture of natural philoso- 
phy : for it might as well be imagined that 
a natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is 
to strengthen the testimony of our senses by 
a priori reasoning, and to convince us that a 
stone when thrown will fall to the ground, and 
that gunpowder will explode when fired ; be- 
cause they show that according to their prin- 
ciples those phenomena must take place as 
they do. But it would be reckoned a mark 
of the grossest ignorance and stupidity not to 
be aware that their object is not to prove the 
existence of an individual phenomenon, which 
our eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is) 
to account for it : i. e. to show according to 
what principle it takes place ; — to refer, in 
short, the individual case to a general law of 
nature. The object of Aristotle's dictum is 
precisely analogous : he had, doubtless, no 
thought of adding to the force of any indi- 
vidual syllogism ; his design was to point out 
the general principle on which that process is 
conducted which takes place in each syllogism. 



ctum.a 
statement of 



§4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 35 

And as the Laws * of nature (as they are called) 
are in reality merely generalized facts, of 
which all the phenomena coming under them 
are particular instances ; so, the proof drawn 
from Aristotle's dictum is not a distinct 
demonstration brought to confirm another 
demonstration, but is merely a generalized 
and abstract statement of all demonstration 
whatever ; and is, therefore, in fact, the very 
demonstration which, (mutatis mutandis) ac- 
commodated to the various subject-matters, is 
actually employed in each particular case. 

In order to trace more distinctly the different The d 

' staten 

steps of the abstracting process, by which any Jf™J a j 
particular argument may be brought into the 
most general form, we may first take a syllogism 
stated accurately and at full length, such as the 
example formerly given, " whatever exhibits 
marks of design, $fc." and then somewhat- 
generalize the expression, by substituting (as 
in Algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for 
the significant terms that were originally used ; 
the syllogism will then stand thus ; " every 
B is A ; C is B ; therefore C is A." The rea- 
soning is no less evidently valid when thus 
stated, whatever terms A, B, and C, respectively 
may be supposed to stand for ; such terms may 
indeed be inserted as to make all or some of 



* Appendix, No. I. art. Law., 
D 2 



36 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

the assertions false ; but it will still be no less 
impossible for any one who admits the truth of 
the premises, in an argument thus constructed, 
to deny the conclusion ; and this it is that 
constitutes the conclusiveness of an argument. 

Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, 
it appears clearly, that "A stands for any thing 
whatever that is affirmed of a whole class," 
(viz, of every B) " which class comprehends or 
contains in it something else" viz, C (of which 
B is, in the second premiss, affirmed) ; and 
that, consequently, the first term (A) is, in the 
conclusion, predicated of the third C. 

Now to assert the validity of this process, 
now before us, is to state the very dictum 
we are treating of, with hardly even a verbal 
alteration ; viz. : 

1. Anything whatever, predicated of a whole 
class, 

2. Under which class something else is con- 
tained, 

3. May be predicated of that which is so 
contained. 

The three members into which the maxim 
is here distributed, correspond to the three 
propositions of the syllogism to which they are 
intended respectively to apply. 

The advantage of substituting for the terms, 
in a regular syllogism, arbitrary unmeaning 
symbols, such as letters of the alphabet, is 



§4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 37 

much the same as in geometry : the reasoning 
itself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and 
without any risk of our being misled by the 
truth or falsity of the conclusion ; which is, in 
fact, accidental and variable ; the essential point 
being, as far as the argument is concerned, the 
connexion between the premises and the con- 
clusion. We are thus enabled to embrace the 
general principle of all reasoning, and to per- 
ceive its applicability to an indefinite number 
of individual cases. That Aristotle, therefore, 
should have been accused of making use of 
these symbols for the purpose of darkening his 
demonstrations, and that too by persons not 
unacquainted with geometry and algebra, is 
truly astonishing. If a geometer, instead of 
designating the four angles of a square by four 
letters, were to call them north, south, east, and 
west, he would not render the demonstration of 
a theorem the easier ; and the learner would 
be much more likely to be perplexed in the 
application of it. 

It belongs then exclusively to a syllogism, 
properly so called (£. e. a valid argument, so 
stated that its conclusiveness is evident from 
the mere form of the expression), that if letters, 
or any other unmeaning symbols, be substi- 
tuted for the several terms, the validity of the 
argument shall still be evident. Whenever 
this is not the case, the supposed argument is 



Detection of 

unsound ai- 



88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

either unsound and sophistical, or else may be 
reduced (without any alteration of its meaning) 
into the syllogistic form ; in which form, the 
test just mentioned may be applied to it. 

What is called an unsound or fallacious 
argument, L e. an apparent argument, which is, 
in reality, none, cannot, of course, be reduced 
into this form ; but when stated in the form 
most nearly approaching to this that is possible, 
its fallaciousness becomes more evident, from 
its nonconformity to the foregoing rule : e. g. 
" whoever is capable of deliberate crime is re- 
sponsible ; an infant is not capable of deliberate 
crime ; therefore, an infant is not responsible," 
(see § 3) : here the term " responsible " is 
affirmed universally of " those capable of deli- 
berate crime ;" it might, therefore, according 
to Aristotle's dictum, have been affirmed of 
anything contained under that class ; but, in 
the instance before us, nothing is mentioned 
as contained under that class ; only, the term 
" infant " is excluded from that class ; and 
though what is affirmed of a whole class may 
be affirmed of anything that is contained under 
it, there is no ground for supposing that it may 
be denied of whatever is not so contained ; for 
it is evidently possible that it may be applicable 
to a whole class and to something else besides : 
to say, e. g. that all trees are vegetables, does 
not imply that nothing else is a vegetable. 



§5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 39 

Nor, when it is said, that all who are capable 
of deliberate crime are responsible, does this 
imply, that no others are responsible ; for 
though this may be very true, it has not been 
asserted in the premiss before us ; and in the 
analysis of an argument, we are to discard all 
consideration of what might be asserted ; con- 
templating only what actually is laid down in 
the premises. It is evident, therefore, that such 
an apparent argument as the above does not 
comply with the rule laid down, nor can be so 
stated as to comply with it, and is consequently 
invalid. 

Again, in this instance, " food is necessary to 
life ; corn is food ; therefore, corn is necessary 
to life :" the term " necessary to life" is affirmed 
of food, but not universally; for it is not said of 
every kind of food : the meaning of the assertion 
being manifestly that some food is necessary to 
life : here again, therefore, the rule has not 
been complied with, since that which has been 
predicated, (i. e. affirmed or denied) not of the 
whole, but of a part only of a certain class, 
cannot be, on that ground, predicated of any 
thing whatever which is contained under that 
class. 

§5. 

The fallacy in this last case is, what is usually 
described in logical language as consisting in 



40 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

the " non-distribution of the middle term :" i. e. 
its not being employed to denote all the objects 
to which it is applicable. In order to under- 
stand this phrase, it is necessary to observe, that 
a proposition being an expression in which one 
thing is affirmed or denied of another ; e.g. "A 
is B," both that of which something is said, and 
that which, is said of it (i. e. both A and B), 
are called fi terms," from their being (in their 
nature) the extremes or boundaries of the pro- 
position ; and there are, of course, two, and but 
two, terms in a proposition (though it may so 
happen that either of them may consist either of 
one word, or of several) ; and a term is said to 
Distribution be " distributed," when it is taken universally, 
so as to stand for every thing it is capable of 
being applied to ; and consequently " undis- 
tributed," when it stands for a portion only of 
the things signified by it : thus, " all food," or 
every kind of food, are expressions which imply 
the distribution of the term " food ;" " some 
food " would imply its non-distribution : and it 
is also to be observed, that the term of which, 
in one premiss, something is affirmed or denied, 
and to which, in the other premiss, something 
else is referred as contained in it, is called the 
" middle " term in the syllogism, as standing 
between the other two (viz. the two terms of 
the conclusion), and being the medium of proof. 
Now it is plain, that if in each premiss a part 



of terms. 



§5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 41 

only of this middle term is employed, i.e. if it 
be not at all distributed, no conclusion can be 
drawn. Hence, if, in the example formerly 
adduced, it had been merely stated that 
"something" (not " whatever" or " everything") 
" which exhibits marks of design, is the work 
of an intelligent author," it would not have 
followed, from the world's exhibiting marks of 
design, that that is the work of an intelligent 
author. 

It is to be observed, also, that the words 
" all " and " every," which mark the distri- 
bution of a term, and " some," which marks 
its non-distribution, are not always expressed : 
they are frequently understood, and left to be 
supplied by the context; e.g. "food is neces- 
sary ;" viz. " some food ;" " man is mortal ;" viz. 
" every man." Propositions thus expressed are 
called by logicians "indefinite" because it is 
left undetermined by the form of the expres- 
sion whether the " subject" (the term of which 
something is affirmed or denied being called 
the "subject" of the proposition, and that which 
is said of it, the " predicate ") be distributed 
or not. Nevertheless it is plain that in every 
proposition the subject either is, or is not, 
distributed, though it be not declared whether 
it is or not; consequently, every proposition, 
whether expressed indefinitely or not, must 
be either "universal" or "particular;" those 



42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

being called universal, in which the predicate 
is said of the whole of the subject (or, in 
other words, where the subject is distributed) ; 
and those particular, in which it is said only 
of a part of the subject: e.g. "All men are 
sinful," is universal ; " some men are sinful," 
particular : and this division of propositions is, 
in logical language, said to be according to 
their u quantity." 
Quantity and But the distribution or non-distribution of the 

quality of 

proportions. p re( n ca ^ e { s entirely independent of the quantity 
of the proposition ; nor are the signs " all " and 
"some" ever affixed to the predicate; because 
its distribution depends upon, and is indicated 
by, the " quality " of the proposition ; i. e. its 
being affirmative or negative; it being a uni- 
versal rule, that the predicate of a negative 
proposition is distributed, and of an affirmative, 
undistributed.* The reason of this may easily 
be understood, by considering that a term which 
stands for a whole class may be applied to (i. e. 

* The learner may perhaps be startled at being told 
that the predicate of an affirmative is never distributed ; 
especially as Aldrich has admitted that accidentally this 
may take place; as in such a proposition as " all equilateral 
triangles are equiangular ;" but this is not accurate : he 
might have said that in such a proposition as the above 
the predicate is distributable, but not that it is actually dis- 
tributed : i. e. it so happens that "all equiangular triangles 
are equilateral ;" but this is not implied in the previous 
assertion ; and the point to be considered is, not what 
might be said with truth, but what actually has been said. 



§5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 43 

affirmed of) anything that is comprehended 
under that class, though the term of which it is 
thus affirmed may be of much narrower extent 
than that other, and may, therefore, be far from 
coinciding with the whole of it : thus it may be 
said with truth, that " the Negroes are uncivi- 
lized," though the term uncivilized be of much 
wider extent than " Negroes," comprehending, 
besides them, Hottentots, Sfc; so that it would 
not be allowable to assert, that " all who are 
uncivilized are Negroes ;" it is evident, there- 
fore, that it is a part only of the term " uncivi- 
lized " that has been affirmed of " Negroes :" 
and the same reasoning applies to every af- 
firmative proposition ; for though it may so 
happen that the subject and predicate coincide, 
i. e. are of equal extent, as, e. g. " all men are 
rational animals ; " " all equilateral triangles 
are equiangular ; " (it being equally true, that 
" all rational animals are men," and that " all 
equiangular triangles are equilateral;") yet this 
is not implied by the form of the expression ; 
since it would be no less true, that " all men 
are rational animals," even if there were other 
rational animals besides man. 

It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the 
predicate is applicable to the subject, it may 
be affirmed, and, of course, cannot be denied, 
of that subject ; and consequently, when the 
predicate is denied of the subject, it is implied 



44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

that no part of that predicate is applicable to 
that subject; i. e. that the whole of the predicate 
is denied of the subject : for to say, e. g. that 
ff no beasts of prey ruminate/' implies that 
beasts of prey are excluded from the whole 
class of ruminant animals, and consequently 
that "no ruminant animals are beasts of prey." 
And hence results the above-mentioned rule, 
that the distribution of the predicate is implied 
in negative propositions, and its non-distribu- 
tion in affirmatives. 
Disuit^tfon It is to be remembered, therefore, that it is 

of middle ' * 

terms. nQ ^ su ffi c i en t f or the middle term to occur in a 
universal proposition ; since if that proposition 
be an affirmative, and the middle term be the 
'predicate of it, it will not be distributed : e. g. 
if in the example formerly given, it had been 
merely asserted, that " all the works of an 
intelligent author show marks of design," and 
that " the universe shows marks of design," 
nothing could have been proved ; since, though 
both these propositions are universal, the 
middle term is made the predicate in each, 
and both are affirmative ; and accordingly, the 
rule of Aristotle is not here complied with, 
since the term " work of an intelligent author," 
which is to be proved applicable to "the" 
universe," would not have been affirmed of the 
middle term (" what shows marks of design ") 
under which " universe" is contained ; but the 



§ 5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 45 

middle term, on the contrary, would have been 
affirmed of it. 

If, however, one of the premises be nega- 
tive, the middle term may then be made the 
predicate of that, and will thus, according to 
the above remark, be distributed : e. g. " no 
ruminant animals are predacious ; the lion is 
predacious ; therefore the lion is not rumi- 
nant :" this is a valid syllogism ; and the middle 
term (predacious) is distributed by being made 
the predicate of a negative proposition. The 
form, indeed, of the syllogism is not that pre- 
scribed by the dictum of Aristotle, but it may 
easily be reduced to that form, by stating the 
first proposition thus : " no predacious animals 
are ruminant ;" which is manifestly implied (as 
was above remarked) in the assertion that "no 
ruminant animals are predacious." The syllo- 
gism will thus appear in the form to which the 
dictum applies. 

It is not every argument, indeed, that can be 
reduced to this form by so short and simple an 
alteration as in the case before us : a longer and 
more complex process will often be required ; 
and rules will hereafter be laid down to faci- 
litate this process in certain cases : but there is 
no sound argument but what can be reduced 
into this form, without at all departing from 
the real meaning and drift of it; and the form 
will be found (though more prolix than is 



46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous 
in which an argument can be exhibited. 

All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the 
one simple principle laid down by Aristotle, 
that " what is predicated, either affirmatively 
or negatively, of a term distributed, may be 
predicated in like manner (i. e. affirmatively or 
negatively) of any thing contained under that 
term." So that when our object is to prove any 
proposition, L e. to show that one term may 
rightly be affirmed or denied of another, the 
process which really takes place in our minds 
is, that we refer that term (of which the other 
is to be thus predicated) to some class (i. e. 
middle term) of which that other may be 
affirmed, or denied, as the case may be. What- 
ever the subject matter of an argument may 
be, the reasoning itself, considered by itself, is 
in every case the same process ; and if the 
writers against Logic had kept this in mind, 
they would have been cautious of expressing 
their contempt of what they call " syllogistic 
reasoning," which is in truth all reasoning; 
and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's principle 
for its obviousness and simplicity, would have 
perceived that these are, in fact, its highest 
praise : the easiest, shortest, and most evident 
theory, provided it answer the purpose of ex- 
planation, being ever the best. 



§ G.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 47 

§6. 

If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, 
in his investigation of the theory of reasoning, 
the point to which we have now arrived, a 
question which would be likely next to engage 
his attention, is that of Predication ; i. e. since 
in reasoning we are to find a middle term, which 
may be predicated affirmatively of the subject in 
question, we are led to inquire what terms may 
be affirmed, and what denied, of what others. 

It is evident that proper names, or any other common an <i 
terms, which denote each but a single indivi- terms ' 
dual, as " Caesar," " the Thames," "the Con- 
queror of Pompey," " this river " (hence called 
in Logic " singular terms ") cannot be affirmed 
of anything besides themselves, and are there- 
fore to be denied of any thing else ; we may say, 
" this river is the Thames," or " Caesar was the 
conqueror of Pompey ;" but we cannot say of 
anything else that it is the Thames, fyc. 

On the other hand, those terms which are 
called " common," as denoting any one indivi- 
dual of a whole class, as " river," u conqueror," 
may of course be affirmed of any, or all that 
belong to that class : as, " the Thames is a 
river ;" " the Rhine and the Danube are rivers." 

Common terms, therefore, are called " pre- 
dicates" (viz. affirmatively predicable), from 
their capability of being affirmed of others : a 
singular term, on the contrary, may be the 



48 .ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

Subject of a proposition,, but never the Predi- 
cate, unless it be of a negative proposition ; (as, 
e. g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob ;) or, 
unless the subject and predicate be only two 
expressions for the same individual object ; as 
in some of the above instances. 
Abstraction The process by which the mind arrives at the 

and generali* 

zaiion. notions expressed by these " common " (or in 
popular language, "general") terms, is properly 
called Generalization ; though it is usually (and 
truly) said to be the business of abstraction ; for 
Generalization is one of the purposes to which 
Abstraction is applied : when we draw off, and 
contemplate separately, any part of an object 
presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of 
it, we are said to abstract that part. Thus, a 
person might, when a rose was before his eyes 
or mind, make the scent a distinct object of 
attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, 
form, Spc. ; and thus, even though it were the 
only rose he had ever met with, he would be 
employing the faculty of Abstraction ; but if, in 
contemplating several objects, and finding that 
they agree in certain points, we abstract the 
circumstances of agreement, disregarding the 
. differences, and give to all and each of these 
objects a name applicable to them in respect 
of this agreement, i. e. a common name, as 
" rose," we are then said to generalize. Ab- 
straction, therefore, does not necessarily imply 



§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 49 

Generalization, though Generalization implies 
Abstraction. 

Much needless difficulty has been raised 
respecting the results of this process ; many 
having contended, and perhaps more having 
taken for granted, that there must be some 
really existing thing* corresponding to each of 
those general or common terms, and of which 
such term is the name, standing for and repre- 
senting it ; e. g. that as there is a really exist- 
ing Being corresponding to the proper name, 
" yEtna," and signified by it, so the common 
term " mountain," must have some one really 
existing thing corresponding to it, and of course 
distinct from each individual mountain (since 
the term is not singular but common), yet 
existing in each, since the term is applicable to 
each of them. " When many different men," 
it is said, " are at the same time thinking or 
speaking about a mountain, i. e. not any par- 
ticular one, but a mountain generally, their 
minds must be all employed on something; 
which must also be one thing, and not several, 
and yet cannot be any one individual : " and 
hence a vast train of mystical disquisitions 
about Ideas, fyc. has arisen, which are at best 
nugatory, and tend to obscure our view of the 
process which actually takes place in the mind. 

* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 
E 



Notions ex- 
pressed by 
common 
terms. 



50 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

The fact is, the notion expressed by a com- 
mon term is merely an inadequate (or incom- 
plete) notion of an individual ; and from the 
very circumstance of its inadequacy, it will 
apply equally well to any one of several in- 
dividuals : e. g. if I omit the mention and the 
consideration of every circumstance which dis- 
tinguishes JEtna from any other mountain, I 
then form a notion (expressed by the common 
term mountain) which inadequately designates 
iEtna (?'. e. which does not imply any of its 
peculiarities), and is equally applicable to any 
one of several other individuals. 

Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinite- 
ly extended by a further abstraction applied to 
common terms : e. g. as by abstraction from 
the term Socrates we obtain the common term 
" Philosopher ; " so, from " philosopher," by a 
similar process, we arrive at the more general 
term " man ;" from " man " we advance to 
" animal," tyc. 

The employment of this faculty at pleasure 
has been regarded, and perhaps with good 
reason, as the characteristic distinction of the 
human mind from that of the Brutes. We are 
thus enabled not only to separate, and consider 
singly one part of an object presented to the 
mind, but also to fix arbitrarily upon whatever 
part we please, according as may suit the pur- 
pose we happen to have in view ; e. g. any 



§6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 51 

individual person to whom we may direct our 
attention, may be considered either in a politi- 
cal point of view, and accordingly referred to 
the class of Merchant, Farmer, Lawyer, fyc. as 
the case may be ; or physiologically, as Negro, 
or White-man ; or theologically, as Pagan or 
Christian, Papist or Protestant; or geographi- 
cally, as European, American, fyc. fyc. And 
so, in respect of anything else that may be 
the subject of our reasoning: we arbitrarily fix 
upon and abstract that point which is essential 
to the purpose in hand; so that the same object Different »b- 

stractions 

may be referred to various different classes, £™ Jjj^ 
according to the occasion. Not, of course, 
that we are allowed to refer anything to a 
class to which it does not really belong; which 
would be pretending to abstract from it some- 
thing that was no part of it ; but that we arbi- 
trarily fix on any part of it which we choose 
to abstract from the rest. 

It is important to notice this, because men 
are often disposed to consider each object as 
really and properly belonging to some one class 
alone,* from their having been accustomed, in 
the course of their own pursuits, to consider, 
in one point of view only, things which may 
with equal propriety be considered in other 
points of view also : L e. referred to various 

* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 

e2 



modes of clas- 
sification 



52 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

Classes, (or predicates.) And this is that which 
chiefly constitutes what is called narrowness-of- 
mind : e.g. a mere hotanist might be astonished 
at hearing such plants as Clover and Lucerne 
included, in the language of a farmer, under 
the term " grasses," which he has been accus- 
tomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely, 
different in all botanical characteristics ; and 
the mere farmer might be no less surprised to 
Different find the troublesome " weed," (as he has been 
accustomed to call it,) known by the name of 
Couch-grass, and which he has been used to 
class with nettles and thistles, to which it has 
no botanical affinity, ranked by the botanist as 
a species of Wheat, {Triticum Repens.) And 
yet neither of these classifications is in itself 
erroneous or irrational ; though it would be 
absurd, in a botanical treatise, to class plants 
according to their agricultural use ; or, in an 
agricultural treatise, according to the structure 
of their flowers. 

The utility of these considerations, with a 
view to the present subject, will be readily 
estimated, by recurring to the account which 
has been already given of the process of rea- 
soning ; the analysis of which shows, that it 
consists in referring the term we are speaking 
of to some class, viz. a middle term; which term 
again is referred to or excluded from (as the 
case may be) another class, viz. the term which 



§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 53 

we wish to affirm or deny of the subject of the 
conclusion. So that the quality of our reason- 
ing in any case must depend on our being 
able correctly, clearly and promptly, to ab- 
stract from the subject in question that which 
may furnish a Middle-term suitable to the 
occasion. 

The imperfect and irregular sketch which 
has here been attempted, of the logical system, 
may suffice (even though some parts of it should 
not be at once fully understood by those who 
are entirely strangers to the study) to point out 
the general drift and purpose of the science, 
and to render the details of it both more inte- 
resting and more intelligible. The analytical 
form, which has here been adopted, is, gene- 
rally speaking, better suited for introducing 
any science in the plainest and most interesting 
form ; though the synthetical, which will hence- 
forth be employed, is the more regular, and 
the more compendious form for storing it up 
in the memory. 



54 [Book II. 



BOOK II. 
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind and 
of Terms. 

operations of There are three operations of the mind 

the mind. L 

which are immediately concerned in argument ; 
1st. Simple Apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 
3d. Discourse or Reasoning.* 
s.mpie-ap. 1st. Simple-apprehension is the notion (or 

prehension, , . , x . 

conception) of any object m the mmd, analo- 
gous to the perception of the senses. It is 
either Incomplex or Complex : Incomplex 
Apprehension is of one object, or of several 
without any relation being perceived between 

* Logical writers have in general begun by laying down 
that there are, in all, three operations of the mind : (in 
universum tres) an assertion by no means incontrovertible, 
and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose ; 
our business is with argumentation, and the operations of 
the mind implied in that ; what others there may be, or 
whether any, are irrelevant questions. 

The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting 
the operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the 
prevailing error (from which probably the minds of the 
writers were not exempt) of supposing that Logic pro- 
fesses to teach " the use of the mental faculties in general ;" 
— the "right use of reason," according to Watts. 



Chap. I. §2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 55 

them, as of e( a man/' " a horse/' " cards :" com- 
plex is of several with such a relation, as of 
" a man on horseback/' " a pack of cards." 

2d. Judgment is the comparing together in judgment. 
the mind two of the notions (or ideas) which 
are the objects of Apprehension, whether com- 
plex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they 
agree or disagree with each other : (or that 
one of them belongs or does not belong, to the 
other.) Judgment, therefore, is either affirma- 
tive or negative. 

3d. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of Discos 
proceeding from one judgment, to another 
founded upon that one, (or the result of it.) 

§2. 
Language affords the signs by which these Language. 
operations of the mind are expressed and com- 
municated. An act of apprehension expressed 
in language, is called a term; an act of judg- 
ment, a proposition ; an act of reasoning, an 
argument; (which, when regularly expressed 
is a syllogism ;) as e. g. 

" Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial ; 
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, 
Therefore they are beneficial :" 

is a Syllogism ; (the act of reasoning being 
indicated by the word " therefore") it consists 
of three propositions, each of which has 



56 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II. 

(necessarily) two terms, as " beneficial," " dis- 
pensations of Providence," fyc* 
T er m3 . Language is employed for various purposes : 

Propositions. . _ 1 . . . 

syllogisms, e.g. the province ot an historian is to convey 
information; of an orator, to persuade, Spc. 
Logic is concerned with it only when employed 
for the purpose of reasoning, (i. e. in order to 
convince ;) and whereas, in reasoning, terms are 
liable to be indistinct, (i. e. without any clear, 
determinate meaning,) propositions to he false, 
and arguments inconclusive, Logic undertakes 
directly and completely to guard against this 
last defect, and, incidentally and in a certain 
degree against the others, as far as can be done 
by the proper use of language : it is, therefore, 
(when regarded as an artj- ) " the Art of 

* In introducing the mention of language previously to 
the definition of Logic, I have departed from established 
practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that 
Logic is entirely conversant about language : a truth which 
most writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully 
aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care 
to impress on their readers. Aldrich's definition of Logic, 
for instance, does not give any hint of this. 

•f It is to be observed, however, that as a science is con- 
versant about knowledge only, an art is the application of 
knowledge to practice : hence Logic (as well as any other 
system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice, 
an art ; while confined to the theory of reasoning, it is 
strictly a science : and it is as such that it occupies the 
higher place in point of dignity, since it professes to de- 
velop some of the most interesting and curious intellectual 
phenomena. It is surely strange, therefore, to find in a 



Chap. I. §2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 57 

employing language properly for the purpose 
of Reasoning." Its importance no one can 
rightly estimate who has not long and atten- 
tively considered how much our thoughts are 
influenced by expressions, and how much error, 
perplexity, and labour, are occasioned by a 
faulty use of language. 

A syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable 
into three propositions, and each proposition 
containing two terms ; of these terms, that 
which is spoken of is called the subject ; that 
which is said of it, the predicate; and these two 
are called the terms (or extremes) because, 
logically, the Subject is placed first, and the 
Predicate last: and, in the middle, the Copula, 
which indicates the act of judgment, as by it 
the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Sub- 
ject. The Copula must be either is or is not, 
the substantive verb being the only verb recog- 
nised by Logic : all others are resolvable, by 
means of the verb, "to be," and a participle or 
adjective : e.g. "the Romans conquered :" the 
word conquered is both copula and predicate, 
being equivalent to " were (Cop.) victorious' 9 
(Pred.)* 

treatise on Logic, a distinct dissertation to prove that it is 
an Art, and not a Science ! 

* It is proper to observe, that the copula, as such, lias 
no relation to time; but expresses merely the agreement 
or disagreement of two given terms : hence, if any other 
tense of the substantive verb, besides the present, is used, 



58 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

§3. 

It is evident, that a Term may consist either 
of one Word or of several ; and that it is not 

categore- every word that is categorematic, i. e. capable 
of being employed by itself as a Term. Ad- 
verbs, Prepositions, Sfc. and also Nouns in any 

syncategore- other case besides the nominative, are syncate- 

matic. u 

gorematic, i. e. can only form part of a term. 
A nominative Noun may be by itself a term. 
A Verb (all except the substantive verb used 
Mixed. as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable 
into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is 
equivalent; and, indeed, is often so resolved in 
the mere rendering out of one language into 
another ; as " ipse adest" " he is present." It 
is to be observed, however, that under "verb," 
we do not include the Infinitive, which is pro- 
perly a Noun-substantive, nor the Participle, 
which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals ; 
being related to their respective verbs in re- 
spect of the things they signify : but not verbs, 
inasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode 

it is either to be understood as the same in sense, (the dif- 
ference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical 
convenience only ;) or else, if the circumstance of time 
really do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as 
to make the use of that tense an essential, then, this 
circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the 
terms : " at that time" or some such expression, being 
understood. Sometimes the substantive verb is both 
copula and predicate ; i. e. where existence only is predi- 
cated : e. g. Deus est. 



Chap. I. §3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 59 

of signification. It is worth observing, that an 
Infinitive (though it often comes last in the 
sentence) is never the predicate, except when 
another Infinitive is the Subject: e.g. 

subj. pred. 

/ \ > f \ 

"I hope to succeed :" i. e. " to succeed is what I hope." 

It is to be observed, also, that in English 
there are two infinitives; one in " i?ig"* the 
same in sound and spelling as the participle 
present, from which, however, it should be 
carefully distinguished; e.g. "rising early is 
healthful," and " it is healthful to rise early," 
are equivalent. In this, and in many other 
cases, the English word IT serves as a represen- 
tative of the subject when that is put last : e.g. 

pred. subj. 

" It is to be hoped that we shall succeed." 

An adjective (including participles) cannot, 
by itself, be made the subject of a proposition ; 
but is often employed as a predicate : as 
" Crassus was rich ;" though some choose to 



* Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity 
by speaking of the participle in " ing," being employed so 
and so ; when it is manifest that that very employment 
of the word constitutes it, to all intents and purposes, an 
infinitive and not a participle. The advantage of the 
infinitive in ing, is, that it may be used either in the 
nominative or in any oblique case ; not, as some suppose 
that it necessarily implies a habit ; e. g. " Seeing is 
believing :" " there is glory in dying for one's country :" 
" a habit of observing," fyc. 



60 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

consider some substantive as understood in 
every such case, {e.g. rich man) and conse- 
quently do not reckon adjectives among Simple 
terms ; (i. e. words which are capable, singly, 
of being employed as terms.) This, however, 
is a question of no practical consequence ; but 
I have thought it best to adhere to Aristotle's 
mode of statement. ( See his Categ.) 
simple- Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the 

terms. 

first part of Logic treats of) there are many 
divisions ; of which, however, one will be suffi- 
cient for the present purpose ; viz. into singular 
and common; because, though any term what- 
ever may be a subject, none but a common term 
can be affirmatively predicated of several others. 
si„gniar A singular term stands for one individual, as 

and common 

terms. « Caesar," "the Thames " (these, it is plain, 
cannot be said [or predicated] affirmatively, of 
any thing but themselves.) A common term 
stands for several individuals, (which are called 
its significates) : i. e. can be applied to any of 
them, as comprehending them in its single 
signification; as "man," "river," "great." 

The learner who has gone through the 
Analytical Outline, will now be enabled to pro- 
ceed to the Second and Third Chapters either 
with or without the study of the remainder of 
what is usually placed in the First Chapter, 
and which is subjoined as a Supplement. See 
Chap. v. 






Chap. II. §1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 61 

Chap. II. — Of Propositions. 

§ i- 

The second part of Logic treats of the pro- 
position ; which is, " Judgment expressed in 
words" 

A Proposition is defined logically* "a sentence Definition of 

proposition. 

indicative," i. e. affirming or denying ; (this ex- 
cludes commands and questions.) " Sentence " 
being the genus, and " Indicative" the difference, 
this definition expresses the whole essence ; 
and it relates entirely to the words of a propo- 
sition. With regard to the matter, its property 
is, to be true or false. Hence it must not be 
ambiguous (for that which has more than one 
meaning is in reality several propositions), nor 
imperfect, nor ungrammatical, for such an ex- 
pression has no meaning at all. 

Since the substance, (i. e. genus,*f or material 
part) of a Proposition is, that it is a sentence ; 
and since every sentence (whether it be a pro- Divisions of 

^ x •* propositions. 

position or not) may be expressed either abso- 
lutely, % or under an hypothesis, § on this we 

* See Chap. v. § 6. f Ibid - § 3 - 

% As, "Caesar deserved death;" "did Caesar deserve 

death ?" 

§ As, " if Caesar was a tyrant, what did he deserve ?" 

" Was Caesar a hero or a villain ?" " If Caesar was a 

tyrant, he deserved death ;" " He was either a hero or 

a vijlain." 



62 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC< [Book II. 

found the division* of propositions according 
substance, to their substance ; viz. into categorical and 
. hypothetical. And as genus is said to be pre- 
dicated in quid (what), it is by the members of 
this division that we answer the question, what 
is this proposition ? (qua? est propositio.) An- 
swer, Categorical or Hypothetical. 

Categorical propositions are subdivided into 
pure, which asserts simply or purely, that the 
subject does or does not agree with the predi- 
cate, and modal, which expresses in what mode 
(or manner) it agrees ; e. g. " an intemperate 
man will be sickly ;" " Brutus killed Caesar 5* 
are pure. " An intemperate man will probably 
be sickly ;" " Brutus killed Caesar justly ;" are 
modal. At present we speak only oipure cate- 
gorical propositions. 

It being the differentia^ of a proposition that 
it affirms or denies, and its property to be true 
or false; and Differentia being predicated in 
quale quid, Property in quale, we hence form 
another division of propositions, viz. according 
Quality. to their quality, into Affirmative and Negative, 
(which is the quality of the expression, and 
therefore, in Logic, essential) and into True 
and False (which is the quality of the matter, 
and therefore accidental.} An Affirmative pro- 
position is one whose copula is affirmative, as 
" birds fly ;" " not to advance is to go back ;" 
a Negative proposition is one whose copula is 

* See Chap. v. § 5. f Ibid - § 3 - 



Chap. II. §2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. G3 

negative, as " man is not perfect ; " " no miser 
is happy/' 

Another division* of propositions is accord- Quantity. 
ing to their quantity (or extent :)if the predi- 
cate is said of the whole of the subject, the 
proposition is Universal: if of a part of it 
only, the proposition is Particular (or partial ;) 
e. g. " England is an island ;" " all tyrants 
are miserable ;" " no miser is rich ;" are Uni- 
versal propositions, and their subjects are 
therefore said to be distributed, being under- 
stood to stand, each, for the whole of its Signi- 
ficates : but, " some islands are fertile ; " " all 
tyrants are not assassinated;" are Particular, 
and their subjects, consequently, not distri- 
buted, being taken to stand for a part only of 
their Significates. 

As every proposition must be either Affirma- 
tive or Negative, and must also be either uni- 
versal or particular, we reckon, in all, four 
kinds of pure categorical propositions, (i. e. 
considered as to their quantity and quality 
both;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol 
(used for brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E; 
Particular Affirmative, /; Particular Nega- 
tive, 0. 

§2. 

When the subject of a proposition is a Com- 
mon-term, the universal signs (" all, no, every") 
* See Chap. v. § 5. 



64 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

are used to indicate that it is distributed, (and 
the proposition consequently is universal ;) the 
particular signs ("some, fyc") the contrary; 
should there be no sign at all to the common 
term, the quantity of the proposition (which is 
called an Indefinite proposition) is ascertained 
by the matter ; i.e. the nature of the connexion 
between the extremes : which is either Neces- 
sary, Impossible, or Contingent. In necessary 

indefinites, and in impossible matter, an Indefinite is un- 
derstood as a universal : e. g. " birds have 
wings ;" i. e. all: " birds are not quadrupeds;" 
i. e. none : in contingent matter, (i. e. where 
the terms partly (i. e. sometimes) agree, and 
partly not) an Indefinite is understood as a 
particular ; e. g. " food is necessary to life ;" 
i. e. some food ; " birds sing ;" i. e. some do ; 
" birds are not carnivorous ;" i. e. some are not, 
or, all are not.* 

singular pro- As for singular propositions, (viz. those whose 

positions. ° •*- -*- s 

subject is either a proper name, or a common 
term with a singular sign) they are reckoned as 
Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. iv. § 2.) because 
in them we speak of the whole of the subject ; 
e. g. when we say, " Brutus was a Roman," we 

* It is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so, 
to reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in respect 
of quantity. They must be either universal or particular, 
though it is not declared which. Such a mode of classifi- 
cation resembles that of some grammarians, who, among 
the Genders, enumerate the doubtful gender ! 



Chap. II. § 2.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 65 

mean, the zvhole of Brutus : this is the general 
rule ; but some singular propositions may 
fairly be reckoned particular ; i. e. when some 
qualifying word is inserted, which indicates 
that you are not speaking of the whole of the 
subject ; e. g. " Caesar was not wholly a 
tyrant ;" " this man is occasionally intem- 
perate ;" " non omnis moriar."* 

It is evident, that the subject is distributed 
in every universal proposition, and never in a 
particular; (that being the very difference be- 
tween universal and particular propositions :) 
but the distribution or non-distribution of the 
predicate, depends (not on the quantity, but) 
on the quality, of the proposition ; for, if any 
part of the predicate agrees with the subject, 
it must be affirmed and not denied of the sub- 
ject ; therefore, for an affirmative proposition 
to be true, it is sufficient that some part of the 
predicate agree with the subject ; and (for the 
same reason) for a negative to be true, it is 
necessary that the whole of the predicate 
should disagree with the subject : e. g. it is 

* It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the 
most naturally, accounted Universals ; but it is only by 
viewing them in the other light, that we can regularly 
state the Contradictory to a Singular proposition. Strictly 
speaking, when we regard such propositions as admitting 
of a variation in Quantity, they are not properly considered 
as Singular ; the subject being, e. g. not Ccesar, but the 
parts of his character. 

F 



GG ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

true that "learning is useful," though the 
whole of the term " useful" does not agree 
with the term " learning," (for many things 
are useful besides learning,) but "no vice is 
useful," would be false, if any part of the term 
"useful" agreed with the term "vice;" (i.e. 
if you could find any one useful thing which 
was a vice.) The two practical rules then to 
be observed respecting distribution, are, 

1st. All universal propositions (and no par- 
ticular) distribute the subject. 

2d. All negative (and no affirmative) the 
predicate.* 

* Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is 
difficult to prove a Negative. At first sight this appears 
very obvious, from the circumstance that a Negative has 
one more Term distributed than the corresponding Affir- 
mative. But then, again, a difficulty may be felt in 
accounting for this, inasmuch as any Negative may be 
expressed (as we shall see presently) as an Affirmative, 
and vice versa. The proposition, e.g. that " such a one is 
not in the Town," might be expressed by the use of an 
equivalent term, " he is absent from the Town." 

The fact is, however, that in every case where the ob- 
servation as to the difficulty of proving a Negative holds 
good, it will be found that the proposition in question 
is contrasted with one which has really a terra the less, 
distributed, or a term of less extensive sense. E. G. It 
is easier to prove that a man has proposed wise measures, 
than that he has never proposed an unwise measure. In 
fact, the one would be, to prove that " Some of his mea- 
sures are wise;" the other, that "All his measures are 
wise." And numberless such examples are to be found. 

But it will very often happen that there shall be Nega- 



Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 67 

It may happen indeed, that the whole of the 
predicate in an affirmative may agree with the 
subject ; e. g. it is equally true, that " all men 
are rational animals ;" and " all rational ani- 
mals are men :" but this is merely accidental, 
and is not at all implied in the form of ex- 
pression, which alone is regarded in Logic* 



Of Opposition, 

§3. 

Two propositions are said to be opposed to 
each other, when, having the same subject 
and predicate, they differ, in quantity, or 
quality, or both.f It is evident, that with any 
given subject and predicate, you may state 
four distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and 
O ; any two of which are said to be opposed; 
hence there are four different kinds of opposi- 
tion, viz. 1st. the two universals (A and E) 

tive propositions much more easily established than 
certain Affirmative ones on the same subject. E. G. That 
" The cause of animal-heat is not respiration," has been 
established by experiments ; but what the cause is, 
remains doubtful. See Note to Chap. III. § 5. 

* When, however, a Singular Term is the Predicate, it 
must, of course, be co-extensive with the subject; as 
" Romulus was the founder of Rome." 

f For Opposition of Terms, see Chap. V. 

p 2 



68 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

contraries, are called contraries to each other ; 2d. the 

fies. contra " two particular, (I and O) subcontraries ; 3d. A 

subalterns, and I, or E and O, subalterns ; 4th. A and O, 

contradicto- or E and I, contradictories. 

nes. 

As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of 
any proposition (its quantity and quality being 
known) must depend on the matter of it, we 
must bear in mind, that, " in necessary matter 
all affirmatives are true, and negatives false ; 
in impossible matter, vice versa; in contingent 
matter, all universale false, and particulars 
true ;" (e. g. " all islands (or some islands) 
are surrounded by water," must be true, be- 
cause the matter is necessary : to say, " no 
islands, or some — not, fyc" would have been 
false : again, " some islands are fertile;" " some 
are not fertile," are both true, because it is 
Contingent Matter: put " all" or "no," in- 
stead of " some, 9 ' and the propositions will be 
false.) Hence it will be evident, that Con- 
traries will be both false in Contingent matter, 
but never both true : Subcontraries, both true 
in Contingent matter, but never both false : 
Contradictories, always one true and the other 
false, Sfc. with other observations, which will 
be immediately made on viewing the scheme ; 
in which the four propositions are denoted by 
their symbols, the different kinds of matter by 
the initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity 
of each proposition in each matter, by the 



Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 



69 



letter v. for (verum) true, f. for (falsum) 
false. 



n. v. 

i. f. 
c. f. 



n. v. 
i. f. 

C. V. 




By a careful study of this scheme, bearing 
in mind, and applying the above rule con- 
cerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all 
the maxims relating to opposition ; as that, 
in the Subalterns, the truth of the particular 
(which is called the subaltemate) follows from 
the truth of the universal (subaltemans), and 
the falsity of the universal from the falsity of 
the particular : that Subalterns differ in quan- 
tity alone; Contraries, and also Subcontraries, 
in quality alone ; Contradictories, in both : 
and hence, that if any proposition is known 
to be true, we infer that its Contradictory is 
false ; if false, its Contradictory true, fyc. 



70 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 



Of Conversion. 

§4. 
A proposition is said to be converted when 
its tefrms are transposed ; i. e. when the sub- 
ject is made the, predicate, and the predicate 
the subject : when nothing more is done, this 
is called simple conversion. No conversion is 
employed for any logical purpose, unless it be 
illative;* i. e. when the truth of the Converse is 
implied by the truth of the Exposita, (or pro- 
position given ; ) e. g. 

" No virtuous man is a rebel, therefore 
No rebel is a virtuous man." 

" Some boasters are cowards, therefore 
Some cowards are boasters." 

mauve con- Conversion can then only be illative when 
no term is distributed in the Converse, which 
was not distributed in the Exposita : (for if that 
be done, you will employ a term universally in 
the Converse, which was only used partially 
in the Exposita.) Hence, as E distributes 
both terms, and I, neither, these propositions 
may be illatively converted in the simple 

* The reader must not suppose from the use of the word 
" illative," that this conversion is a process of reasoning : 
it is in fact only stating the same Judgment in another 
form. 



version. 



Chap. II. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71 

manner ; (vide § 2. ) But as A does not dis- 
tribute the predicate, its simple conversion 
would not be illative ; (e. g. from " all birds 
are animals," you cannot infer that "all ani- 
mals are birds/') as there would be a term 
distributed in the converse, which was not, 
before. We must therefore limit its quantity 
from universal to particular, and the Conver- 
sion will be illative : ( e. g. " some animals 
are birds;") this might be fairly named con- 
version by limitation; but is commonly called 
" Conversion per accidens" E may thus be con- c on 
verted also. But in O, whether the quantity 
be changed or not, there will still be a term 
(the predicate of the converse) distributed, 
which was not before : you can therefore only 
convert it illatively, by changing the quality ; 
i. e. considering the negative as attached to 
the predicate instead of to the copida, and thus 
regarding it as I. One of the terms will then 
not be the same as before ; but the proposition 
will be equipollent (i. e. convey the same 
meaning) ; e. g. " some members of the uni- 
versity are not learned :" you may consider 
" not-learned" as the predicate, instead of 
" learned ;" the proposition will then be I, and 
of course may be simply converted, " some 
who are not learned are members of the uni- 
versity." This may be named conversion by 
negation ; or as it is commonly called, by 



version 
per acokicns" 



72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

contra-posu contra-position.* A may also be fairly con- 
verted in this way, e. g. 

" Every poet is a man of genius ; therefore 
He who is not a man of genius is not a poet :" 
(or, " None but a man of genius can be a poet ;" 
or, "a man of genius alone can be a poet.") 

For (since it is the same thing to affirm some 
attribute of the subject, or to deny the absence 
of that attribute) the original proposition is 
precisely equipollent to this, 

subj. pred. 



" No poet is not-a-man-of-genius ;" 

which, being E, may of course be simply 
converted. Thus, in one of these three ways, 
every proposition may be illatively converted : 
viz. E, I, simply ; A, O, by negation; A, E, 
by limitation. 

Note, that as it was remarked that, in some 
affirmatives, the whole of the predicate does 
actually agree with the subject, so, when this 
is the case, and is granted to be so, A may 
be illatively converted, simply ; but this is an 
accidental circumstance. In a just Definition, 
this is always the case ; for there the terms 
being exactly equivalent (or, as they are called, 

* No mention is made by Aldrich of this kind of con- 
version ; but it has been thought advisable to insert it, as 
being in frequent use, and also as being employed in this 
treatise for the direct reduction of Baroko and Bokardo. 



Chap. III. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73 

convertible terms) it is no matter which is 
made the subject, and which the predicate, 
e. g. " a good government is that which has 
the happiness of the governed for its object ;" 
if this be a right definition, it will follow that 
u a government which has the happiness of 
the governed for its object is a good one." 
Most propositions in mathematics are of this 
description : e. g. 

" All equilateral triangles are equiangular ;" and 
11 All equiangular triangles are equilateral." 



Chap. III. — Of Arguments. 

§ i. 

The third operation of the mind, viz. rea- 
soning, (or discourse) expressed in words, is 
argument; and an argument stated at full 
length, and in its regular form, is called a 
syllogism : the third part of Logic therefore 
treats of the syllogism. Every Argument* s y iio g ist 

* I mean, in the strict technical sense ; for in popular 
use the word Argument is often employed to denote the 
latter of these two parts alone: e.g. "This is an Argument 
to prove so and so;" "this conclusion is established by 
the Argument:" i.e. Premises. — See Appendix, No. I. 
art. Argument. 



74 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

consists of two parts; that which is proved; 
and that by means of which it is proved : the 
former is called, before it is proved, the ques- 
tion; when proved, the conclusion (or infer- 
ence ;) that which is used to prove it, if stated 
last (as is often done in common discourse,) is 
called the reason, and is introduced by " be- 
cause" or some other causal conjunction ; 
(e. g. Caesar deserved death, because he was a 
tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death." If the 
conclusion be stated last (which is the strict 
logical form, to which all Reasoning may be 
reduced) then that which is employed to 
prove it is called the premises,* and the Con- 
clusion is then introduced by some illative 
conjunction, as " therefore," e. g. 

" All tyrants deserve death : 
Caesar was a tyrant ; 
therefore he deserved death. "-j- 

* Both the premises together are sometimes called the 
antecedent. 

f It may be observed that the definition here given of 
an argument is in the common treatises of logic laid down 
as the definition of a syllogism ; a word which I have 
confined to a more restricted sense. There cannot evi- 
dently be any argument, whether regularly or irregularly 
expressed, to which the definition given by Aldrich, for 
instance, would not apply ; so that he appears to employ 
" syllogism " as synonymous with "argument." But be- 
sides that it is clearer and more convenient, when we 
have these two words at hand, to employ them in the two 
senses respectively which we want to express, the truth 



Chap. III. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 75 

Since, then, an argument is an expression Definition of 
in which "from something laid down and 
granted as true (i. e. the Premises) something 
else (i. e. the Conclusion) beyond this must be 
admitted to be true, as follozving necessarily (or 
resulting) from the other ; and since Logic is 
wholly concerned in the use of language, it 
follows that a Syllogism (which is an argument 
stated in a regular logical form) must be 
u an argument so expressed, that the con- Definition of 

. . . Syllogism. 

clusiveness of it is manifest from the mere 
force of the expression" i. e. without consider- 
ing the meaning of the terms : e. g. in this 
syllogism, " Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X :" 
the conclusion is inevitable, whatever terms 
X, Y, and Z, respectively are understood to 
stand for. And to this form all legitimate 
arguments may ultimately be brought. 

is, that in so doing I have actually conformed to Aldrich's 
practice : for he generally, if not always, employs the 
term syllogism in the very sense to which I have confined 
it : viz. to denote an argument stated in regular logical 
form ; as, e. g. in a part of his work (omitted in the late 
editions) in which he is objecting to a certain pretended 
syllogism in the work of another writer, he says, " valet 
certe argumentum ; sijllogismus tamen est falsissimus," &c. 
Now (waiving the exception that might be taken at this 
use of "falsissimus" nothing being, strictly, true or false, 
but a proposition) it is plain that he limits the word 
"syllogism" to the sense in which it is here defined, and 
is consequently inconsistent with his own definition of it. 



(Y-) 



76 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 



§2. 

Aristotle's The rule or axiom (commonly called " die- 

dictum. v ^ 

turn de omni et nullo") by which Aristotle 
explains the validity of this argument, is this : 
"whatever is predicated of a term distributed, 
whether affirmatively or negatively, may be pre- 
dicated in like manner of every thing contained 
under it." Thus, in the examples above, X is 
predicated of Y distributed, and Z is contained 
under Y (i. e. is its subject ;) therefore X is 
predicated of Z : so "all tyrants," Sfc. (p. 74.) 
This rule may be ultimately applied to all 
arguments ; (and their validity ultimately rests 
on their conformity thereto) but it cannot be 
directly and immediately applied to all even of 
pure categorical syllogisms ; for the sake of 
brevity, therefore, some other axioms are 
commonly applied in practice, to avoid the 
occasional tediousness of reducing all syllo- 
gisms to that form in which Aristotle's dictum 
is applicable.* 

* Instead of following Aldrich's arrangement, in laying 
down first the canons which apply to all the figures of 
categorical syllogisms, and then going back to the "dic- 
tum of Aristotle " which applies to only one of them, I 
have pursued what appears a simpler and more philo- 
sophical arrangement, and more likely to impress on the 
learner's mind a just view of the science : viz. 1st. to 
give the rule (Aristotle's dictum) which applies to the 



Chap. III. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77 

We will speak first of pure categorical 
syllogisms ; and the axioms or canons by 
which their validity is to be explained : viz. 
first, if two terms agree with one and the same 
third, they agree with each other: secondly, 
if one term agrees and another disagrees with 
one and the same third, these two disagree with 
each other. On the former of these canons 
rests the validity of affirmative conclusions ; 
on the latter, of negative: for no categorical 
syllogism can be faulty which does not violate 
these canons; none correct which does: hence 
on these two canons are built the rules or 
cautions which are to be observed with respect 
to syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether those canons have been strictly ob- 
served or not. 

1st. Every syllogism has three, and only 
three terms: viz. the middle term, and the 
two terms (or extremes, as they are commonly 
called) of the Conclusion or Question. Of 

most clearly and regularly-constructed argument, the 
Syllogism in the first figure, to which all reasoning may 
be reduced; then the canons applicable to all categoricals ; 
then, those belonging to the hypothetical ; and lastly, to 
treat of the Sorites ; which is improperly placed by 
Aldrich before the hypothetical. By this plan the pro- 
vince of strict Logic is extended as far it can be ; every 
kind of argument which is of a syllogistic character, and 
accordingly directly cognizable by the rules of logic, 
being enumerated in natural order. 



78 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

these, 1st, the subject of the conclusion is 
called the minor term; 2d, its predicate, the 
major term ; and 3d, the middle term,, is that 
with which each of them is separately com- 
pared, in order to judge of their agreement 
or disagreement with each other. If there- 
fore there were two middle terms, the ex- 
tremes, (or terms of the conclusion) not being 
both compared to the same, could not be 
conclusively compared to each other. 

2d. Every syllogism has three, and only 
three propositions ; viz. 1st, the major premiss 
(in which the major term is compared with the 
middle:) 2d, the minor premiss (in which the 
minor term is compared with the middle ;) and 
3d, the Conclusion, in which the Minor term 
is compared with the Major. 

3d. Note, that if the middle term is ambi- 
guous, there are in reality two middle terms, in 
sense, though but one in sound. An am- 
biguous middle term is either an equivocal 
term used in different senses in the two pre- 
mises ; (e. g. 

" Light is contrary to darkness ; 
Feathers are light ; therefore 
Feathers are contrary to darkness :") 

or a term not distributed: for as it is then 
used to stand for a part only of its signijicates , 
it may happen that one of the extremes may 



Chap.III.§2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. ~[) 

have been compared with one part of it, and 
the other with another part of it ; e. g. 

" White is a colour, 

Black is a colour ; therefore 

Black is white." Again, 

" Some animals are beasts, 

Some animals are birds ; therefore 

Some birds are beasts." 

The middle term therefore must be distri- 
buted once, at least, in the premises ; (i. e. by 
being the subject of an universal, or predicate 
of a negative, Chap. ii. § 2. p. 63,) and once is 
sufficient ; since if one extreme has been 
compared to a part of the middle term, and 
another to the whole of it, they must have 
been both compared to the same. 

4th. No term must be distributed in the con- 
clusion which was not distributed in one of the 
premises; for that (which is called an illicit 
process, either of the Major or the Minor 
term) would be to employ the whole of a 
term in the Conclusion, when you had em- 
ployed only a part of it in the Premiss ; and 
thus, in reality, to introduce a fourth term : 
e.g. 

" All quadrupeds are animals, 

A bird is not a quadruped ; therefore 

It is not an animal." — Illicit process of the major. 

5th. From negative premises you can infer 
nothing. For in them the Middle is pro- 
nounced to disagree with both extremes; not, 



80 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

to agree with both ; or, to agree with one, and 
disagree with the other; therefore they can- 
not be compared together ; e. g. 

" A fish is not a quadruped;" 

"A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing. 

6th. If one premiss be negative, the conclu- 
sion must be negative ; for in that premiss the 
middle term is pronounced to disagree with 
one of the extremes, and in the other premiss 
(which of course is affirmative by the pre- 
ceding rule) to agree with the other extreme ; 
therefore the extremes disagreeing with each 
other, the conclusion is negative. In the 
same manner it may be shown, that to prove 
a negative conclusion one of the Premises must 
be a negative. 

* By these six rules all Syllogisms are to be 
tried; and from them it will be evident; 1st, 
that nothing can be proved from two particular 
Premises; (for you will then have either the 
middle Term undistributed, or an illicit pro- 
cess : e. g. 

* Aldrich has given twelve rules, which I found might 
more conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can 
be faulty which violates none of these six rules. It is 
much less perplexing to a learner not to lay down as a 
distinct rule, that, e. g. against particular premises ; which 
is properly a result of the foregoing ; since a syllogism 
with two particular premises would offend against either 
R. 3. or R. 4. 



Chap. III. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 81 

" Some animals are sagacious : 
Some beasts are not sagacious : 
Some beasts are not animals.") 

And, for the same reason, 2dly, that if one 
of the Premises be particular, the Conclusion 
must be particular ; e. g. 

" All who fight bravely deserve reward ; 

Some soldiers fight bravely ;" you can only infer that 

" Some soldiers deserve reward :" 

for to infer a universal Conclusion would be 
an illicit process of the minor. But from two 
universal Premises you cannot always infer a 
universal Conclusion ; e. g. 

" All gold is precious, 

All gold is a mineral : therefore 

Some mineral is precious."* 

And even when we can infer a universal, 
we are always at liberty to infer a particular ; 
since what is predicated of all may of course be 
predicated of some. 

Of Moods. 
§3. 
When we designate the three propositions 
of a syllogism in their order, according to 

* Aldrich, by a strange oversight, has so expressed 
himself as to imply (though he could hardly mean it) that 
we always may, if we will, infer a universal conclusion 
from two universal premises. 

G 



82 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

their respective quantity and quality (i. e. their 
symbols) we are said to determine the mood 
of the syllogism ; e. g. the example just above, 
"all gold, fyc" is in the mood A, A, I. As 
there are four kinds of propositions, and three 
propositions in each syllogism, all the possible 
ways of combining these four, (A, E, I, O,) by 
threes, are sixty-four. For any one of these 
four may be the major premiss, each of these 
four majors may have four different minors, 
and of these sixteen pairs of premises, each 
may have four different conclusions. 4x4 
(=16) x 4 = 64. This is a mere arithmetical 
calculation of the moods, without any regard 
to the logical rules : for many of these moods 
are inadmissible in practice, from violating 
some of those rules ; e. g. the mood E, E, E, 
must be rejected as having negative premises ; 
I, O, O, for particular premises; and many 
others for the same faults ; to which must be 
added I, E, O, for an illicit process of the 
major, in every figure. By examination then 
of all, it will be found that, of the sixty-four, 
there remain but eleven moods which can be 
used in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A, 
A, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, O, 
E, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, O, A, O. 



Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 83 

Of Figure, 

§4. 

The Figure of a syllogism consists in the 
situation of the Middle term with respect to 
the Extremes of the Conclusion, (i. e. the major 
and minor term,) When the Middle term is 
made the subject of the major premiss, and the 
predicate of the minor, that is called the first 
Figure ; (which is far the most natural and 
clear of all, as to this alone Aristotle's Dictum 
may be at once applied.) In the second Figure 
the Middle term is the predicate of both pre- 
mises : in the third, the subject of both : in the 
fourth the predicate of the Major premiss, and 
the subject of the Minor, (This is the most 
awkward and unnatural of all, being the very 
reverse of the first.) Note, that the proper 
order is to place the Major premiss ^r^, and 
the Minor second ; but this does not constitute 
the Major and Minor premises ; for that pre- 
miss (wherever placed) is the Major, which 
contains the major term, and the Minor, the 
minor (v. R. 2. p. 78.) Each of the allowable 
moods mentioned above will not be allowable 
in every Figure ; since it may violate some of 
the foregoing rules, in one Figure, though not 
in another : e. g. I, A, I, is an allowable mood 
in the third Figure ; but in the first it would 

o2 



84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

have an undistributed middle.* So A, E, E, 
would in the first Figure have an illicit process 
of the major, but is allowable in the second ; 
and A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allow- 
able, would in the third have an illicit process 
of the minor : all which may be ascertained by 
trying the different Moods in each figure, as 
per scheme. 

Let X represent the major term, Z the 
minor, Y the middle. 



st Fig. 


2d Fig. 


3d Fig. 


4th Fig. 


Y,X, 


X,Y, 


Y, X, 


X, Y, 


Z, Y, 


Z, Y, 


Y, Z, 


Y, Z, 


Z,X, 


z, X, 


Z, X, 


Z, X. 



The Terms alone being here stated, the 
quantity and quality of each Proposition (and 
consequently the Mood of the whole Syllo- 
gism) is left to be filled up : (L e. between 
Y and X, we may place either a negative or 
affirmative Copula : and we may prefix either 
a universal or particular sign to Y.) By apply- 
ing the Moods then to each Figure, it will be 
found that each Figure will admit six Moods 



I A 

* e. g. Some restraint is salutary : all restraint is un- 

i — i 

pleasant : something unpleasant is salutary. Again : Some 

I A 

herbs are fit for food : nightshade is an herb : some 

I 
nightshade is fit for food. 



Chap. III. §4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 85 

only, as not violating the rules against undis- 
tributed middle, and against illicit process : and 
of the Moods so admitted, several (though 
valid) are useless, as having a particular Con- 
clusion, when a universal might have been 
drawn ; e. g. A, A, I, in the first Figure, 

"All human creatures are entitled to liberty; 
All slaves are human creatures ; therefore 
Some slaves are entitled to liberty." 

Of the twenty-four Moods, then, (six in 
each Figure) five are for this reason neg- 
lected : ,for the remaining nineteen, logicians 
have devised names to distinguish both the 
Mood itself, and the Figure in which it is 
found ; since when one Mood (i. e. one in 
itself, without regard to Figure) occurs in 
two different Figures, (as E, A, E, in the 
first and second) the mere letters denoting 
the mood would not inform us concerning 
the figure. In these names, then, the three 
vowels denote the propositions of which the 
Syllogism is composed : the consonants (be- 
sides their other uses, of which hereafter) 
serve to keep in mind the Figure of the 
Syllogism. 

Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque prio- 
n's. 

Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstlnO, bArOkO,* 
secundse. 

* Or, Fakoro, see § 7. 



86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

C tertia, dArAptl, dlsAmls, dAtlsI, f ElAptOn, 
Fig. 3. < bOkArdO,* f ErlsO, habet : quarta insuper 

( addit. 
Fig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dlmArls, f EsAp</, 
frEsIsOn. 

By a careful study of these mnemonic lines 
(which must be committed to memory) you 
will perceive that A can only be proved in 
the first Figure, in which also every other 
Proposition may be proved; that the second 
proves only negatives; the third only parti- 
culars; that the first Figure requires the 
major premiss to be universal, and the minor, 
affirmative, fyc; with many other such ob- 
servations, which will readily be made, (on 
trial of several Syllogisms, in different Moods) 
and the reasons for which will be found in 
the foregoing rules : e. g. to show why the 
second figure has only negative Conclusions, 
we have only to consider, that in it the mid- 
dle term being the predicate in both premises, 
would not be distributed unless one premiss 
were negative; (Chap. ii. § 2.) therefore the 
Conclusion must be negative also, by Chap, 
in. § 2, Rule 6. One Mood in each figure 
may suffice in this place by way of example : 

First, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) " Every Y is X ; 
(bA) every Z is Y; therefore (rA) every Z 
is X : " e. g. let the major term (which is 

* Or, Dokamo, see § 7. 



Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 87 

represented by X) be " one who possesses all 
virtue ;" the minor term (Z) " every man who 
possesses one virtue ;" and the middle term 
(Y) " every one who possesses prudence ;" 
and you will have the celebrated argument of 
Aristotle, Eth. sixth book, to prove that the 
virtues are inseparable ; viz. 

" He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue ; 
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence ; 

therefore 
He who possesses one, possesses all." 

Second, Camestres, (cAm) " every X is Y ; 
(Es) no Z is Y ; (trES) no Z is X." Let the 
major term (X) be " true philosophers," the 
minor (Z) " the Epicureans ;" the middle (Y) 
"reckoning virtue a good in itself;" and this 
will be part of the reasoning of Cicero, Off. 
book first and third, against the Epicureans. 

Third, Darapti, viz. {dA) " every Y is X ; 
(rAp) every Y is Z ; therefore (tl) Some Z is 
X :" *. g. ' 

* Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals ; 
but prudence is a virtue : therefore some virtue has for 
its object the benefit of the individual," 

is part of Adam Smith's reasoning {Moral 
Sentiments) against Hutcheson and others, 
who placed all virtue in benevolence. 

Fourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) " every X is Y; 
(En) no Y is Z ; therefore (Es) no Z is X :" 
e. g. 



88 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

" Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature ; 
Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to 

society ; therefore 
What is hurtful to society is never expedient." 

is part of Cicero's argument in Off. Lib. hi. ; 
but it is an inverted and clumsy way of 
stating what would much more naturally fall 
into the first Figure ; for if you examine the 
Propositions of a Syllogism in the fourth 
Figure, beginning at the Conclusion, you will 
see that as the major term is predicated of the 
minor, so is the minor of the middle, and that 
again of the major ; so that the major appears 
to be merely predicated of itself. Hence the 
five Moods in this Figure are seldom or never 
used ; some one of the fourteen (moods with 
names) in the first three Figures, being the 
forms into which all arguments may most 
readily be thrown ; but of these, the four in 
the first Figure are the clearest and most 
natural ; as to them Aristotle's dictum will 
immediately apply.* And as it is on this dictum 

* With respect to the use of the first three Figures 
(for the fourth is never employed but by an accidental 
awkwardness of expression) it may be remarked, that the 
First is that into which an argument will be found to fall 
the most naturally, except in the following cases : — First, 
When we have to disprove something that has been main- 
tained, or is likely to be believed, our arguments will 
usually be found to take most conveniently the form of 
the Second Figure : viz. we prove that the thing we are 



Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 89 

that all Reasoning ultimately depends, so all 
arguments may be in one way or other 
brought into some one of these four Moods ; 
and a Syllogism is, in that case, said to be 
reduced: (i. e. to the first figure.) These four 
are called the 'perfect moods, and all the rest 
'imperfect. 

speaking of cannot belong to such a Class, either because 
it wants what belongs to the whole of that Class, (Cesare) 
or because it has something of which that Class is desti- 
tute; (Camestres) e.g. "No impostor would have warned 
his followers, as Jesus did, of the persecutions they would 
have to submit to :" and again, " An enthusiast would 
have expatiated, which Jesus and his followers did not, 
on the particulars of a future state." 

The same observations will apply, mutatis mutandis, 
when a Particular conclusion is sought, as in Festino and 
Baroko. 

The arguments used in the process called the " Ab- 
scissio Infiniti," will in general be the most easily referred 
to this Figure. See Chap. v. § 1. subsection 6. 

The Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when 
the Middle term is Singular, since a Singular term can 
only be a Subject. This is also the form into which most 
arguments will naturally fall that are used to establish 
an objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's Pre- 
miss, when his argument is such as to require that premiss 
to be Universal. It might be called, therefore, the 
Enstatic Figure. E. G. If any one contends that " this 
or that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it 
cannot be explained or comprehended," his suppressed 
major premiss may be refuted by the argument that " the 
connexion of the Body and Soul cannot be explained or 
comprehended," Sec. 

A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may 
be exhibited in this form. 



90 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Ostensive Reduction. 

§ >• 

In reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of 
course, allowed to introduce any new Term 
or Proposition, having nothing granted but 
the truth of the Premises ; but these Pre- 
mises are allowed to be illatively converted 
(because the truth of any Proposition implies 
that of its illative converse) or transposed: by 
taking advantage of this liberty, where there 
is need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the 
Premises originally given, either the very same 
Conclusion as the original one, or another 
from which the original Conclusion follows by 
illative conversion ; e. g. Darapti, 

" All wits are dreaded ; 

All wits are admired ; 

Some who are admired are dreaded," 

into Darii, by converting by limitation (per 
accidens) the minor Premiss. 

" All wits are dreaded; 

Some who are admired are wits ; therefore 

Some who are admired are dreaded." 

Camestres, 

" All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself; 
The advocates of pleasure do not account, §c. 
Therefore they are not true philosophers," 



Chap. III. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [)[ 

reduced to Celarent, by simply converting the 
minor, and then transposing the Premises. 

11 Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not 

advocates of pleasure ; 
All true philosophers account virtue, §c. : therefore 
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure." 

This Conclusion may be illative ly converted 
into the original one. 

Baroko ;• e. g. Reduction by 



means of 
conversion 



" Every true patriot is a friend to religion ; by negation. 

Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ; 
Some great statesmen are not true patriots," 

to Ferio, by converting the major by negation, 
(contraposition), vide Chap. ii. § 4. 

" He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot : 
Some great statesmen, #c." 

and the rest of the Syllogism remains the 
same : only that the minor Premiss must be 
considered as affirmative, because you take 
" not-a-friend-to-religion," as the middle term. 
In the same manner Bokardo f to Darii ; e. g. 

" Some slaves are not discontented ; 

All slaves are wronged ; therefore 

Some who are wronged are not discontented." 

Convert the major by negation (contrapo- 
sition) and then transpose them ; the Con- 
clusion will be the converse by negation of the 

* Or Fakoro, considered i. c. as Festino. 
t Or Dokamo, considered /*. r. as Disarms. 



92 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

original one, which therefore may be inferred 
from it ; e. g. 

11 All slaves are wronged ; 

Some who are not discontented are slaves ; 

Some who are not discontented are wronged." 

In these ways (by what is called Ostensive 
Reduction, because you prove, in the first 
figure, either the very same Conclusion as be- 
fore, or one which implies it) all the imperfect 
Moods may be reduced to the four perfect 
ones. But there is also another way, called 



Reductio ad impossibile. 

§6. 

By which we prove (in the first figure) not 
directly that the original Conclusion is true, 
but that it cannot be false ; i. e, that an ab- 
surdity would follow from the supposition of 
its being false ; e. g, 

" All true patriots are friends to religion ; 
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ; 
Some great statesmen are not true patriots." 

If this Conclusion be not true, its contra- 
dictory must be true ; viz. 

" All great statesmen are true patriots." 

Let this then be assumed, in the place of the 



Chap. III. §7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 93 

minor Premiss of the original Syllogism, and 
a false conclusion will be proved ; e. g. bAr. 

"All true patriots are friends to religion; 
bA', All great statesmen are true patriots ; 
rA, All great statesmen are friends to religion :" 

for as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of 
the original minor Premiss, it must be false, 
since the Premises are always supposed to be 
granted ; therefore one of the Premises (by 
which it has been correctly proved) must be 
false also ; but the major Premiss (being one 
of those originally granted) is true ; therefore 
the falsity must be in the minor Premiss ; 
which is the contradictory of the original con- 
clusion ; therefore the original Conclusion 
must be true. This is the indirect mode of 
Reasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. § 1.) 

This kind of Reduction is seldom employed 
but for Baroko and Bokardo, which are thus 
reduced by those who confine themselves to 
simple Conversion, and Conversion by limita- 
tion, (per accidens ;) and they framed the 
names of their Moods, with a view to point 
out the manner in which each is to be re- 
duced ; viz. B, C, D, F, which are the initial 
letters of all the Moods, indicate to which 
Mood of the first figure (Barbara, Celarent, 
Darii, and Ferio) each of the others is to be 
reduced : m indicates that the Premises are to 



94 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

be transposed ; s and p, that the Proposition 
denoted by the vowel immediately preceding, 
is to be converted; s, simply, p, per accidens, 
(by limitation :) thus, in Camestres, (see ex- 
ample, p. 87,) the C indicates that it must be 
reduced to Celarent ; the two ss, that the 
minor Premiss and Conclusion must be con- 
verted simply ; the m, that the Premises must 
be transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip, 
denotes that the premises warrant a univer- 
sal conclusion in place of a particular. The 
I, though of course it cannot be illatively 
converted per accidens, viz: so as to become 
A, yet is thus converted in the Conclusion, 
because as soon as the premises are trans- 
posed (as denoted by the m,) it appears that a 
universal conclusion follows from them. 

K (which indicates the reduction ad im- 
possibile) is a sign that the Proposition, 
denoted by the vowel immediately before it 
must be left out, and the contradictory of the 
Conclusion substituted ; viz. for the minor 
Premiss in Baroko and the major in Bokardo. 
But it has been already shown, that the 
Conversion by contraposition (by negation) 
will enable us to reduce these two Moods, 
ostensively.* 

* If any one should choose that the names of these 
moods should indicate this, he might make K the index 
of conversion by negation; and then the names would be, 
by a slight change, FaJcoro and Dokamo. 



C hap. IV. 5 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 95 



Chap. IV. 

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. III. 

Of Modal Syllogisms, and of all Arguments 
besides regular and Pure-Categorical Syl- 
logisms, 

OfModals. 

§1. 

Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical 
Propositions, and the Syllogisms composed of 
such. A pure categorical proposition is styled 
by some logicians a proposition " de inesse" 
from its asserting simply that the Predicate is 
or is not (in our conception) contained in the 
Subject ; as " John killed Thomas." A modal 
proposition asserts that the Predicate is or is 
not contained in the Subject in a certain 
mode or manner ; as, " accidentally," " wil- 
fully," $c. 

A Modal proposition may be stated as a 
pure one, by attaching the Mode to one of 
the Terms: and the Proposition will in all 
respects fall under the foregoing rules ; e. g. 
"John killed Thomas wilfully and maliciously ;" 
here the Mode is to be regarded as part of the 



96 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Predicate. " It is probable that all knowledge 
is useful ;" " probably useful" is here the Pre- 
dicate. But when the Mode is only used to 
express the necessary, contingent, or impos- 
sible connexion of the Terms, it may as well 
be attached to the Subject : e. g. " man is 
necessarily mortal ; " is the same as ' ' all men 
are mortal:" "injustice is in no case expe- 
dient," corresponds to "no injustice is ex- 
pedient :" and " this man is occasionally 
intemperate," has the force of a particular: 
(vide Chap. ii. § 2. note.) It is thus, and thus 
only, that two singular Propositions may be 
contradictories ; e, g. " this man is never in- 
temperate," will be the contradictory of the 
foregoing. Indeed every sign (of universality 
or particularity) may be considered as a 
Mode. 

Since, however, in all Modal Propositions, 
you assert that the dictum (L e. the assertion 
itself) and the Mode, agree together, or dis- 
agree, so, in some cases, this may be the most 
convenient way of stating a Modal, purely : 

subj.cop. pred. subject. 

r-i i — i , n , — > 

e. g. " It is impossible that all all men should 

subject. 



be virtuous." Such is a proposition of the 

subj. cop. pred. 

Apostle Paul's : " This is a faithful saying, fyc. 

subject . 

that Jesus Christ came into the world to save 



Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 97 

81) bj. 

sinners." In these cases one of your Terms 
(the subject) is itself an entire Proposition. 

In English, the word In is often used in 
expressing one proposition combined with 
another, in such a manner as to make the 
two, one proposition : e. g. " You will have a 
formidable opponent to encounter in the Em- 
peror :" this involves two propositions; 1st, 
" You will have to encounter the Emperor ;" 
2d, u He will prove a formidable opponent :" 
this last is implied by the word in, which de- 
notes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians 
mentioned above, when they speak of a pro- 
position "de messe") that that Predicate is 
contained in that Subject. 

It may be proper to remark in this place, 
that we may often meet with a Proposition 
whose drift and force will be very different, 
according as we regard this or that as its Pre- 
dicate. Indeed, properly speaking, it may be 
considered as several different Propositions, 
each indeed implying the truth of all the rest, 
but each having a distinct Predicate ; the 
division of the sentence being varied in each 
case ; and the variations marked, either by 
the collocation of the words, the intonation 
of the voice, or by the designation of the em- 
phatic words, viz. : the Predicate, as scored 
under, or printed in italics. E. G. " The 

ii 



98 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

1 2 # 3 

Organon of Bacon was not designed to 

4 5 6 

supersede the Organon of Aristotle:" this 
might be regarded as, at least, six different 
propositions : if the word numbered (1) were 
in italics, it would leave us at liberty to 
suppose that Bacon might have designed to 
supersede by some work of his, the Organon 
of Aristotle ; but not by his own Organon : 
if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand 
the author to be contending, that whether or 
no .any other author had composed an Or- 
ganon with such a design, Bacon at least did 
not : if No. 3, then we should understand 
him to maintain that whether Bacon's Or- 
ganon does or does not supersede Aristotle's, 
no such design at least was entertained : and 
so with the rest. Each of these is a distinct 
Proposition; and though each of them im- 
plies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily be 
seen by examining the example given) one of 
them may be, in one case, and another, in an- 
other, the one which it is important to insist on. 
We should consider in each case what 
Question it is that is proposed, and what an- 
swer to it would, in the instance before us, 
be the most opposite or contrasted to the one 
to be examined. E. G. " You will find this 
doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either 
with, "You will find in Bacon a different 



Chap IV. § l.J SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 99 

doctrine/' or with, "You will find this doctrine 
in a different author." 

And observe, that when a proposition is 
contrasted with one which has a different pre- 
dicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word ; 
as "this man is a murderer;" i.e. not one 
who has slain another accidentally, or in self- 
defence : " this man is sl murderer," with the 
Copula for the emphatic word, stands opposed 
to " he is not a murderer ;" a proposition with 
the same terms, but a different Copula.* 

It will often happen that several of the Pro- 
positions which are thus stated in a single sen- 
tence, may require, each, to be distinctly stated 
and proved : e. g. the Advocate may have to 
prove, first the fact, that " John killed Tho- 
mas ; " and then, the character of the act, that 
"the killing was wilful and malicious." See 
Praxis, at the end of the vol. See also Ele- 
ments of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. § 5. 

* Thus if any one reads (as many are apt to do) " Thou 
shalt not steal," — " Thou shalt not commit adultery," he 
implies the question to be, whether we are commanded to 
steal or to forbear : but the question really is, what things 
are forbidden; and the answer is, "Thou shalt not steal;" 
" Thou shalt not commit adultery," &c. 

The connexion between Logic and correct Delivery is 
further pointed out in Rhet. App. I. 

Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coin- 
cide ; for when the "is" or the "not" is emphatic, it 
becomes properly the Predicate : viz. " the statement of 
this man's being a murderer, is true" or, " is not true." 
H 2 



100 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Of Hypotheticals. 
§2. 

A hypothetical Proposition is denned to be, 
two or more categoricals united by a Copula 
(or conjunction), and the different kinds of 
hypothetical Propositions are named from 
their respective conjunctions ; viz. conditional, 
disjunctive, causal, Sfc. 

When a hypothetical Conclusion is inferred 
from a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force 
of the Reasoning does not turn on the hypo- 
thesis, then the hypothesis (as in Modals) 
must be considered as part of one of the 
Terms; so that the Reasoning will be, in 
effect, categorical : e. g. 

predicate. 

" Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain : 
Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore 

predicate. 

He was either a hero or a villain." 

" Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence ; 

subject. 

If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come 
from God ; 

If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reve- 
rence." 

But when the Reasoning itself rests on the 
hypothesis (in which way a categorical Con- 
clusion may be drawn from a hypothetical 
Premiss,) this is what is called a hypothetical 



Chap. IV. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 101 

Syllogism ; and rules have been devised for 
ascertaining the validity of such Arguments 
at once, without bringing them into the 
categorical form. (And note, that in these 
Syllogisms the hypothetical Premiss is called 
the major, and the categorical one the minor.) 
They are of two kinds, conditional and dis- 
junctive. 

Of Conditionals. 
§3. 

A Conditional Proposition has in it an illa- 
tive force ; i. e. it contains two, and only two 
categorical Propositions, whereof one results 
from the other (or follows from it,) e. g. 

antecedent. 



" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, 

consequent. 

they are entitled to respect." 

That from which the other results is called the 
antecedent ; that which results from it, the con- 
sequent (consequens ;) and the connexion be- 
tween the two (expressed by the word "if") 
the consequence (consequential) The natural 
order is, that the antecedent should come 
before the consequent; but this is frequently 
reversed : e. g. " the husbandman is well off if 
he knows his own advantages ;" Virg. Geor, 
And note, that the truth or falsity of a con- 
ditional Proposition depends entirely on the 



1 02 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

consequence : e. g. " if Logic is useless, it 
deserves to be neglected;" here both Ante- 
cedent and Consequent are false: yet the 
whole Proposition is true ; i. e. it is true that 
the Consequent follows from the Antecedent. 
" If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an 
usurper," is just the reverse case : for though 
it is true that "Cromwell was an English- 
man," and also " that he was an usurper," yet 
it is not true that the latter of these Pro- 
positions depends on the former ; the whole 
Proposition, therefore, is false, though both 
Antecedent and Consequent are true. A Con- 
ditional Proposition, in short, may be con- 
sidered as an assertion of the validity of a 
certain Argument ; since to assert that an 
argument is valid, is to assert that the Con- 
clusion necessarily results from the Premises, 
whether those Premises be true or not. 

The meaning, then, of a Conditional Propo- 
sition is this ; that the antecedent being granted, 
the consequent is granted : which may be con- 
, sidered in two points of view : first, if the 
Antecedent be true, the Consequent must be 
true ; hence the first rule ; the antecedent being 
granted, the consequent may be inferred; se- 
condly, if the Antecedent were true, the Con- 
sequent would be true ; hence the second rule ; 
the consequent being denied, the antecedent may 
be denied ; for the Antecedent must in that 



Chap. IV. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 03 

case be false ; since if it were true, the Con- 
sequent (which is granted to be false) would 
be true also : e. g. " if this man has a fever, 
he is sick : " here, if you grant the antecedent, 
the first rule applies, and you infer the truth 
of the Consequent ; " he has a fever, there- 
fore he is sick : " if A is B, C is D ; but A is B, 
therefore C is D (and this is called a construc- 
tive Conditional Syllogism ;) but if you deny 
the consequent (i. e. grant its contradictory) 
the second rule applies, and you infer the 
contradictory of the antecedent; "he is not 
sick, therefore he has not a fever ;" this is the constructive 
destructive Conditional Syllogism : if A is B, tive. 
C is D ; C is not D, therefore A is not B. 
Again, "if the crops are not bad, corn must 
be cheap," for a major ; then, " but the crops 
are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is 
Constructive. " Corn is not cheap, therefore 
the crops are bad," is Destructive. " If every 
increase of population is desirable, some mi- 
sery is desirable ; but no misery is desirable ; 
therefore some increase of population is not 
desirable," is Destructive. But if you affirm 
the consequent, or deny the antecedent, you can 
infer nothing ; for the same Consequent may 
follow from other Antecedents : e. g. in the 
example above, a man may be sick from other 
disorders besides a fever ; therefore it does 
not follow, from his being sick, that he has a 



of Condi 
tionals 



104 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book H.. 

fever; or (for the same reason) from his not 
having a fever, that he is not sick. There 
are, therefore, two, and only two, kinds 
of Conditional Syllogisms ; the constructive, 
founded on the first rule, and answering to 
direct Reasoning ; and the destructive, on the 
second, answering to indirect ; being in fact a 
mode of throwing the indirect form of reason- 
ing into the direct : e. g. If C be not the 
centre of the circle, some other point must be ; 
which is impossible : therefore C is the centre. 
(Euclid, B. III. Pr, 1.) 
conversion And note, that a Conditional Proposition 
may (like the categorical A) be converted by 
negation ; i. e. you may take the contradictory 
of the consequent, as an antecedent, and the 
contradictory of the antecedent, as a consequent : 
e.g. "if this man is not sick he has not a 
fever." By this conversion of the major Pre- 
miss, a Constructive Syllogism may be reduced 
to a Destructive, and vice versa. (See § 6. 
p. 92.) 

Of Disjunctives. 
§ 4. 

A Disjunctive Proposition may consist of 
any number of categoricals ; and of these, 
some one, at least, must be true, or the whole 
Proposition will be false : if, therefore, one or 



Chap. IV. § t.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 105 

more of these categoricals be denied (/. e. 
granted to be false) you may infer that the 
remaining one, or (if several) some one of the 
remaining ones, is true : e. g. " either the 
earth is eternal, or the work of chance, or the 
work of an intelligent Being ; it is not eternal, 
nor the work of chance ; therefore it is the 
work of an intelligent Being." " It is either 
spring, summer, autumn, or winter ; but it is 
neither spring nor summer; therefore it is 
either autumn or winter." Either A is B, or 
C is D ; but A is not B, therefore C is D. 
Note, that in these examples (as well as in 
very many others) it is implied not only that 
one of the members (the categorical Proposi- 
tions) must be true, but that only one can be 
true ; so that, in such cases, if one or more 
members be affirmed, the rest may be denied; 
[the members may then be called exclusive :] 
e. g. " it is summer, therefore it is neither 
spring, autumn, nor winter ;" " either A is B, 
or C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is not D." 
But this is by no means universally the case ; 
e. g. " virtue tends to procure us either the 
esteem of mankind, or the favour of God :" 
here both members are true, and consequently 
from one being affirmed we are not authorized 
to deny the other. 

It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism 
may easily be reduced to a conditional; e, g. 



106 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

if it is not spring or summer, it is either 
autumn or winter, Sfc. 

The Dilemma*, 

is a complex kind of Conditional Syllogism. 

1st. If you have in the major Premiss se- 
veral antecedents all with the same consequent, 
then these Antecedents, being (in the minor) 
disjunctively granted (i. e. it being granted 
that some one of them is true), the one common 
consequent may be inferred (as in the case of a 
simple Constructive Syllogism :) e. g. if A is B, 
C is D ; and if X is Y, C is D ; but either 
A is B, or X is Y ; therefore C is D. " If the 
blest in heaven have no desires, they will be 
perfectly content ; so they will, if their desires 

* The account usually given of the Dilemma in Logical 
treatises is singularly perplexed and unscientific. Aldrich, 
in speaking of it, abstains from all use of Logical terms, 
and speaks in a loose, vague, and rhetorical manner. And 
it is remarkable that all the rules he gives respecting it, 
and the faults against which he cautions us, relate exclu- 
sively to the Subject-matter : as if one were to lay down 
as rules respecting a Syllogism in Barbara, " 1st. Care 
must be taken that the major Premiss be true ; 2dly. 
that the minor Premiss be true!" 

Most, if not all, writers on this point either omit to tell 
us whether the Dilemma is a kind of conditional, or of 
disjunctive argument ; or else refer it to the latter class, on 
account of its having one disjunctive Premiss ; though it 
clearly belongs to the class of conditionals. 



Chap. IV. §5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 107 

are fully gratified ; but either they will have 

no desires, or have them fully gratified; there- simple eon- 

^ ° etrnctive Di- 

fore they will be perfectly content." Note, in lemma - 
this case, the two conditionals which make up 
the major Premiss may be united in one Pro- 
position by means of the word "whether:" e.g. 
" whether the blest, Sfc. have no desires, or 
have their desires gratified, they will be con- 
tent." 

2d. But if the several antecedents have each complex con- 

strnctive Di- 

a different consequent, then the Antecedents, lemma - 
being, as before, disjunctively granted, you 
can only disjunctively infer the consequents : 
e. g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is Y, E is F : 
but either A is B, or X is Y ; therefore either 
C is D, or E is F. " If ^Eschines joined in 
the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent ; if he 
did not, he is unpatriotic : but he either 
joined, or not, therefore he is either incon- 
sistent, or unpatriotic." (Demost. For the 
Crown.) This case, as well as the foregoing, 
is evidently constructive. 

In the Destructive form, whether you have 
one Antecedent with several Consequents, or 
several Antecedents either with one, or with 
several Consequents ; in all these cases, if you 
deny the whole of the Consequent, or Conse- 
quents, you may in the conclusion deny the 
whole of the Antecedent or Antecedents : e.g. 
"if the world were eternal, the most useful 



108 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

arts, such as printing, fyc. would be of un- 
known antiquity: and on the same supposi- 
tion, there would be records long prior to the 
Mosaic ; and likewise the sea and land, in all 
parts of the globe, might be expected to 
maintain the same relative situations now as 
formerly : but none of these is the fact : 
therefore the world is not eternal." Again, 
"if the world existed from eternity, there 
would be records prior to the Mosaic ; and 
if it were produced by chance, it would not 
bear marks of design : there are no records 
prior to the Mosaic ; and the world does bear 
marks of design : therefore it neither existed 
from eternity, nor is the work of chance." 
These are commonly called Dilemmas, but 
hardly differ from simple conditional Syllo- 
gisms, two or more being expressed together. 
Nor is the case different if you have one 
antecedent with several consequents, which 
consequents you disjunctively deny; for that 
comes to the same thing as wholly denying 
them ; since if they be not all true, the one 
antecedent must equally fall to the ground; 
and the Syllogism will be equally simple : e. g.* 
" if we are at peace with France by virtue of 
the treaty of Paris, we must acknowledge the 
sovereignty of Buonaparte ; and also we must 

* A.D. 1815. 



Chap. IV. §5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1()9 

acknowledge that of Louis : hut we cannot do 
both of these ; therefore we are not at peace," 
fyc; which is evidently a simple Destructive. 
The true Dilemma is, " a conditional Syllogism 
xvith several* antecedents in the major, and a 
disjunctive minor;" hence, 

3d. That is most properly called a destructive Destructive 

i • i i Sim n Dilemma. 

Dilemma, which has (like the constructive ones) 
a disjunctive minor Premiss ; i. e, when you 
have several Antecedents with each a different 
Consequent; which Consequents (instead of 
wholly denying them, as in the case lately 
mentioned) you disjunctively deny ; and thence, 
in the Conclusion, deny disjunctively the An- 
tecedents : e. g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is 
Y, E is F : but either C is not D, or E is not 
F ; therefore, either A is not B, or X is not Y. 
" If this man were wise, he would not speak 
irreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he 
were good he would not do so in earnest ; 
but he does it, either in jest, or earnest; there- 
fore he is either not wise or not good." 

Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or Resolution of 

a Dilemma. 

more simple Conditional Syllogisms : e. g. " If 
iEschines joined, fyc. he is inconsistent ; he 
did join, fyc. therefore he is inconsistent ;" and 

* The name Dilemma implies precisely two antecedents ; 
and hence it is common to speak of "the horns of a di- 
lemma;" but it is evident there may be either two or 
more. 



110 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

again, "if iEschines did not join, fyc. he is 
unpatriotic; he did not, fyc. therefore he is 
unpatriotic." Now an opponent might deny 
either of the minor Premises in the above 
Syllogisms, but he could not deny both; and 
therefore he must admit one or the other of 
the Conclusions : for, when a Dilemma is 
employed, it is supposed that some one of the 
Antecedents must be true (or, in the destruc- 
tive kind, some one of the Consequents false), 
but that we cannot tell which of them is so ; 
and this is the reason why the argument is 
stated in the form of a Dilemma. 

Sometimes it may happen that both ante- 
cedents may be true, and that we may be 
aware of this ; and yet there may be an ad- 
vantage in stating (either separately or con- 
jointly) both arguments, even when each 
proves the same conclusion, so as not to 
derive any additional confirmation from the 
other ; — still, I say, it may sometimes be 
advisable to state both, because, of two pro- 
positions equally true, one man may deny 
or be ignorant of the one, while he admits 
the other, and another man, vice versa. 

From what has been said, it may easily be 
seen that all Dilemmas are in fact conditional 
syllogisms; and that Disjunctive Syllogisms 
may also be reduced to the form of Condi- 
tionals : but as it has been remarked, that 



Chap. IV. § 6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 1 1 

all Reasoning whatever may ultimately be 
brought to the one test of Aristotle's " Dic- 
tum/' it remains to show how a Conditional 
Syllogism may be thrown into such a form, 
that that test will at once apply to it ; and 
this is called the 

Reduction of Hi/pot heticals* 
§6. 

For this purpose we must consider every 
Conditional Proposition as a universal affir- 
mative categorical Proposition, of which the 

* Aldrich has stated, through a mistake, that Aristotle 
utterly despised Hypothetical Syllogisms, and thence made 
no mention of them ; but he did indicate his intention to 
treat of them in some part of his work, which either was 
not completed by him according to his design, or else (in 
common with many of his writings) has not come down 
to us. 

Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid 
which cannot be reduced to a categorical form ; and this 
is evidently agreeable to what has been said at the begin- 
ning of Chap. iii. ; but then he has unfortunately omitted 
to teach us how to reduce Hypothetical to this form ; 
except in the case where the Antecedent and Consequent 
chance to have each the same subject ; in which case, he 
tells us to take the minor Premiss and Conclusion as an 
Enthymeme, and fill that up categorically ; e.g. "If Caesar 
was a tyrant, he deserved death : he was a tyrant ; there- 
fore he deserved death;" which may easily be reduced to 
a categorical form, by taking as a major Premiss, " all 
tyrants deserve death." But when (as is often the case) 
the Antecedent and Consequent have not each the same 



112 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Terms are entire Propositions, viz. the ante- 
cedent answering to the Subject, and the con- 
sequent to the Predicate ; e. g. to say, " if 
Louis is a good king, France is likely to 
prosper," is equivalent to saying, " the case 
of Louis being a good king, is a case of 
France being likely to prosper:" and if it be 
granted, as a minor Premiss to the Condi- 
tional Syllogism, that " Louis is a good king," 
that is equivalent to saying, " the present case 
is the case of Louis being a good king;" 
from which you will draw a conclusion in 
Barbara, (viz. " the present case is a case of 
France being likely to prosper,") exactly 



subject, (as in the very example he gives, " if A is B, C is 
D,") he gives no rule for reducing such a Syllogism as 
has a Premiss of this kind ; and indeed leads us to sup- 
pose that it is to be rejected as invalid, though he has just 
before demonstrated its validity. And this is likely to 
have been one among the various causes which occasion 
many learners to regard the whole system of Logic as a 
string of idle reveries, having nothing true, substantial, or 
practically useful in it ; but of the same character with the 
dreams of Alchymy, Demonology, and judicial Astrology. 
Such a mistake is surely the less inexcusable in a learner, 
when his master first demonstrates the validity of a certain 
argument, and then tells him that after all it is good for 
nothing ; (prorsus repudiandum.) In the late editions of 
Aldrich's Logic, all that he says of the reduction of 
Hypothetical is omitted; which certainly would have 
been an improvement, if a more correct one had been 
substituted ; but as it is, there is a complete hiatus in the 
system. 



Chap.IV.§6.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 113 

equivalent to the original Conclusion of the 
Conditional Syllogism ; viz. " France is likely to 
prosper." As the Constructive Condition may 
thus be reduced to Barbara, so may the De- 
structive, in like manner, to Celarent : e. g. 
" if the Stoics are right, pain is no evil : but 
pain is an evil ; therefore the Stoics are not 
right ;" is equivalent to — " the case of the 
Stoics being right, is the case of pain being 
no evil ; the present case is not the case of 
pain being no evil ; therefore the present case 
is not the case of the Stoics being right." This 
is Camestres, which, of course, is easily re- 
duced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all Condi- 
tional Syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, 
by considering them all as constructive ; which 
may be done, as mentioned above, by con- 
verting by negation the major Premiss. (See 
p. 104.) " 

The reduction of Hypotheticals may always 
be effected in the manner above stated; but 
as it produces a circuitous awkwardness of 
expression, a more convenient form may in 
some cases be substituted : e. g. in the ex- 
ample above, it may be convenient to take 
"true" for one of the Terms: "that pain is 
no evil is not true ; that pain is no evil is 
asserted by the Stoics; therefore something 
asserted by the Stoics is not true." Some- 
times again it may be better to unfold the 

i 



114 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

argument into two Syllogisms: e.g. in a for- 
mer example ; first, " Louis is a good king ; 
the governor of France is Louis; therefore 
the governor of France is a good king." And 
then, second, " every country governed by a 
good king is likely to prosper/' Sfc. [A Di- 
lemma is generally to be reduced into two or 
more categorical Syllogisms.] And when the 
antecedent and consequent have each the 
same Subject, you may sometimes reduce the 
Conditional by merely substituting a categori- 
cal major Premiss for the conditional one : 
e. g. instead of " if Caesar was a tyrant, he 
deserved death; he was a tyrant, therefore he 
deserved death ;" you may put for a major, 
" all tyrants deserve death ;" fyc. But it is of 
no great consequence, whether Hypotheticals 
are reduced in the most neat and concise man- 
ner or not ; since it is not intended that they 
should be reduced to categoricals, in ordinary 
'practice, as the readiest way of trying their 
validity, (their own rules being quite sufficient 
for that purpose ;) but only that we should be 
able, if required, to subject any argument 
whatever to the test of Aristotle's Dictum, in 
order to show that all Reasoning turns upon 
one simple principle. 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 1 5 

Of Enthymeme, Sorites, fyc. 

§7. 

There are various abridged forms of Argu- 
ment which may be easily expanded into 
regular Syllogisms : such as, 

1st. The Enthymeme, which is a Syllogism Emi.ymemc. 
with one Premiss suppressed. As all the 
Terms will be found in the remaining Premiss 
and Conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the 
Syllogism by supplying the Premiss that is 
wanting, whether major or minor : e. g. 
" Caesar was a tyrant ; therefore he deserved 
death." " A free nation must be happy ; 
therefore the English are happy." 

This is the ordinary form of speaking and 
writing. It is evident that Enthymemes may 
be filled up hypothetically.* 

2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms, 
in the first figure, in which the Conclusion of 

* It is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly 
syllogistic ; i. e. its conclusiveness is not apparent from 
the mere form of expression, without regard to the mean- 
ing of the Terms ; because it is from that we form our 
judgment as to the truth of the suppressed Premiss. 
The expressed Premiss may be true, and yet the Con- 
clusion false. The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly 
syllogistic; as may be seen by the examples. If the 
Premises stated be true, the conclusion must be true. 

i 2 



116 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

each is made the Premiss of the next, till you 
arrive at the main or ultimate Conclusion of 
all, you may sometimes state these briefly, in 
sorites. a form called Sorites ; in which the Predicate 
of the first proposition is made the Subject of 
the next ; and so on, to any length, till finally 
the Predicate of the last of the Premises is 
predicated (in the Conclusion) of the Subject 
of the first : e. g. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is 
E ; therefore A is E. " The English are a 
brave people ; a brave people are free ; a free 
people are happy ; therefore the English are 
happy." A Sorites then, has as many middle 
Terms as there are intermediate Propositions 
between the first and the last; and conse- 
quently, it may be drawn out into as many 
separate Syllogisms; of which the first will 
have, for its major Premiss, the second, and 
for its minor, the first of the Propositions of 
the Sorites ; as may be seen by the example. 
The reader will perceive also by examination 
of that example, and by framing others, that 
the first proposition in the Sorites is the only 
minor premiss that is expressed : when the 
whole is resolved into distinct syllogisms, each 
conclusion becomes the minor premiss of the 
succeeding syllogism. Hence, in a Sorites, 
the first proposition, and that alone, of all the 
premises, may be particular; because in the 
first figure the minor may be particular, but 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 117 

not the major ; (see Chap. iii. § 4) and all 
the other propositions, prior to the conclusion, 
are major premises. It is also evident that 
there may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one, 
negative premiss, viz. the last : for if any of 
the others were negative, the result would be 
that one of the syllogisms of the Sorites would 
have a negative minor premiss ; which is (in 
the 1st Fig.) incompatible with correctness. 
See Chap. iii. § 4. 

A string of Conditional Syllogisms may gjg£ tlletle ■ , 
in like manner be abridged into a Sorites ; 
e. g. if A is B, C is D ; if C is D, E 
is F ; if E is F, G is H ; but A is B, there- 
fore G is H. " If the Scriptures are the word 
of God, it is important that they should be 
well explained ; if it is important, fyc. they 
deserve to be diligently studied : if they de- 
serve, Sfc. an order of men should be set 
aside for that purpose ; but the Scriptures are 
the word, fyc; therefore an order of men 
should be set aside for the purpose, fyc.:"* in 
a destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back 
from the denial of the last consequent to the 
denial of the first antecedent : " G is not H ; 
therefore A is not B." 

* Hence it is evident how injudicious an arrangement 
has been adopted by former writers on Logic, who have 
treated of the Sorites and Enthymcme before they en- 
tered on the subject of Hypothetical. 



118 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book II. 

induction. Those who have spoken of Induction or of 
Example. Example, as a distinct kind of Argument in a 
Logical point of view, have fallen into the 
common error of confounding Logical with 
Rhetorical distinctions, and have wandered 
from their subject as much as a writer on the 
orders of Architecture would do who should 
introduce the distinction between buildings of 
brick and of marble. Logic takes no cogni- 
zance of Induction, for instance, or of a priori 
reasoning, fyc, as distinct Forms of argument ; 
for when thrown into the syllogistic form, and 
when letters of the alphabet are substituted 
for the Terms (and it is thus that an Argu- 
ment is properly to be brought under the cog- 
nizance of Logic), there is no distinction 
between them ; e. g. a " Property which 
belongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and 
antelope, belongs to all horned animals; ru- 
mination belongs to these ; therefore to all." 
This, which is an inductive argument, is evi- 
dently a Syllogism in Barbara. The essence 
of an inductive argument (and so of the other 
kinds which are distinguished from it) consists 
not in the form of the Argument, but in the 
relation which the Subject-matter of the Pre- 
mises bears to that of the Conclusion.* 

* See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. ii. § 6. Nothing probably 
has tended more to foster the prevailing error of consi- 
dering Syllogism as a particular kind of argument, than 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 1 ] 9 



revia- 

tioni. 



3d. There are various other abbreviations Abb 

UOII: 

commonly used, which are so obvious as 
hardly to call for explanation : as where one 
of the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the 
Conclusion of an Enthymeme which is ex- 
pressed at the same time : e. g. " all useful 
studies deserve encouragement; Logic is 
such (since it helps us to reason accurately ,) 
therefore it deserves encouragement ;" here 
the minor Premiss is what is called an En- 
thymematic sentence. The antecedent in that 
minor Premiss (i. e. that which makes it 
Enthymematic) is called by Aristotle the Pro- 
syllogism. 

It is evident that you may, for brevity, 
substitute for any term an equivalent ; as in Eq^ienti 
the last example, " it," for " Logic ;" " such" 
for "a useful study," fyc. The doctrine of 
Conversion, laid down in the Second Chapter, 
furnishes many equivalent propositions, since 
each is equivalent to its illative converse. 
The division of nouns also (for which see 
Chap, v.) supplies many equivalents ; e. g. if 
A is the genus of B, B must be a species 
of A : if A is the cause of B, B must be the 
effect of A. 

4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first Sjiiogismi 
sight appear faulty, will often be found, n i,lc " ncct ' 

the inaccuracy just noticed, which appears in all or most 
of the logical works extant. Sec DisscrtdUon on the 
Province of Reasoning. Ch. i. S*e b«loW, ^3US-J3q) 



120 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

examination, to contain correct reasoning, 
and, consequently, to be reducible to a re- 
gular form ; e. g. when you have, apparently, 
negative Premises, it may happen, that by 
considering one of them as affirmative, (see 
Chap. ii. § 4. p. 72), the Syllogism will be 
regular : e. g. " no man is happy who is not 
secure : no tyrant is secure ; therefore no 
tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism in Celarent* 
Sometimes there will appear to be too many 
terms ; and yet there will be no fault in the 
Reasoning, only an irregularity in the ex- 
pression : e. g. " no irrational agent could 
produce a work which manifests design ; the 
universe is a work which manifests design ; 
therefore no irrational agent could have pro- 
duced the universe." Strictly speaking, this 
Syllogism has five terms ; but if you look to 
the meaning, you will see, that in the first 
Premiss (considering it as a part of this Argu- 
ment) it is not, properly, " an irrational agent" 
that you are speaking of, and of which you 

* If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has 
really negative Premises, the only effect will he to change 
that fault into another : viz. an excess of Terms, or 
(which is substantially the same) an undistributed middle ; 
e. g. " an enslaved people is not happy ; the English are 
not enslaved ; therefore they are happy :" if " enslaved" 
be regarded as one of the Terms, and " not enslaved " as 
another, there will manifestly be four. Hence you may 
see how very little difference there is in reality between 
the different faults which are enumerated. 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 121 

predicate that it could not produce a work 
manifesting design ; but rather it is this 
u work/' fyc. of which you are speaking, and 
of which it is predicated that it could not be 
produced by an irrational agent; if, then, 
you state the Propositions in that form, the 
Syllogism will be perfectly regular. (See § 1. 
of this Supplement.) 

Thus, such a Syllogism as this, " every true 
patriot is disinterested ; few men are disin- 
terested; therefore few men are true patriots;" 
might appear at first sight to be in the second 
Figure, and faulty ; whereas it is Barbara, 
with the Premises transposed: for you do not 
really predicate of " few men," that they are 
" disinterested," but of " disinterested persons," 
that they are " few." Again, " none but 
candid men are good reasoners ; few infidels 
are candid ; few infidels are good reasoners." 
In this it will be most convenient to consider 
the major Premiss as being, " all good rea- 
soners are candid," (which of course is pre- 
cisely equipollent to its illative converse by 
negation;) and the minor Premiss and Con- 
clusion may in like manner be fairly expressed 
thus — " most infidels are not candid ; there- 
fore most infidels are not good reasoners :" 
which is a regular Syllogism in Camestres* 

* The reader is to observe that the term employed as 
the Subject of the minor premiss, and of the conclusion, 



122 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Or, if you would state it in the first Figure, 
thus : " those who are not candid (or un- 
candid) are not good reasoners ; most infidels 
are not candid; most infidels are not good 
reasoners." 



Chap. V. 

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 

[This Supplement may be studied either before or after the 
Compendium.'] 

§1- ■ 

The usual divisions of nouns into univocal, 
equivocal, and analogous, and into nouns of 
the first and second intention, are not, strictly- 
speaking, divisions of words, but divisions of 
the manner of employing them ; the same word 
may be employed either univocally, equivo- 
cally, or analogously ; either in the first inten- 
tion or in the second. The ordinary logical 
treatises often occasion great perplexity to the 
learner, by not noticing this circumstance, but 
rather leading him to suppose the contrary. 

is " most-infidels :" he is not to suppose that " most " is a 
sign of distribution ; it is merely a compendious expres- 
sion for " the greater part of." 



Chap. V. § 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 123 

(See Book III. § 8.) Some of those other 
divisions of nouns, which are the most com- 
monly in use, though not appropriately and 
exclusively belonging to the Logical system, 
i. e. to the theory of reasoning, it may be 
worth while briefly to notice in this place. 

Let it be observed then, that a noun ex- 
presses the view we take of an object. And 
its being viewed as an object, i. e. as one, or 
again as several, depends on our arbitrary 
choice ; e. g. we may consider a troop of 
cavalry as one object ; or we may make any 
single horse with its rider, or any separate 
man or horse, or any limb of either, the sub- 
ject of our thoughts. 

1. When then any one object is considered singer ami 

Common 

according to its actual existence, as numerically ter,iis - 
one, the noun denoting it is called Singular ; 
as, u this tree," the " city of London," Sfc. 
When it is considered as to its nature and 
character only, as being of such a description 
as will equally apply to other single objects, 
the inadequate or incomplete view (see Ana- 
lytical Outline, § 6.) thus taken of an indi- 
vidual is expressed by a Common noun ; as 
" tree," " city." 

2. When any object is considered as a part Absointc ami 

J ° l Relative. 

of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole 
or to another part, of a more complex object 
of thought, the noun expressing this view 



124 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

is called Relative: and to Relative noun is 
opposed Absolute ; as denoting an object con- 
sidered as a whole,, and without reference to 
anything of which it is a part, or to any other 
part distinguished from it. Thus, " Father/' 
and " Son/' " Rider," " Commander," fyc, 
are Relatives, being regarded, each as a part 
of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, fyc. ; 
the same object designated absolutely would 
be termed a Man, Living-Being, fyc. 

correlative. Nouns are Correlative to each other, which 
denote objects related to each other, and 
viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a 
King is a ruler of men, " King " and " Man " 
are not correlative, but King and Subject, are. 

compatible 3. When there are two views which cannot 

and Opposite. 

be taken of one single object at the' same 
time, the terms expressing these views are 
said to be Opposite, or Inconsistent (repug- 
nantia) ; as, " black and white ;" when both 
may be taken of the same object at the same 
time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible 
(convenientia) ; as, " white and cold." Rela- 
tive terms are Opposite, only when applied 
with reference to the same subject ; as one 
may be both Master and Servant, but not at 
the same time to the same person. 
concrete and 4. When the notion derived from the view 
taken of any object, is expressed with a refe- 
rence to, or as in conjunction with, the object 



(hap. V. § 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 125 

that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a 
Concrete term; as, "foolish," or "fool;" when 
without any such reference, by an Abstract 
term ; as, " folly." 

5. A term which denotes a certain view Positive, 

Privative, 

of an object as being actually taken of it, is a » (,Ne s iUive - 
called Positive ; as, " speech" " a man speak- 
ing:" a term denoting that this view might 
conceivably be taken of the object, but is not, 
is Privative ; as, u dumbness," a " man silent" 
fyc* That which denotes that such a notion 
is not and could not be formed of the object, 
is called Negative ; as, a u dumb statue," a 
" lifeless carcase," Sfc. 

It is to be observed that the same term 
may be regarded either as Positive, or as Pri- 
vative or Negative, according to the quality 
or character which we are referring to in our 
minds : thus, of " happy " and " miserable," 
we may regard the former as Positive, and 
the latter ( chappy) as Privative ; or vice 

* Many Privative epithets are such that by a little 
ingenuity the application of them may be represented as 
an absurdity. Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced in this 
treatise) that a jest is generally a mock-fallacy, i. e. a 
fallacy not designed to deceive, but so palpable as only to 
furnish amusement, might be speciously condemned as 
involving a contradiction : for " the design to deceive," it 
might be said, " is essential to a fallacy." In the same 
way it might be argued that it is absurd to speak of " a 
dead man;" e.g. "every man is a living creature; nothing 
dead is a living creature ; therefore no man is dead !" 



126 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

versa ; according as we are thinking of enjoy- 
ment or of suffering. 
Definite and 6. A Privative or Negative term is also 

Indefinite. . 

called Indefinite (infinitum) in respect of its 
not defining and marking out an object ; in 
contradistinction to this, the Positive term is 
called Definite (finitum) because it does thus 
define or mark out. Thus, " organized being," 
or " Caesar," are called Definite, as marking 
out, and limiting our view to, one particular 
class of Beings, or one single person ; " unor- 
ganized," or " not-Caesar," are called Indefi- 
nite, as not restricting our view to any class, 
or individual, but only excluding one, and 
leaving it undetermined, what other individual 
the thing so spoken of may be, or what other 
class it may belong to. 
contradic It is to be observed, that the most perfect 

tory opposi- 

uonof terms. pp OS ition between nouns exists between any 
two which differ only in respectively wanting 
and having the particle not (either expressly, or 
in sense) attached to them ; as, " organized," 
and " not-organized," " corporeal," and " in- 
corporeal;" for not only is it impossible for 
both these views to be taken at once of the 
same thing, but also, it is impossible but that 
one or other should be applicable to every 
object; as there is nothing that can be both, 
so there is nothing that can be neither. Every 
thing that can be even conceived must be 



Chap. V. § 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 127 

either " Caesar/' or " not-Caesar;" either " cor- 
poreal/' or " incorporeal." And in this way a 
complete twofold division may be made of any 
subject, being certain (as the expression is) to 
exhaust it. And the repetition of this process, 
so as to carry on a subdivision as far as there 
is occasion, is thence called by Logicians 
u abscissio infiniti ;" i. e. the repeated cutting 
off of that which the object to be examined is 
not ; e.g. 1. This disorder either is, or is not, 
a dropsy ; and for this or that reason, it is 
not ; 2. Any other disease either is, or is not, 
gout ; this is not : then, 3. It either is, or is 
not, consumption, S?c. fyc? This procedure is 
very common in Aristotle's works. 

Such terms may be said to be in contra- 
dictory opposition to each other. 

On the other hand, Contrary terms, i. e. contrary 
those which, coming under some one class, 
are the most different of all that belong to that 
class, as "wise" and "foolish," both denoting 
mental habits, are opposed, but in a different 
manner : for though both cannot be applied to 
the same object, there may be other objects 
to which neither can be applied : nothing can 
be at once both " wise" and " foolish ;" but a 
stone cannot be either. 

§2. 

The notions expressed by Common terms, 
we are enabled (as has been remarked in the 



128 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Analytical Outline) to form by the faculty of 
abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any 
object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively 
to some particular circumstances belonging to 
it, [some certain parts of its nature as it 
were,] and quite withhold our attention from 
the rest. When, therefore, we are thus con- 
templating several individuals which resemble 
each other in some part of their nature, we 
can (by attending to that part alone, and not 
to those points in which they differ) assign 
them one common name, which will express or 
stand for them merely as far as they all agree; 
and which, of course, will be applicable to all 
or any of them ; (which process is called 
Geueraiiza- generalization) and each of these names is 
called a common term, from its belonging to 
Predicabies. them all alike ; or a predicable, because it 
may be predicated affirmatively of them, or of 
any one of them. 

Generalization (as has been remarked) im- 
plies abstraction, but it is not the same thing ; 
for there may be abstraction without generali- 
zation: when we are speaking of an Indi- 
vidual, it is usually an abstract notion that we 
form ; e. g. suppose we are speaking of the 
present King of France ; he must actually be 
either at Paris or elsewhere ; sitting, standing, 
or in some other posture ; and in such and 
such a dress, fyc. Yet many of these circum- 



Chap. V. § 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. ] 29 

stances, (which are separable Accidents [vide 
§ 6] and consequently) which are regarded as 
non-essential to the individual, are quite dis- 
regarded by us ; and we abstract from them 
what we consider as essential ; thus forming 
an abstract notion of the Individual. Yet 
there is here no generalization. 



§3. 

Whatever term can be affirmed of several Spedes 
things, must express either their whole essence, 
which is called the Species ; or a part of their 
essence {viz. either the material part, which is 
called the Genus, or the formal and distin- GenuB . 
guishing part, which is called Differentia, or Differen ti a . 
in common discourse, characteristic) or some- 
thing joined to the essence ; whether necessarily 
(i. e. to the whole species, or, in other words, 
universally, to every individual of it), which is 
called a Property ; or contingently (*. e. to Pro rt 
some individuals only of the species), which is 
an Accident. Acc i (le)lt . 



1 30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Every predicable expresses either 

/■ \ s 

The whole essence or part of its or something 

of its subject: essence joined to its 

viz. : Species J essence 

Genus —Difference 



Property Accident 



universal [peculiar universal 
but not but not and pe- 

peculiar universal]* culiar 



inseparable — separable. 

It is evident, from what has been said, that 
the Genus and Difference put together make 

* And, consequently, not correctly called a Property, 
as is remarked below ; but inserted here as having been 
usually reckoned such by logical writers. They have 
also added a fourth kind of Property ; viz. that which is 
peculiar to a Species, and belongs to every Individual of 
it, but not at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradic- 
tion ; since whatever does not always belong to a Species, 
does not belong to it universally. It is through the 
ambiguity of words that they have fallen into this con- 
fusion of thought ; e. g. the example commonly given is, 
"homini canescere ;" " to become grey" being, they say, 
(though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every 
individual, though not always, but only in old age, fyc. 
Now, if by " canescere" be meant the very circumstance 
of becoming grey, this manifestly does not belong to 
every man : if again it be meant to signify the liability to 
become grey hereafter, this does belong always to man. 
And the same in other instances. Indeed the very Pro- 
prium fixed on by Aldrich, " risibility," is nearly parallel 
to the above. Man is " always capable of laughing ;" but 
he is not " capable of laughing always." 



Chap. V. §3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 131 

up the Species : e.g. "rational" and " animal" 
constitute " man ;" so that, in reality, the 
Species contains the Genus (i. e. implies it ;) 
and when the Genus is called a whole, and is 
said to contain the Species, this is only a meta- 
phorical expression, signifying that it compre- 
hends the Species, in its own more extensive 
signification : e. g. if I predicate of Caesar that 
he is an animal, I say the truth indeed, but 
not the whole truth ; for he is not only an 
animal, but a man ; so that " man," is a more 
full and complete expression than " animal ;" 
which for the same reason is more extensive, 
as it contains, (or rather comprehends) and 
may be predicated of, several other species, 
viz. " beast," u bird," Sfc. In the same man- 
ner the name of a species is a more extensive, 
but less full and complete term than that of 
an individual {viz. a singular term; ) since the 
species may be predicated of each of these.* 

* " The impression produced on the mind by a Singu- 
lar Term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in 
. by the eye, of any object (suppose some particular man) 
near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to distin- 
guish the features of the individual : in a fainter light, or 
rather farther off, we merely perceive that the object is a 
man : this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the 
name of the Species : yet farther off, or in a still feebler 
light, we can distinguish merely some living object ; and at 
length, merely some object ; these views corresponding 
respectively with the terms denoting the Genera, less or 
more remote." Rhet. Part III. Chap. ii. § 1. 

k2 



132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

[Note, that genus and species are commonly 
said to be predicated hi quid (jl) {i.e. to answer 
to the question, " what ?" as, " what is Caesar?" 
Answer, "a man ;" " what is a man ?" Answer, 
" an animal.") Difference, in "quale quid;" 
(ttoIop tl) Property and Accident in quale 

(irolov.y\ 

§4- 
subaltern A genus, which is also a species, is called a 

genus and . . . , 

species. subaltern genus or species ; as " bird," which is 
the genus of "pigeon" (i. e. of which " pigeon" 
is a species) is itself a species of " animal." A 
genus, which is not considered as a species of 
anything, is called summum (the highest) ge- 
nus ; a species which is not considered as a 
genus of any thing, i. e. is regarded as con- 
taining under it only individuals, is called 
injima (the lowest) species. 

When I say of a Magnet, that it is " a kind 
of iron-ore," that is called its proximum genus, 
because it is the closest (or lowest) genus 
that is predicated of it: "mineral" is its more 
remote genus. 

When I say that the Differentia of a magnet 
is its " attracting iron," and that its Property 
is "polarity," these are called respectively a 
Specific Difference and Property ; because 
magnet is an injima species (i. e. only a species.) 

When I say that the Differentia of iron ore 



Chap. V. § 4.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 133 

is its " containing iron*' and its property " be- 
ing attracted by the magnet," these are called 
respectively, a generic Difference and Pro- 
perty, because iron ore is a subaltern species 
or genus, being both the genus of magnet, and 
a species of mineral. 

That is the most strictly called a Property, 
which belongs to the whole of a Species, and 
to that Species alone ; as polarity to the mag- 
net. [And such a property it is often hard to 
distinguish from the differentia ; but whatever 
you consider as the most essential to the nature 
of a Species, with respect to the matter you 
are engaged in, you must call the differentia ; 
as "rationality" to "man;" and whatever 
you consider as rather an accompaniment (or 
result) of that difference, you must call the 
property ; as the "use of speech" seems to be 
a result of rationality.] But very many pro- 
perties which belong to the whole of a species 
are not peculiar to it; as, "to breathe air" 
belongs to every man ; but not to man alone ; 
and it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so 
much a property of the Species " man," as of 
the higher, /'. e. more comprehensive, Species, 
which is the genus of that, viz. of " land- 
animal." Other Properties, as some logicians 
call them, are peculiar to a species, but do not 
belong to the whole of it ; e. g. man alone can 
be a poet, but it is not every man that is 



134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

so. These, however, are more commonly and 
more properly reckoned as accidents. 
Accidents se- For that is most properly called an Acci- 
Fnse a parabi«. dent, which may be absent or present, the 
essence of the Species continuing the same ; 
as, for a man to be " walking," or a " native 
of Paris :" of these two examples, the former 
is what logicians call a separable Accident, 
because it may be separated from the indi- 
vidual: (e.g. he may sit down;) the latter 
is an inseparable Accident, being not separable 
from the individual, (i. e. he who is a native 
of Paris can never be otherwise;) "from the 
individual," I say, because every accident must 
be separable from the species, else it would be 
a property.* 

Let it here be observed, that both the 
general name " Predicable," and each of the 

* This seems to me a clearer and more correct descrip- 
tion of the two kinds of accident than the one given by 
Aldrich ; viz. that a Separable Accident may be actually 
separated, and an Inseparable, only in thought, " ut Man- 
tuanum esse, a Virgilio." For surely " to be the author 
of the iEneid " was another Inseparable Accident of the 
same individual; "to be a Roman citizen" another; and 
" to live in the days of Augustus" another : now can we 
in thought separate all these things from the essence of 
that individual ? To do so would be to form the idea of 
a different individual. We can indeed conceive a man, 
and one who might chance to bear the name of Virgil, 
without any of these Accidents ; but then it would plainly 
not be the same man. 



Chap. V. § 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 135 

classes of Predicables, (viz. Genus, Species, 
fyc.) are relative ; i. e. we cannot say what 
predicable any term is, or whether it is any 
at all, unless it be specified of what it is to 
be predicated: e.g. the term "red" would 
be considered a genus, in relation to the terms 
" pink," " scarlet," 8?c. : it might be regarded 
as the differentia, in relation to " red rose ; " — 
as a property of " blood," — as an accident of 
* a house," fyc. 

And universally, it is to be steadily kept 
in mind, that no " common terms" have, as 
the names of individuals have, any real thing 
existing in nature corresponding to them {rohe 
Tt, as Aristotle expresses it, though he has 
been represented as the champion of the op- 
posite opinion : vide Cat eg. c. 3.), but that 
each of them is merely a name denoting a 
certain inadequate notion which our minds 
have formed of an Individual, and which, 
consequently, not including anything wherein 
that individual differs from certain others, is 
applicable equally well to all or any of them : 
thus "man" denotes no real thing (as the 
sect of the Realists maintained) distinct from 
each individual, but merely any man, viewed 
inadequately, i. e. so as to omit, and abstract 
from, all that is peculiar to each individual ; 
by which means the term becomes applicable 
alike to any one of several individuals, or 



136 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

(in the plural) to several together ; and we 
arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we 
thus choose to abstract and consider sepa- 
rately, disregarding all the rest ; so that the 
same individual may thus be referred to any 
of several different Species, and the same 
Species to several Genera, as suits our pur- 
Diiferent pose. Thus it suits the Farmer's purpose to 
I-iassScation. class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and 
other possessions, under the name of " stack :" 
the Naturalist, suitably to his purpose, classes 
them as " quadrupeds" which term would 
include wolves, deer, fyc, which to the farmer 
would be a most improper classification : the 
Commissary, again, would class them with 
corn, cheese, fish, 8pc, as "provision;" that 
which is most essential in one view, being 
subordinate in another. 

§5. 
Division, An individual is so called because it is in- 

capable of logical division ; which is a meta- 
phorical expression to signify "the distinct 
( L e, separate) enumeration of several things 
signified by one common name." This ope- 
ration is directly opposite to generalization, 
(which is performed by means of abstrac- 
tion ;) for as, in that, you lay aside the 
differences by which several things are dis- 
tinguished, so as to call them all by one 



Chap. V. § 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 137 

common name, so, in Division, you add on 
the Differences, so as to enumerate them 
by their several particular names. Thus, 
"mineral" is said to be divided into "stones, 
metals," fyc. ; and metals again into " gold, 
iron," Sfc. ; and these are called the Parts 
(or Members) of the division. 

The rules for Division are three : 1st. each 
of the Parts, or any of them short of all, 
must contain less (u e. have a narrower sig- 
nification) than the thing divided. 2d. All 
the Parts together must be exactly equal to 
the thing divided ; (therefore we must be 
careful to ascertain that the summum genus 
may be predicated of every term placed under 
it, and of nothing else.) 3d. The Parts or 
Members must be opposed ; i. e. must not be 
contained in one another: e.g. if you were 
to divide "book" into "poetical, historical, 
folio, quarto, french, latin," fyc. the members 
would be contained in each other ; for a 
french book may be a quarto, and a quarto, 
french, fyc. You must be careful, therefore, 
to keep in mind the principle of division with 
which you set out : e. g. whether you begin 
dividing books according to their matter, their 
language, or their size, Sfc. all these being so 
many c?*oss divisions. And when anything is 
capable (as in the above instance) of being 
divided in several different ways, we are not 



138 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

to reckon one of these as the true, or real, 
or right one, without specifying what the 
object is which we have in view : for one 
mode of dividing may be the most suitable 
for one purpose, and another for another ; 
as e. g. one of the above modes of dividing 
books would be the most suitable to a book- 
binder ; another in a philosophical, and the 
other in a philological view. 

It must be carefully remembered, that the 
word " Division," as employed in Logic, is, as 
has been observed already, metaphorical; for 
to divide, means, originally and properly, to 
separate the component parts of anything; 
each of which is of course absolutely less than 
the whole : e. g. a tree ('%. e. any individual tree) 
might be divided "physically," as it is called 
into root, trunk, branches, leaves, tyc. -Now 
it cannot be said that a root or a leaf is a 
tree : whereas in a Logical Division each of 
the Members is, in reality, more than the 
whole ; e. g, if you divide tree (i. e. the genus, 
tree) into oak, elm, ash, fyc. we may say of 
the oak, or of any individual oak, that "■ it is 
a tree ;" for by the very word " oak," we ex- 
press not only the general notion of a tree, 
but more, viz. the peculiar Characteristic (L e. 
Difference) of that kind of tree. 

It is plain, then, that it is logically only, 
i. e. in our mode of speaking, that a Genus 



Chap. V. § C] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 139 

is said to contain (or rather comprehend ) its 
Species ; while metaphysically, (i. e. in our 
conceptions) a Species contains, i. e, implies, 
its Genus. 

Care must be taken not to confound a phy- 
sical Division with a logical ; which beginners 
are apt to do, by introducing, in the course of 
a Division, the mention of the real Parts of 
which an Individual consists, and of each 
which accordingly the whole cannot be af- 
firmed. 

§6. 
Definition is another metaphorical word, Dcfim.it 
which literally signifies, "laying down a boun- 
dary ;" and is used in Logic to signify " an 
expression which explains any term, so as 
to separate it from everything else," as a 
boundary separates fields. A Nominal Defi- 
nition (such as are those usually found in a 
dictionary of one's own language) explains 
only the meaning of the term, by giving some 
equivalent expression, which may happen to 
be better known. Thus you might define a 
"Term," that which forms one of the ex- 
tremes or boundaries of a "proposition;" and 
a " Predicable," that which may be predi- 
cated ; " decalogue," ten commandments ; 
" telescope," an instrument for viewing distant 
objects, fyc. A Real Definition is one which 



140 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

explains and unfolds the nature of the thing ; 
and each of these kinds of definition is either 
accidental or essential. An essential Definition 
assigns (or lays down) the constituent parts of 
the essence (or nature). An accidental Defi- 
nition (which is commonly called a description) 
assigns the circumstances belonging to the 
essence, viz. Properties and Accidents (e. g, 
causes, effects, fyc): thus, "man" may be 
described as " an animal that uses fire to 
two divi- dress his food," Sfc. [And here note, that in 

sions of de- 
finition- describing a species, you cannot mention any- 
thing which is strictly an accident, because, 
if it does not belong to the whole of the 
Species, it cannot define it : in describing an 
individual, on the contrary, you enumerate 
the accidents, because by them it is that one 
individual differs from another, and in this 
case you add the species : e. g. " Philip was 
a man, of Macedon, who subdued Greece," fyc. 
Individuals, it is evident, can be defined (i, e. 
described) in this way alone.] 

Lastly, the Essential Definition is divided 
into physical (i, e. natural) and logical or 
metaphysical : the physical Definition lays 
down the real parts of the essence which are 
actually separable ; the logical, lays down the 
ideal parts of it, which cannot be separated 
except in the mind: thus, a plant would be 
defined physically, by enumerating the leaves, 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 141 

stalks, roots, fyc. of which it is composed : 
logically, it would be defined " an organized 
Being, destitute of sensation ;" the former of 
these expressions denoting the Genus, the 
latter the Difference ; for a logical definition 
must always consist of the genus and differen- 
tia, which are the parts of which Logic con- 
siders every species as consisting, and which 
evidently are separable in the mind alone. 
Thus " man" is defined ' c a rational animal," 
fyc. So also a " Proposition" might be de- 
fined, physically, " a subject and predicate 
combined by a copula : " the parts here enu- 
merated being actually separable ; but logically 
it would be defined "a sentence which affirms 
or denies ;" and these two parts of the essence 
of a Proposition (which are the genus and 
differentia of it) can be separated in the mind 
only. And note, that the Difference is not 
always one quality, but is frequently com- 
pounded of several together, no one of which 
would alone suffice. 

Definitions are divided into Nominal and 
Real, according to the object accomplished by 
them ; whether to explain, merely, the mean- 
ing of the word, or the nature of the thing : 
on the other hand, they are divided into Ac- 
cidental, Physical, and Logical, according to 
the means employed by each for accomplishing 
their respective objects ; whether it be the 



1 42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

enumeration of attributes, or of the physical, 
or the metaphysical parts of the essence. 
These, therefore, are evidently two cross di- 
visions. In this place we are concerned with 
nominal definitions only (except, indeed, of 
logical terms) because all that is requisite 
for the purposes of reasoning (which is the 
proper province of Logic) is, that a term 
shall not be used in different senses: a real 
definition of anything belongs to the science 
or system which is employed about that thing. 
It is to be noted, that in mathematics (and 
indeed in all strict Sciences) the Nominal, 
and the Real Definition exactly coincide; the 
meaning of the word, and the nature of the 
thing, being exactly the same. This holds 
good also with respect to Logical terms, 
most Legal, and many Ethical terms. 

It is scarcely credible how much confusion 
has arisen from the ignorance of these dis- 
tinctions which has prevailed among logical 
writers.* 

* In Chap. ii. § 3 of Book IV. the doctrine here laid 
down will be more fully developed. 

Aldrich, having given as an instance of a Nominal Defi- 
nition the absurd one of " homo, qui ex humo," has led 
some to conclude that the Nominal Definition must be 
founded on the etymology ; or at least that such was his 
meaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plain from 
the circumstance that Wallis (from whose work his is 
almost entirely abridged) expressly says the contrary. Be 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 143 

The principal rules for definition are three ; 
viz. 1st. The definition must be adequate ; i. c. 
neither too extensive nor too narrow for the 
thing defined : e. g. to define u fish," " an 
animal that lives in the water," would be too 
extensive, because many insects, fyc. live in 
the water ; to define it, " an animal that 
has an air-bladder," would be too narrow ; 
because many fish are without any. 

2d. The definition must be in itself plainer 
than the thing defined, else it would not ex- 
plain it : I say, " in itself," {i. e. generally) 
because, to some particular person, the term 
defined may happen to be even more familiar 
and better understood, than the language of 
the definition. 

3d. The Third Rule usually given by Logi- 
cians for a definition, is, that it should be 
couched in a convenient number of appropriate 
words (if such can be found suitable for the 
purpose) : since figurative words (which are 
opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce am- 
biguity or indistinctness ; too great brevity may 
occasion obscurity; and too great prolixity, con- 
fusion. But this perhaps is rather an admonition 
with respect to Style, than a strictly logical 
rule ; nor can we accordingly determine with 

this as it may, however, it is plain that the etymology of 
a term has nothing to do with any logical consideration of 
it. See note to § S, of Book III. 



144 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

precision, in each case, whether it has been 
complied with or not ; there is no drawing the 
line between " too long" and "too concise/' 
fyc. Nor would a definition unnecessarily 
prolix be censured as 'incorrect, but as inele- 
gant, inconvenient, fyc. If, however, a defini- 
tion be chargeable with Tautology, (which is 
a distinct fault from prolixity or verbosity) it 
is properly incorrect, though without offend- 
ing against the first two rules. Tautology 
consists in inserting too much, not in mere 
words, but in sense ; yet not so as too much to 
narrow the definition (in opposition to Rule 1.) 
by excluding some things which belong to the 
class of the thing defined ; but only, so as to 
state something which has been already im- 
plied. Thus, to define a Parallelogram ts a 
four-sided figure whose opposite sides are 
parallel and equal, would be tautological ; be- 
cause, though it is true that such a figure, and 
such alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of 
the sides is implied in their being parallel, and 
may be proved from it. Now the insertion of 
the words " and equal," leaves, and indeed 
leads, a reader to suppose that there may be 
a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are 
parallel but not equal.* Though therefore 

* This would be inferred according to the principle of 
" exceptio probat regulum," an exception proves a rule. 
The force of the maxim is this; (for it is not properly 



Chap. V. § C.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 145 

such a definition asserts nothing false, it 
leads to a supposition of what is false ; and 
consequently is to be regarded as an incor- 
rect definition. 

confined to the case where an exception, strictly so called, 
is mentioned) that the mention of any circumstance intro- 
duced into the statement of a precept, law, remark, fyc. (for 
the application of the maxim is not confined to the case 
of Definitions) is to be presumed necessary to be inserted ; 
so that the precept, tyc. would not hold good if this cir- 
cumstance were absent. If e. g. it be laid down that he 
who breaks into an empty house shall receive a certain 
punishment, it would be inferred that this punishment 
would not be incurred by breaking into an occupied house : 
if it were told us that some celestial phenomenon could 
not be seen by the naked eye, it would be inferred that it 
would be visible through a telescope : fyc. 

And much is often inferred in this manner, which was 
by no means in the Author's mind; from his having in- 
accurately inserted what chanced to be present to his 
thoughts. Thus, he who says that it is a crime for people 
to violate the property of a humane Landlord who lives 
among them, may perhaps not mean to imply that it is no 
crime to violate the property of an absentee-landlord, or 
of one who is not humane ; but he leaves an opening for 
being so understood. Thus again (to recur to the case 
of definitions) in saying that " an animal which breathes 
through gills and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false 
is asserted, a presumption is afforded that you mean to 
give too narrow a definition ; in violation of Rule I. 

And Tautology, as above described, is sure to mislead 
any one who interprets what is said, conformably to the 
maxim that the exception proves a rule. 



146 [Book III. 



BOOK III. 
OF FALLACIES. 

Introduction. 

Definition of By a Fallacy is commonly understood, " any 
unsound mode of arguing, which appears to 
demand our conviction, and to be decisive of 
the question in hand, when in fairness it is 
not." Considering the ready detection and 
clear exposure of Fallacies to be both more 
extensively important, and also more difficult, 
than many are aware of, I propose to take 
a Logical view of the subject ; referring the 
different Fallacies to the most convenient 
heads, and giving a scientific analysis of the 
procedure which takes place in each. 

After all, indeed, in the practical detection 
of each individual Fallacy, much must depend 
on natural and acquired acuteness ; nor can 
any rules be given, the mere learning of 
which will enable us to apply them with me- 
chanical certainty and readiness : but still we 
shall find that to take correct general views 
of the subject, and to be familiarized with 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 147 

scientific discussions of it, will tend, above all 
things, to engender such a habit of mind, as 
will best fit us for practice. 

Indeed the case is the same with respect to 
Logic in general ; scarcely any one would, in 
ordinary practice, state to himself either his 
own or another's reasoning, in Syllogisms in 
Barbara at full length ; yet a familiarity with 
Logical principles tends very much (as all 
feel, who are really well acquainted with 
them) to beget a habit of clear and sound 
reasoning. The truth is, in this, as in many 
other things, there are processes going on in 
the mind (when we are practising anything 
quite familiar to us) with such rapidity as to 
leave no trace in the memory ; and we often 
apply principles which did not, as far as 
we are conscious, even occur to us at the 
time. 

It would be foreign, however, to the pre- inaccurate 

language of 

sent purpose, to investigate fully the manner t f ^ er wri - 
in which certain studies operate in remotely 
producing certain effects on the mind : it is 
sufficient to establish the fact, that habits of 
scientific analysis (besides the intrinsic beauty 
and dignity of such studies) lead to practical 
advantage. It is on Logical principles there- 
fore that I propose to discuss the subject of 
Fallacies; and it may, indeed, seem to have 
been unnecessary to make any apology for 

l 2 



148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

so doing, after what has been formerly said, 
generally, in defence of Logic ; but that the 
generality of Logical writers have usually fol- 
lowed so opposite a plan : whenever they have 
to treat of anything that is beyond the mere 
elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all 
reference to the principles they have been 
occupied in establishing and explaining, and 
have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular 
kind of language ; such as would be the best 
suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but 
seems strangely incongruous in a professed 
Logical treatise. What should we think of 
a Geometrical writer, who, after having gone 
through the elements with strict definitions 
and demonstrations, should, on proceeding 
to Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference 
to scientific principles, — all use of technical 
terms, — and treat of the subject in undefined 
terms, and with probable and popular argu- 
ments ? It would be thought strange, if even 
a Botanist, when addressing those whom he 
had been instructing in the principles and the 
terms of his system, should totally lay these 
aside when he came to describe plants, and 
adopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it 
affords but too much plausibility to the cavils 
of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that 
the very writers who profess to teach it should 
never themselves make any application of, or 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 149 

reference to, its principles, on those very occa- 
sions, when, and xvhen only, such application 
and reference are to be expected. If the 
principles of any system are well laid down, — 
if its technical language is judiciously framed, 
— then, surely, those principles and that lan- 
guage will afford (for those who have once 
thoroughly learned them) the best, the most 
clear, simple, and concise method of treating 
any subject connected with that system. Yet 
even the accurate Aldrich, in treating of the 
Dilemma and of the Fallacies, has very much 
forgotten the Logician, and assumed a loose 
and rhetorical style of writing, without making 
any application of the principles he had for- 
merly laid down, but, on the contrary, some- 
times departing widely from them.* 

The most experienced teachers, when ad- 
dressing those who are familiar with the 
elementary principles of Logic, think it re- 
quisite, not indeed to lead them, on each 
occasion, through the xvhole detail of those 

* He is far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies 
than in any other part of his treatise ; of which this one 
instance may serve : after having distinguished Fallacies 
into those in the expression, and those in the matter (" in 
dictione," and " extra dictionem,") he observes of one or 
two of these last, that they are not properly called Falla- 
cies, as not being Syllogisms faulty in form (" Syllogismi 
forma peccantcs,") as if any one, which was such, could 
be " Fallacia extra dictionem" 



150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

principles, when the process is quite obvious, 
but always to put them on the road, as it were, 
to those principles, that they may plainly see 
their own way to the end, and take a scientific 
view of the subject : in the same manner as 
mathematical writers avoid indeed the occa- 
sional tediousness of going all through a very 
simple demonstration, which the learner, if he 
will, may easily supply ; but yet always speak 
in strict mathematical language, and with re- 
ference to mathematical principles, though 
they do not always state them at full length. 
I would not profess, therefore, any more than 
they do, to write (on subjects connected with 
the science) in a language intelligible to those 
who are ignorant of its first rudiments : to do 
so, indeed, would imply that one was not 
taking a scientific view of the subject, nor 
availing one's-self of the principles that had 
been established, and the accurate and con- 
cise technical language that had been framed. 
Mistakes as The rules already given enable us to de- 

to the office 

of Logic, velop the principles on which all reasoning 
is conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter 
of it, and to ascertain the validity or fal- 
laciousness of any apparent argument, as far 
as the form of expression is concerned; that 
being alone the proper province of Logic. 

But it is evident that we may nevertheless 
remain liable to be deceived or perplexed in 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 151 

Argument by the assumption of false or doubt- 
ful Premises, or by the employment of in- 
distinct or ambiguous Terms; and, accordingly, 
many Logical writers, wishing to make then- 
systems appear as perfect as possible, have 
undertaken to give rules " for attaining clear 
ideas," and for " guiding the judgment ;" and 
fancying or professing themselves successful in 
this, have consistently enough denominated 
Logic, the " Art of using the Reason ;" which 
in truth it would be, and would nearly super- 
sede all other studies, if it could of itself 
ascertain the meaning of every Term, and the 
truth or falsity of every Proposition, in the 
same manner as it actually can the validity of 
every Argument. And they have been led 
into this, partly by the consideration that 
Logic is concerned about the three operations 
of the mind — simple Apprehension, Judgment, 
and Reasoning ; not observing that it is not 
equally concerned about all : the last opera- 
tion being alone its appropriate province ; 
and the rest being treated of only in reference 
to that. 

The contempt justly due to such preten- 
sions has most unjustly fallen on the Science 
itself; much in the same manner as Chemistry 
was brought into disrepute among the un- 
thinking, by the extravagant pretensions of 
the Alchy mists. And those Logical writers 



152 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book III. 

have been censured, not (as they should have 
been) for making such professions, but for not 
fulfilling them. It has been objected, espe- 
cially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at 
a loss as to the most important and difficult 
point in Reasoning ; viz, the ascertaining the 
sense of the terms employed, and removing 
their ambiguity. A complaint resembling that 
made (according to a story told by Warbur- 
ton,* and before alluded to) by a man who 
found fault with all the reading-glasses pre- 
sented to him by the shopkeeper ; the fact 
being that he never learnt to read. In the 
present case, the complaint is the more un- 
reasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor 
ever can possibly be, any such system devised 
as will effect the proposed object of clearing 
up the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however, 
no small advantage, that the rules of Logic, 
though they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear 
up ambiguity in any Term, yet do point out 
in which Term of an Argument it is to be 
sought for ; directing our attention to the 
middle Term, as the one on the ambiguity of 
which a Fallacy is likely to be built. 

It will be useful, however, to class and 
describe the different kinds of ambiguity 
which are to be met with; and also the 
various ways in which the insertion of false, 

* In his Div. Leg. 



§1.J OF FALLACIES. 153 

or, at least, unduly assumed, Premises, is 
most likely to elude observation. And though 
the remarks which will be offered on these 
points may not be considered as strictly form- 
ing a part of Logic, they cannot be thought 
out of place, when it is considered how essen- 
tially they are connected with the application 
of it. 

§ 1- 

The division of Fallacies into those in the Division of 

Fallacies. 

words (IN DICTIONE,) and those in the 
matter (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not 
been, by any writers hitherto, grounded on 
any distinct principle : at least, not on any 
that they have themselves adhered to. The 
confounding together, however, of these two 
classes is highly detrimental to all clear no- 
tions concerning Logic ; being obviously allied 
to the prevailing erroneous views which make 
Logic the art of emploijing the intellectual 
faculties in general, having the discovery of 
truth for its object, and all kinds of know- 
ledge for its proper subject-matter ; with all 
that train of vague and groundless specu- 
lations which have led to such interminable 
confusion and mistakes, and afforded a pre- 
text for such clamorous censures. 

It is important, therefore, that rules should 
be given for a division of Fallacies into 



154 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

Logical and Non-logical, on such a principle 
as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness 
and perplexity. 

If any one should object, that the division 
about to be adopted is in some degree arbi- 
trary, placing under the one head Fallacies, 
which many might be disposed to place under 
the other, let him consider not only the in- 
distinctness of all former divisions, but the 
utter impossibility of framing any that shall 
be completely secure from the objection urged, 
in a case where men have formed such various 
and vague notions, from the very want of 
some clear principle of division. Nay, from 
the elliptical form in which all reasoning is 
usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved 
and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the 
most part conveyed, it must of course be 
often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbi- 
trary choice, not only to which genus each 
hind of Fallacy should be referred, but even 
to which kind to refer any one individual Fal- 
lacy : for since, in any course of Argument, 
one Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently 
happens, in the case of a Fallacy, that the 
hearers are left to the alternative of supplying 
either a Premiss which is not true, or else, one 
indetermi- which does not prove the Conclusion ; e. g. if a 

nate charac- 

;^j° s fFal * man expatiates on the distress of the country, 
and thence argues that the government is 



§2.] OF FALLACIES. 155 

tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume 
either that " every distressed country is under 
a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, or, 
merely that " every country under a tyranny 
is distressed," which, however true, proves 
nothing, the Middle Term being undistributed. 
Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would 
be referred to the head of " extra dictionem ;" 
in the latter to that of "in dictione :" which 
are we to suppose the speaker meant us to 
understand? Surely just whichever each of 
his hearers might happen to prefer : some 
might assent to the false Premiss ; others, 
allow the unsound Syllogism : to the Sophist 
himself it is indifferent, as long as they can 
but be brought to admit the Conclusion. 

Without pretending, then, to conform to 
every one's mode of speaking on the subject, 
or~to lay down rules which shall be in them- 
selves (without any call for labour or skill in 
the person who employs them) readily appli- 
cable to, and decisive on each individual case, 
I propose a division which is at least perfectly 
clear in its main principle, and coincides, per- 
haps, as nearly as possible with the established 
notions of Logicians on the subject. 



§ 2 

, t\ 
does, or does not follow from the Premises. 



In every Fallacy, the Conclusion either l 

J J ' Fallacies. 



156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

Where the Conclusion does not follow from 
the Premises, it is manifest that the fault is 
in the Reasoning, and in that alone ; these, 
therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being, 
properly, violations of those rules of Reason- 
ing which it is the province of Logic to lay 
down. 

Of these, however, one kind are more purely 
Logical, as exhibiting their fallaciousness by 
the bare form of the expression, without any 
regard to the meaning of the Terms : to 
which class belong : 1 st. Undistributed Middle ; 
2d. Illicit Process ; 3d. Negative Premises, or 
Affirmative Conclusion from a negative Pre- 
miss, and vice versa : to which may be added, 
4th. those which have palpably (i.e. expressed) 
more than three Terms. 

The other kind may be most properly called 
semi-logical ; viz. all the cases of ambiguous 
middle Term except its non-distribution : for 
though in such cases the conclusion does not 
follow, and though the rules of Logic show 
that it does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the 
middle Term is ascertained, yet the discovery 
and ascertainment of this ambiguity requires 
attention to the sense of the term, and know- 
ledge of the Subject-matter; so that here, 



* In the same manner as we call that a criminal court 
in which crimes are judged. 



§2.] OF FALLACIES. 157 

Logic " teaches us not how to find the Fallacy, 
but only where to search for it," and on what 
principles to condemn it. 

Accordingly it has been made a subject of 
bitter complaint against Logic, that it presup- 
poses the most difficult point to be already 
accomplished, viz the sense of the Terms to 
be ascertained. A similar objection might be 
urged against every other art in existence ; 
e. g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts 
for the cultivation of land presuppose the 
possession of a farm ; or against Perspective, 
that its rules are useless to a blind man. The 
objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when 
urged against Logic, because the object which 
it is blamed for not accomplishing cannot j>os- 
sibly be within the province of any one art 
whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceiv- 
able that there should be any method, science, 
or system, that should enable one to know 
the full and exact meaning of every term in 
existence ? The utmost that can be done is 
to give some general rules that may assist us 
in this work ; which is done in the first two 
chapters of Book II. 

The very author of the objection says, 
" This (the comprehension of the meaning of 
general Terms) is a study which every in- 
dividual must carry on for himself; and of 
which no rules of Logic (how useful soever 



158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

they may be in directing our labours) can 
supersede the necessity." D. Stewart, Phil. 
Vol. II. chap. ii. s. 2. 

Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal 
from men their imperfect conception of the 
meaning of a term, than the circumstance of 
their being able fully to comprehend a process 
of reasoning in which it is involved, without 
attaching any distinct meaning at all to 
that Term; as is evident when X Y Z are 
used to stand for Terms, in a regular Syllo- 
gism : thus a man may be familiarized with a 
Term, and never find himself at a loss from 
not comprehending it ; from which he will be 
very likely to infer that he does comprehend 
it, when perhaps he does not, but employs it 
vaguely and incorrectly; which leads to fal- 
lacious Reasoning and. confusion. It must be 
owned, however, that many Logical writers 
have, in great measure, brought on themselves 
the reproach in question, by calling Logic 
" the right use of Reason, " laying down 
" rules for gaining clear ideas," and such-like 
akafavela, as Aristotle calls it. (Rhet. Book I. 
Chap, ii.) 

§3. 

Material Fai- The remaining class (viz. where the Conclu- 
sion does follow from the Premises) may be 
called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies : 



§3.] OF FALLACIES. 159 

of these there are two kinds ; * 1st. when 
the Premises are such as ought not to have 
been assumed ; 2d. when the Conclusion is 
not the one required, but irrelevant ; which 
Fallacy is called " ignoratio elenchi" because 
your Argument is not the " elenchus" (i, e. 
proof of the contradictor?/) of your opponent's 
assertion, which it should be ; but proves, in- 
stead of that, some other proposition resem- 
bling it. Hence, since Logic defines what 
Contradiction is, some may choose rather to 
range this with the Logical Fallacies, as it 
seems, so far, to come under the jurisdiction 
of that art ; nevertheless, it is perhaps better 
to adhere to the original division, both on 
account of its clearness, and also because few 
would be inclined to apply to the Fallacy in 
question the accusation of being inconclusive, 
and consequently illogical reasoning : besides 
which, it seems an artificial and circuitous 
way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an 
opponent and a contradiction ; the simple state- 
ment of the matter being this, — I am required, 
by the circumstances of the case, (no matter 
why) to prove a certain Conclusion ; I prove, 
not that, but one which is likely to be mis- 
taken for it; — in this lies the Fallacy. 

* For it is manifest that the fault, if there be any, must 
be either 1st. in the Premises, or 2dly. in the Conclusion, 
or 3dly. in the Connexion between them. 



160 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

It might be desirable therefore to lay aside 
the name of " ignoratio elenchi," but that it 
is so generally adopted as absolutely to re- 
quire some mention to be made of it. The 
other kind of Fallacies in the Matter will 
comprehend (as far as the vague and ob- 
scure language of Logical writers will allow 
us to conjecture) the fallacy of " non causa 
pro causa" and that of " petitio principii:" of 
these, the former is by them distinguished into 
" a non vera pro vera" and " a non tali pro 
tali;" this last would appear to be arguing 
from a case not parallel as if it were so ; 
which, in Logical language, is, having the 
suppressed Premiss false ; for it is in that the 
parallelism is affirmed ; and the " non vera 
pro vera" will in like manner signify the ex- 
pressed Premiss being false ; so that this Fal- 
lacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, neither 
more nor less than falsity (or unfair assump- 
tion) of a Premiss. 

The remaining kind, "petitio principii" 
(begging the question>) takes place when a 
Premiss, whether true or false, is either 
plainly equivalent to the Conclusion, or de- 
pends on it for its own reception. It is to 
be observed, however, that in all correct 
Reasoning the Premises must, virtually, im- 
ply the Conclusion ; so that it is not possi- 
ble to mark precisely the distinction between 



§ 4.] OF FALLACIES. l(jl 

the Fallacy in question and fair Argument; 
since that may be correct and fair Rea- 
soning to one person, which would be, to 
another, " begging the question ; " inasmuch 
as to one, the Conclusion might be more 
evident than the Premiss, and to the other, 
the reverse. The most plausible form of this 
Fallacy is arguing in a circle; and the greater 
the circle, the harder to detect. 

§4- 

There is no Fallacy that may not properly 
be included under some of the foregoing 
heads : those which in. the Logical treatises 
are separately enumerated, and contradistin- 
guished from these, being in reality instances 
of them, and therefore more properly enume- 
rated inlthe subdivision thereof; as in the 
scheme annexed : — 



M 



162 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 



[Book III. 



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S3 






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2 2.0I 



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J 3 co 

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o EL 



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|5.J OF FALLACIES. 163 

§5. 

On each of the Fallacies which have been 
thus enumerated and distinguished, I propose 
to offer some more particular remarks ; but 
before I proceed to this, it will be proper to 
premise two general observations, 1st. on the 
importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detect- 
ing and describing Fallacies : both have been 
already slightly alluded to ; but it is requisite 
that they should here be somewhat more fully 
and distinctly set forth. 

1st. It seems by most persons to be taken 
for granted that a Fallacy is to be dreaded importance 

of detecting 

merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by Faiude.. 
a skilful sophist ; or if they allow that a man 
may with honest intentions slide into one un- 
consciously, in the heat of argument, still they 
seem to suppose that where there is no dispute, 
there is no cause to dread Fallacy ; whereas 
there is much danger, even in what may be 
called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares 
into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far 
deceived as even to act upon the conclusion 
thus obtained. By solitary reasoning I mean 
the case in which one is not seeking for argu- 
ments to prove a given question, but labouring 
to elicit from one's previous stock of know- 
ledge some useful inference.* To select one 

* See the chapter on " inferring and proving," (Book IV. 
Ch. iii.) in the Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning. 

M 2 



164 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

from innumerable examples that might be 
cited, and of which some more will occur in 
the subsequent part of this essay; it is not 
improbable that many indifferent sermons 
have been produced by the ambiguity of the 
word "plain:" a young divine perceives the 
truth of the maxim, that " for the lower 
orders one's language cannot be too plain:" 
(i. e. clear and perspicuous, so as to require 
no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,) 
and when he proceeds to practise, the word 
"plain" indistinctly flits before him, as it 
were, and often checks him in the use of 
ornaments of style, such as metaphor, epithet, 
antithesis, fyc, which are opposed to " plain- 
ness" in a totally different sense of the word ; 
being by no means necessarily adverse to 
perspicuity, but rather, in many cases, con- 
ducive to it ; as may be seen in several of 
the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which 
are the very ones that are the most richly 
adorned with figurative language. So far in- 
deed is an ornamented style from being unfit 
for the vulgar, that they are pleased with it even 
in excess. Yet the desire to be " plain," com- 
bined with that dim and confused notion which 
the ambiguity of the word produces in such 
as do not separate in their minds, and set 
before themselves, the two meanings, often 
causes them to write in a dry and bald style, 



§5.] OF FALLACIES. 165 

which has no advantage in point of perspicuity, 
and is least of all suited to the taste of the 
vulgar. The above instance is not drawn 
from- mere conjecture, but from actual expe- 
rience of the fact. 

Another instance of the strong influence of innueucc of 

words ou 

words on our ideas may be adduced from a th0p s bt '- 
widely different subject : most persons feel a 
certain degree of surprise on first hearing of 
the result of some late experiments of the 
Agricultural Chemists, by which they have 
ascertained that universally what are called 
heavy soils are specifically the lightest ; and 
vice versa. Whence this surprise ? for no one 
ever distinctly believed the established names 
to be used in the literal and primary sense, in 
consequence of the respective soils having 
been xveighed together ; indeed it is obvious 
on a moment's reflection that tenacious clay- 
soils (as well as muddy roads) are figuratively 
called heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing, 
or passing over them, which produces an effect 
like that of bearing or dragging a heavy 
weight ; yet still the terms u light" and 
" heavy," though used figuratively, have most 
undoubtedly introduced into men's minds 
something of the ideas expressed by them in 
their primitive sense. The same words, when 
applied to articles of diet, have produced im- 
portant errors ; many supposing some article 



166 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

of food to be light of digestion from its being 
specifically light. So true is the ingenious ob- 
servation of Hobbes, that " words are the 
counters of wise men, and the money of 
fools."* 

* " Men imagine," says Bacon, " that their minds have 
the command of Language ; but it often happens that 
Language bears rule over their mind." Some of the 
weak and absurd arguments which are often urged against 
Suicide may be traced to the influence of words on 
thoughts. When a Christian moralist is called on for a 
direct Scriptural precept against suicide, instead of reply- 
ing that the Bible is not meant for a complete code of 
laws, but for a system of motives and principles, the answer 
frequently given is " thou shalt do no murder ;" and it is 
assumed in the arguments drawn from Reason, as well as 
in those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of 
Murder; viz. because it is called se\£-murder; and thus, 
deluded by a name, many are led to rest on an unsound 
argument, which, like all other fallacies, does more harm 
than good, in the end, to the cause of truth. Suicide, if 
any one considers the nature and not the name of it, 
evidently wants the most essential characteristic of mur- 
der, viz. the hurt and injury done to one's neighbour, in 
depriving him of life, as well as to others by the insecurity 
they are in consequence liable to feel. And since no one 
can, strictly speaking, do injustice to himself, he cannot, 
in the literal and primary acceptation of the words, be said 
either to rob or to murder himself. He who deserts the 
post to which he is appointed by his great Master, and 
presumptuously cuts short the state of probation graciously 
allowed him for working out his salvation, (whether by 
action or by patient endurance,) is guilty indeed of a 
grievous sin, but of one not the least analogous in its 
character to murder. It implies no inhumanity. It is 
much more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in 



§5.] OF FALLACIES. 167 

More especially deserving of attention is 
the influence of Analogical Terms in leading 
men into erroneous notions in Theology ; 
where the most important terms are analogi- 
cal ; and yet they are continually employed 
in Reasoning, without due attention (oftener 
through want of caution than by unfair de- 
sign) to their analogical nature ; and most of 
the errors into which theologians have fallen 
may be traced, in part, to this cause.* 

In speaking of the importance of refuting 
Fallacies, (under which name I include, as 
will be seen, any false assumption employed as 
a premiss) this consideration ought not to be 
overlooked ; that an unsound Principle, which 
has been employed to establish some mis- 
indolence, or in trifling pursuits, — that life which is be- 
stowed as a seed-time for the harvest of immortality. What 
is called in familiar phrase " killing time," is, in truth, an 
approach, as far as it goes, to the destruction of one's own 
life : for " Time is the stuff life is made of." 

It is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such 
arguments as will bear the test of a close examination, 
than to resort to such as may indeed at the first glance 
be more specious and appear stronger, but which, when 
exposed, will too often leave a man a dupe to the fallacies 
on the opposite side. But it is especially the error of 
controversialists to urge every thing that can be urged ; 
to snatch up the first weapon that comes to hand ; 
(" furor arma ministrat ;") without waiting to consider 
what is TRUE. 

* Sec the notes to Ch. v. § 1. of the Dissertation sub- 
joined. 



168 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IIL 

chievously false Conclusion, does not at once 
become harmless, and too insignificant to be 
worth refuting, as soon as that conclusion is 
given up, and the false Principle is no longer 
employed for that particular use. It may 
equally well lead to some other no less mis- 
chievous result. " A false premiss, according 
as it is combined with this, or with that, true 
one, will lead to two different false conclu- 
sions. Thus, if the principle be admitted, 
that any important religious errors ought to 
be forcibly suppressed, this may lead either 
to persecution on the one side, or to latitudi- 
narian indifference on the other. Some may 
be led to justify the suppression of heresies by 
the civil sword ; and others, whose feelings 
revolt at such a procedure, and who see per- 
secution reprobated and discountenanced by 
those around them, may be led by the same 
principle to regard religious errors as of little 
or no importance, and all religious persuasions 
as equally acceptable in the sight of God." * 

Thus much, as to the extensive practical in- 
fluence of Fallacies, and the consequent high 
importance of detecting and exposing them. 

§6. 

Difficulty of 2dly. The second remark is, that while 

detecting . 

Fallacies, sound reasoning is ever the more readily 
* The Errors of Romanism, Ch. v. § 2. p. 228. 



§C] OF FALLACIES. 169 

admitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be 
such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected 
as soon as perceived, will, of course, be the 
more likely to obtain reception, the more it is 
obscured and disguised by obliquity and com- 
plexity of expression : it is thus that it is the 
most likely. either to slip accidentally from the 
careless reasoner, or to be brought forward 
deliberately by the Sophist. Not that he 
ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to 
be perceived ; on the contrary, it is for his 
purpose that the expression should appear as 
clear and simple as possible, while in reality it 
is the most tangled net he can contrive. 
Thus, whereas it is usual to express our rea- 
soning, elliptically, so that a Premiss (or even 
two or three entire steps in a course of argu- 
ment) which may be readily supplied, as being 
perfectly obvious, shall be left to be under- 
stood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses 
what is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest 
part of the argument : and uses every other 
contrivance to withdraw our attention (his 
art closely resembling the juggler's) from the 
quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the 
uncertainty before mentioned, to which class 
any individual Fallacy is to be referred : and 
hence it is that the difficulty of detecting and 
exposing Fallacy, is so much greater than that 
of comprehending and developing a process of 



170 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book III. 

sound argument. It is like the detection and 
apprehension of a criminal in spite of all his 
arts of concealment and disguise ; when this is 
accomplished, and he is brought to trial with 
all the evidence of his guilt produced, his con- 
viction and punishment are easy ; and this is 
precisely the case with those Fallacies which 
are given as examples in Logical treatises ; 
they are in fact already detected, by being 
stated in a plain and regular form, and are, as 
it were, only brought up to receive sentence. 
Or again, fallacious reasoning may be com- 
pared to a perplexed and entangled mass of 
accounts, which it requires much sagacity and 
close attention to clear up, and display in a 
regular and intelligible form ; though when this 
is once accomplished, the whole appears so per- 
fectly simple, that the unthinking are apt to 
undervalue the skill and pains which have 
been employed upon it. 

Moreover, it should be remembered that a 
very long discussion is one of the most effec- 
tual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, like poison, 
is at once detected, and nauseated, when 
presented to us in a concentrated form ; but 
a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few 
sentences, would not deceive a child, may 
deceive half the world, if diluted in a quarto 
volume. For, as in a calculation, one single 
figure incorrectly stated will enable us to 



§ (J.J OF FALLACIES. 1 7 i 

arrive at any result whatever, though every 
other figure, and the whole of the operations, 
be correct, so, a single false assumption in any 
process of reasoning, though every other be 
true, will enable us to draw what conclusion 
we please ; and the greater the number of 
true assumptions, the more likely it is that 
the false one will pass unnoticed.* But 
when you single out one step in the course of 
the reasoning, and exhibit it as a Syllogism 
with one Premiss true and the other false, the 
sophistry is easily perceived. To use another 
illustration, it is true in a course of argument, 
as in Mechanics, that " nothing is stronger 
than its weakest part ;" and consequently a 

* I have seen a long argument to prove that the potato 
is not a cheap article of food ; in which there was an ela- 
borate, and perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per 
acre of potatoes, and of wheat, — the quantity lost in bran — 
expense of grinding, dressing, $c. and an assumption 
slipped in, as it were incidentally, that a given quantity of 
potatoes contains but one-tenth part of nutritive matter equal 
to bread : from all which (and there is probably but one 
groundless assertion in the whole) a most triumphant 
result was deduced. This, however, gained the undoubt- 
ing assent of a Review by no means friendly to the author, 
and usually noted more for scepticism than for ready 
assent ! u All things," says an apocryphal writer, " are 
double, one against another, and nothing is made in vain :" 
unblushing assertors of falsehood seem to have a race of 
easy believers provided on purpose for their use : men 
who will not indeed believe the best-established truths 
of religion, but are ready to believe any thing else. 



172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

chain which has one faulty link will break : 
but though the number of the sound links 
adds nothing to the strength of the chain, it 
adds much to the chance of the faulty one's 
escaping observation. 

To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies 
that have ever been enumerated as too glaring 
and obvious to need even being mentioned, 
because the simple instances given in logical 
treatises, and there stated in the plainest 
and consequently most easily detected form, 
are such as would (in that form) deceive no 
one; — this, surely, shows extreme weakness, 
or else unfairness. It may readily be allowed, 
indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and 
bring them under the general rules, is a harder 
task than to lay down those general rules ; 
but this does not prove that the latter office 
is trifling or useless, or that it does not essen- 
tially conduce to the performance of the 
other : there may be more ingenuity shown 
in detecting and arresting a malefactor, and 
convicting him of the fact, than in laying 
down a law for the trial and punishment of 
such persons ; but the latter office, L e, that 
of a legislator, is surely neither unnecessary 
nor trifling. 

It should be added that a close observation 
and Logical analysis of Fallacious arguments, 
as it tends (according to what has been already 



§ 7.] OF FALLACIES. 173 

said) to form a habit of mind well suited for 
the practical detection of Fallacies ; so, for 
that very reason, it will make us the more 
careful in making allowance for them : i. e. to 
bear in mind how much men in general are 
liable to be influenced by them. E. G. a re- 
futed argument ought to go for nothing ; but in 
fact it will generally prove detrimental to the 
cause, from the Fallacy which will be pre- 
sently explained. Now, no one is more likely 
to be practically aware of this, and to take 
precautions accordingly, than he who is most 
versed in the whole theory of Fallacies ; for 
the best Logician is the least likely to calcu- 
late on men in general being such. 

§7. 
Of Fallacies in form, 

enough has already been said in the pre- 
ceding Compendium : and it has been re- 
marked above, that it is often left to our 
choice to refer an individual Fallacy to this 
head or to another. 

To the present class we may the most con- 
veniently refer those Fallacies, so common in 
practice, of supposing the conclusion false, 
because the Premiss is false, or because the 
argument is unsound ; and inferring the truth 
of the Premiss from that of the Conclusion ; 



174 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. k [Book III. 

e.g. if any one argues for the existence of a 
God, from its being universally believed, a 
man might perhaps be able to refute the argu- 
ment by producing an instance of some nation 
destitute of such belief; the argument ought 
then (as has been observed above) to go for 
nothing : but many would go further, and 
think that this refutation had disproved the 
existence of a God ; in which they would be 
guilty of an illicit process of the major term ; 
viz. " whatever is universally believed must 
be true ; the existence of a God is not uni- 
versally believed; therefore it is not true." 
Others again from being convinced of the 
truth of the conclusion would infer that of the 
Premises; which would amount to the Fal- 
lacy of an undistributed middle : viz. " what 
is universally believed, is true ; the existence 
of a God is true ; therefore it is universally 
believed." Or, these Fallacies might be stated 
in the hypothetical form; since the one evi- 
dently proceeds from the denial of the antece- 
dent to the denial of the consequent ; and the 
other from the establishing of the consequent 
to the inferring of the antecedent ; which two 
Fallacies will often be found to correspond 
respectively with those of Illicit process of the 
major, and Undistributed middle. 

Fallacies of this class are very much kept 
out of sight, being seldom perceived even by 



§ 7.] OF FALLACIES. 175 

those who employ them ; but of their prac- 
tical importance there can be no doubt, since 
it is notorious that a weak argument is always, 
in practice, detrimental ; and that there is no 
absurdity so gross which men will not readily 
admit, if it appears to lead to a conclusion of 
which they are already convinced. Even a 
candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to 
be, by this means, misled, when he is seeking 
for arguments to support a conclusion which 
he has long been fully convinced of himself ; 
L e. he will often use such arguments as 
would never have convinced himself, and are 
not likely to convince others, but rather (by 
the operation of the converse Fallacy) to 
confirm in their dissent those who before dis- 
agreed with him. 

It is best therefore to endeavour to put 
yourself in the place of an opponent to your 
own arguments, and consider whether you 
could not find some objection to them. The 
applause of one's own party is a very unsafe 
ground for judging of the real force of an 
argumentative work, and consequently of its 
real utility. To satisfy those who were doubt- 
ing, and to convince those who were opposed, 
are the only sure tests : but these persons are 
seldom very loud in their applause, or very 
forward in bearing their testimony. 



176 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

Of Ambiguous middle. 
§8. 

That case in which the middle is undistri- 
buted belongs of course to the preceding head, 
the fault being perfectly manifest from the 
mere form of the expression : in that case the 
extremes are compared with two parts of the 
same term ; but in the Fallacy which has been 
called semi-logical, (which we are now to 
speak of) the extremes are compared with 
two different terms, the middle being used in 
two different senses in the two Premises.* 

And here it may be remarked, that when 
the argument is brought into the form of a 
regular Syllogism, the contrast between these 
two senses will usually appear very striking, 
from the two Premises being placed together ; 
and hence the scorn with which many have 
treated the very mention of the Fallacy of 
Equivocation, deriving their only notion of it 
from the exposure of it in Logical treatises ; 
whereas, in practice it is common for the two 
Premises to be placed very far apart, and dis- 
cussed in different parts of the discourse ; by 
which means the inattentive hearer overlooks 
any ambiguity that may exist in the middle 

* For some instances of important ambiguities, see 
Appendix. 



§8.J OF FALLACIES. 177 

term. Hence the advantage of Logical ha- 
bits, to fix our attention strongly and steadily 
on the important terms of an argument. 

One case, which may be regarded as com- paronymous 

word?. 

ing under the head of Ambiguous middle, is, 
what is called, " Fallacia Figures Dictionis" 
the Fallacy built on the grammatical structure 
of language, from men's usually taking for 
granted that paronymous words ( i. e. those 
belonging to each other, as the substantive, 
adjective, verb, fyc. of the same root) have a 
precisely correspondent meaning ; which is by 
no means universally the case. Such a fallacy 
could not indeed be even exhibited in strict 
Logical form, which would preclude even the 
attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in 
sound as well as sense : but nothing is more 
common in practice than to vary continually 
the terms employed, with a view to grammati- 
cal convenience ; nor is there anything unfair 
in such a practice, as long as the meaning is 
preserved unaltered : e. g. " murder should be 
punished with death ; this man is a murderer ; 
therefore he deserves to die," fyc. Spc. Here 
we proceed on the assumption (in this case 
just) that to commit murder and to be a mur- 
derer, — to deserve death and to be one who 
ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent 
expressions : and it would frequently prove a 
heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind 

N 



178 ELEMENTS OF LOGrC. [Book III. 

of liberty ; but the abuse of it gives rise to 
the Fallacy in question : e. g. " projectors are 
unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a 
project, therefore he is unfit to be trusted :*" 
here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis 
that he who forms a project must be a projec- 
tor : whereas the bad sense that commonly 
attaches to the latter word, is not at all im- 
plied in the former. 

This Fallacy may often be considered as 
lying not in the middle, but in one of the 
terms of the conclusion ; so that the conclu- 
sion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all 
warranted by the Premises, though it will 
appear to be so, by means of the grammatical 
affinity of the words : e. g. " to be acquainted 
with the guilty is a presumption of guilt ; this 
man is so acquainted ; therefore we may 
presume that he is guilty : " this argument 
proceeds on the supposition of an exact cor- 
respondence between "presume" and "pre- 
sumption? which, however, does not really 
exist ; for " presumption " is commonly used 
to express a kind of slight suspicion ; whereas 
"to presume" amounts to absolute belief. 

The above remark will apply to some other 
cases of ambiguity of term ; viz. the conclu- 
sion will often contain a term, which (though 
not, as here, different in expression from the 
* Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations : Usury. 



§8.] OF FALLACIES. 179 

corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is 
liable to be understood in a sense different 
from what it bears to the Premiss ; though, of 
course, such a Fallacy is less common, be- 
cause less likely to deceive, in those cases than 
in this; where the term used in the conclu- 
sion, though professing to correspond with 
one in the Premiss, is not the very same in 
expression, and therefore is more certain to 
convey a different sense ; which is what the 
Sophist wishes. 

There are innumerable instances of a non- 
correspondence in paronymous words, similar 
to that above instanced ; as between art and 
artful, design and designing, faith and faith- 
ful, Sfc. ; and the more slight the variation of 
meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be 
successful ; for when the words have become 
so widely removed in sense as "pity" and 
" pitiful," every one would perceive such a 
Fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest. 

This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, 
by stating merely the impossibility of reducing 
such an argument to the strict Logical form ; 
(unless indeed you are addressing regular 
Logicians) you must find some way of point- 
ing out the non-correspondence of the terms 
in question ; e. g. with respect to the example 
above, it might be remarked, that we speak 
of strong or faint "presumption," but we use 
\ 2 



180 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

no such expression in conjunction with the 
verb "presume/' because the word itself im- 
plies strength. 

No fallacy is more common in controversy 
than the present, since in this way the Sophist 
will often be able to misinterpret the proposi- 
tions which his opponent admits or maintains, 
and so employ them against him. Thus in the 
examples just given, it is natural to conceive 
one of the Sophist's Premises to have been 
borrowed from his opponent.* 
Etymology. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or 
rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch 
of that founded on etymology; viz. when a 
Term is used at one time, in its customary, 
and at another, in its etymological sense. 
Perhaps no example of this can be found 
that is more extensively and mischievously 
employed than in the case of the word repre- 
sentative : assuming that its right meaning 
must correspond exactly with the strict and 
original sense of the verb, "represent," the 
Sophist persuades the multitude, that a mem- 
ber of the House of Commons is bound to be 
guided in all points by the opinion of his 
-constituents : and, in short, to be merely their 

* Perhaps a dictionary of such paronymous words as 
do not regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly 
as useful as one of synonyms ; i. e. properly speaking, of 
pseudo-synonyms. 



§9.] OF FALLACIES. 181 

spokesman: whereas law and custom, which 
in this case may be considered as fixing the 
meaning of the Term, require no such thing, 
but enjoin the representative to act according 
to the best of his own judgment, and on his 
own responsibility.* 

§9. 
It is to be observed, that to the' head of Fallacy of 

Icterroga- 

Ambiguous middle should be referred what tions - 
is called " Fallacia plurium Interrogationum" 
which may be named, simply, " the Fallacy 
of Interrogation ;" viz. the Fallacy of asking 
several questions which appear to be but one ; 
so that whatever one answer is given, being of 
course applicable to one only of the implied 
questions, may be interpreted as applied to 
the other; the refutation is, of course, to 
reply separately to each question, L e. to 
detect the ambiguity. 

I have said, several " questions which ap- 

* Home Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such 
weapons for any Sophist who may need them ; and has 
furnished some specimens of the employment of them. 
He contends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or im- 
mutable " Truth," because the word is derived from to 
11 trow," i. e. believe. He might on as good grounds 
have censured the absurdity of speaking of sending a 
letter by the "post" because a post, in its primary 
sense, is a pillar ; or have insisted that " Sycophant" 
can never mean anything but " Fig-shower." 



182 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III.' 

pear to be but one" for else there is no Fal- 
lacy ; such an example, therefore, as " estne 
homo animal et lapis?" which Aldrich gives, 
is foreign to the matter in hand; for there 
is nothing unfair in asking two distinct ques- 
tions (any more than in asserting two dis- 
tinct propositions) distinctly and avowedly. 

This Fallacy may be referred, as has been 
said, to the head of Ambiguous middle. In all 
Reasoning it is very common to state one of 
the Premises in form of a question, and when 
that is admitted, or supposed to be admitted, 
then to fill up the rest; if then one of the 
Terms of that question be ambiguous, which- 
ever sense the opponent replies to, the Sophist 
assumes the other sense of the Term in the 
remaining Premiss. It is therefore very com- 
mon to state an equivocal argument, in form 
of a question so worded, that there shall be 
little doubt which reply will be given ; but if 
there be such doubt, the Sophist must have 
two Fallacies of equivocation ready ; e. g. the 
question "whether anything vicious is expe- 
dient," discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where, 
by the bye, he seems not a little perplexed 
with it himself) is of the character in ques- 
tion, from the ambiguity of the word " expe- 
dient" which means sometimes, "conducive 
to temporal prosperity," sometimes " con- 
ducive to the greatest good : " whichever 



§ 10.J OF FALLACIES. 1 S3 

answer therefore was given, the Sophist might 
have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this 
term ; viz. if the answer be in the negative, 
his argument, Logically developed, will stand 
thus, — u what is vicious is not expedient ; 
whatever conduces to the acquisition of wealth 
and aggrandizement is expedient ; therefore it 
cannot be vicious : " if in the affirmative, then 
thus, — u whatever is expedient is desirable ; 
something vicious is expedient, therefore de- 
sirable." 

This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed Distribution 

and non-dis- 

in such a manner, that the uncertainty shall trib » tio "- 
be, not about the meaning, but the extent of a 
Term, i. e. whether it is distributed or not : 
e. g. " did A B in this case act from such and 
such a motive ?" which may imply either, 
"was it his sole motive?" or "was it one of 
his motives?" in the former case the term 
" that-which-actuated-A B " is distributed ; in 
the latter, not : now if he acted from a mixture 
of motives, whichever answer you give, may 
be misrepresented, and thus disproved. 

§10. 

In some cases of ambiguous middle, the intriuic and 

rr\ • l 'ill incidoiit.il 

Term in question may be considered as hav- eq»«w«tioM. 
ing in itself, from its own equivocal nature, 
two significations ; (which apparently consti- 
tutes the " Fallacia equivocations " of Logical 



1 84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

writers ;) others again have a middle Term 
which is ambiguous from the context, i. e. 
from what is understood in conjunction with it. 
This division will be found useful, though it 
is impossible to draw the line accurately in it. 
The elliptical character of ordinary discourse 
causes many Terms to become practically 
ambiguous, which yet are not themselves em- 
ployed in different senses, but with different 
applications, which are understood. Thus, 
" The Faith " would be used by a Christian 
writer to denote the Christian Faith, and by 
a Mussulman, the Mahometan ; yet the word 
Faith, has not in these cases, of itself, two 
different significations. So eKXetcrol, " elect," 
or " chosen," is sometimes applied to such as 
are " chosen," to certain privileges and advan- 
tages ; (as the Israelites were, though " they 
were overthrown in the wilderness " for their 
disobedience ; and as all Christians are fre- 
quently called in the New Testament) some- 
times again to those who are " chosen," as fit 
to receive a final reward, having made a right 
use of those advantages ; as when our Lord 
says, " many are called, but few chosen." * 

* What Logicians have mentioned under the title of 
" Fallacia amphibolise " is referable to this last class ; 
though in real practice it is not very likely to occur. An 
amphibolous sentence is one that is capable of two mean- 
ings, not from the double sense of any of the words, but 



§ 10.J OF FALLACIES. 185 

There are various ways in which words Aedd»t«i 

J equivocation. 

come to have two meanings : 1 st. by accident ; 
(i. e. when there is no perceptible connection 
between the two meanings) as " light " sig- 
nifies both the contrary to "heavy," and the 
contrary to " dark." Thus, such proper 
names as John or Thomas, fyc. which happen 
to belong to several different persons, are 
ambiguous, because they have a different sig- 
nification in each case where they are applied. 
Words which fall under this first head are 
what are the most strictly called equivocal. 

2dly . There are several terms in the use of First and 

seco"' 1 

which it is necessary to notice the distinction lion 



second mlen- 



from its admitting of a double construction : as in the 
instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable ; " quod 
tangitur a Socrate, illud sentit ;" where " illud " may be 
taken either as the nominative or accusative. So also the 
celebrated response of the oracle ; " Aio te, iEacida, Ro- 
manos vincere posse :" which closely resembles (as Shak- 
speare remarks) the witch-prophecy, " The Duke yet lives 
that Henry shall depose." A similar effect is produced 
by what the French call " construction louche," a squint- 
ing construction ; i. e. where some word or words may be 
referred either to the former or latter clause of the sen- 
tence ; of which an instance occurs in the rubric prefixed 
to the service of the 30th January. " If this day shall 
happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used] 
and the fast kept the next day following :" the clause in 
brackets may belong either to the former or the latter 
part of the sentence. In the Nicene Creed, the words 
u by whom all tilings were made," are grammatically re- 
ferable either to the Father or the Son. 



1 86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

between first and second intention.* The 
" first-intention " of a Term, (according to 
the usual acceptation of this phrase) is a 
certain vague and general signification of it, as 
opposed to one more precise and limited, which 
it bears in some particular art, science, or 
system, and which is called its " second-inten- 
tion." Thus, among farmers, in some parts, 
the word " beast " is applied particularly and 
especially to the ox kind ; and " bird," in the 
language of many sportsmen, is in like manner 
appropriated to the partridge : the common 
and general acceptation (which every one is 
well acquainted with) of each of those two 
words, is the First-intention of each ; the 
other, its Second-intention. 

* I am aware that there exists another opinion as to 
the meaning of the phrase " second-intention;" and that 
Aldrich is understood by some persons to mean (as indeed 
his expression may very well be understood to imply) 
that every predicable must necessarily be employed in the 
Second-intention. I do not undertake to combat the 
doctrine alluded to, because I must confess that, after 
the most patient attention devoted to the explanations 
given of it, I have never been able to comprehend what 
it is that is meant by it. It is one, however, which, 
whether sound or unsound, appears not to be connected 
with any Logical processes, and therefore may be safely 
passed by on the present occasion. 

For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word 
" Species," when applied to organized beings (viz. as de- 
noting those plants or animals, which it is conceived may 
have descended from a common stock), see the subjoined 
Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. § 1. 



§10.] OF FALLACIES. 187 

It is , evident that a Term may have several 
Second-intentions, according to the several 
systems into which it is introduced, and of 
which it is one of the technical Terms : thus 
" line " signifies, in the Art-military, a certain 
form of drawing up ships or troops : in Geo- 
graphy, a certain division of the earth ; to 
the fisherman, a string to catch fish," fyc. Sfc. ; 
all which are so many distinct Second-inten- 
tions, in each of which there is a certain 
signification "of extension in length" which 
constitutes the First-intention, and which cor- 
responds pretty nearly with the employment 
of the Term in Mathematics.* 

It will sometimes happen, that a Term shall 
be employed always in some one or other of 
its second intentions ; and never, strictly in 
the first, though that first intention is a part 
of its signification in each case. It is evident, 
that the utmost care is requisite to avoid con- 
founding together, either the first and second 
intentions, or the different second intentions 
with each other. 

3rdly. When two or more things are con- Resemblance 

and analogy. 

nected by resemblance or analogy, they will 

* In a few instances the Second-intention, or philoso- 
phical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the 
First-intention, or popular use : thus " affection " is 
limited in popular use to " love;" " charity," to "alms- 
giving ;" " flower," to those which have conspicuous 
petals; and fruit, to such as are eatable. 



188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

frequently have the same name. Thus a 
" blade of grass/' and the contrivance in 
building called a " dove-tail" are so called 
from their resemblance to the blade * of a 
swords and the tail of a real dove. But two 
things may be connected by analogy, though 
they have in themselves no resemblance: for 
analogy is the resemblance of ratios (or rela- 
tions:) thus, as a sweet taste gratifies the 
palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear ; 
and hence the same word, " sweet" is applied 
to both, though no flavour can resemble a 
sound in itself: so, the leg of a table does not 
resemble that of an animal ; nor the foot of a 
mountain that of an animal; but the leg 
answers the same purpose to the table, as the 
leg of an animal to that animal ; the foot of a 
mountain has the same situation relatively to 
the mountain, as the foot of an animal to the 
animal; this analogy therefore may be ex- 
pressed like a mathematical analogy (or pro- 
portion) " leg : animal :: supporting stick : 
table." 

In all these cases (of this 3rd head) one of 
the meanings of the word is called by Logi- 
cians proper, L e. original or primary ; the 

* Unless, indeed, the primary application of the Term 
be to the leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting 
instruments, which is perhaps more probable ; but the 
question is unimportant in the present case. . 



§10.] OF FALLACIES. 189 

other improper, secondary, or transferred : 
thus, sweet is originally and properly applied 
to tastes ; secondarily and improperly (i. e. by 
analogy) to sounds : thus also, dove-tail is 
applied secondarily (though not by analogy, 
but by direct resemblance) to the contrivance 
in building so called. When the secondaiy 
meaning of a word is founded on some fan- 
ciful analogy, and especially when it is intro- 
duced for ornament sake, we call this a 
metaphor ; as when we speak of " a ship's 
ploughing the deep." The turning up of the 
surface being essential indeed to the plough, 
but accidental only to the ship ; but if the 
analogy be a more important and essential 
one, and especially if we have no other word 
to express our meaning but this transferred 
one, we then call it merely an analogous 
word (though the metaphor is analogous also) 
e.g. one would hardly call it metaphorical 
or figurative language to speak of the leg of a 
table, or mouth of a river,* 

4thly. Several things may be called by the comeetion 
same name (though they have no connection place - 
of resemblance or analogy) from being con- 
nected by vicinity of time or place; under 
which head will come the connection of cause 
and effect, or of part and zvhole, fyc. Thus a 

* See Dr. Copleston's account of Analogy in the notes 
to his " Four Discourses." 



190 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

door signifies both an opening in the wall 
(more strictly called the door-way) and a 
board which closes it; which are things nei- 
ther similar nor analogous. When I say, 
" the rose smells sweet ;" and " I smell the 
rose ;" the word " smell " has two meanings : 
in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a 
certain sensation in my own mind ; in the 
former of a certain quality in the flower, 
which produces that sensation, but which of 
course cannot in the least resemble it; and 
here the word smell is applied with equal 
propriety to both.* Thus we speak of 
Homer, for " the works of Homer ;" and 
this is a secondary or transferred meaning: 
and so it is when we say, " a good shot," for 
a good marksman ; but the word " shot " has 
two other meanings, which are both equally 
proper ; viz. the thing put into a gun in order 
to be discharged from it, and the act of dis- 
charging it. 

Thus, " learning " signifies either the act of 
acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself; 
e.g. "he neglects his learning;" "Johnson 
was a man of learning." " Possession" is am- 
biguous in the same manner, and a multitude 
of others. 

* On this ambiguity have been founded the striking 
parodoxes of those who have maintained that there is no 
heat in fire, no cold in ice, tyc. The sensations of heat, 
cold, Sj'c. can of course only belong to a Sentient Being. 



§10.] OF FALLACIES. 191 

Much confusion often arises from ambiguity 
of this kind, when unperceived ; nor is there 
any point in which the copiousness and con- 
sequent precision of the Greek language, is 
more to be admired than in its distinct terms 
for expressing an act, and the result of that 
act ; e. g. irpa^ts, " the doing of anything ; " 
7rpay/jLa, the " thing done ; " so, Boats and 

Bco pov, Xipfrts and X^/xa, Sfc. 

It will very often happen, that two of the 
meanings of a word will have no connection 
with one another, but will each have some 
connection with a third. Thus " martyr " 
originally signified a witness; thence it was 
applied to those who suffered in bearing testi- 
mony to Christianity; and thence again it is 
often applied to u sufferers " in general : the 
first and third significations are not the least 
connected. Thus w post " signifies originally 
a pillar, (postum, from pono) then a distance 
marked out by posts ; and then the carriages, 
messengers, Sfc. that travelled over this dis- 
tance. It would puzzle any one, proceeding 
on mere conjecture, to make out how the 
word " premises " should have come to signify 
a building. 

Ambiguities of this kind belong practically 
to the first head: there being no perceived 
connection between the different senses. 

The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of 



192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

the Term which is suspected of being used in 
two senses ; viz, a Nominal, not necessarily a 
Real Definition : as was remarked in Book IT. 
Chap. v. 

But here it may be proper to remark, that 
for the avoiding of Fallacy or of verbal con- 
troversy, it is only requisite that the term 
should be employed uniformly in the same 
sense as far as the existing question is con- 
cerned; thus, two persons might, in discussing 
the question, whether Caesar was a great 
man, have some such difference in their ac- 
ceptation of the epithet " great," as would be 
non-essential to that question ; e. g. one of 
them might understand by it nothing more 
than eminent intellectual and moral qualities ; 
while the other might conceive it to imply the 
performance of splendid actions : this abstract 
difference of meaning would not produce any 
disagreement in the existing question, because 
both those circumstances are united in the 
case of Caesar ; but if one (and not the other) 
of the parties understood the epithet " great " 
to imply pure patriotism, generosity of cha- 
racter, fyc> then there would be a disagree- 
ment as to the application of the Term, even 
between those who might think alike of 
Caesar's character. Definition, the specific for 
ambiguity, is to be employed, and demanded 
with a view to this principle ; it is sufficient 



§ 11] OF FALLACIES. 193 

on each occasion to define a Term as far as 
regards the question in hand. 

§11. 

Of those cases where the ambiguity arises 
from the context, there are several species ; 
some of which Logicians have enumerated, 
but have neglected to refer them, in the first 
place, to one common class (viz. the one 
under which they are here placed;) and have 
even arranged some under the head of Fal- 
lacies " in dictione" and others under that of 
" extra dictionem" 

We may consider, as the first of these Fallacy of 

Division and 

species, the Fallacy of " Division" and that of Com P° 8ition - 
" Composition," taken together, since in each 
of these the middle Term is used in one 
Premiss collectively, in the other, distribu- 
tive ly : if the former of these is the major 
Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this is 
called the " Fallacy of Division ;" the Term 
which is first taken collectively being after- 
wards divided ; and vice versa. The ordinary 
examples are such as these ; " All the angles 
of a triangle are equal to two right angles : 
A B C is an angle of a triangle ; therefore 
A B C is equal to two right angles." " Five 
is one number ; three and two are five ; 
therefore three and two are one number ;" or, 
" three and two are two numbers, five is 



194 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

three and two, therefore five is two numbers :" 
it is manifest that the middle Term, three and 
two (in this last example) is ambiguous, signi- 
fying, in the major Premiss, " taken dis- 
tinctly," in the minor, " taken together :" and 
so of the rest. 

To this head may be referred the Fallacy 
by which men have sometimes been led to 
admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of 
Necessity ; e. g. " he who necessarily goes 
or stays (L e. in reality, ' who necessarily goes, 
or who necessarily stays') is not a free agent ; 
you must necessarily go or stay ( i. e. * you 
must necessarily take the alternative') there- 
fore you are not a free agent." Such also is 
the Fallacy which probably operates on most 
adventurers in lotteries ; e. g. " the gaming of 
a high prize is no uncommon occurrence ; and 
what is no uncommon occurrence may rea- 
sonably be expected ; therefore the gaining of 
a high prize may reasonably be expected;" 
the Conclusion, when applied to the indi- 
vidual (as in practice it is), must be under- 
stood in the sense of "reasonably expected 
by a certain individual;" therefore for the 
major Premiss to be true, the middle Term 
must be understood to mean, " no uncom- 
mon occurrence to some one particular per- 
son ;" whereas for the minor (which has been 
placed first) to be true, you must understand 



§11.] OF FALLACIES. 195 

it of " no uncommon occurrence to some one 
or other ;" and thus you will have the Fallacy 
of Composition. 

There is no Fallacy more common, or more 
likely to deceive, than the one now before us : 
the form in which it is most usually employed, 
is, to establish some truth, separately, con- 
cerning each single member of a certain class, 
and thence to infer the same of the xohole col- 
lectively : thus some infidels have laboured to 
prove concerning some one of our Lord's 
miracles, that it might have been the result 
of an accidental conjuncture of natural circum- 
stances : next, they endeavour to prove the 
same concerning another ; and so on ; and 
thence infer that all of them might have been 
so. They might argue in like manner, that 
because it is not very improbable one may 
throw sixes in any one out of a hundred 
throws, therefore it is no more improbable that 
one may throw sixes a hundred times running. 

This Fallacy may often be considered as 
turning on the ambiguity of the word " all ;" 
which may easily be dispelled by substituting 
for it the word " each" or " every," where that 
is its signification ; e. g. " all these trees make 
a thick shade," is ambiguous, meaning, either, 
" every one of them," or u all together." 

This is a Fallacy with which men are ex- 
tremely apt to deceive themselves : for when a 

o 2 



196 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

multitude of particulars are presented to the 
mind, many are too weak or too indolent to 
take a comprehensive view of them ; hut con- 
fine their attention to each single point, by 
turns ; and then decide, infer, and act, accord- 
ingly : e, g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding 
that he is able to afford this, or that, or the 
other expense, forgets that all of them together 
will ruin him. 

To the same head may be reduced that 
fallacious reasoning by which men vindicate 
themselves to their own conscience and to 
others, for the neglect of those undefined du- 
ties, which though indispensable, and there- 
fore not left to our choice whether we will 
practise them or not, are left to our discre- 
tion as to the mode, and the particular 
occasions, of practising them ; e. g. " I am 
not bound to contribute to this charity in 
particular ; nor to that ; nor to the other :" 
the 'practical conclusion which they draw, is, 
that all charity may be dispensed with. 

As men are apt to forget that any two cir- 
cumstances (not naturally connected) are 
more rarely to be met with combined than 
separate, though they be not at all incom- 
patible ; so also they are apt to imagine, 
from finding that they are rarely combined, 
that there is an incompatibility ; e. g. if the 
chances are ten to one against a man's 



§ 12.] OF FALLACIES. ]97 

possessing strong reasoning powers, and ten 
to one against exquisite taste, the chances 
against the combination of the two (suppos- 
ing them neither connected or opposed) will 
be a hundred to one. Many, therefore, from 
finding them so rarely united, will infer that 
they are in some measure incompatible ; 
which Fallacy may easily be exposed in the 
form of Undistributed middle : " qualities un- 
friendly to each other are rarely combined ; 
excellence in the reasoning powers, and in 
taste, are rarely combined ; therefore they are 
qualities unfriendly to each other." 

§ 12. 
The other kind of ambiguity arising fromFaiiacia 
the context, and which is the last case of 
Ambiguous middle that I shall notice, is the 
" fallacia accidentis," together with its con- 
verse, " fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad 
dictum simpliciter ;" in each of which the mid- 
dle Term is used, in one Premiss to signify 
something considered simply, in itself, and as 
to its essence ; and in the other Premiss, so 
as to imply that its Accidents are taken into 
account with it : as in the well-known ex- 
ample, " what is bought in the market is 
eaten ; raw meat is bought in the market ; 
therefore raw meat is eaten." Here the 
middle has understood in conjunction with 



198 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

it, in the major Premiss, " as to its substance 
merely :" in the minor, u as to its condition and 
circumstances •." 

To this head, perhaps, as well as to any, 
may be referred the Fallacies which are fre- 
quently founded on the occasional, partial, 
and temporary variations in the acceptation 
of some Term, arising from circumstances of 
person, time, and place, which will occasion 
something to be understood in conjunction 
with it beyond its strict literal signification ; 
e. g. the phrase " Protestant -ascendancy," 
having become a kind of watch-word or ga- 
thering-cry of a party, the expression of good 
wishes for it would commonly imply an ad- 
herence to certain measures not literally ex- 
pressed by the words ; to assume therefore 
that one is unfriendly to " Protestant-ascend- 
ancy " in the literal sense, because he has 
declared himself unfriendly to it when imply- 
ing and connected with such and such other 
sentiments, is a gross Fallacy ; and such an 
one as perhaps the authors of the above would 
much object to, if it were assumed of them 
that they were adverse to "■' the cause of 
liberty throughout the world," and to " a fair 
representation of the people," from their 
objecting to join with the members of a 
factious party in the expression of such sen- 
timents. 



§ 13.] OF FALLACIES. 199 

Such Fallacies may fairly be referred to the 
present head. 

§13. 

Of the Non-logical (or material) Fallacies : 
and first, of " begging the question ;" Petitio 
Principii. 

The indistinct and unphilosophical account Begging the 

a A quest jou. 

which has been given by Logical writers of 
the Fallacy of " non causa" and that of "pe- 
titio principii" makes it very difficult to 
ascertain wherein they conceived them to 
differ, and what, according to them, is the 
nature of each ; without therefore professing 
to conform exactly to their meaning, and 
with a view to distinctness only, which is the 
main point, let us confine the name "petitio 
principii " to those cases in which the Premiss 
either appears manifestly to be the same as 
the Conclusion, or is actually proved from the 
Conclusion, or is such as would naturally 
and properly so be proved ; (as if one should 
attempt to prove the being of a God from the 
authority of Holy- writ ;) and to the other 
class be referred all other cases, in which 
the Premiss (whether the expressed or the 
suppressed one) is either proved false, or has 
no sufficient claim to be received as true. 
Let it however be observed, that in such 



200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

cases (apparently) as this, we must not too 
hastily pronounce the argument fallacious ; 
for it may be perfectly fair at the commence- 
ment of an argument to assume a Premiss that 
is not more evident than the Conclusion, or is 
even ever so paradoxical, provided you pro- 
ceed to prove fairly that Premiss : and in like 
manner it is both usual and fair to begin by 
deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss 
exactly equivalent to it ; which is merely 
throwing the proposition in question into the 
form in which it will be most conveniently 
proved. Arguing in a Circle, however, must 
necessarily be unfair; though it frequently is 
practised undesignedly ; e. g. some Mechani- 
cians attempt to prove, (what they ought to 
lay down as a probable but doubtful hypo- 
thesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates 
equally ; " why ?" because those bodies which 
contain more particles ever gravitate more 
strongly, i. e. are heavier : " but (it may be 
urged) those which are heaviest are not always 
more bulky ; " " no, but still they contain 
more particles, though more closely con- 
densed;" "how do you know that?" "because 
they are heavier ; " " how does that prove it ?" 
" because all particles of matter gravitating 
equally, that mass which is specifically the 
heavier must needs have the more of them in 
the same space." 



§ 13.] OF FALLACIES. 201 

Obliquity and disguise being of course most obu qB uj ... 
important to the success of the petitio pruicipu 
as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will 
in general either have recourse to the circle, 
or else not venture to state distinctly his as- 
sumption of the point in question, but will 
rather assert some other proposition which 
implies it;* thus keeping out of sight (as a 
dexterous thief does stolen goods) the point 
in question, at the very moment when he is 
taking it for granted. Hence the frequent 
union of this Fallacy with " ignoratio elenchi :" 
[vide § 15.] The English language is per- 
haps the more suitable for the Fallacy of 
petitio principii, from its being formed from 
two distinct languages, and thus abounding in 
synonymous expressions which have no re- 
semblance in sound, and no connection in 
etymology ; so that a Sophist may bring 
forward a proposition expressed in words of 
Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the 
very same proposition stated in words of Nor- 
man origin ; e. g. " to allow every man an 
unbounded freedom of speech must always 
be, on the whole, advantageous to the State ; 

* Gibbon affords the most remarkable instances of tin's 
kind of style. That which he really means to speak of, 
is hardly ever made the subject of his proposition. His 
way of writing reminds one of those persons who never 
dare look you full in the face. 



202 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

for it is highly conducive to the interests of 
the Community, that each individual should 
enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of ex- 
pressing his sentiments." 

§ H. 

undue as- The next head is, the falsity, or, at least, 

sumption. ^ 

undue assumption, of a Premiss, when it is 
not equivalent to, or dependent on, the Con- 
clusion ; which, as has been before said, 
seems to correspond nearly with the meaning 
of Logicians, when they speak of " non causa 
pro causa." This name indeed would seem to 
imply a much narrower class : there being 
one species of arguments which are from cause 
to effect ; in which, of course, two things are 
necessary; 1st, the sufficiency of the cause; 
2d, its establishment; these are the two 
Premises ; if therefore the former be unduly 
assumed, we are arguing from that which is 
not a sufficient cause as if it were so : e. g. as 
if one should contend from such a man's 
having been unjust or cruel, that he will 
certainly be visited with some heavy temporal 
judgment, and come to an untimely end. In 
this instance the Sophist, from having as- 
sumed, in the Premiss, the (granted) existence 
of a pretended cause, infers in the conclusion 
the existence of the pretended effect, which 
we have supposed to be the Question. Or 



§ 14.] OF FALLACIES. 203 

vice versd, the pretended effect may be em- 
ployed to establish the cause ; e. g. inferring 
sinfulness from temporal calamity. But when 
both the pretended cause and effect are 
granted, L e. granted to exist, then the So- 
phist will infer something from their pre- 
tended connection ; L e. he will assume as a 
Premiss, that " of these two admitted facts, 
the one is the cause of the other :" as the 
opponents of the Reformation assumed that it 
was the cause of the troubles which took 
place at that period, and thence inferred that 
it was an evil.* In like manner, nothing 
is more common than to hear a person state 

* In many cases, a Sign (see Rhet. Part I.) from which 
one might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken 
for the Cause of it: as if one should suppose the falling 
of the mercury to be a cause of rain, of which it certainly 
is an indication. Whereas the fact will often be the very 
reverse ; e. g. a great deal of money in a country is a 
pretty sure proof of its wealth, and thence has been often 
regarded as the cause of it ; whereas in truth it is an 
effect. The same, with a numerous and increasing popu- 
lation. So also exposure to want and hardship in youth, 
has been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of 
those men and brutes which have been brought up in 
barren countries of ungenial climate. Yet the most ex- 
perienced cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceteris 
paribus, the more hardy for having been well fed and 
sheltered in youth ; but early hardships, by destroying 
all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors. So, 
loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle, and firing it, docs 
not give it strength ; but proves, if it escape, that it was 
strong. 



204 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

confidently, as from his own experience, that 
such and such a patient xvas cured by this or 
that medicine : whereas all that he absolutely 
knows, is that he took the medicine, and that 
he recovered. Such an argument as either of 
these might strictly be called " non causa pro 
causa ;" but it is not probable that the Logical 
writers intended any such limitation (which 
indeed would be wholly unnecessary and im- 
pertinent,) but rather that they were con- 
founding together cause and reason; the 
sequence of Conclusion from Premises being 
perpetually mistaken for that of effect from 
physical cause.* It may be better, therefore, 
to drop the name which tends to perpetuate 
this confusion, and simply to state (when 
such is the case) that the Premiss is unduly 
assumed ; i. e. without being either self-evi- 
dent, or satisfactorily proved. 

The contrivances by which men may deceive 
themselves or others, in assuming Premises 
unduly, so that that undue assumption shall 
not be perceived, (for it is in this the Fallacy 
consists) are of course infinite. Sometimes 
(as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss 
is suppressed, as if it were too evident to need 
being proved, or even stated, and as if the 
whole question turned on the establishment of 
the other Premiss. Thus Home Tooke proves, 

* See Appendix, No. I. article Reason. 



§ 14.] OF FALLACIES. 205 

by an immense induction, that all particles 
were originally nouns or verbs ; and thence 
concludes, that in reality they are so still, and 
that the ordinary division of the parts of 
speech is absurd ; keeping out of sight, as 
self-evident, the other Premiss, which is ab- 
solutely false; viz. that the meaning and force 
of a word, now, and for ever, must be that 
which it, or its root, originally bore. 

Sometimes men are shamed into admitting 
an unfounded assertion, by being confidently 
told, that it is so evident, that it would argue 
great weakness to doubt it. In general, how- 
ever, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a 
direct assertion of what he means unduly to 
assume ; because that might direct the reader's 
attention to the consideration of the question 
whether it be true or not; since that which 
is indisputable does not so often need to be 
asserted : it succeeds better, therefore, to allude 
to the proposition, as something curious and 
remarkable; just as the Royal Society were 
imposed on by being asked to account for the 
fact that a vessel of water received no addition 
to its weight by a live fish put into it; while 
they were seeking for the cause, they forgot 
to ascertain the fact, and thus admitted with- 
out suspicion a mere fiction. Thus an eminent 
Scotch writer, instead of asserting that " the 
advocates of Logic have been worsted and 



references. 



206 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

driven from the field in every controversy," 
(an assertion which, if made, would have been 
the more readily ascertained to be perfectly 
groundless,) merely observes, that " it is a cir- 
cumstance not a little remarkable" 
Faiucy of One of the many contrivances employed 
for this purpose, is what may be called the 
"Fallacy of references;" which is particularly 
common in popular theological works. It is 
of course a circumstance which adds great 
weight to any assertion, that it shall seem to 
be supported by many passages of Scripture : 
now when a writer can find few or none of 
these, that distinctly and decidedly favour his 
opinion, he may at least find many which may 
be conceived capable of being so understood, 
or which, in some way or other, remotely 
relate to the subject ; but if these texts were 
inserted at length, it would be at once per- 
ceived how little they bear on the question ; 
the usual artifice therefore is, to give merely 
references to them ; trusting that nineteen out 
of twenty readers will never take the trouble 
of turning to the passages, but, taking for 
granted that they afford, each, some degree 
of confirmation to what is maintained, will 
be overawed by seeing every assertion sup- 
ported, as they suppose, by five or six Scrip- 
ture-texts. 

Frequently the Fallacy of ignoratio elenchi 



§ 14.] OF FALLACIES. 207 

is called in to the aid of this ; i. e. the Premiss c©mMMtion 

of tliis l-'al- 

is assumed on the ground of another proposi- fetS^.** 
tion, somewhat like it, having been proved. 
Thus, in arguing by example, fyc. the pa- 
rallelism of two cases is often assumed from 
their being in some respects alike, though per- 
haps they differ in the very point which is 
essential to the argument. E. G. From the 
circumstance that some men of humble sta- 
tion, who have been well educated, are apt 
to think themselves above low drudgery, it 
is argued, that universal education of the 
lower orders would beget general idleness : 
this argument rests, of course, on the assump- 
tion of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the 
past, and the future; whereas there is a cir- 
cumstance that is absolutely essential, in which 
they differ ; for when education is universal it 
must cease to be a distinction ; which is pro- 
bably the very circumstance that renders men 
too proud for their work. 

This very same Fallacy is often resorted to 
on the opposite side : an attempt is made to 
invalidate some argument from Example, by 
pointing out a difference between the two 
cases : though they agree in every thing that 
is essential to the question. 

It should be added that we may often be calculation of 

probabilities. 

deceived, not only by admitting a premiss 
which is absolutely unsupported, but also, by 



208 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

attributing to one which really is probable, 
a greater degree of probability than rightly 
belongs to it. And this effect will often be 
produced by our omitting to calculate the 
probability in each successive step of a long 
chain of argument. Each link may have an 
excess of chances in its favour, and yet the 
ultimate conclusion may have a great pre- 
ponderance against it ; e. g. " All Y is (pro- 
bably) X : all Z is (probably) Y : therefore Z 
is (probably) X : " now suppose the truth of 
the major premiss to be more probable than 
not; in other words, that the chances for it 
are more than | ; say £ ; and for the truth of 
the minor, let the chances be greater still; 
say |: then by multiplying together the nu- 
merators, and also the denominators of these 
two fractions, ^ x - we obtain ^, as indicating 
the degree of probability of the conclusion ; 
which is less than ^ ; i. e. the conclusion is 
less likely to be true than not. E. G. " The 
reports this author heard are (probably) true ; 
this (something which he records) is a report 
which (probably) he heard; therefore it is 
true:" suppose, first, The majority of the re- 
ports he heard, as 4 out of 7, (or 12 of 21,) 
to be true ; and, next, That he generally, as 
twice in three times, (or 8 in 12,) reports 
faithfully what he heard; it follows that of 
21 of his reports, only 8 are true. Of course, 



§ 16.] OF FALLACIES. 209 

the results are proportionally striking when 
there is a long series of arguments of this 
description. And yet weak and thoughtless 
reasoners are often influenced by hearing a 
great deal urged, — a great number of proba- 
bilities brought forward, — in support of some 
conclusion ; i. e, a long chain, of which each 
successive link is weaker than the foregoing ; 
instead of (what they mistake it for) a cumu- 
lation of arguments, each, separately proving 
the probability of the conclusion. 

Lastly, it may be here remarked, conform- 
ably with what has been formerly said, that 
it will often be left to your choice whether to 
refer this or that fallacious argument to the 
present head, or that of Ambiguous middle ; 
" if the middle term is here used in this sense, 
there is an ambiguity ; if in that sense, the 
proposition is false" 

§ 15. 

The last kind of Fallacy to be discussed irrei 
is that of Irrelevant Conclusion, commonly 
called ignoratio elenchi. Various kinds of 
propositions are, according to the occasion, 
substituted for the one of which proof is re- 
quired. 

Sometimes the Particular for the Universal ; 
sometimes a proposition with different Terms : 
and various are the contrivances employed to 

r 



evant 
Conclusion. 



210 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

effect and to conceal this substitution, and to 
make the Conclusion which the Sophist has 
drawn, answer, practically, the same purpose 
as the one he ought to have established. I 
say, " practically the same purpose," because 
it will very often happen that some emotion 
will be excited — some sentiment impressed on 
the mind — (by a dexterous employment of this 
Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the dispo- 
sition requisite for your purpose, though they 
may not have assented to, or even stated dis- 
tinctly in their own minds, the proposition which 
it was your business to establish. Thus if a 
Sophist has to defend one who has been guilty 
of some serious offence, which he wishes to ex- 
tenuate, though he is unable distinctly to prove 
that it is not such, yet if he can succeed in 
making the audience laugh at some casual mat- 
ter, he has gained practically the same point. 
So also if any one has pointed out the extenu- 
ating circumstances in some particular case of 
offence, so as to show that it differs widely 
from the generality of the same class, the 
Sophist, if he find himself unable to disprove 
these circumstances, may do away the force 
of them, by simply referring the action to that 
very class, which no one can deny that it 
belongs to, and the very name of which will 
excite a feeling of disgust sufficient to coun- 
teract the extenuation ; e. g. let it be a case 



§ 15.J OF FALLACIES. 211 

of peculation, and that many mitigating cir- 
cumstances have been brought forward which 
cannot be denied; the sophistical opponent 
will reply, " well, but after all, the man is a 
rogue, and there is an end of it ;" now in 
reality this was (by hypothesis) never the 
question ; and the mere assertion of what was 
never denied, ought not, in fairness, to be 
regarded as decisive ; but practically, the odi- 
ousness of the word, arising in great measure 
from the association of those very circumstances 
which belong to most of the class, but which 
we have supposed to be absent in this parti- 
cular instance, excites precisely that feeling of 
disgust, which in effect destroys the force of 
the defence. In like manner we may refer to 
this head, all cases of improper appeals to 
the passions, and every thing else which is 
mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the 

matter in hand (e£<w rov irpdyfiaros.) 

In all these cases, as has been before ob- 
served, if the fallacy we are now treating of 
be employed for the apparent establishment, 
not of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very 
commonly happens) of a Premiss, (/. e. if the 
Premiss required be assumed on the ground 
that some proposition resembling it has been 
proved) then there will be a combination of 
this Fallacy with the last mentioned. 

A good instance of the employment and 
p2 



tation. 



212 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

exposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, 
in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus concern- 
ing the Mitylenaeans : the former (over and 
above his appeal to the angry passions of 
his audience) urges the justice of putting the 
revolters to death ; which, as the latter 
remarked, was nothing to the purpose, since 
the Athenians were not silting in judgment, 
but in deliberation, of which the proper end 
is expediency. 
This fallacy It is evident, that ignoratio elenchi may be 

used in refu- ° * 

employed as well for the apparent refutation 
of your opponent's proposition, as for the ap- 
parent establishment of your own ; for it is 
substantially the same thing, to prove what 
was not denied, or to disprove what was not 
asserted : the latter practice is not less com- 
mon, and it is more offensive, because it 
frequently amounts to a personal affront in 
attributing to a person opinions, fyc. which he 
perhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a 
discussion one party vindicates, on the ground 
of general expediency, a particular instance of 
resistance to Government in a case of intole- 
rable oppression, the opponent may gravely 
maintain, that " we ought not to do evil that 
good may come :" a proposition which of 
course had never been denied ; the point in 
dispute being "whether resistance in this par- 
ticular case mere doing evil or not." In this 



§ 15.] OF FALLACIES. 213 

example it is to be remarked (and the remark 
will apply very generally) that the Fallacy of 
petitio principii is combined with that of igno- 
ratio elenchi, which is a very common and 
successful practice ; viz. the Sophist proves, 
or disproves, not the proposition which is 
really in question, but one which so implies it 
as to proceed on the supposition that it is 
already decided, and can admit of no doubt ; 
by this means his " assumption of the point in 
question" is so indirect and oblique, that it 
may easily escape notice ; and he thus esta- 
blishes, practically, his Conclusion, at the very 
moment he is withdrawing your attention 
from it to another question. 

There are certain kinds of argument re- 
counted and named by Logical writers, which 
we should by no means universally call Fal- 
lacies ; but which when unfairly used, and so 
far as they are fallacious, may very well be 
referred to the present head ; such as the " ar- 
gumentum ad hominem" or personal argument, ^[j™?;^ 
" argumentum ad verecundiam" " argumentum 
ad populum" fyc. all of them regarded as con- 
tradistinguished from " argumentum ad rem" 
or according to others (meaning probably the 
very same thing) " ad judicium." These have 
all been descibed in the lax and popular lan- 
guage before alluded to, but not scientifically : 
the " argumentum ad hominem" they say, " is 



ad hominem, 
&c. 



214 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

addressed to the peculiar circumstances, cha- 
racter, avowed opinions, or past conduct of 
the individual, and therefore has a reference 
to him only, and does not bear directly and 
absolutely on the real question, as the s argu- 
mentum ad rem ' does :" in like manner, the 
" argumentum ad verecundiam" is described as 
an appeal to our reverence for some respected 
authority, some venerable institution, fyc. and 
the " argumentum ad populum" as an appeal 
to the prejudices, passions, fyc. of the multi- 
tude ; and so of the rest. Along with these is 
usually enumerated " argumentum ad ignoran- 
tiam" which is here omitted, as being evi- 
dently nothing more than the employment of 
some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of 
that word, towards such as are likely to be 
deceived by it. It appears then (to speak 
rather more technically) that in the " argu- 
mentum ad hominem" the conclusion which 
actually is established, is not the absolute and 
general one in question, but relative and par- 
ticular ; viz. not that " such and such is the 
fact," but that " this man is bound to admit it, 
in conformity to his principles of Reasoning, 
or in consistency with his own conduct, situa- 
tion," $*c* Such a Conclusion it is often 

* " The argumentum ad hominem " will often have the 
effect of shifting the burden of proof, not unjustly, to 
the adversary. (See Rhet.) A common instance is the 



i 15.] OF FALLACIES. 215 

both allowable and necessary to establish, in 
order to silence those who will not yield to 
fair general argument ; or to convince those 
whose weakness and prejudices would not 
allow them to assign to it its due weight : it is 
thus that our Lord on many occasions silences 
the cavils of the Jews ; as in the vindication 
of healing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled 
by the authorized practice of drawing out a 
beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as 
we have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be 

defence, certainly the readiest and most concise, fre- 
quently urged by the Sportsman, when accused of bar- 
barity in sacrificing unoffending hares or trout to his 
amusement : he replies, as he may safely do, to most of 
his assailants, " why do you feed on the flesh of animals ?" 
and that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its 
being usually opposed by a palpable falsehood ; viz, that 
the animals which are killed for food are sacrificed to our 
necessities ; though not only men can, but a large propor- 
tion (probably a great majority) of the human race 
actually do, subsist in health and vigour without flesh - 
diet ; and the earth would support a much greater human 
population were such a practice universal. When shamed 
out of this argument they sometimes urge that the brute 
creation would overrun the earth, if we did not kill them 
for food ; an argument, which, if it were valid at all, 
would not justify their feeding on fish ; though, if fairly 
followed up, it ivould justify Swift's proposal for keeping 
down the excessive population of Ireland. The true 
reason, viz, that they eat flesh for the gratification of the 
palate, and have a taste for the pleasures of the table, 
though not for the sports of the field, is one which they 
do not like to assign. 



216 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

done plainly, and avozvedly ; but if you at- 
tempt to substitute this partial and relative 
Conclusion for a more general one — if you tri- 
umph as having established your proposition 
absolutely and universally, from having esta- 
blished it, in reality, only as far as it relates 
to your opponent, then you are guilty of a 
Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating 
of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which 
was, by your own account, proposed to be 
proved : the fallaciousness depends upon the 
deceit or attempt to deceive. The same ob- 
servations will apply to " argumentum ad 
verecundiam," and the rest. 

It is very common to employ an ambiguous 
Term for the purpose of introducing the 
Fallacy of irrelevant Conclusion : L e. when 
you cannot prove your proposition in the 
sense in which it was maintained, to prove it 
in some other sense ; e. g. these who contend 
against the efficacy of faith, usually employ 
that word in their arguments in the sense of 
mere belief, unaccompanied with any moral or 
practical result, but considered as a mere 
intellectual process ; and when they have thus 
proved their Conclusion, they oppose it to 
one in which the word is used in a widely 
different sense.* 

* " When the occasion or object in question is not such 
as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular 



§ 1C] OF FALLACIES. 217 

§16. 

The Fallacy of tgnoratio elenchi is nowhere 
more common than in protracted controversy, 
when one of the parties, after having at- 
tempted in vain to maintain his position, shifts 
his ground as covertly as possible to another, 
instead of honestly giving up the point. An 
instance occurs in an attack made on the 

readers or hearers, the emotions required, it is a common 
Rhetorical artifice to turn their attention to some object 
which will call forth these feelings ; and when they are 
too much excited to be capable of judging calmly, it will 
not be difficult to turn their Passions, once roused, in the 
direction required, and to make them view the case before 
them in a very different light. When the metal is heated 
it may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus 
vehement indignation against some crime, may be directed 
against a person who has not been proved guilty of it ; 
and vague declamations against corruption, oppression, 
<^c. or against the mischiefs of anarchy ; with high-flown 
panegyrics on liberty, rights of man, ^c. or on social 
order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, $c. will 
gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without 
proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils 
or these advantages ; and it will in consequence become 
the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For 
the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of 
what may be called stimulating ideas associated with 
them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially 
of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of 
feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment ; so that 
a string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the 
effect of a train of sound Argument." — Rhetoric, Part II. 
Chap. ii. § 6. 



mises alter- 
nately. 



218 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

system pursued at one of our Universities. 
The objectors, rinding themselves unable to 
maintain their charge of the present neglect of 
Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect 
they attributed the late general decline in those 
studies) shifted their ground, and contended 
that that University was never famous for Ma- 
thematicians : which not only does not establish, 
but absolutely overthrows, their own original 
assertion ; for if it never succeeded in those pur- 
suits, it could not have caused their late decline. 
Fallacy of A practice of this nature is common in oral 

combating L 

e " controversy especially ; viz. that of combating 
both your opponent's Premises alternately, and 
shifting the attack from the one to the other, 
without waiting to have either of them de- 
cided upon before you quit it. 

It has been remarked above, that one class 
of the propositions that may be, in this Fal- 
lacy, substituted for the one required, is the 
particular for the universal: similar to this, is 
the substitution of a conditional with a uni- 
versal antecedent, for one with a particular 
antecedent, which will usually be the harder 
to prove : e. g. you are called on, suppose, to 
prove that " if any private interests are hurt by 
a proposed measure, it is inexpedient;" and 
you pretend to have done so by showing that 
" if all private interests are hurt by it, it must 
be inexpedient." Nearly akin to this is the 



§ 17.] OF FALLACIES. 2 If) 

very common case of proving something to be 
possible when it ought to have been proved 
highly 'probable; or probable, when it ought 
to have been proved necessary ; or, which 
comes to the very same, proving it to be not 
necessary, when it should have been proved not 
probable ; or 'improbable, when it should have 
been proved impossible. Aristotle (in Rhet. 
Book II.) complains of this last branch of the 
Fallacy, as giving an undue advantage to the 
respondent ; many a guilty person owes his 
acquittal to this ; the jury considering that 
the evidence brought does not demonstrate 
the absolute impossibility of his being inno- 
cent, though perhaps the chances are innu- 
merable against it. 

§17. 
Similar to this case is that which may be JJJ"* of 

J Objections. 

called the Fallacy of objections : L e. showing 
that there are objections against some plan, 
theory, or system, and thence inferring that it 
should be rejected; when that which ought 
to have been proved is, that there are more, 
or stronger objections, against the receiving 
than the rejecting of it. This is the main, 
and almost universal Fallacy of infidels, and 
is that of which men should be first and prin- 
cipally warned. This is also the strong hold 
of bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose all 



220 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

reforms and alterations indiscriminately; for 
there never was, nor will be, any plan executed 
or proposed, against which strong and even 
unanswerable objections may not be urged ; 
so that unless the opposite objections be set 
in the balance on the other side, we can never 
advance a step. " There are objections," 
said Dr. Johnson, " against a plenum, and 
objections against a vacuum ; but one of them 
must be true."* 

* This is, as has been said, the principal engine em- 
ployed by the adversaries of our Faith : they find nume- 
rous " objections " against various parts of Scripture; to 
some of which no satisfactory answer can be given ; and 
the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on 
these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger 
objections against the supposition that the Christian Re- 
ligion is of human origin ; and that where we cannot 
answer all objections, we are bound in reason and in can- 
dour to adopt the hypothesis which labours under the 
least. That the case is as I have stated, I am authorized 
to assume, from this circumstance ; that no complete and 
consistent account has ever been given of the manner in 
which the Christian Religion, supposing it a human contri- 
vance, could have arisen and prevailed as it did. And yet 
this may obviously be demanded with the utmost fairness, 
of those who deny its divine origin. The Religion exists: 
that is the phenomenon ; those who will not allow it to 
have come from God, are bound to solve the phenomenon 
on some other hypothesis less open to objections ; they 
are not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise 
in this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently with 
acknowledged facts) some probable way in which it may 
have arisen, reconcileable with all the circumstances of 
the case. That infidels have never done this, though they 



§ 18. J OF FALLACIES. 221 

The very same Fallacy indeed is employed 
on the other side, by those who are for over- 
throwing whatever is established as soon as 
they can prove an objection against it, with- 
out considering whether more and weightier 
objections may not lie against their own 
schemes : but their opponents have this de- 
cided advantage over them, that they can 
urge with great plausibility, " we do not call 
upon you to reject at once whatever is ob- 
jected to, but merely to suspend your* judgment, 
and not come to a decision as long as there 
are reasons on both sides:" now since there 
always will be reasons on both sides, this non- 
decision is practically the very same thing as 
a decision in favour of the existing state of 
things ; the delay of trial becomes equivalent 
to an acquittal* 

§ 18. 
Another form of ignoratio elenchi, which is F * ll * c y ° f 

o » proving a 

also rather the more serviceable on the side qletdon*" 

have had near 2000 years to try, amounts to a confession 
that no such hypothesis can be devised, which will not be 
open to greater objections than lie against Christianity. 

* " Not to resolve, is to resolve." Bacon. 

How happy it is for mankind that in the most momen- 
tous concerns of life their decision is generally formed for 
them by external circumstances : which thus saves them 
not only from the perplexity of doubt and the danger of 
delay, but also from the pain of regret ; since we acquiesce 
much more cheerfully in that which is unavoidable. 



222 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III 

of the respondent, is, to prove or disprove 
some part of that which is required, and dwell 
on that, suppressing all the rest. 

Thus, if a University is charged with culti- 
vating only the mere elements of Mathematics, 
and in reply a list of the books studied there 
is produced, should even any one of those 
books be not elementary, the charge is in 
fairness refuted ; but the Sophist may then 
earnestly contend that some of those books 
are elementary ; and thus keep out of sight 
the real question, mk. whether they are all 
so. This is the great art of the answerer of a 
book ; suppose the main positions in any 
work to be irrefragable, it will be strange if 
some illustration of them, or some subordinate 
part in short, will not admit of a plausible 
objection ; the opponent then joins issue on 
one of these incidental questions, and comes 
forward with " a Reply " to such and such 
a work. 

Hence the danger of ever advancing more 
than can be well maintained ; # since the refu- 
tation of that will often quash the whole : a 
guilty person may often escape by having too 



* The Quakers would perhaps before now have suc- 
ceeded in doing away our superfluous and irreverent 
oaths, if they had not, besides many valid and strong 
arguments, adduced so many that are weak and easily 
refuted. 



§ 19.J OF FALLACIES. 223 

much laid to his charge ; so he may also by 
having too much evidence against him, i. e. 
some that is not in itself satisfactory : thus, a 
prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by 
showing that one of the witnesses against him 
is an infamous informer and spy ; though 
perhaps if that part of the evidence had been 
omitted, the rest would have been sufficient 
for conviction. 

Cases of this nature might very well be re- 
ferred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, 
of inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from 
the Falsity of a Premiss ; which indeed is very 
closely allied to the present Fallacy : the real 
question is, " whether or not this Conclusion 
ought to be admitted;" the Sophist confines 
himself to the question, " whether or not it 
is established by this particular argument ; " 
leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he 
has carried his point as to the latter question, 
that the former is thereby decided. 

§19. 
It will readily be perceived that nothing is suppre^i 

Conclusion. 

less conducive to the success of the Fallacy in 
question than to state clearly, in the outset, 
either the proposition you are about to prove, 
or that which you ought to prove ; it answers 
best to begin with the Premises, and to in- 
troduce a pretty long chain of argument before 



224 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

you arrive at the Conclusion. The careless 
hearer takes for granted, at the beginning, 
that this chain will lead to the Conclusion 
required; and by the time you are come to 
the end, he is ready to take for granted that 
the Conclusion which you draw is the one 
required ; his idea of the question having 
gradually become indistinct. This Fallacy 
is greatly aided by the common practice of 
suppressing the Conclusion and leaving it to 
be supplied by the hearer, who is of course 
less likely to perceive whether it be really that 
" which was to be proved," than if it were 
distinctly stated. The practice therefore is at 
best suspicious ; and it is better in general to 
avoid it, and to give and require a distinct 
statement of the Conclusion intended. 

§20. 

jests. Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it 

may not be improper to mention the just and 
ingenious remark, that Jests are Fallacies ;* 
i. e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely 
to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that 
resemblance of argument which is calculated 
to amuse by the contrast; in the same 
manner that a parody does, by the contrast 
of its levity with the serious production which 
it imitates. There is indeed something 
* See Wallis's Logic. 



§ 20.] OF FALLACIES. 225 

laughable even in Fallacies which are in- 
tended for serious conviction, when they are 
thoroughly exposed. There are several dif- 
ferent kinds of joke and raillery, which will be 
found to correspond with the different kinds 
of Fallacy : the pun (to take the simplest and 
most obvious case) is evidently, in most in- 
stances, a mock argument founded on a pal- 
pable equivocation of the middle Term : and 
the rest in like manner will be found to 
correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to 
be imitations of serious argument. 

It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, 
or games, (jraihiaX) properly so called, will be 
found, on examination, to be imitative of serious 
transactions ; as of War, or Commerce.* But 
to enter fully into this subject would be un- 
suitable to the present occasion. 

I shall subjoin some general remarks on the 
legitimate province of Reasoning, and on its 
connection with Inductive philosophy, and 
with Rhetoric : on which points much misap- 
prehension has prevailed, tending to throw 
obscurity over the design and use of the 
Science under consideration. 

* See some excellent remarks on " Imitation," in Dr. 
A. Smith's posthumous Essays. 



226 [Book IV. 



BOOK IV. 

DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF 
REASONING. 



Logic being concerned with the theory of 
Reasoning, it is evidently necessary, in order 
to take a correct view of this Science, that all 
misapprehensions should be removed relative 
to the occasions on which the Reasoning- 
process is employed, — the purposes it has 
in view, — and the limits within which it is 
confined. 

Simple and obvious as such questions may 
appear to those who have not thought much 
on the subject, they will appear on further 
consideration to be involved in much per- 
plexity and obscurity, from the vague and 
inaccurate language of many popular writers. 
To the confused and incorrect notions that 
prevail respecting the Reasoning-process may 
be traced most of the common mistakes re- 
specting the Science of Logic, and much of 
the unsound and unphilosophical argumen- 



ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 227 

tation which is so often to be met with in the 
works of ingenious writers. 

These errors have been incidentally ad- 
verted to in the foregoing part of this work ; 
but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the 
subject, to offer on these points some further 
remarks, which could not have been there 
introduced without too great an interruption 
to the development of the system. Little 
or nothing indeed remains to be said that is 
not implied in the principles which have been 
already laid down ; but the results and appli- 
cations of those principles are liable in many 
instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly 
pointed out. These supplementary observa- 
tions will neither require, nor admit of, so 
systematic an arrangement as has hitherto 
been aimed at ; since they will be such as 
are suggested principally by the objections 
and mistakes of those who have misunder- 
stood, partially or entirely, the nature of the 
Logical system. 



q2 



228 Book IV. 



Chap. I. 
Of Induction. 

§1. 

Mistake of Much has been said by some writers of the 

opposing 

£yiio g ism. to superiority of the Inductive to the Syllogistic 
method of seeking truth, as if the two stood 
opposed to each other ; and of the advantage 
of substituting the Organon of Bacon for that 
of Aristotle, fyc. fyc. which indicates a total 
misconception of the nature of both. There 
is, however, the more excuse for the confu- 
sion of thought which prevails on this subject, 
because eminent Logical writers have treated, 
or at least have appeared to treat, of Induc- 
tion as a distinct kind of argument from the 
Syllogism ; which if it were, it certainly might 
be contrasted with the Syllogism : or rather 
the whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the 
ground, since one of the very first principles 
it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on what- 
ever subject, is one and the same process, 
which may be clearly exhibited in the form 
of Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed, 
therefore, that this was the deliberate mean- 
ing of those writers ; though it must be 



Chap. I. § 1.] OF INDUCTION. 229 

admitted that they have countenanced the 
error in question, by their inaccurate expres- 
sions. This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have 
arisen from a vagueness in the use of the 
word Induction, which is sometimes employed 
to designate the process of investigation and 
of collecting facts ; sometimes, the deducing 
of an inference from those facts. The former 
of these processes (viz. that of observation 
and experiment) is undoubtedly distinct from 
that which takes place in the Syllogism ; 
but then it is not a process of argument ; the 
latter again is an argumentative process ; but 
then it is, like all other arguments, capable of 
being Syllogistically expressed. And hence 
Induction has come to be regarded as a distinct 
kind of argument from the Syllogism. This 
Fallacy cannot be more concisely or clearly 
stated, than in the technical form with which 
we may now presume our readers to be 
familiar. 

" Induction is distinct from Syllogism : 
Induction is a process of Reasoning ;" therefore 
" There is a process of Reasoning distinct from 
Syllogism." 

Here, " Induction," which is the middle 
Term, is used in different senses in the two 
Premises. 

In the process of Reasoning by which we Analysis <* 
deduce, from our observation of certain known 



230 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

cases, an inference with respect to unknown 
ones, we* are employing a Syllogism in Bar- 
bara with the major * Premiss suppressed ; 
that being always substantially the same, as it 
asserts, that " what belongs to the individual 
or individuals we have examined, belongs to 
the whole class under which they come :" e.g. 
from an examination of the history of several 
tyrannies, and finding that each of them was 
of short duration, we conclude, that " the same 
is likely to be the case with all tyrannies ;" the 
suppressed major Premiss being easily supplied 
by the hearer ; viz. " that what belongs to the 
tyrannies in question is likely to belong to all." 
Two senses Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an 

of the word _ 

induction, argument, may, ot course, be stated Syllo- 
gistically : but so far forth as it is a process of 
inquiry with a view to obtain the Premises of 
that argument, it is, of course, out of the 
province of Logic.f Whether the Induction 

* Not the minor, as Aldricli represents it. The instance 
he gives will sufficiently prove this : " This and that, and 
the other magnet attract iron : therefore so do all." If 
this were, as he asserts, an Enthymeme whose minor is 
suppressed, the only Premiss which we could supply, to 
fill it up, would be, " All magnets are this, that, and the 
other ;" which is manifestly false. 

f And this is the original and strict sense of the word. 
Induction means properly, not the deducing of the con- 
clusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances, 
bearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number 
has been collected. 






Chap. I. §2.] OF INDUCTION. 231 

(in this last sense) has been sufficiently ample, 
i. e. takes in a sufficient number of individual 
cases, — whether the character of those cases 
has been correctly ascertained — and how far 
the individuals we have examined are likely to 
resemble, in this or that circumstance, the rest 
of the class, tipc. fyc., are points that require 
indeed great judgment and caution ; but this 
judgment and caution are not to be aided by 
Logic, because they are, in reality, employed 
in deciding whether or not it is fair and 
allowable to lay down your Premises ; L e. 
whether you are authorized or not, to assert, 
that " what is true of the individuals you 
have examined, is true of the whole class:" 
and that this or that is true of those indivi- 
duals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing 
to do with the truth or falsity of the Premises, 
except of course when they are the conclu- 
sions of former arguments ; but merely teach 
us to decide, not whether the Premises are 
fairly laid down, but whether the Conclusion 
follows fairly from the Premises or not. 

§2. 
Whether the Premiss may fairly be assumed, Assumption 
or not, is a point which cannot be decided « induction, 
without a competent knowledge of the nature 
of the subject ; e. g. in Natural Philosophy, in 
which the circumstances that in any case affect 



232 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

the result, are usually far more clearly ascer- 
tained, a single instance is often accounted a 
sufficient Induction ; e. g. having once ascer- 
tained that an individual magnet will attract 
iron, we are authorized to conclude that this 
property is universal : in the affairs of human 
life, on the other hand, a much fuller Induc- 
tion is required, as in the former example. 
In short, the degree of evidence for any propo- 
sition we originally assume as a Premiss 
(whether the expressed or the suppressed 
one) is not to be learned from Logic, nor 
indeed from any one distinct Science ; but 
is the province of whatever Science furnishes 
the subject-matter of your argument. None 
but a Politician can judge rightly of the de- 
gree of evidence of a proposition in Politics ; 
a Naturalist, in Natural History, fyc. fyc. 
invest- E. G. from examination of many horned 
animals, as sheep, cows, fyc, a Naturalist finds 
that they have cloven feet ; now his skill as 
a Naturalist is to be shown in judging whether 
these animals are likely to resemble in the 
form of their feet all other horned animals ; 
and it is the exercise of this judgment, toge- 
ther with the examination of individuals, that 
constitutes what is usually meant by the In- 
ductive process; which is that by which we 
gain, properly, new truths, and which is not 
connected with Logic ; being not what is 



tion. 



Chap. I.§2.] OF INDUCTION. 233 

strictly called Reasoning, but Invest] gat) on. 
But when this major Premiss is granted him, 
and is combined with the minor, viz. that the 
animals he has examined have cloven feet, 
then he draws the Conclusion Logically: viz. 
that " the feet of all horned animals are clo- 
ven." * Again, if from several times meeting 
with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded 
that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, 
one would object to his Induction ; and yet 
it would not be, as an argument, illogical; 
since the Conclusion follows fairly, if you 
grant his implied Premiss, that the events 
which happened on those particular Fridays 
are such as must hapen on all Fridays ; but 
we should object to his laying down this Pre- 
miss : and therefore should justly say that 
his Induction was faulty, though his argument 
were correct. 

And here it may be remarked, that the The more 

' doubttui in- 

ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that ^f'; 1 - 

in an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss 
should be always the one of whose truth 
least doubt can exist, is not observed in In- 
duction : for the Premiss which is usually 
the more doubtful of the two, is, in that, the 

* I have selected an instance in which Induction is tlie 
only ground we have to rest on ; no reason, that I know 
of, .having ever been assigned that could have led us to 
conjecture this curious fact a priori. 



u 

iulucti'jii. 



234 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

major; it being in few cases quite certain that 
the individuals, respecting which some point 
has been ascertained, are to be fairly regarded 
as a sample of the whole class : the major 
Premiss, nevertheless, is seldom expressed, 
for the reason just given, that it is easily 
understood, as being, mutatis mutandis, the 
same in every Induction. 

What has been said of Induction will 
equally apply to Example ; which differs from 
it only in having a singular instead of a 
general Conclusion ; e. g. in the instance 
above, if the Conclusion had been drawn, 
not respecting tyrannies in general, but re- 
specting this or that tyranny, that it was not 
likely to be lasting, each of the cases adduced 
to prove this would have been called an 
Example. 



Chap. II. §1.] 235 



Chap. II. 
On the Discovery of Truth. 

§1. 

Whether it is by a process of Reasoning 
that New Truths are brought to light, is a 
question which seems to be decided in the ne- 
gative by what has been already said ; though 
many eminent writers seem to have taken for 
granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, in a 
great measure, a dispute concerning the use of 
words; but it is not, for that reason, either 
uninteresting or unimportant, since an inaccu- 
rate use of language may often, in matters of 
Science, lead to confusion of thought, and to 
erroneous conclusions. And, in the present 
instance, much of the undeserved contempt 
which has been bestowed on the Logical sys- 
tem may be traced to this source ; for when 
any one has laid down, that " Reasoning is 
important in the discovery of Truth," and that 
" Logic is of no service in the discovery of 
Truth," (each of which propositions is true 
in a certain sense of the terms employed, 
but not in the same sense) he is naturally 



236 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

led to conclude, that there are processes of 
Reasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does 
not apply, and, of course, to misconceive alto- 
gether the nature of the Science. 

In maintaining the negative side of the 
above question, three things are to be pre- 
mised : first, that it is not contended that 
discoveries of any kind of Truth can be made 
(or at least are usually made) without Reason- 
ing ; only, that Reasoning is not the whole of 
the process, nor the whole of that which is 
important therein ; secondly, that Reasoning 
shall be taken in the sense, not of every exer- 
cise of the Reason, but of Argumentation, in 
which we have all along used it, and in 
which it has been defined by all the Logical 
writers, viz. " from certain granted propo- 
sitions to infer another proposition as the 
consequence of them : " thirdly, that by a 
" New Truth," be understood something nei- 
ther expressly nor virtually asserted before, — 
not implied and involved in anything already 
known. 

To prove, then, this point demonstratively 
becomes in this manner perfectly easy ; for 
since all Reasoning (in the sense above de- 
fined) may be resolved into Syllogisms ; and 
since even the objectors to Logic make it a 
subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the 
Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion, 



Chap. II. § l.J DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 237 

it follows at once that no New Truth (as 
above defined) can be elicited by any process 
of Reasoning. 

It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly- 
celebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
objects to the Syllogism altogether, as necessa- 
rily involving a petit 10 principii ; an objection 
which, of course, he would not have been dis- 
posed to bring forward, had he perceived that, 
whether well or ill-founded, it lies against all 
arguments whatever. Had he been aware that 
a Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument 
otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any 
argument whatever, stated regularly and at 
full length, he would have obtained a more 
correct view of the object of all Reasoning ; 
which is, merely to expand and unfold the 
assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied 
in those with which we set out, and to bring 
a person to perceive and acknowledge the full 
force of that which he has admitted ; to con- 
template it in various points of view; to admit 
in one shape what he has already admitted in 
another, and to give up and disallow whatever 
is inconsistent with it. 

Nor is it always a very easy task even to 
bring before the mind the several bearings, — 
the various applications, — of any one proposi- 
tion. A common Term comprehends several, 
often numberless individuals; and these often, 



238 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

in some respects, widely differing from each 
other; and no one can be, on each occasion of 
his employing such a Term, attending to and 
fixing his mind on each of the individuals, or 
even of the species so comprehended. It is to 
be remembered, too, that both Division and 
Generalization are in a great degree arbi- 
trary ; i. e. that we may both divide the same 
genus on several different principles, and may 
refer the same species to several different 
classes, according to the nature of the dis- 
course and drift of the argument ; each of 
which classes will furnish a distinct middle 
Term for an argument, according to the 
question. E. G. If we wished to prove that 
"a horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen ex- 
ample from the above writer,) we might refer 
it to the genus " animal ; " to prove that " it 
has only a single stomach," to the genus of 
" non-ruminants ; " to prove that it is " likely 
to degenerate in a very cold climate," we 
should class it with " original productions of 
a hot climate," fyc. fyc. Now, each of these, 
and numberless others to which the same 
thing might be referred, are implied by the 
very term, "horse;" yet it cannot be ex- 
pected that they can all be at once pre- 
sent to the mind whenever that term is 
uttered. Much less, when, instead of such 
a Term as that, we are employing Terms 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 23.9 

of a very abstract and, perhaps, complex 
signification,* as " government, justice," $r. 

The ten Categories f or Predicaments, categories. 
which Aristotle and other Logical writers 
have treated of, being certain general heads 
or summa genera, to one or more of which 
every Term may be referred, serve the pur- 
pose of marking out certain tracks, as it were, 
which are to be pursued in searching for 
middle Terms, in each argument respectively ; 
it being essential that we should generalize 
on a right principle, with a view to the ques- 
tion before us ; or, in other words, that we 
should abstract that portion of any object 
presented to the mind, which is important 
to the argument in hand. There are ex- 
pressions in common use which have a re- 
ference to this caution ; such as, " this is a 
question, not as to the nature of the object, 

* On this point there are some valuable remarks in the 
Philosophy of Rhetoric itself, Book IV. Chap. vii. 

-f- The Categories enumerated l)y Aristotle, are obffla, 

■KOOOV, 7TO~lOV, irpUffTl, TTOU , 7TOTe, ke'iadcu, t\£iy f TTOul)', 

7raor)(£ij' ; which are usually rendered, as adequately as, 
perhaps, they can be in our language, Substance, Quan- 
tity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Posses- 
sion, Action, Suffering. The Catalogue has been by 
some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be 
done by subdividing some of the heads ; and by others 
curtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately 
be referred to the two heads of Substance and Attribute, 
or (in the language of some Logicians) Accident. 



240 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

but the magnitude of it:" "this is a question 
of time, or of place" Spc., i. e. " the subject 
must be referred to this or to that Category." 
With respect to the meaning of the Terms 
in question, "Discovery," and "New Truth;" 
it matters not whether we confine ourselves to 
the narrowest sense, or admit the widest, pro- 
vided we do but distinguish: there certainly 
are two kinds of " New Truth" and of 
Discovery," if we take those words in the 

Discovery. . 1 • i • i i i 

widest sense in which they are ever used. 
First, such Truths as were, before they were 
discovered, absolutely unknown, being not im- 
plied by anything we previously knew, though 
we might perhaps suspect them as probable ; 
such are all matters of fact strictly so called, 
when first made known to one who had not 
any such previous knowledge, as would enable 
him to ascertain them a priori ; L e. by Rea- 
soning ; as, if we inform a man that we have 
a colony at Botany Bay ; or that the earth 
is at such a distance from the sun ; or that 
platina is heavier than gold. The commu- 
nication of this kind of knowledge is most 
information, usually, and most strictly, called information ; 
we gain it from observation, and from testi- 
mony ; no mere internal workings of our own 
minds (except when the mind itself is the 
very object to be observed), or mere discus- 
sions in words, will make these known to us ; 



(i.w.IUl.j DISCOVER? OF TRUTH. 211 

though there is great room for sagacity in 
judging what testimony to admit, and forming 
conjectures that may lead to profitable obser- 
vation, and to experiments with a view to it. 

The other class of Discoveries is of a very 
different nature. That which may be elicited 
by Reasoning, and consequently is implied in 
that which we already know, we assent to on 
that ground, and not from observation or tes- 
timony : to take a Geometrical truth upon 
trust, or to attempt to ascertain it by obser- 
vation, would betray a total ignorance of the 
nature of the Science. In the longest de- 
monstration, the Mathematical teacher seems 
only to lead us to make use of our own stores, 
and point out to us how much we had already 
admitted ; and, in the case of many Ethical 
propositions, we assent at first hearing, though 
perhaps we had never heard or thought of the 
proposition before ; so also do we readily as- 
sent to the testimony of a respectable man, 
who tells us that our troops have gained a 
victory ; but how different is the nature of 
the assent in the two cases. In the latter 
we are ready to thank the man for his infor- 
mation, as being such as no wisdom or learn- 
ing would have enabled us to ascertain ; in 
the former, we usually exclaim "very true!" 
" that is a valuable and just remark ; that 
never struck me before!" implying at once 

R 



242 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

our practical ignorance of it, and also our 
consciousness that we possess, in what we 
already know, the means to ascertain the 
truth of it ; that we have a right, in short, 
to bear our testimony to its truth. 

To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth 
of this description may be as completely un- 
known to a man as the other ; but as soon 
as it is set before him, and the argument by 
which it is connected with his previous no- 
tions is made clear to him, he recognises it as 
something conformable to, and contained in, 
his former belief. 

It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of 
Reminiscence arose from a, hasty extension of 
what he had observed in this class, to all ac- 
quisition of knowledge whatever. His Theory 
of ideas served to confound together matters 
of fact respecting the nature of things, (which 
may be perfectly new to us) with propositions 
relating to our own notions, and modes of 
thought ; (or to speak, perhaps, more cor- 
rectly, bur own arbitrary signs) which propo- 
sitions must be contained and implied in those 
very complex notions themselves ; and whose 
truth is a conformity, not to the nature of 
things, but to our own hypothesis. Such 
are all propositions in pure Mathematics, and 
many in Ethics, viz. those which involve no 
assertion as to real matters of fact. It has 



Chap. II. §1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 243 

been rightly remarked,* that Mathematical 
propositions are not properly true or false, 
in the same sense as any proposition respect- 
ing real fact is so called ; and hence the truth 
(such as it is) of such propositions is necessary 
and eternal ; since it amounts only to this, 
that any complex notion which you have ar- 
bitrarily framed, must be exactly conformable 
to itself. The proposition, that " the belief 
in a future state, combined with a complete 
devotion to the present life, is not consistent 
with the character of prudence," would be 
not at all the less true if a future state were 
a chimera, and prudence a quality which was 
no-where met with ; nor would the truth of 
the Mathematician's conclusion be shaken, 
that " circles are to each other as the squares 
of their diameters," should it be found that 
there never had been a circle, or a square, con- 
formable to the definition in rcrum natura. f 

* Dugakl Stewart's Philosophy, Vol. II. 

•j" Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke, and 
others, to demonstrate (in the mathematical sense) the 
existence of a Deity. This can only be done by covertly 
assuming in the Premises the very point to be proved. 
No matter of fact can be mathematically demonstrated; 
though it may be proved in such a manner as to leave no 
doubt on the mind. E. G. I have no more doubt that I 
met such and such a man, in this or that place, yesterday, 
than that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles: but the kind of certainty I have of these two 
truths is widely different; to say, that I did not meet the 
R 2 



244 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

The Ethical proposition, just instanced, is 
one of those which Locke calls " trifling," be- 
cause the Predicate is merely a part of the 
complex idea implied by the subject; and he 
is right, if by "trifling" he means that it gives 
not, strictly speaking, any information : but he 
should consider, that to remind a man of what 
he had not, and what he would not have 
thought of, may be, practically, as valuable 
as giving him information ; and that most 
propositions in the best sermons, and all, in 
pure Mathematics, are of the description 
which he censures. 

It is, indeed, rather remarkable that he 
should speak so often of building Morals into 
a demonstrative Science, and yet speak so 
slightingly of those very propositions to which 
we must absolutely confine ourselves, in order 
to give to Ethics even the appearance of such 
a Science ; for the instant you come to an 
assertion respecting a matter of fact, as that 
" men ( L e, actually existing men) are bound 
to practise virtue," or " are liable to many 
temptations," you have stepped off the ground 
of strict demonstration, just as when you 
proceed to practical Geometry. 

man, would be false indeed, but it would not be anything 
inconceivable, self-contradictory, and absurd ; but it would 
be so, to deny the equality of the angles of a triangle to 
two right angles. 



Ch,u>. II. § I.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 215 

But to return : it is of the utmost import- information 

-,. . i • i /» rv and Instruc- 

ance to distinguish these two kinds ot Dis- tio »- 
covery of Truth. In relation to the former, 
as I have said, the word " information " is 
most strictly applied ; the communication of 
the latter is more properly called " instruc- 
tion." I speak of the usual practice ; for it 
would be going too far to pretend that writers 
are uniform and consistent in the use of these, 
or of any other term. We say that the His- 
torian gives us information respecting past 
times ; the Traveller, respecting foreign coun- 
tries : on the other hand, the Mathematician 
gives instruction in the principles of his Sci- 
ence ; the Moralist instructs us in our duties ; 
and we generally use the expressions u a well- 
informed man," and " a well-instructed man," 
in a sense conformable to that which has been 
here laid down. However, let the words be 
used as they may, the things are evidently 
different, and ought to be distinguished. It 
is a question comparatively unimportant, whe- 
ther the term " Discovery " shall or shall not 
be extended to the eliciting of those Truths, 
which, being implied in our previous know- 
ledge, may be established by mere strict 
Reasoning. Similar verbal questions, indeed, 
might be raised respecting many other cases : 
e. g. one has forgotten (i. e. cannot recollect) 
the name of some person or place ; perhaps 



246 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

we even try to think of it, but in vain ; at 
last some one reminds us, and we instantly 
recognise it as the one we wanted to recollect ; 
it may be asked, was this in our mind or not ? 
The answer is, that in one sense it was, and 
in another sense, it was not. Or, again, sup- 
pose there is a vein of metal on a man's estate, 
which he does not know of; is it part of 
his possessions or not ? and when he finds it 
out and works it, does he then acquire a new 
possession or not ? Certainly not, in the same 
sense as if he has a fresh estate bequeathed 
to him, which he had formerly no right to ; 
but to all practical purposes it is a new pos- 
session. This case, indeed, may serve as an 
illustration of the one we have been consider- 
ing ; and in all these cases, if the real distinc- 
tion be understood, the verbal question will 
not be of much consequence. To use one 
more illustration. Reasoning has been aptly 
compared to the piling together blocks of 
stone ; on each of which, as on a pedestal, a 
man can raise himself a small, and but a 
small, height above the plain ; but which, 
when skilfully built up, will form a flight of 
steps, which will raise him to a great eleva- 
tion. Now (to pursue this analogy) when the 
materials are all ready to the builder's hand, 
the blocks ready dug and brought, his work 
resembles one of the two kinds of Discovery 



( Hap. II. § 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 247 

just mentioned, viz. that to which we have 
assigned the name of instruction : but if his 
materials are to be entirely, or in part, pro- 
vided by himself, — if he himself is forced to 
dig fresh blocks from the quarry, — this cor- 
responds to the other kind of Discovery. 

§ 2. 
I have hitherto spoken of the employment Physical du 

# covcries. 

of argument in the establishment of those 
hypothetical Truths (as they may be called) 
which relate only to our own abstract no- 
tions ; it is not, however, meant to be in- 
sinuated that there is no room for Reasoning 
in the establishment of a matter of fact ; 
but the other class of Truths have first been 
treated of, because, in discussing subjects of 
that kind, the process of Reasoning is always 
the principal, and often the only thing to be 
attended to, if we are but certain and clear 
as to the meaning of the terms; whereas, 
when assertions respecting real existence are 
introduced, we have the additional and more 
important business of ascertaining and keeping 
in mind the degree of evidence for those facts ; 
since, otherwise, our Conclusions could not 
be relied on, however accurate our Reason- 
ing ; but, undoubtedly, we may by Reasoning 
arrive at matters of fact, if we have matters 
of fact to set out with as data; only that it 



248 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

will very often happen that, "from certain 
facts/' as Campbell remarks, " we draw only 
probable Conclusions;" because the other 
Premiss introduced (which he overlooked) is 
only probable. He observed that in such an 
instance, for example, as the one lately given, 
we infer from the certainty that such and such 
tyrannies have been short-lived, the probability 
that others will be so ; and he did not con- 
sider that there is an understood Premiss 
which is essential to the argument ; (viz. that 
all tyrannies will resemble those we have 
already observed) which being only of a pro- 
bable character, must attach the same degree 
of uncertainty to the Conclusion.* An indi- 
vidual fact is not unfrequently elicited by 
skilfully combining, and Reasoning from, those 
already known ; of which many curious cases 
occur in the detection of criminals by officers 
of justice, and Barristers, who acquire by 
practice such dexterity in that particular de- 
partment, as to draw sometimes the right 
Conclusion from data, which might be in the 
possession of others, without being applied to 

* And the doubtfulness is multiplied, if both Premises 
are uncertain. For since it is only on the supposition of 
both Premises being true, that we can calculate on the 
truth of the Conclusion, we must state in numbers the 
chances against each Premiss being true, and then mul- 
tiply these together, to judge of the degree of evidence of 
the Conclusion.— See Book III. § 14. 



Cha*. II. § 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 2 19 

the same use. In all cases of the establish- 
ment of a general fact from Induction, that 
general fact (as has been formerly remarked) 
is ultimately established by Reasoning ; e. g. 
Bakewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder, ob- 
served, in a great number of individual 
beasts, a tendency to fatten readily, and 
in a great number of others the absence 
of this constitution : in every individual of 
the former description, he observed a certain 
peculiar make, though they differed widely in 
size, colour, fyc. Those of the latter descrip- 
tion differed no less in various points, but 
agreed in being of a different make from the 
others : these facts were his data ; from 
which combining them with the general prin- 
ciple, that Nature is steady and uniform in 
her proceedings, he logically drew the conclu- 
sion that beasts of the specified make have 
universally a peculiar tendency to fattening : 
but then his principal merit consisted in making 
the observations, and in so combining them 
as to abstract from each of a multitude of 
cases, differing widely in many respects, the 
circumstances in which they all agreed ; and 
also in conjecturing skilfully how far those 
circumstances were likely to be found in the 
whole class : the making of such observations, 
and still more the combination, abstraction, 
and judgment employed, are what men com- 



250 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

monly mean (as was above observed) when 
they speak of Induction ; and these operations 
are certainly distinct from Reasoning.* The 
same observations will apply to numberless 
other cases ; as, for instance, to the Discovery 
of the law of "vis inertia?" and the other 
principles of Natural Philosophy. 

But to what class, it may be asked, should 
be referred the Discoveries thus made ? All 
would agree in calling them, when first ascer- 
tained, " New Truths," in the strictest sense 
of the word; which would seem to imply 
their belonging to the class which may be 
called by way of distinction, " Physical Disco- 
veries:" and yet their being ultimately esta- 
blished by Reasoning, would seem, according 
to the foregoing rule, to refer them- to the 
other class, viz. what may be called " Logical 
Logical Di S - Discoveries ;" since whatever is established by 
Reasoning must have been contained and 
virtually asserted in the Premises. In answer 
to this, it is to be observed, that they cer- 
tainly do belong to the latter class, relatively 
to a person who is in possession of the 
data: but to him who is not, they are 
New Truths of the other class ; for it is to be 
remembered, that the words " Discovery" 
and " New Truths" are necessarily relative: 
there may be a proposition which is to one 

* See Book I. § 1. Note. 



covenes. 



Chap. II. § 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 251 

person absolutely known; to another (viz, one 
to whom it has never occurred, though he is in 
possession of all the data from which it may 
be proved) it will be (when he comes to 
perceive it, by a process of instruction) what 
we have called a Logical Discovery: to a third 
( viz. one who is ignorant of these data) it will 
be absolutely unknown, and will have been, 
when made known to him, a perfectly and 
properly New Truth, — a piece of information, 
— a Physical Discovery, as we have called it.* 
To the Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at 
the Discovery by Reasoning from his observa- 
tions, and from established principles com- 
bined with them, the Discovery is of the 
former class ; to the multitude, probably, of 
the latter, as they will have been most likely 
not possessed of all his data. 

It follows from what has been said, that in character of 
Mathematics, and in such Ethical propositions 

* It may be worth while in this place to define what is 
properly to be called Knowledge : it implies three things; 
1st, firm belief, 2dly, of what is true, 3dly, on sufficient 
grounds. If any one c. g. is in doubt respecting one of 
Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be said to know the 
proposition proved by it ; if, again, he is fully convinced 
of anything that is not true, he is mistaken in supposing 
himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are each folly 
confident, one that the moon is inhabited, and the other 
that it is not, (though one of these opinions must be true J 
neither of them could properly be said to hum the truth, 
since he cannot have sufficient proof of it. 



scientific 
truths. 



252 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

as we were lately speaking of, we do not allow 
the possibility of any but a Logical Discovery ; 
i. e. no proposition of that class can be true, 
which was not implied in the definitions and 
axioms we set out with, which are the first 
principles : for since these propositions do not 
profess to state any matter of fact, the only 
Truth they can possess, consists in conformity 
to the original principles : to one, therefore, 
who knows these principles, such propositions 
are Truths already implied, since they may be 
developed to him by Reasoning, if he is not 
defective in the discursive faculty ; and again, 
to one who does not understand those princi- 
ples (i. e. is not master of the definitions) 
such propositions are in great measure, if not 
wholly, unmeaning. On the other hand, pro- 
positions relating to matters of fact, may he, 
indeed, implied in what he already knew ; (as 
he who knows the climate of the Alps, the 
Andes, Sfc. tipc. has virtually admitted the 
general fact, that " the tops of mountains are 
comparatively cold") but as these possess an 
absolute and physical Truth, they may also be 
absolutely " new," their Truth not being im- 
plied by the mere terms of the propositions. 
The truth or falsity of any proposition con- 
cerning a triangle, is implied by the meaning 
of that and of the other Geometrical terms ; 
whereas, though one may understand (in the 



Chap. II. §3.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 253 

ordinary sense of that word) the full meaning 
of the terms " planet," and " inhabited," and 
of all the other terms in the language, he 
cannot thence be certain that the planets 
are, or are not, inhabited. 

§3. 

It has probably been the source of much 
perplexity, that the term " true" has been 
applied indiscriminately to two such different 
classes of propositions. The term definition is Dean 
used with the same laxity ; and much confu- 
sion has thence resulted. Such Definitions as 
the Mathematical, must imply every attribute 
that belongs to the thing defined ; because 
that thing is merely our meaning; which 
meaning the Definition lays down : whereas, 
real substances, having an independent exist- 
ence, may possess innumerable qualities (as 
Locke observes) not implied in the meaning 
we attach to their names, or, as Locke ex- 
presses it, in our ideas of them. " Their eu«i u 
nominal essence (to use his language) is not "" 
the same as their real essence ;" whereas the 
nominal essence, and the real essence, of a 
Circle, fyc. are the same. A Mathematical 
Definition, therefore, cannot properly be called 
true, since it is not properly a proposition ,* 

* I mean in this place, that expression of a Definition 
in which the name is conjoined with that which is, pro- 



i 

Nominal de- 
itions. 



254 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

(any more than an article in a Dictionary,) 
but merely an explanation of the meaning of 
a Term. Perhaps in Definitions of this class, 
it might be better to substitute (as Aristotle 
usually does) the imperative mood for the 
indicative: thus bringing them. into the form 
of postulates; for the Definitions and the 
Postulates in Mathematics differ in little or 
nothing but the form of expression : e. g. " let 
a four-sided figure, of equal sides and right 
angles, be called a square," would clearly 
imply that such a figure is conceivable, and 
that the writer intended to employ that term to 
signify such a figure : which is precisely all 
that is meant to be asserted. If, indeed, a 
Mathematical writer mean to assert that the 
ordinary sense of the term is that which he 
has given, that, certainly, is a proposition, 
which must be either true or false ; but in 
defining a neiv term, though the term indeed 
may be ill chosen and improper, or the Defi- 
nition may be self-contradictory, and conse- 
quently unintelligible, the words " true," and 
" false," do not apply. The same 'may be 
said of what are called nominal Definitions of 

perly speaking, the definition of it, in the form of a pro- 
position : as e. g. " a Triangle is a plane superficial 
figure bounded by three straight lines:" the words in 
italics are what, strictly speaking, constitute the Defini- 
tion ; but what I am here speaking of is the whole sen- 
tence. 



Chaf. II. § 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 255 

other things, i. e. those which merely explain 
the meaning of the word ; viz. they can be 
true or false only when they profess (and so 
far as they profess) to give the ordinary and 
established meaning of the term. But those 
which are called real Definitions, viz. which 
unfold the nature of the thing, (which they 
may do in various degrees,) to these the 
epithet " true " may be applied ; and to make 
out such a Definition will often be the very 
end (not as in Mathematics the beginning) of 
our study.* 

In Mathematics there is no such distinction 
between nominal and real Definition ; the 
meaning of the term, and the nature of the 
thing, being one and the same : so that no 
correct Definition whatever of any Mathema- 
tical term can be devised, which shall not 
imply every thing which belongs to the term. 

§4. 
When it is asked, then, whether such great Ambiguity or 

the wont 

Discoveries, as have been made in Natural RMMttl »«' 
Philosophy, were accomplished, or can be 
accomplished, by Reasoning? the inquirer 
should be reminded, that the question is am- 
biguous ; it may be answered in the affir- 
mative, if by " Reasoning" is meant to be 

* Burke on Taste, in the Introduction to his " Essay 
on the Sublime and Beautiful." 



256 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

included the assumption of Premises. To the 
right performance of that work, is requi- 
site, not only, in many cases, the ascertain- 
ment of facts, and of the degree of evidence 
for doubtful propositions, (in which observation 
and experiment will often be indispensable,) 
but also a skilful selection and combination of 
known facts and principles ; such as implies, 
amongst other things, the exercise of that 
powerful abstraction which seizes the com- 
mon circumstances — the point of agreement — 
in a number of, otherwise, dissimilar indi- 
viduals; and it is in this that the greatest 
genius is shown. But if " Reasoning" be 
understood in the limited sense in which it 
is usually denned, then we must answer in 
the negative ; and reply that such Discoveries 
are made by means of Reasoning combined 
with other operations. 

In the process I have been speaking of, there 
is much Reasoning throughout ; and thence 
the whole has been carelessly called a "pro- 
cess of Reasoning." 

It is not, indeed, any just ground of com- 
plaint that the word Reasoning is used in two 
senses; but that the two senses are perpe- 
tually confounded together : and hence it is 
that some Logical writers fancied that Rea- 
soning (viz. that which Logic treats of) was 
the method of discovering Truth ; and that 



Chap. II. §4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 257 

so many other writers have accordingly com- 
plained of Logic for not accomplishing that 
end; urging that "Syllogism" (i.e. Reason- 
ing ; though they overlooked the coincidence) 
never established any thing that is, strictly 
speaking, unknown to him who has granted 
the Premises : and proposing the introduction 
of a certain " rational Logic" to accomplish 
this purpose ; i. e. to direct the mind in the 
process of investigation. Supposing that 
some such system could be devised — that it 
could even be brought into a scientific form, 
(which he must be more sanguine than scien- 
tific who expects,) — that it were of the great- 
est conceivable utility, — and that it should be 
allowed to bear the name of u Logic," (since 
it would not be worth while to contend about 
a name) still it would not, as these writers 
seem to suppose, have the same object pro- 
posed with the Aristotelian Logic ; or be in 
any respect a rival to that system. A plough 
may be a much more ingenious and valuable 
instrument than a flail ; but it never can be 
substituted for it. 

Those Discoveries of general laws of Na- 
ture, fyc. of which we have been speaking, 
being of that character which we have de- 
scribed by the name of " Logical Discoveries," 
to him who is in possession of all the Premises 
from which they are deduced; but being, to the 

S 



258 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

multitude (who are unacquainted with many 
of those Premises) strictly " New Truths/' 
hence it is, that men in general give to the 
general facts, and to them, most peculiarly, 
the name of Discoveries ; for to themselves they 
are such, in the strictest sense ; the Premises 
from which they were inferred being not only 
originally unknown to them, but frequently 
remaining unknown to the very last; e.g. the 
general conclusion concerning cattle, which 
Bake well made known, is what most Agri- 
culturists (and many others also) are ac- 
quainted with ; but the Premises he set out 
with, viz. the facts respecting this, that, and 
the other, individual ox, (the ascertainment of 
which facts was his first Discovery,) these are 
what few know, or care to know, with any 
exact particularity. 

observation And it may be added, that these disCO- 
amI experi- m i 

veries of particular facts, which are the 
immediate result of observation, are, in them- 
selves, uninteresting and insignificant, till they 
are combined so as to lead to a grand general 
result ; those who on each occasion watched 
the motions, and registered the times of oc- 
cupation of Jupiter's satellites, little thought,- 
perhaps, themselves, what magnificent results 
they were preparing the way for.* So that 

* Hence, Bacon urges us to pursue Truth, without 
always requiring to perceive its practical application. 



meat. 



Chap. II. HJ DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 259 

there is an additional cause which has con- 
fined the term Discovery to these grand ge- 
neral conclusions ; and, as was just observed, 
they are, to the generality of men, perfectly 
New Truths in the strictest sense of the word, 
not being implied in any previous knowledge 
they possessed. Very often it will happen, 
indeed, that the conclusion thus drawn will 
amount only to a probable conjecture; which 
conjecture will dictate to the inquirer such an 
experiment, or course of experiments, as will 
fully establish the fact : thus Sir H. Davy, 
from finding that the flame of hydrogen gas 
was not communicated through a long slender 
tube, conjectured that a shorter but still slen- 
derer tube would answer the same purpose ; 
this led him to try the experiments, in which, 
by continually shortening the tube, and at the 
same time lessening its bore, he arrived at 
last at the wire-gauze of his safety-lamp. 

It is to be observed also, that whatever 
credit is conveyed by the word " Discovery," 
to him who is regarded as the author of it, 
is well deserved by those who skilfully select 
and combine known Truths {especially such 
as have been long and generally known) so 
as to elicit important, and hitherto unthought- 
of, conclusions; their's is the master-mind: — 
dpxtreKToviKi) (frpovrjcns. Whereas men of very 
inferior powers "may sometimes, by immediate 
s 2 



260 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

observation, discover perfectly new facts, em- 
pirically ; and thus be of service in furnishing 
materials to the others ; to whom they stand 
in the same relation (to recur to a former 
illustration) as the brickmaker or stone- 
quarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly 
creditable to Adam Smith, and to Mr. Mal- 
thus, that the data from which they drew 
such important Conclusions had been in every 
one's hands for centuries. 

As for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as 
we have before said) must alzvays be of the 
description to which we have given the name 
of " Logical Discoveries ;" since to him who 
properly comprehends the meaning of the 
Mathematical terms, (and to no other are the 
Truths themselves, properly speaking, intel- 
ligible) those results are implied in his pre- 
vious knowledge, since they are Logically 
deducible therefrom. It is not, however, 
meant to be implied, that Mathematical Dis- 
coveries are effected by pure Reasoning, and 
by that singly. For though there is not here, 
as in Physics, any exercise of judgment as to 
the degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any 
experiments and observations, yet there is the 
same call for skill in the selection and combina- 
tion of the Premises in such a manner as shall 
be best calculated to lead to a new, that is, 
miperceived and unthought-of Conclusion. 



-•radons 
connected 



Chap.II.§5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 20' 1 

In folloxving, indeed, and taking in a de- 
monstration, nothing is called for but pure 
Reasoning ; but the assumption of Premises is 
not a part of Reasoning, in the strict and tech- 
nical sense of that term. Accordingly, there 
are many who can follozv a Mathematical 
demonstration, or any other train of argu- 
ment, who would not succeed well in framing 
one of their own.* 

§5. 
For both kinds of Discovery then, the Lo- o pe 

* com 

gical, as well as the Physical, certain opera- •„£' ReMon 
tions are requisite, beyond those which can 
fairly be comprehended under the strict sense 
of the word " Reasoning ;" in the Logical, is 
required a skilful selection and combination of 
known Truths: in the Physical, we must em- 
ploy, in addition (generally speaking) to that 
process, observation and experiment. It will 
generally happen, that in the study of nature, 
and, universally, in all that relates to matters 
of fact, both kinds of investigation will be 
united ; i. e. some of the facts or principles 
you reason from as Premises, must be ascer- 
tained by observation; or, as in the case of 
the safety-lamp, the ultimate Conclusion will 

* Hence, the Student must not confine himself to this 
passive kind of employment, if he would truly become a 
Mathematician. 



262 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

need confirmation from experience ; so that 
both Physical and Logical Discovery will 
take place in the course of the same process : 
we need not, therefore, wonder, that the two 
are so perpetually confounded. In Mathe- 
matics, on the other hand, and in great part 
of the discussions relating to Ethics and Ju- 
risprudence, there being no room for any 
Physical Discovery whatever, we have only 
to make a skilful use of the propositions in our 
possession, to arrive at every attainable result. 
The investigation, however, of the latter 
class of subjects differs in other points also 
from that of the former. For, setting aside 
the circumstance of our having, in these, no 
question as to facts, — no room for observa- 
tion, — there is also a considerable difference 
in what may be called, in both instances, the 
process of Logical investigation ; the Premises 
on which we proceed being of so different a 
nature in the two cases. 
Matbemati- To take the example of Mathematics, the 

cal and other A ' 

Reasoning. Definitions, which are the principles of our 
Reasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still 
fewer; and both are, for the most part, laid 
down and placed before the student in the 
outset; the introduction of a new Definition 
or Axiom, being of comparatively rare occur- 
rence, at wide intervals, and with a formal 
statement ; besides which, there is no room 



Chap. II. §5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 263 

for doubt concerning either. On the other 
hand, in all Reasonings which regard matters 
of fact, we introduce, almost at every step, 
fresh and fresh propositions (to a very great 
number) which had not been elicited in the 
course of our Reasoning, but are taken for 
granted ; viz, facts and laws of Nature, which 
are here the principles of our Reasoning, and 
maxims, or " elements of belief," which answer 
to the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the 
opening of a Treatise, for example, on Che- 
mistry, on Agriculture, on Political Economy, 
Sfc. the author should make, as in Mathe- 
matics, a formal statement of all the propo- 
sitions he intended to assume, as granted 
throughout the whole work, both he and his 
readers would be astonished at the number; 
and, of these, many would be only probable, 
and there would be much room for doubt as 
to the degree of probability, and for judg- 
ment, in ascertaining that degree. 

Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always 
employed precisely in the same simple form ; 
e. g. the axiom that u things equal to the 
same are equal to one another," is cited, 
whenever there is need, in those very words ; 
whereas the maxims employed in the other 
class of subjects, admit of, and require, con- 
tinual modifications in the application of 
them : e. g. " the stability of the laws of 



264 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

Nature/' which is our constant assumption in 
inquiries relating to Natural Philosophy, as- 
sumes many different shapes, and in some of 
them does not possess the same absolute cer- 
tainty as in others ; e. g. when, from having 
always observed a certain sheep ruminating, 
we infer, that this individual sheep will con- 
tinue to ruminate, we assume that i( the pro- 
perty which has hitherto belonged to this 
sheep will remain unchanged ; " when we infer 
the same property of all sheep, we assume 
that " the property which belongs to this 
individual belongs to the whole species :" if, 
on comparing sheep with some other kinds of 
horned animals, and finding that all agree in 
ruminating, we infer that " all horned animals 
ruminate," we assume that "the whole of a 
genus or class are likely to agree in any point 
wherein many species of that genus agree ;" 
or in other words, " that if one of two pro- 
perties, fyc. has often been found accompanied 
by another, and never without it, the former 
will be universally accompanied by the latter :" 
now all these are merely different forms of 
the maxim, that "nature is uniform in her 
operations," which, it is evident, varies in ex- 
pression in almost every different case where 
it is applied, and admits of every degree of 
evidence, from absolute moral certainty, to 
mere conjecture. 



Ohap. II. § 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 265 

The same may be said of an infinite num- 
ber of principles and maxims appropriated to, 
and employed in, each particular branch of 
study. Hence, all such Reasonings are, in 
comparison of Mathematics, very complex ; 
requiring so much more than that does, be- 
yond the process of merely deducing the con- 
clusion Logically from the Premises : so that 
it is no wonder that the longest Mathematical 
demonstration should be so much more easily 
constructed and understood, than a much 
shorter train of just Reasoning concerning 
real facts. The former has been aptly com- 
pared to a long and steep, but even and 
regular flight of steps, which tries the breath, 
and the strength, and the perseverance only; 
while the latter resembles a short, but rugged 
and uneven, ascent up a precipice, which 
requires a quick eye, agile limbs, and a firm 
step ; and in which we have to tread now on 
this side, now on that — ever considering, as 
we proceed, whether this or that projection 
will afford room for our foot, or whether 
some loose stone may not slide from under 
us. There are probably as many steps of 
pure Reasoning in one of the longer of Eu- 
clid's demonstrations, as in the whole of an 
argumentative treatise on some other subject, 
occupying perhaps a considerable volume. 

As for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings 



266 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

which were lately mentioned as in some re- 
spects resembling those of Mathematics, (viz. 
such as keep clear of all assertions respecting 
facts) they have this difference ; that not only 
men are not so completely agreed respecting 
the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, 
but the meaning also of each term cannot be 
absolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary 
definition ; on the contrary, a great part of 
our labour consists in distinguishing accurately 
the various senses in which men employ each 
term, — ascertaining which is the most pro- 
per, — and taking care to avoid confounding 
them together. 



Chap. III. 
Of Inference and Proof. 

§i- 

Since it appears, from what has been said, 
that universally a man must possess some- 
thing else besides the Reasoning-faculty, in 
order to apply that faculty properly to his 
own purpose, whatever that purpose may be ; 
it may be inquired whether some theory could 



Chap. III. §1.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 267 

not be made out, respecting those " other 
operations''' and "intellectual processes, dis- 
tinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary 
for us sometimes to employ in the investiga- 
tion of truth;"* and whether rules could 
not be laid down for conducting them. 

Something has, indeed, been done in this Different ao. 

plications of 

way by more than one writer; and more might *•»* "'"-■ 
probably be accomplished by one who should 
fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind 
the principles of Logic, properly so called ; 
but it would hardly be possible to build up 
anything like a regular Science respecting 
these matters, such as Logic is, with respect 
to the theory of Reasoning. It may be use- 
ful, however, to observe, that these " other 
operations" of which we have been speaking, 
and which are preparatory to the exercise 
of Reasoning, are of two kinds, according to 
the nature of the end proposed; for Rea- 
soning comprehends Inferring and Proving; 
which are not two different things, but the 
same thing regarded in two different points 
of view : like the road from London to York, 
and the road from York to London. He 
who infers,f proves ; and he who proves, 
infers; but the word "infer" fixes the mind 

* D. Stewart. 

f I mean, of course,' when the word is understood to 
imply correct Inference. 



268 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV, 

first on the Premiss, and then on the Con- 
clusion ; the word " prove/' on the contrary, 
leads the mind from the conclusion to the 
Premiss. Hence, the substantives derived 
from these words respectively, are often used 
to express that which, on each occasion, is 
last in the mind ; Inference being often used 
to signify the Conclusion (i. e. Proposition 
inferred) and Proof, the Premiss. We say, 
also, " How do you prove that ? " and " What 
do you infer from that?" which sentences 
would not be so properly expressed if we 
were to transpose those verbs. One might, 
therefore, define Proving, " the assigning of 
a reason or argument for the support of a 
given proposition ; " and Inferring, " the de- 
duction of a Conclusion from given Premises." 
In the one case our Conclusion is given, (i. e. 
set before us) and we have to seek for argu- 
ments ; in the other, our Premises are given, 
and we have to seek for a Conclusion : i. e. 
to put together our own propositions, and 
try what will follow from them ; or, to speak 
more Logically, in the one case, we seek to 
refer the Subject of which we would predi- 
cate something, to a class to which that Pre- 
dicate will (affirmatively or negatively) apply ; 
in the other, we seek to find comprehended, 
in the Subject of which we have predicated 
something, some other term to which that 



Chap. III. §2.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 269 

Predicate had not been before applied.* Each 
of these is a definition of Reasoning. 

§2. 
To infer, then, is the business of the Philo- invest^u. 

and A<l\o- 

sopher; to prove, of the Advocate; the former, catc - 
from the great mass of known and admitted 
truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional 
truth whatever, that has been hitherto unper- 
ceived ; and perhaps, without knowing, with 
certainty, what will be the terms of his Con- 
clusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks 
to ascertain what is the ratio of circles to each 
other, or what is the line whose square will be 
equal to a given circle ; the Advocate, on the 
other hand, has a Proposition put before him, 
which he is to maintain as well as he can : his 
business, therefore, is to find middle terms 
(which is the inventio of Cicero) ; the Philo- 
sopher's, to combine and select known facts, 
or principles, suitably, for gaining from them 
Conclusions which, though implied in the 
Premises, were before unperceived : in other 
words, for making " Logical Discoveries." 

To put the same thing in another point of 
view, we may consider all questions as falling 

* " Proving" may be compared to the act of putting 
away any article into the proper receptacle of goods o£ 
that description; "inferring," to that of bringing out the 
article when needed. 



270 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

under two classes ; viz. " What shall be pre- 
dicated of a certain Subject ;" and which 
Copula, affirmative or negative, shall connect 
a certain Subject and Predicate : we inquire, 
in short, either, 1st, " What is A?" or, 2d, 
" Is A, B, or is it not?" The former class 
of questions belongs to the Philosopher ; the 
latter to the Advocate.* — (See Rhet. Appen- 
dix G. p. 387.) 

* The distinction between these two classes of questions 
is perhaps best illustrated by reference to some case in 
which our decision of each of the questions involved in 
some assertion is controverted, by different parties. E. G. 
Paul says, that the apostles preached " Christ crucified ; 
to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks, foolish- 
ness : " that Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious death, 
was the Messiah, the Saviour of the World, was a doctrine 
opposed both by Jews and Gentiles ; though on different 
grounds, according to their respective prejudices: the 
Jews, who " sought after a Sign " (i. e. the coming of the 
Messiah in the clouds to establish a splendid temporal 
kingdom) were "offended" — "scandalized" — at the 
doctrine of a suffering Messiah: the Greeks who "sought 
after Wisdom" (i.e. the mode of themselves exalting their 
own nature, without any divine aid) ridiculed the idea of a 
Heavenly Saviour altogether ; which the Jews admitted. 
In logical language, the Gentiles could not comprehend 
the Predicate ; the Jews, denied the Copula. 

It may be added, that in modern phraseology, the 
operations of corresponding prejudices are denoted, 
respectively by the words "paradox" (a "stumbling- 
block ") and " nonsense ;" (" foolishness ") which are 
often used, the one, by him who has been accustomed to 
hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, the other, by 
him who has formed no opinion on the subject. 



Chap. III. § 2. j INFERENCE AND PROOF. 271 

Such are the respective preparatory pro- 
cesses in these two branches of study. They 
are widely different ; they arise from, and 
generate, very different habits of mind ; and 
require a very different kind of training and 
precept.* The Pleader, or Controversialist, 
or, in short, the Rhetorician in general, who 
is, in his own province, the most skilful, may 
be but ill-fitted for Philosophical investigation, 
even where there is no observation wanted : — 
when the facts are all ready ascertained for 
him. And again, the ablest Philosopher may 
make an indifferent disputant ; especially, 
since the arguments which have led him to 
the conclusion, and have, with him, the most 
weight, may not, perhaps, be the most pow- 
erful in controversy. The commonest fault, 
however, by far, is to forget the Philosopher 
or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, 
improperly. It is therefore of great use to 
dwell on the distinction between these two 
branches. As for the bare process of Rea- 
soning, that is the same in both cases ; but 

* It is evident that the business of the Advocate and 
that of the Judge are in this manner opposed ; the one 
being to find arguments for the support of his client's 
cause ; the other, to ascertain the truth. And hence it 
is, that those who have excelled the most in the former 
department, sometimes manifest a deficiency in the latter, 
though the subject-matter^ in which they arc conversant, 
remains the same. 



272 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book- IV. 

the preparatory processes which are requisite, 
in order to employ Reasoning profitably, these, 
we see, branch off into two distinct channels. 
In each of these, undoubtedly, useful rules 
may be laid down ; but they should not be 
confounded together. Bacon has chosen the 

philosophical department of Philosophy ; giving rules in his 
Organon, not only for the conduct of experi- 
ments to ascertain new facts, but also for the 
selection and combination of known facts and 
principles, with a view of obtaining valuable 
Inferences ; and it is probable that a system of 
such rules is what some writers mean (if they 
have any distinct meaning) by their proposed 
" Logic." 

Rhetorical In the other department, precepts have 

inquiry. 

been given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical 
writers, as a part of their plan. How far 
these precepts are to be considered as 
belonging to the present system, — whether 
" method " is to be regarded as a part of 
Logic, — whether the matter of Logic is to be 
included in the system, — whether Bacon's is 
properly to be reckoned a kind of Logic ; all 
these are merely verbal questions, relating to 
the extension, not of the Science, but of the 
name. The bare process of Reasoning, i. e. 
deducing a Conclusion from Premises, must 
ever remain a distinct operation from the 
assumption of Premises, however useful the 



Chap.III. §3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 273 

rules may be that have been given, or may 
be given, for conducting this latter process, 
and others connected with it; and however 
properly such rules may be subjoined to the 
precepts of that system to which the name 
of Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. 
Such rules as I now allude to may be of 
eminent service ; but they must always be, 
as I have before observed, comparatively 
vague and general, and incapable of being 
built up into a regular demonstrative theory 
like that of the Syllogism ; to which theory 
they bear much the same relation as the 
principles and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical 
criticism to those of Grammar; or those of 
practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. I 
find no fault with the extension of a term : 
but I would suggest a caution against con- 
founding together, by means of a common 
name, things essentially different ; and above 
all I would deprecate the sophistry of striving 
to depreciate what is called " the school- 
Logic," by perpetually contrasting it with 
systems with which it has nothing in com- 
mon but the name, and whose object is 
essentially different. 

§3. 
It is not a little remarkable that writers; h, * 

non ami 

whose expressions tend to confound together, : 



274 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

by means of a common name, two branches 
of study which have nothing else in com- 
mon (as if they were two different plans for 
attaining one and the same object), have them- 
selves complained of one of the effects of 
this confusion, viz. the introduction, early in 
the career of Academical Education, of a 
course of Logic ; under which name, they 
observe, " men now * universally compre- 
hend the works of Locke, Bacon, $*c." which, 
as is justly remarked, are unfit for beginners. 
Now this would not have happened, if men 
had always kept in mind the meaning or 
meanings of each name they used. And it 
may be added, that, however justly the word 
Logic may be thus extended, we have no 
ground for applying to the Aristotelian Logic 
the remarks above quoted respecting the Ba- 
conian ; which the ambiguity of the word, 
if not carefully kept in view, might lead us 
to do. Grant that Bacon's work is a part of 
Logic ; it no more follows, from the unfitness 
of that for learners, that the Elements of the 
Theory of Reasoning should be withheld from 
them, than it follows that the elements of 
Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit 
for boys, because Newton's Principia, which 
also bears the title of Mathematical, is above 
their grasp. Of two branches of study which 

* i. e. in the Scotch universities. 



Chap. IV. § 1.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS 275 

bear the same name, or even of two parts of 
the same branch, the one may be suitable to 
the commencement, the other to the close 
of the Academical career. 

At whatever period of that career it may- 
be proper to introduce the study of such as 
are usually called Metaphysical writers, it 
may be safely asserted, that those who have 
had the most experience in the business of 
giving instruction in Logic, properly so called, 
as well as in other branches of knowledge, 
prefer and generally pursue the plan of letting 
their pupils enter on that study, next in order 
after the elements of Mathematics. 



Chap. IV. 
Of Verbal and Real Questions. 

§1. 

The ingenious author of the Philosophy of 
Rhetoric having maintained, or rather as- 
sumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal 
controversy alone, there may be an advantage 
(though it has been my aim throughout to 
show the application of it to all Reasoning) 
in pointing out the difference between Verbal 

t 2 



276 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

and Real Questions, and the probable origin 
of Campbell's mistake ; for to trace any error 
to its source, will often throw more light on 
the subject in hand than can be obtained if 
we rest satisfied with merely detecting and 
refuting it. 

Every Question that can arise, is in fact a 
Question whether a certain Predicate is or is 
not applicable to a certain subject, or what 
Predicate is applicable ; * and whatever other 
account may be given by any writer, of the 
nature of any matter of doubt or debate, 
will be found ultimately to resolve itself into 
Difference this. But sometimes the Question turns on 

between a 

verbal and a the meaning and extent of the terms em- 

:stion. o 

ployed ; sometimes, on the things signified by 
them. If it be made to appear, therefore, 
that the opposite sides of a certain Question 
may be held by persons not differing in their 
opinion of the matter in hand, then that Ques- 
tion may be pronounced Verbal ; as depend- 
ing on the different senses in which they 
respectively employ the terms. If, on the 
contrary, it appears that they employ the 
terms in the same sense, but still differ as to 
the application of one of them to the other, 
then it may be pronounced that the Question 
is Real, — that they differ as to the opinions 
they hold of the things in Question. 

* See Chap. iii. § 2. 



between a 
verbal am 
real quest 



Chap. IV. § I.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 277 

If, for instance, two persons contend whe- 
ther Augustus deserved to be called a " great 
man," then, if it appeared that the one in- 
cluded, under the term " great," disinterested 
patriotism, and on that ground excluded Au- 
gustus from the class, as wanting in that 
quality ; and that the other also gave him no 
credit for that quality, but understood no more 
by the term u great," than high intellectual 
qualities, energy of character, and brilliant 
actions, it would follow that the parties did 
not differ in opinion except as to the use of 
a term, and that the Question was Verbal. 
If, again, it appeared that the one did give 
Augustus credit for such patriotism, as the 
other denied him, both of them including 
that idea in the term great, then the Ques- 
tion would be Real. Either kind of Question, 
it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical 
principles ; but the middle terms emj)loyed 
would be different; and for this reason, among 
others, it is important to distinguish Verbal 
from Real controversy. In the former case, 
e. g. it might be urged with truth, that the 
common use of the expression " great and 
good " proves that the idea of good is not 
implied in the ordinary sense of the word 
great ; an argument which could have, of 
course, no place in deciding the other Ques- 
tion. 



tions mis 
taken for 
Keal. 



278 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

§ 2. 

verbal Ques- It is by no means to be supposed that all 
Verbal Questions are trifling and frivolous. It 
is often of the highest importance to settle cor- 
rectly the meaning of a word, either according 
to ordinary use, or according to the meaning 
of any particular writer or class of men : but 
when Verbal Questions are 7nistaken for Real, 
much confusion of thought and unprofitable 
wrangling will be generally the result. Nor is 
it always so easy and simple a task, as might 
at first sight appear, to distinguish them from 
each other : for several objects to which one 
common name is applied will often have many 
points of difference, and yet that name may 
perhaps be applied to them all in the same 
sense, and may be fairly regarded as the 
genus they come under, if it appear that they 
all agree in what is designated by that name, 
and that the differences between them are in 
points not essential to the character of the 
genus. A cow and a horse differ in many 
respects, but agree in all that is implied by 
the term " quadruped," which is therefore 
applicable to both in the same sense.* So 

* Yet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly- 
brought against a writer, in consequence of a gratuitous 
assumption of our own. An Eastern writer, e.g. may be 
speaking of " beasts of burden ; " and the reader may 



Chap. IV. § 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 27!) 

also the houses of the ancients differed in 
many respects from ours, and their ships still 
more; yet no one would contend that the 
terms " house " and " ship," as applied to 
both, are ambiguous, or that oIkos might not 
fairly be rendered house, and vavs ship; be- 
cause the essential characteristic of a house 
is, not its being of this or that form or 
materials, but its being a dwelling for men ; 
these therefore would be called two different 
kinds of houses ; and consequently the term 
" house " would be applied to each, without 
any equivocation, in the same sense : and so 
in the other instances. On the other hand, 
two or more things may bear the same name, 
and may also have a resemblance in many 
points, and may from that resemblance have 
come to bear the same name, and yet if the 
circumstance which is essential to each be 
wanting in the other, the term may be pro- 
nounced ambiguous. E. G. The word " Plan- 
tain" is the name of a common herb in 

chance to have the idea occur to his mind of Horses and 
Mules ; lie thence takes for granted that these were 
meant ; and if it afterwards come out that it was Camels. 
he perhaps complains of the writer for misleading him by 
not expressly mentioning the species ; saying, " I could 
not know that he meant Camels." lie did not mean Camels, 
in particular ; he meant, as he said, " beasts of burden ; " 
and Camels are such, as well as Horses and Mules. He 
is not accountable for your suppositions. 



280 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

Europe, and of an Indian fruit-tree : both 
are vegetables; yet the term is ambiguous, 
because it does not denote them so far forth 
as they agree. Again, the word " Priest " is 
applied to the Ministers of the Jewish and 
of the Pagan religions, and also to those 
of the Christian ; and doubtless the term 
is so used in consequence of their being both 
ministers (in some sort) of religion. Nor 
would every difference that might be found 
between the Priests of different religions con- 
stitute the term ambiguous, provided such 
differences were non-essential to the idea 
suggested by the word Priest ; as e. g. the 
Jewish Priest served the true God, and the 
Pagan, false Gods : this is a most important 
difference, but does not constitute the term 
ambiguous, because neither of these circum- 
stances is implied and suggested by the term 
'lepevs; which accordingly was applied both 
to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But the term 
'lepevs does seem to have implied the office 
of offering sacrifice, atoning for the sins of 
the people, and acting as mediator between 
man and the object of his worship ; and ac- 
cordingly that term is never applied to any 
one under the Christian system, except to 
the ONE great Mediator. The Christian 
ministers not having that office which was 
implied as essential in the term 'Upevs, were 



C.i.u>. IV. § 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 281 

never called by that name, but by that of 
Trpeo-Purepos* It may be concluded, there- 
fore, that the term Priest is ambiguous, as cor- 
responding to the terms ' [epev? and irpeafiv-repos 
respectively, notwithstanding that there are 
points in which these two agree. These 
therefore should be reckoned, not two different 
kinds of Priests, but Priests in two different 
senses ; since (to adopt the phraseology of 
Aristotle) the definition of them, so far forth 
as they are Priests, would be different. 

It is evidently of much importance to keep 
in mind the above distinctions, in order to 
avoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing as Verbal 
controversies, what in reality are not such, 
merely because the Question turns on the 
applicability of a certain Predicate to a certain 
subject; or, on the other hand, falling into the 
opposite error of mistaking words for things, 
and judging of men's agreement or disagree- 
ment in opinion in every case, merely from 
their agreement or disagreement in the terms 
employed. 

* From which our word Priest is derived, but which 
(it is remarkable) is never translated " Priest " in our 
version of the Scriptures, but " Elder." 



282 [Book IV. 

Chap. V. 
Of Realism. 

§1. 

Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to 
the mistake just noticed, and thus to produce 
undetected Verbal Questions and fruitless Lo- 
gomachy, than the prevalence of the notion 
of the Realists,* that genus and species are 
some real Things, existing independently of 
our conceptions and expressions ; and that, 
as in the case of singular terms there is some 
real individual corresponding to each, so in 
common terms, also, there is something cor- 
responding to each, which is the object of our 
thoughts when we employ any such term.f 

* It is well known what a long and furious controversy 
long existed in all the universities of Europe between the 
sects of the Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat of 
which was allayed by the Reformation, which withdrew 
men's attention to a more important question. 

f A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to 
Aristotle, who expressly contradicts it. He calls in- 
dividuals " primary Substances" (irp^rai ovaiai), Genus 
and Species " secondary," as not denoting (rode ti) a 
" really-existing thing," Ildo-a de ovaia Soke! rofa ti 
Gtiixaiveiv. 'E7ri fiev ovv tmv 7rpu)TU)v ovaiuiv ara^Kbtar- 
f3r]Tr)TOP icai aXr)deg e(ttiv, otl rode ti ai^aivtC cirofiov yap 
teal tv aptdfiu) to hrfkov^evov eotiv. 'E7rt £e tmv devTpcov 
ovaiojv, <I>AINETAI jizv 6fJioi(x)c rw ir^fiaTi tyjq 7rpo<7)]yopiac 



Cbaf. V. § I.] REALISM. 283 

There is one circumstance which ought to 
be noticed, as having probably contributed not 
a little to foster this error: I mean the peculiar 
technical sense of the word " Species" when Technics 
applied to organized Beings. It has been laid ^; li " ( 1 ) ", , ; > 
down in the course of this work, that when b! 
several individuals are observed to resemble 
each other in some point, a common name 
may be assigned to them denoting that 
point, — applying to all or any of them so far 
forth as respects that common attribute, — 
and distinguishing them from all others ; as, 
e. g. the several individual buildings, which, 
however different in other respects, agree in 
being constructed for men's dwelling, are 
called by the common name of "House:" 
and it was added, that as we select at pleasure 
the circumstance that we choose to abstract, 
we may thus refer the same individual to 
several different species, according as it suits 
our purpose ; and the same in respect of the 
reference of Species to Genus : whence it 
seems plainly to follow that Genus and Spe- 
cies are no real things existing independent 
of our thoughts, but are creatures of our 
own minds. Yet in the case of Species of 
organized Beings, it seems at first sight as 

race tl at]f.iciiveiv, oral' enrtj, avOpiowoc, f/ %iaoy' ()\ MI IN 
TE AAH6E2' &XXa fiaKkov xoiov r« trrjfialyti' k. r. \. 
Aristotle, Categ. § 3. 



284 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

if this rule did not hold good; but that the 
Species to which each individual belongs, could 
not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us, 
but must be something real, unalterable, and 
independent of our thoughts. Caesar or 
Socrates, for instance, it may be said, must 
belong to the Species Man, and can belong 
to no other ; and the like, with any individual 
Brute, or Plant. On the other hand, if any 
one utters such a proposition as " Argus was 
a mastiff," to what head of Predicables would 
this Predicate be referred ? Surely our logi- 
cal principles would lead us to answer, that 
it is the Species; since it could hardly be 
called an Accident, and is manifestly no other 
Predicable. And yet every Naturalist would 
at once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct 
Species, but only a variety of the Species Dog. 
This however does not satisfy our inquiry as 
to the head of Predicables to which it is to 
be referred. 

The solution of the difficulty is to be found 

in the consideration of the peculiar technical 

sense of the word "Species" when applied to 

species dis- organized Beings : in which case it is always 

linguished by _ . _ . _ . . . 

Naturals applied (when we are speaking strictly, as 
naturalists) to such individuals as are sup- 
posed to be descended from a common stock, 
or which might have so descended; viz. which 
resemble one another (to use M. Cuvier's 



Chap. V.§1.] REALISM. 285 

expression) as much as those of the same stock 
do. Now this being a point on which all 
(not merely Naturalists) are agreed, and since 
it is a matter of fact, that such and such in- <*•*&** of 

fact mimI 

dividuals are, or are not, thus connected, it (, '"""" f 

' ' J arrangement. 

follows, that every question whether a cer- 
tain individual Animal or Plant belongs to a 
certain Species or not, is a question not of 
mere arrangement, but of fact. But in the 
case of questions respecting Genus it is other- 
wise. If, e. g. two Naturalists differed, in the 
one placing (as Linnaeus) all the Species of 
Bee under one Genus, which the other sub- 
divided (as later writers have done) into se- 
veral genera, it would be evident that there 
was no question of fact debated between 
them, and that it was only to be considered 
which was the more convenient arrangement ; 
if, on the other hand, it were disputed whether 
the African and the Asiatic Elephant are 
distinct Species, or merely Varieties, it would 
be equally manifest that the question is one 
of fact; since both would allow that if they 
were descended (or might have descended) 
from the same stock, they were of the same 
Species, and if otherwise, of two : this is the 
fact, which they endeavour to ascertain, by 
such indications as are to be found. 

For it is to be further observed, that this 
fact being one which cannot be directly 



286 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

known, the consequence is, that the marks 
by which any Species of Animal or Plant is 
known, are not the very Differentia which 
constitutes that Species. Now, in the case of 
unorganized beings, these two coincide ; the 
Mark by marks by which a diamond, e. £*. is distin- 

which a J ° 

kSownnot guished from other minerals, being the very 
DirtvmuSa. Differentia that constitutes the Species Dia- 
mond. And the same is the case in the 
Genera of organized beings likewise : the 
Linnaean Genus " felis," e. g. (when consi- 
dered as a Species, i. e. as falling under some 
more comprehensive class) is distinguished 
from others under the same Order, by those 
very marks which constitute its Differentia. 
But in the Infimae Species (according to the 
view of a Naturalist) of plants and animals, 
this, as has been said, is not the case ; since 
here the Differentia which constitutes each 
Species includes in it a circumstance which 
cannot be directly ascertained (viz. the being 
sprung from the same stock), but which we 
conjecture from circumstances of resemblance; 
so that the marks by which a Species is known, 
are not in truth the whole of the Differentia 
itself, but indications of the existence of that 
Differentia; viz. indications of descent from 
a common stock.* 

* There are few, and but a few, other Species to which 
the same observations will in a great degree apply : I mean 



Cbaf.V. § 1.] fcfeALISM. 287 

Hence it is that Species, in tlie case of or- 
ganized beings, appears to be something real, 
and independent of our thoughts and lan- 
guage ; and hence, naturally enough, the same 
notions have been often extended to the Ge- 
nera also, and to Species of other things: so 
that men have an idea of each individual of 
every description truly belonging to some one 
Species and no other; and each Species in 
like manner to some one Genus ; whether 
we happen to be right or not in the ones 
to which we refer them. 

Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow 
and maintain this doctrine ; but those who are 
not especially on their guard, are perpetually 
sliding into it unawares. 

Nothing so much conduces to this as the 
transferred and secondary use of the words 
"same,"* "one and the same," " identical," Ambiguity « 
fyc. when it is not clearly perceived and care- ;;';;;"• 
fully borne in mind, that they are employed 



in which the Differentia which constitutes the Species, and 
the mark by which the Species is known, are not the same: 
e. s. "Murder:" the Differentia of which is that it be 
committed "with malice aforethought ; " this cannot be 
directly ascertained ; and therefore we distinguish murder 
from any other homicide by circumstances of preparation, 
<Jc, which are not in reality the Differentia, but indica- 
tions of the Differentia; i. e. grounds for concluding that 
the malice did exist. 

* See Appendix, No. I. art. Same. 



one, kc 



288 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV, 

in a secondary sense, and that more frequently 
even than in the primary. 

Suppose, e. g. a thousand persons are 
thinking of the Sun, it is evident it is one 
and the same individual object on which all 
these minds are employed ; so far all is clear : 
but suppose all these persons are thinking of 
a Triangle ; — not any individual triangle, but 
Triangle in general ; — and considering, per- 
haps, the equality of its angles to two right 
angles ; it would seem as if, in this case also, 
their minds were all employed on " one and 
the same" object: and this object of their 
thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere 
word triangle, but that which is meant by it ; nor 
again, can it be everything that the word will 
apply to, for they are not thinking of tri- 
angles, but of one thing. Those who do not 
acknowledge that this u one thing" has an ex- 
istence independent of the human mind, are 
in general content to tell us, by way of ex- 
planation, that the object of their thoughts 
is the abstract " idea" of a triangle ; * an 
explanation which satisfies, or at least silences 
many; though it may be doubted whether 
they very clearly understand what sort of a 
thing an " idea" is, which may thus exist in a 

* Conceplualists is a name sometimes applied to those 
who adopt this explanation ; to which class Locke is 
referred. 



Chap.V. §1.] REALISM, 289 

thousand different minds at once, and yet be 
" one and the same." 

The fact is, that " unity" and " sameness" 
are in such cases employed, not in the pri- 
mary sense, but to denote perfect similarity. 
When we say that ten thousand different 
persons have all " one and the same" Idea 
in their minds, or are all of " one and the 
same" Opinion, we mean no more than that 
they are all thinking exactly alike ; when we 
say that they are all in the " same" posture, 
we mean that they are all placed alike ; and 
so also they are said all to have the u same" 
disease, when they are all diseased alike. 

One instance of the confusion of thought 
and endless logomachy which may spring 
from inattention to this ambiguity of the 
words " same," fyc, is afforded by the con- 
troversy arising out of a sermon of Dr. King 
(Archbishop of Dublin), published about a 
century ago. He remarked (without express- 
ing himself perhaps with so much guarded 
precision as the vehemence of his opponents 
rendered needful) that " the attributes of the 
Deity (viz. Wisdom, Justice, $r.) are not to be 
regarded as the same with those human (nul- 
lities which bear the same names, but are 
called so by resemblance and analogy only." 
For this he was decried by Bishop Berkeley 
and a host of other objectors, down to the 

u 



290 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

present time, as an Atheist, or little better. 
If the divine attributes, they urged, are not 
precisely the same in kind (though superior 
in degree) with the human qualities which 
bear the same name, we cannot imitate the 
Deity as the Scriptures require ; — we cannot 
know on what principles we shall be judged ; 
— we cannot be sure that God exists at all; 
with a great deal more to the same purpose ; 
all of which would have been perceived to be 
entirely needless, had the authors but recol- 
lected to ascertain the meaning of the prin- 
cipal word employed. For, 1st, When any 
two persons (or other objects) are said to 
have the " same " quality, accident, Sfc, what 
we predicate of them is evidently a certain 
resemblance, and nothing else. One man, 
e. g. does not feel another's sickness ; but 
they are said to have the "same" disease, if 
they are precisely similar in respect of their 
ailments : and so also they are said to have 
the same complexion, if the hue and texture 
of their skins be alike. 2dly, Such qualities 
as are entirely relative, — which consist in the 
relation borne by the subject to certain other 
things, — in these, it is manifest, the only re- 
semblance that can exist, is, resemblance of 
relations, i. e. ANALOGY. Courage, e. g. 
consists in the relation in which one stands 
(ev r<£ 6%€tp irfaq irpoQ, Arist.) towards dangers ; 



Chap. V. §1.] REALISM. 2 ( .)\ 

Temperance or Intemperance, towards bodily 
pleasures, fyc. When it is said, therefore, of 
two courageous men, that they have both the 
same quality, the only meaning this expression 
can have, is, that they are, so far, completely 
analogous in their characters ; — having similar 
ratios to certain similar objects. In short, as, 
in all qualities, sameness can mean only strict 
resemblance, so, in those which are of a rela- 
tive nature, resemblance can mean only ana- 
logy. Thus it appears, that what Dr. King 
has been so vehemently censured for asserting 
respecting the Deity, is literally true even 
with respect to men themselves ; viz. that it 
is only by Analogy that two persons can be 
said to possess the same virtue, or other such 
quality. 3dly, But what he means is plainly, 
that this analogy is far less exact and complete 
in the case of a comparison between the 
Deity and his creatures, than between one 
man and another; which surely no one 
would venture to deny. But the doctrine 
against which the attacks have been directed, 
is self-evident, the moment we consider the 
meaning of the term employed.* 

In the Introduction and Notes to the last 
edition of Archbishop King's Discourse, I 

* See Dr. Copleston's excellent Analysis and Defence 
of Archbishop King's principles, in the Notes to his 
" Four Discourses.'' 

. 2 



292 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

have considered the matters in debate more 
fully ; but this slight notice of them has been 
introduced in this place, as closely connected 
with the present subject. 

§2. 
origin of the The origin of this secondary sense of the 

ambiguity of 

" san,e '" &c - words, "same/' "one/' "identical/' Sfc. (an 
attention to which would clear away an in- 
calculable mass of confused Reasoning and 
Logomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use 
of Language and of other signs, for the pur- 
pose of mutual communication. If any one 
utters the " one single" word " triangle," and 
gives "one single" definition of it; each of 
the persons who hear him forms a certain 
notion in his own mind, not differing in any 
respect from that of each of the rest; they 
are said therefore to have all " one and the 
same" notion, because, resulting from, and 
corresponding with, (that which is, in the 
primary sense) " one and the same" expres- 
sion ; and there is said to be " one single" 
idea of every triangle (considered merely as a 
triangle) because one single name or defini- 
tion is equally applicable to each. In like 
manner, all the coins struck by the same sin- 
gle die, are said to have " one and the same" 
impression, merely because the (numerically) 
one description which suits one of these coins, 



Chap. V. §2.] REALISM. 293 

will equally suit any other that is exactly 
like it. 

It is not intended to recommend the disuse 
of the words " same," " identical," $c. in this 
transferred sense ; which, if it were desirable 
would be utterly impracticable ; but merely 
a steady attention to the ambiguity thus 
introduced, and watchfulness against the 
errors thence arising.* The difficulties and 
perplexities which have involved the ques- 
tions respecting personal identity, among 
others, may be traced principally to the neg- 
lect of this caution.f But a full consideration 

* It is with words as with money. Those who know the 
value of it best, are not therefore the least liberal. We 
may lend readily and largely; and though this be done 
quietly and without ostentation, there is no harm in keep- 
ing an exact account in our private memorandum-book 
of the sums, the persons, and the occasions on which they 
were lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our 
own use ; or they may be employed by the borrower for 
a wrong purpose; or they may have been so long in his 
possession that he begins to look upon them as his own. 
In either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to 
call them in. " Logic Vindicated." Oxford, 1809. 

f I mean that many writers have sought an explanation 
of the primary sense of identity (viz. personal) by looking 
to the secondary. Any grown man, e.g. is, in the primary 
sense, the same person he was when a child: this sameness 
is, I conceive, a simple notion, which it is vain to attempt 
explaining by any other more simple; but when philo- 
sophers seek to gain a clearer notion of it by looking t<> 
the cases in which sameness is predicated in another scum . 
viz. similarity, such as exists between several individuals 



294 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

of that question would be unsuitable to the 
subject of this work. 

denoted by a common name, (as when we say that there 
are growing on Lebanon some of the same trees with which 
the Temple was built, meaning cedars of that species) this 
is surely as idle as if we were to attempt explaining the 
primary sense, e.g. of " rage," as it exists in the human 
mind, by directing our attention to the " rage" of the sea. 
Whatever personal identity does consist in, it is plain that 
it has nothing to do with similarity; since every one would 
be ready to say, " When I WAS a child, I thought as a 
child, — I spake as a child, — I understood as a child; but 
when I became a man, I put away childish things." 



APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX. 



LIS! OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING APPEND1 


Argument. 


Hence. — See Reason, 


Same. 


Authority. 


Why. 


Sin. 


Can. — See May. 


Identical. — See One, 


Therefore. — See Wh) 


Capable. — See Possi- 


Same. 


Truth. 


ble, Impossible, Ne- 


Impossibility. 


Why. 


cessary. 


Indifference. 


Whence.— See Why. 


Case. 


Law. 




Cause. — See Reason, 


May. — See Must. 






Why. 


Necessary. 




Certain. 


Old. 


Value. 


Church. 


One. 


Wealth. 


Election. 


Person. 


Labour. 


Expect. 


Possible. 


Capital. 


Experience. 


Priest. 


Rent. 


Falsehood. — See Truth 


Reason. 


Wages. 


Gospel. 


Regeneration. 


Profits. 



No. I. 



ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO 
BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY. 

It has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the import- 
ance of attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater 
number of instances than could have been conveniently 
either inserted in the context or introduced in a note, 
without too much interrupting the course of the discussion 
of Fallacies. 

I have purposely selected instances from various Bubjects, 
and some from the most important; being convinced thai 
the disregard and contempt with which logical Btudiei arc 



298 APPENDIX. 

usually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that 
the science is incapable of useful application to any matters 
of real importance, and is merely calculated to afford an 
exercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms ; — syllogisms 
to prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions of 
the different senses of " canis" or " gallus ;" a mistake 
which is likely to derive some countenance (however 
unfairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling 
exemplifications. 

The words and phrases which may be employed as 
ambiguous middle terms are of course innumerable : but 
it may be in several respects of service to the learner, to 
explain the ambiguity of a few of those most frequently 
occurring in the most important discussions, and whose 
double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked; 
and this, not by entering into an examination of all the 
senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those 
only which are the most liable to be confounded together. 

It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is 
the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the 
greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are 
among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the 
generality consider there is the least room to doubt. It 
is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger 
arises ; words in very common use are both the most liable, 
from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one 
sense into another, and also the least likely to have that 
ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually 
mistaken for accurate knowledge. 

It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not 
unfrequently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, 
" such an author uses such a word in this, or that sense," 
or " means so and so, by this word." We should not use 
these expressions, (as some have inadvertently done) in 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 299 

reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, m 
the authors mind, of the object in question; of which the 
notions conveyed to others by the word may often fall short ; 
nor again should we regard the sense in which they under- 
stand him, as necessarily his sense (though it is theirs) of 
the word employed, since they may mistake his meaning; 
but we must consider what sense it is likely he expected 
and intended to convey, to those to whom he addressed 
himself. And a judicious writer will always expect each 
word to be understood, as nearly as the context will allow, 
in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has esta- 
blished, except so far as he may have given some different 
explanation. But there are many who, from various causes, 
frequently fail of conveying the sense they design. 

It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers ; 
that one who takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense 
of the words employed in any discussion, whatever care he 
may use to show that what he is inquiring after, is, the 
received sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the 
inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempting to introduce 
some new sense of the words in question, in order to serve 
a purpose. 

ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been de- 
fined in the foregoing treatise ; (Compendium, Book II. Ch. hi. 
§ 1) in that sense it includes (as is there remarked) tin- 
Conclusion as well as the Premises: and thus it is, that 
we say a Syllogism consists of three propositions; PMf. the 
Conclusion which is proved, as well as those by which it 
is proved. 

But in ordinary discourse, Argument is very often used 
for the Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Con- 
clusion; e. g. "the Conclusion which this Argument i- 
intended to establish is so and so." 



300 APPENDIX. 

It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly 
speaking, a course or series of such Arguments ; when a 
certain Conclusion is established by Premises, which are 
themselves, in the same dissertation, proved by other pro- 
positions, and perhaps those again, by others ; the whole 
of this dissertation is often called an Argument to prove 
the ultimate conclusion designed to be established ; though 
in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e. g. 
that we speak of " Warburton's Argument to prove the 
divine legation of Moses," Sfc. 

Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be 
properly called a Disputation; i. e. two trains of argument, 
opposed to each other : as when we say that A and B had 
a long Argument on such and such a subject ; and that A 
had the best of the Argument. Doubtless the use of the 
word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion 
entertained by many, that Logic is the " art of wrangling," 
that it makes men contentious, Sfc: they have heard that 
it is employed about Arguments ; and hastily conclude that 
it is confined to cases where there is opposition and contest. 

It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various 
forms of stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of 
as different kinds of Argument : as when we speak of a 
Categorical or Hypothetical Argument, or of one in the first 
or some other figure ; though every logician knows that the 
same individual Argument may be stated in various figures, §c. 

This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those 
who speak of the Syllogism as a peculiar kind of Argu- 
ment ; and of " Syllogistic Reasoning," as a distinct mode 
of Reasoning, instead of being only a certain form of 
expressing any argument. 

AUTHORITY. — This word is sometimes employed in 
its primary sense when we refer to any one's example, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 301 

testimony, or judgment : as when, e.g. we speak of cor- 
recting a reading in some book, on the Authority of an 
ancient MS. — giving a statement of some tact, on the 
Authority of such and such historians, c $c 

In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the 
Latin " Auctoritas." 

Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to " Po- 
testas," Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a 
Magistrate, §-c. 

Many instances may be found in which writers have 
unconsciously slid from one sense of the word to another, 
so as to blend confusedly in their minds the two ideas. 
In no case perhaps has this more frequently happened than 
when we are speaking of the Authority of the Church : in 
which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article 
Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority 
(in the primary sense) of the Catholic, i. e. Universal 
Church, at any particular period, is often appealed to, in 
support of this or that doctrine or practice: and it is, 
justly, supposed that the opinion of the great body of the 
Christian World affords a presumption (though only a pre- 
sumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretation 
of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any cere- 
mony, regulation, 8fc. 

On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority 
in the other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, t<> 
enforce anything not contrary to God's Word. But the 
Catholic or Universal Church, not being one religious com- 
munity on earth, can have no Authority in the Bense of 
Power ; since, whatever the Romanists may pretend, there 
never was a time when the power of the Pope, of a Coun- 
cil, or of any other human Governors, over all Christians, 
was admitted, or could be proved to have any JU8< claim to 
he admitted. 



302 APPENDIX. 

Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas may have 
every degree of weight, from absolute infallibility, (such 
as, in religious matters, Christians attribute to the Scrip- 
tures) down to the faintest presumption. See Hawkins on 
Tradition. Hinds's History of the Early Progress of 
Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Errors 
of Romanism, Chap. iv. And Essay on the Omission of 
Creeds, fyc. in the New Testament. 

CAN. —See " May." 

CAPABLE. — See " Possible," "Impossible," and 

" Necessary." 

CASE. — Sometimes Grammarians use this word to 
signify (which is its strict sense) a certain " variation in 
the writing and utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation 
in which it stands to some other part of the sentence;" 
sometimes to denote that relation itself: whether indicated 
by the termination, or by a preposition, or by its colloca- 
tion; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who 
does not occasionally employ the term in each sense, with- 
out explaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous 
debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a specimen 
of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Grammar ; in 
which the Authors insist on giving the Greek language an 
Ablative case, with the same termination, however, as the 
Dative : (though, by the way, they had better have fixed 
on the Genitive, which oftener answers to the Latin Abla- 
tive) urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termi- 
nation be necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns 
will be without an Ablative, some without a Genitive or 
without a Dative, and all Neuters without an Accusative. 
And they add, that since it is possible, in every instance, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 303 

to render into Greek the Latin Ablative, consequently there 
must be an Ablative in Greek. If they had known and 
recollected that in the language of Lapland there are, as 
we are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to 
use an argument which would prove that there must 
therefore be thirteen Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All 
this confusion might have been avoided, if it had but been 
observed that the word " Case " is used in two senses. 

CAUSE.— See " Reason," and " Why." 

CERTAIN. — This is a word whose ambiguity, together 
with that of many others of kindred signification (as "may," 
"can," "must," "possible," §c.) has occasioned infinite 
perplexity in discussions on some of the most important 
subjects ; such as the freedom of human actions, the divine 
foreknowledge, §c. 

In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its 
etymology from cerno) to the state of a person's mind ; 
denoting any one's full and complete conviction ; and, 
generally, though not always, implying that there is suf- 
ficient ground for such conviction. It was thence easily 
transferred to the truths or events, respecting which this 
conviction is rationally entertained. And Uncertain (as w r ell 
as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjec- 
tives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, " it is certain 
that a battle has been fought:" " it is certain that the moon 
will be full on such a day:" "it is uncertain whether such 
a one is alive or dead:" " it is uncertain whether it will 
rain to-morrow :" meaning, in these and in all other cases, 
that we are certain or uncertain respectively; not indica t ing 
any difference in the character of the events themselves, 
except in reference to our knowledge respecting them; far 
the same thing may be, at the same time, both certain and 



304 APPENDIX. 

uncertain, to different individuals; e.g. the life or death 
at a particular time, of any one, is certain, to his friends 
on the spot ; uncertain or contingent, to those at a distance. 
From not attending to this circumstance, the words " un- 
certain" and " contingent" (which is employed nearly in 
the same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) have 
been considered by many writers* as denoting some quality 
in the things themselves ; and have thus become involved 
in endless confusion. " Contingent" is indeed applied to 
events only, not to persons : but it denotes no quality in 
the events themselves ; only, as has been said, the relation 
in which they stand to a person who has no complete 
knowledge respecting them. It is from overlooking this 
principle, obvious as it is when once distinctly stated, that 
Chance or Fortune has come to be regarded as a real 
agent, and to have been, by the ancients, personified as a 
Goddess, and represented by statues. 

CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church, 
i. e. the Universal or Catholic Church, — the Society com- 
prehending in it all Christians, who are " Members one 
of another," and who compose the Body, of which Christ 
is the Head; Jwhich, collectively taken, has no visible 
supreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or 
council ;| and which is one, only in reference to its One 
invisible Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ, 
dwelling in it. See Hinds's History of the Rise of 



* Among others, Archbishop King, in his discourse on Predestination, 
has fallen into this error ; as is explained in the Notes and the Appendix 
to my edition of that work. 

It may be allowable to mention in this place, that I have been repre- 
sented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a note to 
Mr. Davison's work on Prophecy ; through a mistake, which the author 
candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectify. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 305 

Christianity, and Blanco White's Preservative against 
Popery. 

Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church ; I. e. 
any one branch of that general Society ; having governors 
on earth, and existing as a community possessing authority 
over its own members ; in which sense we read of the 
" Seven Churches in Asia;" — of Paul's having " the care 
of all the Churches," Sfc. This ambiguity has often greatly 
favoured the cause of the Church of Rome; which being 
admitted by her opponents to be a Church, i. e. a branch, 
though an unsound and corrupt one, of the universal Church 
of Christ, is thence assumed to be the Church, — the Society 
in which all men are called upon to enrol themselves. — See 
the article " Truth." 

The Church is also not unfrequently used to denote the 
Clergy, in contradistinction to the Laity ; as, when we speak 
of any one's being educated for the Church, meaning, " for 
the Ministry." Some would perhaps add that it is in this 
sense we speak of the endowments of the Church ; since 
the immediate emolument of these is received by clergy- 
men. But if it be considered that they receive it in the 
capacity of public instructors and spiritual pastors, these 
endowments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a cer- 
tain sense, to the whole body, for whose benefit they are, 
in this way, calculated ; in the same manner as we consider, 
e. g. the endowment of a professorship in a university, as 
a benefaction, not to the professors alone, but to the uni- 
versity at large. 

ELECTION. — This is one of the terms which is often 
to all practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed, 
strictly speaking, in two different senses, but with dif- 
ferent applications, according to that which is understood 
in conjunction with it. — See Book III. § 10. See also 

\ 



306 APPENDIX. 

Essays on some of the Difficulties) §c. Essay III. "On 
Election." 

EXPECT. — This word is liable to an ambiguity, 
which may sometimes lead, in conjunction with other 
causes, to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used 
in the sense of " anticipate " — " calculate on," §c. 
(eXmZb)) in short, "consider as probable ;" sometimes for 
"require, or demand as reasonable," — "consider as 
right" (a£uo.) 

Thus, I may fairly " expect" (a^iio) that one who has 
received kindness from me, should protect me in distress ; 
yet I may have reason to expect (kXiriZ^iv) that he will not : 
" England expects every man to do his duty;" but it would 
be chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a universal perfor- 
mance of duty. Hence, when men of great revenues, 
whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendor and 
sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this 
is expected of them ; which is true, in the sense that such 
conduct is anticipated as probable; not true, as implying 
that it is required or approved. Thus also, because it 
would be romantic to expect (i. e. calculate upon) in public 
men a primary attention to the public good, or in men in 
general an adherence to the rule of doing as you would be 
done by, many are apt to flatter themselves that they cannot 
reasonably be expected (i. e. fairly called upon) to act on 
such principles. What may reasonably be expected (in one 
sense of the word) must be, precisely the practice of the 
majority; since it is the majority of instances that constitutes 
probability : what may reasonably be expected (in the 
other sense) is something much beyond the practice of 
the generality; as long at least as it shall be true that 
" narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there 
be that find it." 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 307 

EXPERIENCE. — This word, in its strict sense, applies 
to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. 
Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to the jjast 
alone. Thus it is that a man knows by experience what 
sufferings he has undergone in some disease, or what height 
the tide reached at a certain time and place. 

More frequently the word is used to denote that Judg- 
ment which is derived from experience in the primary 
sense, by reasoning from that, in combination with other 
data. Thus, a man may assert, on the ground of Expe- 
rience, that he was cured of a disorder by such a medi- 
cine — that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that 
disorder; — that the tide may always be expected, under 
such circumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly 
speaking, none of these can be known by Experience, but 
are conclusions derived from Experience. It is in this 
sense only that Experience can be applied to the future, or, 
which comes to the same thing, to any general fact ; as, 
e. g. when it is said that we know by Experience that 
water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze. 

There are again two different applications of the word 
(see Book III. § 10), which, when not carefully distin- 
guished, lead in practice to the same confusion as the 
employment of it in two senses ; vis:, we sometimes under- 
stand our own personal Experience ; sometimes, general 
Experience. Hume has availed himself of this (practical) 
ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles ; in which he observes, 
that we have experience of the frequent falsity of Testimony, 
but that the occurrence of a miracle is contrary to our 
Experience, and is consequently what no testimony ought 
to be allowed to establish. Now had he explained whose 
Experience he meant, the argument would have come to 
nothing: if he means, the Experience of mankind uni\cr- 
sally, i. e. that a Miracle has never come under the 

\ g 



308 APPENDIX. 

Experience of any one, this is palpably begging the ques- 
tion : if he means the Experience of each individual who 
has never himself witnessed a Miracle, this would establish a 
rule (visa, that we are to believe nothing of which we have 
not ourselves experienced the like) which it would argue 
insanity to act upon. Not only was the King of Bantam 
justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evi- 
dence for the existence of Ice, but no one would be autho- 
rized on this principle to expect his own death. His 
Experience informs him, directly, only that others have 
died. Every disease under which he himself may have 
laboured, his Experience must have told him has not ter- 
minated fatally ; if he is to judge strictly of the future by 
the past, according to this rule, what should hinder him 
from expecting the like of all future diseases? 

Some have never been struck with this consequence of 
Hume's principles ; and some have * even failed to perceive 
it when pointed out : but if the reader thinks it worth his 
while to consult the author, he will see that his principles, 
according to his own account of them, are such as I have 
stated. 

Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct 
meaning, something intermediate between universal, and 
individual experience ; viz. the Experience of the gene- 
rality, as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence ; 
in which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that 
false Testimony is a thing of common occurrence, and that 
Miracles are not ; an obvious truth, indeed ; but too general 
to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case. 
In any other individual question, as to the admissibility of 
evidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely 
the average chances for the truth of Testimony in the 
abstract, without inquiring what the Testimony is, in the 
particular instance before us. As if, e. g. any one had 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 309 

maintained that no testimony could establish Columbus's 
account of the discovery of America, because it is more 
common for travellers to lie, than for new Continents to be 
discovered. See Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon 
Buonaparte. 

It is to be observed by the way, that there is yet an 
additional ambiguity in the entire phrase " contrary to 
experience ;" in one sense, a miracle, or any other event, 
may be called contrary to the experience of any one who 
has never witnessed the like; as the freezing of water was 
to that of the King of Bantam ; in another and stricter 
sense, that only is contrary to a man's experience, which he 
knows by experience not to be true ; as if one should be 
told of an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having 
seen it administered without effect. No testimony can 
establish what is, in this latter sense, contrary to experience. 
We need not wonder that ordinary minds should be be- 
wildered by a sophistical employment of such a mass of 
ambiguities. 

Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and 
profound, on account of the Subject on which they are 
employed; if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they 
would be deemed unworthy of serious notice. 

The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of 
Hume's Essay on Miracles was my object in this Article. 
That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the way 
of a " reductio ad absurdum," by mere reference to the 
case of the King of Bantam adduced by the author him- 
self. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often per- 
haps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian 
sophist at the expense of those unable to expose it- fallacy, 
never probably made one convert. The author himself 
seems plainly to have meant it as ;i specimen of lii- inge- 
nuity in arguing on a given hypothesis: lor he disputes 



310 APPENDIX. 

against miracles as against the Course of Nature ; whereas, 
according to him, there is no such thing as a Course of 
Nature ; his scepticism extends to the whole external 
world; — to everything, except the ideas or impressions on 
the mind of the individual ; so that a miracle which is 
believed, has, in that circumstance alone, on his prin- 
ciples, as much reality as anything can have. 

But my object has been to point out, by the use of this 
example, the fallacies and blunders which may result from 
inattention to the ambiguity of the word Experience : and 
this cannot be done by a mere indirect argument ; which 
refutes indeed, but does not explain, an error. 

FALSEHOOD and FALSITY.— See " Truth." 

GOSPEL. — This is instanced as one of the words which is 
practically ambiguous, from its different applications, even 
though not employed (as it sometimes is) in different senses. 

Conformably to its etymological meaning of " Good- 
tidings," it is used to signify (and that especially and 
exclusively) the welcome intelligence of Salvation to man, 
as preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was 
afterwards transitively applied to each of the four histories 
of our Lord's life, published by those who are called the 
Evangelists. And the term is often used to express collec- 
tively the Gospel-doctrines ; i, e, the instructions given men 
how to avail themselves of the offer of salvation: and 
preaching the Gospel, is accordingly often used to include 
not only the proclaiming of the good tidings, but the 
teaching of what is to be believed and done, in consequence. 
This ambiguity is one source of some important theological 
errors : many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found 
exclusively, or chiefly, in the Gospels ; to the neglect of the 
other Sacred Writings. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 311 

Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the " Gospel/ 1 
and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often 
hence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and the 
Apostolic Epistles must exactly coincide ; and that in case 
of any apparent difference, the former must be the standard, 
and the latter must be taken to bear no other sense than 
what is implied by the other ; a notion which leads ine- 
vitably and immediately to the neglect of the Apostolic 
Epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and 
modified into a complete coincidence with our Lord's Dis- 
courses. Whereas it is very conceivable, that though both 
might be in a certain sense " good tidings," yet, one may 
contain a much more full development of the Christian 
scheme than the other ; which is confirmed by the con- 
sideration, that the principal events on which the Religion 
is founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ) 
had not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our 
Lord, when he preached, saying, " the Kingdom of 
Heaven is at hand;' not that it was actually established; 
as it was, when his Apostles were sent forth to preach 
to all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties, &c. 
Essay II. 

HENCE.— See " Reason" and " Why." 

IDENTICAL.— See " One" and " Same." 

IMPOSSIBILITY. — According to the definition we 
may choose to give of this word, it may be said either that 
there are three Species of it, or that it may be used in three 
different senses. 1st. What may be called a mathematical 
impossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and soil- 
contradiction ; e. g. that two straight lines Bhould enclose a 
space, is not only impossible but inconceivable, as it would 



312 APPENDIX. 

be at variance with the definition of a straight line. And it 
should be observed, that inability to accomplish anything 
which is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of 
jjower, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the 
fullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e. g. to con- 
struct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other 
two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each 
other as the side of a square and its diameter, it is not from 
a defect of power that we are precluded from solving such 
a problem as these ; since in fact the problem is in itself 
unmeaning and absurd : it is, in reality, nothing, that is 
required to be done: 

#dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is 
something at variance with the existing Laws of Nature, 
and which consequently no Being, subject to those Laws, 
(as we are) can surmount ; but we can easily conceive a 
Being capable of bringing about what in the ordinary course 
of Nature is impossible : e. g. to multiply five loaves into 
food for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of the waves, 
are things physically impossible, but imply no contradiction; 
on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being, if 
there be such an one, who created the Universe, is able 
to alter at will the properties of any of the Substances it 
contains.* 

And an occurrence of this character we call miraculous. 
Not but that one person may perform without supernatural 
power what is, to another, physically impossible ; as, e. g. 
a man may lift a great weight, which it would be physically 
impossible for a child to raise ; because it is contrary to the 
Laws of Nature that a muscle of this degree of strength 
should overcome a resistance which one of that degree is 



* See an able disquisition on Miracles, subjoined to the Life of Apol- 
lonius Tyanseus, in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 3]3 

equal to. But if any one perform what is beyond the 
natural powers of man universally, he has performed a 
miracle. Much Sophistry has been founded on the aeglecl 
of the distinction between these two senses. It has even 
been contended, that no evidence ought to induce a in. in 
of sense to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the 
ground that it is a thing impossible; in other words, that it 
is a miracle; for if it were not el thing impossible to man, 
there would be no miracle in the case : so that such an 
argument is palpably begging the question ; but it has often 
probably been admitted from an indistinct notion being 
suggested of Impossibility in the first sense; in which 
sense (viz. that of self-contradiction) no evidence certainly 
would justify belief. 

3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree 
of improbability which leaves no room for doubt. In this 
sense we often call a thing impossible, which implies no 
contradiction, or any violation of the Laws of Nature, but 
which yet we are rationally convinced will never occur, 
merely from the multitude of chances against it ; as, e. g. 
that unloaded dice should turn up the same faces one 
hundred times successively. And in this sense, we cannot 
accurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point 
the improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence 
we often have occasion to speak of this or that as almost 
impossible, though not quite, be. The other Impossi- 
bilities do not admit of degrees. That a certain throw 
should recur two or three times successively, we should 
not call very improbable ; the improbability is increased at 
each successive step; but we cannot say exactly when it 
becomes impossible; though no one would scruple to call 
one hundred such recurrences impossible. 

In the same sense we often call things impossible which 
are completely within the power of known agents to bring 



314 APPENDIX. 

about, but which we are convinced no one of them ever will 
bring about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people in 
the world should with one accord forsake their habitations 
and wander about the world as savages, every one would 
call an impossibility ; though it is plain they have the power 
to do so, and that it depends on their choice which they 
will do. In like manner, if we were told of a man's having 
disgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to be pos- 
sessed of the most undaunted courage, we should without 
scruple (and with good reason, supposing the idea formed 
of his character to be a just one) pronounce this an Im- 
possibility ; meaning that there is sufficient ground for 
being fully convinced that the thing could never take place ; 
not from any idea of his not having power and liberty to 
fly if he would ; for our certainty is built on the very cir- 
cumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with 
his being of such a disposition as never to have the will to act 
disgracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, it 
would be, in the other sense, impossible for him to fly ; viss* 
out of his power. " Capable " has a corresponding ambiguity. 

The performance of anything that is morally impossible 
to a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if 
the impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally im- 
possible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such a 
scheme of ethical and religious doctrine as the Gospel 
exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell 
distant and improbable future events with the exactitude 
of many of the prophecies in the Old Testament. 

Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, 
and has interminably protracted the discussions respecting 
the long-agitated question of human freedom, has arisen 
from inattention to the ambiguity which has been here 
noticed. If the Deity, it is said, " foresees exactly what I 
shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for me to 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 315 

act otherwise ;" and thence it is inferred that man's actions 
cannot be free. The middle term employed in such an 
argument as this is " impossible," or " impossibility " cm- 
ployed in two senses : he to whom it is in one Bense 
impossible, (viz. physically) to act otherwise than he does, 
(i. e. who has it not in his power J is not a free agent ; 
correct foreknowledge implies impossibility in another Bense, 
mar. moral impossibility; — the absence of all room for 
doubt.* And the perplexity is aggravated by resorting, 
for the purpose of explanation, to such words as " may," 
" can," " possible," " must," §c., all of which are affected 
by a corresponding ambiguity. (See Tucker's Light of 
Nature, in the Chapters on Providence, on Free-will, and 
some others.) I have endeavoured to condense and to 
simplify some of the most valuable parts of his reasonings 
in the notes and appendix to an edition of Archbishop 
King's Discourse on Predestination. 



INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the Will, 
and of the Judgment, is subject to an ambiguity which some 
of my readers may perhaps think hardly worth noticing ; 



* It should be observed, that many things which are not usually 
termed " mathematically " necessary or impossible, will at once appear 
such, when stated, not abstractedly, but with all their real circumstances : 
e. g. that " Brutus stabbed Csesar," is a fact, the denial of which, though 
a falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contradictory (like the denial 
of the equality of two right angles ;) because, abstracted///, we can COOr 
ceivc Brutus acting otherwise : but if we insert the circumstances (which 
of course really existed) of his having complete power, libert;/, and also 
a predominant will, to do so, then, the denial of the action amounts to a 
"mathematical" impossibility, OT self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily 
against the dictates of a predominant will, implies an riled without fl ante. 

Of Future events, that Being and no other, can ha\c the lame know- 
ledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the cauece, remote oc 
immediate, internal and external, on which each depends. 



316 APPENDIX. 

the distinction between unbiassed candour and impartiality, 
on the one side, and carelessness on the other, being so 
very obvious. But these two things nevertheless have been, 
from their bearing the same name, confounded together; 
or at least represented as inseparably connected. I have 
known a person maintain, with some plausibility, the 
inexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of 
educating people, or appointing teachers to instruct them, 
in any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, medi- 
cine, religion, politics, §c, on the ground, that a man 
must wish to believe and to find good reasons for believing, 
the system in which he has been trained, and which he 
has been engaged in teaching ; and this wish must prejudice 
his understanding in favour of it, and consequently render 
him an incompetent judge of truth. 

Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as 
this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the 
ambiguity of the word Indifference, and others connected 
with it. For it would follow, from such a principle, that no 
physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in a 
certain mode of treating any disorder, because he must 
wish to think the theory correct which he has learned : nay, 
no physician should be trusted who is not utterly indifferent 
whether his patient recovers or dies; since else, he must 
wish to find reasons for hoping favourably from the mode 
of treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit of the 
public, proposed by a philanthropist, should be listened 
to ; since such a man cannot but wish it may be success- 
ful ; §c. 

No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclina- 
tions ; but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to 
guard against this bias.* If a scheme be proposed to any 

* It is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation of this 
bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, in opposite 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317 

one for embarking his capital in some speculation which 
promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find tliat 
the expectations held out are well-founded : but every one 
would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should 
suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, 
on insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him. 
But we should not think such imprudence an inevitable con- 
sequence of his desire to increase his property. His wishes, 
we should say, were both natural and wise ; but since they 
could not render the event more probable, it was most 
unwise to allow them to influence his decision. In like 
manner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence 
of the Christian religion satisfactory ; but a wise man docs 
not for that reason take for granted that it is satisfactory ; 
but weighs the evidence the more carefully on account of 
the importance of the question. 

And it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to sup- 
pose that the bias is always in favour of the conclusion 
wished for : it is often in the contrary direction. The pro- 
verbial expression of "too good news to be true," bears 

cases. Such writers, e.g. as I have just alluded to, disparage the 
judgment of those who have been accustomed to study and to teach the 
Christian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it ; on 
the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be admitted 
that their authority shall go for nothing ; and that the question shall be 
tried entirely by the reasons adduced. But then, on the same principle, 
how strong must be the testimony of the multitudes who admit the 
truth of Christianity, but to whom it is a source of uneasiness or of 
dismay: who have not adopted any antinomian system to quiet their 
conscience while leading an unchristian life ; but, when they hear of 
"righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, tremble," and try 
to dismiss such thoughts till a more convenient season. The case of 
these, who have every reason to wish Christianity untrue, is pasted by, 
by the very same persons who are insisting on the influence of tin- 
opposite bias. According to the homely hut expreesive proverb, tin \ 
are "deaf on one ear." 



318 APPENDIX. 

witness to the existence of this feeling. There is in some 
minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases where their 
wishes are strong; — a morbid distrust of evidence which 
they are especially anxious to find conclusive : e. g. ground- 
less fears for the health or safety of an ardently-beloved 
child, will frequently distress anxious parents. 

Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the state 
of health of each individual) lead towards these opposite 
miscalculations, — the over-estimate or under-estimate of the 
reasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to find true. 

Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and 
to decide according to the evidence; preserving the In- 
difference of the Judgment, even where the Will neither 
can, nor should be indifferent. 

LAW is, etymologically, that which is " laid" down ; and 
is used, in the most appropriate, sense, to signify some 
general injunction, command, or regulation, addressed to 
certain Persons, who are called upon to conform to it. It is 
in this sense that we speak of " the Law of Moses," " the 
Law of the Land," Sfc. 

It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the state- 
ment of some general fact, the several individual instances 
of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, analogous to 
the conduct of persons in respect to a Law which they 
obey. It is in this sense that we speak of " the Laws of 
Nature :" when we say that " a seed in vegetating directs 
the radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in compli- 
ance with a Law of Nature," we only mean that such is 
universally the fact ; and so, in other cases. 

It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity 
of individual cases to the general rule is that which con- 
stitutes a Law of Nature. If water should henceforth never 
become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing of water 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 319 

would no longer be a Law of Nature: whereas in the Other 

sense, a Law is not the more or the less a Law from the 

conformity or non-conformity of individuals to it : if an act 
of our legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disre- 
garded by every one, it would not on that account be the 
less a Law. 

This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly 
stated, as hardly to need mention: yet writers of great note 
and ability have confounded these two senses together; I 
need only mention Hooker (in the opening of his great 
work) and Montesquieu : the latter of whom declaims on 
the much stricter observance in the Universe of the Laws of 
Nature, than in mankind, of the divine and human Laws 
laid down for their conduct: not considering that, in the 
former case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law. 

MAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as 
CANNOT) are each used in two senses, which are very 
often confounded together. They relate sometimes to 
Poiver, sometimes to Contingency. 

When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of 
money, " now he may purchase the field he was wishing 
for," we mean that it is in his poiver ; it is plain that he 
may, in the same sense, hoard up the money, or spend 
it on something else; though perhaps we are quite sure, 
from our knowledge of his character and situation, that 
he will not. When again we say, " it may rain to-mor- 
row," or " the vessel may have arrived in port," the ex- 
pression does not at all relate to power, but merely to 
contingency: i.e. we mean, that though we are not Mire 
such an event will happen or has happened, we are not 
sure of the reverse. 

When, again, we say " this man, of so grateful i dis- 
position, must have eagerly embraced Buch an opportunitj 



320 APPENDIX. 

of requiting his benefactor," or " one who approves of 
the slave trade must be very hard-hearted," we only 
mean to imply the absence of all doubt on these points. 
The very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness 
exclude the idea of compulsion. But when we say that 
" all men must die," or that " a man must go to prison who 
is dragged by force," we mean " whether they will or not " 
— that there is no power to resist. So also if we say that 
a Being of perfect goodness " cannot " act wrong, we do 
not mean that it is out of his power; since that would 
imply no goodness of character ; but that there is sufficient 
reason for feeling sure that he will not. It is in a very 
different sense that we say of a man fettered in a prison, 
that he " cannot " escape : meaning, that though he has 
the will, he wants the ability. 

These words are commonly introduced, in questions 
connected with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions, 
to explain the meaning of " necessary," " impossible," $c. ; 
and having themselves a corresponding ambiguity, they 
only tend to increase the perplexity. 

" Chaos umpire sits, *" 

And by deciding worse embroils the fray." 

MUST.— See " May." 

NECESSARY. — This word is used as the contrary to 
" impossible " in all its senses, and is of course liable to a 
corresponding ambiguity. Thus it is " mathematically 
Necessary " that two sides of a triangle should be greater 
than the third ; there is a " physical Necessity " for the 
fall of a stone ; and a " moral Necessity " that a Being of 
a certain character should act, when left perfectly free, 
conformably to that character ; i. e. we are sure he will act 
so; though of course it is in his power to act otherwise; 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 321 

else there would be no moral agency. 4 Thia ambiguit] is 
employed sophistically to justify immoral conduct \ mnce 
no one is responsible for anything done under " necessity," 
— I. e. physical necessity ; as when a man is dragged any- 
where by external force, or falls down from being too 
weak to stand; and then the same excuse is fallaciously 
extended to " moral necessity " also. 

There are likewise numberless different applications of 
the word " necessary " (as well as of those derived from it) 
in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the diffe- 
rence of the things understood in conjunction with it: e.g. 
food is "necessary;" vh. — to life: great wealth is "ne- 
cessary " — to the gratification of a man of luxurious habits ; 
the violation of moral duty is in many cases " necessary" — 
for the attainment of certain worldly objects ; the renuncia- 
tion of such objects, and subjugation of the desires is M ne- 
cessary " — to the attainment of the Gospel-promises, Sfc. 
And thus it is that "necessity" has come to be "the 
tyrant's plea;" for as no one is at all responsible for what 
is a matter of physical necessity, — what he has no power 
to avoid, — so, a degree of allowance is made for a man's 
doing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be 
the least of two evils ; as, e. g. when a man who is famishing 
takes the first food he meets with, as "necessary" to 
support life, or throws over goods in a storm, when it i> 
"necessary," in order to save the ship. But if the plea 
of necessity be admitted without inquiring for what the act 
in question is necessary, anything whatever may be thus 
vindicated; since no one commits any crime which i> not. 
in his view, "necessary" to the attainment of some sup- 
posed advantage or gratification. 

The confusion of thought is further increased In the 
employment on improper occasions of the phrase " ab*o- 
* See the article " [mpMubilitj ." note. 
v 



322 APPENDIX. 

lutely necessary ; " which, strictly speaking, denotes a case 
in which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary 
for a man's safety, that he should remain in a house which 
he cannot quit without incurring danger : it is absolutely, or 
simply, necessary that he should remain there, if he is 
closely imprisoned in it. 

I have treated more fully on this fruitful source of so- 
phistry in the Appendix (No. I.) to King's "Discourse on 
Predestination." In the course of it, I suggested an ety- 
mology of the word, which I have reason to think is not 
correct ; but it should be observed, that this makes no 
difference in the reasoning, which is not in any degree 
founded on that etymology; nor have I, as some have 
represented, attempted to introduce any new or unusual 
sense of the word, but have all along appealed to common 
use, — the only right standard, — and merely pointed out 
the senses in which each word has actually been employed. 
See the introduction to this Appendix. 

OLD. — This word, in its strict and primary sense, de- 
notes the length of time that any object has existed ; and 
many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in 
any other. It is, however, very frequently employed 
instead of " Ancient," to denote distance of time. The 
same transition seems to have taken place in Latin. Horace 
says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient Roman 
authors, but who did not live to be old — 

" quo fit ut omnis 



Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella 
Vita Senis." 



The present is a remarkable instance of the influence of an 
ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who 
are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 

the watch against its effects; the impressions and ideas 
associated by habit with the word when used in one sense, 
being always apt to obtrude themselves unawares when it 
is employed in another sense, and thus to affect our rea- 
sonings : e.g. " Old times,"—" the Old World," $c. are 
expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not, 
produce imperceptibly the associated impression of the 
superior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as a 
general rule, we attribute to Old men. Yet no one is 
really ignorant that the world is older now than ever it 
was ; and that the instruction to be derived from observa- 
tions on the past (which is the advantage that Old persons 
possess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to 
every successive generation : and Bacon's remark to this 
purpose appears, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism ; 
yet few, perhaps, that he made, are more important. There 
is always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of defe- 
rence, to the authority of " Old times," as of aged men. 

It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs, 
institutions, §c. when they still exist, may be literally 
called Old ; and have this advantage attending them, that 
their effects may be estimated from long experience ; 
whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-esta- 
blished Law or System, whether it may not produce in 
time some effects which were not originally contemplated. 

ONE — is sometimes employed to denote strict and pro- 
per numerical Unity, sometimes, close Resemblance ; — 
correspondence with one single description. — See "Same." 

" Facies non omnibus UNA, 

Nee diversa tamen ; qualem decet esse sore-rum." 

Ov. Met am. 1). ii. 

It is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and 
proper sense of tins word, that men arc exhorted to w be 

v2 



324 APPENDIX. 

of one mind ; " i. e. to agree in their faith, pursuits, mutual 
affections, &c. 

It is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck from 
a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be " of one and the 
same form and weight," and also, " of one and the same 
substance." In this secondary or improper sense also, a 
child is said to be " of one and the same (bodily) substance 
with its mother ; " or, simply " of the substance of its 
mother : " for these two pieces of money, and two human 
Beings, are numerically distinct 

It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, 
and to explain on proper occasions, these different uses of 
the word ; lest men should insensibly slide into error on 
the most important of all subjects, by applying, in the 
secondary sense, expressions which ought to be understood 
in the primary and proper. — See " Person." 

PERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, invariably 
implies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one 
Person, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar theolo- 
gical sense, in which we speak of the "three Persons" of 
the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus employed by our 
Divines as a literal, or perhaps etymological, rendering of 
the Latin word " Persona." I am inclined to think, however, 
from the language of Wallis (the Mathematician and Logician) 
in the following extract, as well as from that of some other 
of our older writers, that the English word Person was 
formerly not so strictly confined as now, to the sense it 
bears in common conversation among us. 

" That which makes these expressions" (viz. respecting the 
Trinity) "seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have 
used themselves to fansie that notion only of the word Person, 

* Most of the following observations will apply to the word "Per- 
sonality," 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 325 

according to which three men are accounted to be three persons, 
and these three persons to be three men. But lie may consider that 
there is another notion of the word Person, and in common use 
too, wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons, 
and those persons to be the same man : that is, the same man as 
sustaining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully, 
Tres Personas Units sustineo; meam, adcersarii, judieis. And 
then it will seem no more harsh to say, The three Persons, Fa- 
ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God, than to say, God the 
Creatour, God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one 

God it is much the same thing whether of the two 

forms we use." — Letters on the Trinity, p. 03. 

"The word Person (persona) is originally a Latin word, and doth 
not properly signify a Man, (so that another person must needs 
imply another man) for then the word Homo would have served, 
and they needed not have taken in the word Persona; but rather, 
one so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in 
other circumstances (considerably different) is reputed another per- 
son. And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears 
by those noted phrases, personam induere, personam deponcre, 
personam agcre, and many the like in approved Latin authours< 
Thus the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a £tflg 
and a Father, if he be invested both with regal and paternal 
authority. Now because the King and the Father are for the 
most part not only different persons but different men also, (and 
the like in other cases) hence it comes to pass that another Person 
is sometimes supposed to imply another man; but not always, 
nor is that the proper sense of the word. Tt is Englished in our 
dictionaries by the state, quality or condition whereby one man 
differs from another ; and so, as the condition alters, the Person 
alters, though the man be the same. 

"The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the 
three somemhats, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend 
to design by the name Person ; so that we are not from the word 
Person to determine what was that Notion; but from thai Notion 
which they would express, to determine in what MOM the WOld 



326 APPENDIX. 

Person is here used," fyc. tyc. — Letter V. in Answer to the Ariaris 
Vindication.* 

What was precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers 
intended to convey, and how far it approached the classical 
signification of the word " Persona," it may not be easy to 
determine. But we must presume that they did not intend 
to employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense of the word 
Person; both because "Persona" never, I believe, bore 
that sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is evident 
that, in that sense, "three divine Persons" would have 
been exactly equivalent to "three Gods;" a meaning 
which the orthodox always disavowed. 

It is probable that they had nearly the same view with 
which the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis ; 
which seems calculated to express "that which stands under 
fi. e. is the Subject of) Attributes." They meant, it may be 
presumed, to guard against the suspicion of teaching, on the 
one hand, that there are three Gods, or three Parts of the one 
God; or, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost are no more than three Names, all, of the same sig- 
nification; and they employed accordingly a term which 
might serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes 
belong to all and each of these, yet) there are Attributes 



* Dr. Wallis's theological works, considering his general celebrity, 
are wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, in his day, one 
of the ablest Defenders of the Church's doctrine, against the Arians and 
Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the censure, not only of 
them, but of all who, though not professedly Arian, gave such an expo- 
sition of the doctrine as amounts virtually to Tritheism. I beg to be 
understood however as not demanding an implicit deference for his, or 
for any other human authority, however eminent. We are taught to 
"call no man Master, on earth." But the reference to Dr. Wallis may 
serve both to show the use of the word in his days, and to correct the 
notion, should any have entertained it, that the views of the subject 
here taken are, -in our Church, anything novel. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 327 

of each, respectively, which are not so strictly applicable 
to either of the others, as such; as when, for instance, 
the Son is called especially the " Redeemer," and the 
Holy Spirit, the "Comforter or Paraclete," §c. The no- 
tion thus conveyed is indeed very faint, and imperfect ; 
but is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what 
Man is, and what God is,) the less likely to lead to error. 
One may convey to a blind man, a notion of seeing, cor- 
rect as far as it goes, and instructive to him, though very 
imperfect: if he form a more full and distinct notion of 
it, his ideas will inevitably be incorrect. — See Essay VII. 
§ 5, Second Series.* 

It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in render- 
ing the Latin " Persona," used the word Person, whose 
ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a most 
important point from the theological sense, and yet is not 
so remote from it as to preclude all mistake and perplexity. 
If " Hypostasis," or any other completely foreign term had 
been used instead, no idea at all would have been conveyed 
except that of the explanation given ; and thus the danger at 
least of being misled by a word, would have been avoided. f 

Our Reformers however did not introduce the word into 
their Catechism ; though it has been (I must think, inju- 
diciously) employed in some popular expositions of the 
Catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to its 
being used in a peculiar sense. 

As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood, 

* It is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reliance t<> 
be placed on etymology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that " II \ - 
postasis," "Substantia," and "Understanding," so widely different in 
their sense, correspond in their etymology. 

t I wish it to he observed, that it is the ambif/i/i/i/ of the word Penon 
which renders it objectionable; not, its being nowhere employed in 
Scripture in the technical sense of theologians; for this Circumstance fa 
rather an advantage.— Sec Essay V!. (Second Series) | I. note. 



328 APPENDIX. 

but ^understood, should be guarded against most sedu- 
lously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of error, but 
to inculcate important truth ; by seldom or never employing 
this ambiguous word without some explanation or caution. 
For if we employ, without any such care, terms which we 
must be sensible are likely to mislead, at least the unlearned 
and the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the plea of 
not having directly inculcated error. 

I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may 
be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not 
wonderful that some should be led to renounce a doctrine, 
which, through the ambiguity in question, may be represented 
to them as involving a self-contradiction, or as leading to 
Tritheism; — that others should insensibly slide into this 
very error; — or that many more (which I know to be no 
uncommon case) should, for fear of that error, deliberately, 
and on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out of their 
thoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which they have 
assented once for all, but which they find it dangerous to 
dwell on ; though it is in fact the very Faith into which,* by 
our Lord's appointment, we are baptized. 

Nor should those who do understand, or at least have once 
understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied that they 
are thenceforward safe from all danger in that quarter. It 
should be remembered that the thoughts are habitually in- 
fluenced, through the force of association, by the recurrence 
of the ordinary sense of any word to the mind of those who 
are not especially on their guard against it. See " Fallacies," 
§5.f 

* els to ovo^ia, "into the Name;" not "in the Name." Matt.xxviii. 19. 

f The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is 
not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the habitual 
impressions on the mind. The Romanists natter themselves that they 
are safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge the truth, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 329 

Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God, 

of itself a sufficient safeguard; since, from the additional 
ambiguities of "One" and "Unity," (noticed in the pre- 
ceding Article) we may gradually fall into the notion of a 
merely figurative Unity; such as Unity of substance merely, 
(see the preceding Article) — Unity of purpose, — concert of 
action, §c. such as is often denoted by the phrase " one 
mind." See " Same," in this Appendix, and " Disser- 
tation," Book IV. Chap. v. 

When however I speak of the necessity of explanations, 
the reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not 
explanations of the nature of the Deitt/, but, of our own use 
of uords. On the one hand we must not content ourselves 
with merely saying that the whole subject is mysterious and 
must not be too nicely pried into ; while we neglect to notice 
the distinction between divine revelations, and human expla- 
nations of them; — between inquiries into the mysteries of 
the Divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from the 
ambiguities of language, and of a language too, adopted by 
uninspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the 
Christian is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to 
understand it : but to claim an uninquiring assent to expres- 
sions of man's framing, (however judiciously framed) without 
even an attempt to ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one 
of the worst errors of the Romanists. 

On the other' hand, to require explanations of what God is 
in Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of t In- 
human faculties, and foreign from the apparent design of 

that "God only is to be srrrrrf ; " MX. with "Latvia;" though they 
allow Adoration, ( " hvperdulia" and " dulia" ) to the Virgin and 
other Saints, — to Images, — and to Relics: to which it lias beenji 
replied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself, it would be, in 
practice, nugatory; since the mass of the people must BOOU (as experience 

proves) lose sight of* it entirely in their habitual devotions. 



230 APPENDIX. 

Scripture-revelation;* which seems to be, chiefly if not 
wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the 
essential articles of faith) with a view to our practical benefit, 
and to the influencing of our feelings and conduct, not so 
much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He is rela- 
tively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our Church-Catechism 
directs our attention to these points) to " believe in God, 
who, as the Father, hath made us and all the World, — as 
the Son, hath redeemed us and all mankind, — as the Holy 
Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all the elect people of God."f 
And this distinction is, as I have said, pointed out in the 
very form of Baptism. Nothing indeed can be more de- 
cidedly established by Scripture, — nothing more indistinctly 
explained (except as far as relates to us) than the doctrine of 
the Trinity ; J nor are we perhaps capable, with our present 
faculties, of comprehending it more fully. 

And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such in- 
structions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it 
seems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our 
state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects in 
which even the ablest of human minds can but " see through 
a glass, darkly." On these, the Learned can have no ad- 
vantage over others ; though we are apt to forget that any 

* In these matters our inquiry, at least our first inquiry, should 
always be, what is revealed : nor if any one refuses to adopt as an article 
of faith, this or that exposition, should he be understood as necessarily 
maintaining its falsity. For we are sure that there must be many truths 
relative to the Deity, which we have no means of ascertaining : nor does 
it follow that even every truth which can be ascertained, must be a part 
of the essential faith of a Christian. 

f Hawkins's Manual, p. 12. 

% Compare together, for instance, such passages as the following ; for 
it is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on insulated 
texts, that the Word of God is to be rightly understood : Luke i. 35, and 
John xiv. 9; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20; John xvi. 7, 
Coloss.ii. 9; Philipp. i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19 ; Matt. x. 20, and John xiv. 23. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 33] 

mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, — BUipaniiig 
the utmost reach of human intellect, — must be sucfa to the 
learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the simple 
alike; — that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, and the 
weakest, are on a level.* 

With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded 
to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and in- 
deed during, the Apostolical times, f seem to have been alike 

* "Sir, in these matters," (said one of the most eminent of our Re- 
formers, respecting another mysterious point,) " I am so fearful, that I 
dare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise, than as the Scripture 
doth as ifc were lead me by the hand." 

And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take it for a 
guide, than to resort to it merely for confirmations, contained in detached 
texts, of the several parts of some System of Theology, which the student 
fixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the guide which 
he permits to "lead him by the hand;" while passages culled out from 
various parts of the Sacred Writings in subserviency to such system, are 
formed into what may be called an anagram of Scripture : and then, by 
reference to this system as a standard, each doctrine or discourse is 
readily pronounced Orthodox, or Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or 
Nestorian, fyc. ; and all this, on the ground that the theological scheme 
which the student has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The materials 
indeed are the stones of the Temple; but the building constructed with 
them is a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this, too common, 
procedure, students would fairly search the Scriptures with a view not 
merely to defend their opinions, but to form them, — not merely for argu- 
ments, but for truth, — keeping human expositions to their own propel 
purposes, [See Essay VI. First Series,] and not allowing these to become, 
practically, a standard, — if in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on 
the side of Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on their tide, 
how much sounder, as well as more charitable, would their conclusions 
often be ! 

t It is important to remember,— what we are very liable to klM 
sight of— the circumstance, that, not only there arose grievous errors 
during the time of the Apostles, and consequently such were likely to 
exist in the times Immediately following, but also that when theM 
inspired guides were removed, there was no longer the same infallible 
authority to decide what was error. In the absence of such a guide, 
some error- might he received as orthodox, and some sound doctrim - 
be condemned as heterodox. 



332 APPENDIX. 

chargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the par- 
ticular explanations adopted by each : 

" Unus unique 
Error ; sed variis illudit partibus." 

The Gnostics* introduced a theory of ^ons, or successive 
emanations from the divine " Pleroma" or Fullness; one 
of whom was Christ, and became incarnate in the man 
Jesus.f The Sabellians are reported to have described 
Christ as bearing the same relation to the Father, as the 
illuminating ((ptoTLGTiKov) quality, does to the Sun; while the 
Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality: (SoXttov) 
or again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul, and 
Spirit of a man; or again, to Substance, — Thought or 
Reason, — and Will or Action. The Arians again appear to 
have introduced in reality three Gods; the Son and The 
Holy Spirit, created Beings, but with a certain imparted 
divinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians, gave opposite, 
but equally fanciful and equally presumptuous explanations 
of the Incarnation, §c. §c. 

Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogether 
exempt from the same fault of presumptuous speculation. 
" Who," says Chrysostom, " was he to whom God said, 

Let us make man? who but he the Son of God?" 

And Epiphanius, on the same passage, says, " this is the 
language of God to his Word." Each of these writers, it 
may be observed, in representing God (under that title) as 
addressing Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being pre- 
viously to the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely 
to the Arian tritheism. And Justin Martyr in a similar 

* Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no accounts but 
those of their opponents ; which however we may presume to contain 
more or less of approximation to what was really maintained. 

f These heretics appear to have split into many different sects, 
teaching various modifications of the same absurdities. — See Burton's 
Bampton Lectures. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 333 

tone, expressly speaks of God as " One, not in number, but 
in judgment or designs."* I will not say that such parages 
as these may not be so interpreted as to exclude both the 
Arian and every other form of tritheism ; but it is a dangerous 
thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation, but in 
a professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is 
a mere chance whether it may not lead into the most un- 
scriptural errors. If the early writers had not been habitually 
very incautious in this point, that could hardly have taken 
place which is recorded respecting the council held at Rimini, 
(a.d. 360) in which a Confession of Faith was agreed upon, 
which the Arians soon after boasted of as sanctioning their 
doctrine, and " the Church," we are told, " was astonished 
to find itself unexpectedly become Arian. "f 

The fact is, that numberless writers, both of those who 
were, and who were not, accounted heretics, beinu- dis- 
pleased, and justly, with one another's explanations of the 
mode of existence of the Deity, instead of taking warning 
aright from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, the 
remedy, in some other explanation instead, concerning 
matters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found 
nothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and 
indistinct, though decisive, declarations of Scripture, that 
"God was in Christ, reconciling the World unto Himself;" 
— that " in Him dwelleth all the Fullness of the Godhead, 
bodily ;" — that " it is God that worketh in us both to will 
and to do of his good pleasure ;"— that if we "keep Christ's 
saying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in Him ;'" that " if an\ 
man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his f — and 
that " the Lord is the Spirit," $c.% They wanted something 

* Ovtos yeypapnevos Ofoy, iVcpoS «OTI TOV ro tthi'th 

7rou'iaavTOS Qeov, opidpco Af'-yco, aXX OV yvu>iiij ; A • • 

t See Essay VI. (Second Series) $ 2. Note b. 

1 Not, as in our version, "that Spirit :" 'o oVRvptoc TO irptvp 



334 APPENDIX. 

more full, and more philosophical, than all this ; and their 
theology accordingly was " spoiled, through philosophy and 
vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of 
the World, and not after Christ." Hostile as they were to 
each other, the grand mistake in principle was common to 
many of all parties. 

And in later ages the Schoolmen kept up the same Spirit, 
and even transmitted it to Protestants. " Theology teaches," 
(says a passage in a Protestant work) " that there is in God, 
one Essence, two Processions, three Persons, four Relations, 
five Notions, and the Circumincession, which the Greeks call 
Perichoresis." .... What follows is still more to my 
purpose ; but I cannot bring myself to transcribe any further. 
" Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without 
knowledge ?" 

But the substance of great part of what I have been 
saying, has been expressed in better language than mine, 
in a late work which displays no ordinary ability, Mr. 
Douglas's Errors regarding Religion. 

" The radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical 
or orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scan- 
dalous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds 
from the disposition so natural in man of being wise above what 
is written. They are not satisfied with believing a plain decla- 
ration of the Saviour, * I and the Father are one.' They under- 
take with the utmost presumption and folly to explain in what 
manner the Father and the Son are one ; but man might as well 
attempt to take up the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as 
endeavour by his narrow understanding, to comprehend the 
manner of the Divine existence." .... P. 50. 

"Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox. 
While the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth 
by every subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms, 
the orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 335 

nature with a profusion of words, which either had no meaning, 
or were gross mistakes, or inapplicable mataphon when applied 

to the infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content 
with using such arguments against the heretics as generally 
produced a new heresy without refuting the former one, as 
soon as they obtained the power they expelled them from the 
Roman empire, and sent them with all the zeal which perse- 
cution confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity, 
had lost, to spread every variety of error amongst the nations of 
the barbarians. 

" Orthodoxy was become a very nice affair, from the rigour 
of its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the 
highway for the simple, which the Gospel presents. A slip in a 
single expression was enough to make a man a heretic-. The 
use or omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Chris- 
tianity. Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed 

a new heresy Never does human folly and learned 

ignorance appear in a more disgusting point of view than in these 
disputes of Christians amongst themselves ; nor does any study 
appear so well calculated to foster infidelity as the history of 
Christian sects, unless the reader be guided by light from above, 
and carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible from the 
miserable disputes of pretended Christians." — P. 53. 

To discuss this important subject more fully (or perhaps 
indeed as fully as it has been here treated of) is hardly 
suitable to a logical work: and yet the importance of 
attending to the ambiguity I have now been considering, 
cannot be duly appreciated, without offering some remarks 
on the subject-matter with which that ambiguity is con- 
nected; and such remarks again, if scantily and imperfectly 
developed, are open to cavil or mistake. I must take the 
liberty therefore of referring the reader to such works, 
both my own, and those of others, as contain something 
of a fuller statement of the same news. See Etm I First 
Series), Essay [I. f 4, and Essays l\. and V.; Second 



336 APPENDIX. 

Series, Essay VI. § 2, p. 199; VII. § 3; and IX. § 1.— 
Origin of Romish Errors, Chap. ii. § 1 . Archbishop 
Kings Sermon on Predestination, &c, and Encyclop. Me- 
tropol. History, Chap, xxvii. p. 589, and Chap, xxxiv. 
p. 740. 

POSSIBLE.— This word, like the others of kindred 
meaning, relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to 
power; and these two senses are frequently confounded. 
In the first sense we say, e.g. " it is possible this patient 
may recover," not meaning, that it depends on his choice ; 
but that we are not sure whether the event will not be 
such. In the other sense it is " possible" to the best man 
to violate every rule of morality ; since if it were out of his 
power to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral 
goodness in the case ; though we are quite sure that such 
never will be his choice. — See " Impossible." 

PRIEST.— See " Dissertation," Book IV. Ch. iv. § 2. 

Etymologically, the word answers to Presbyter, i. e. 
Elder in the Christian Church ; and is often applied to the 
second order of Christian Ministers at the present day. 
But it is remarkable that it never occurs in this sense, in 
our translation of the Scriptures : the word -n-pecyftyrepog 
being always rendered by Elder ; and its derivative, Priest, 
always given as the translation of'lspevg. This latter is 
an office assigned to none under the Gospel-scheme, 
except the ONE great High Priest, of whom the Jewish 
Priests were types, and who offered a sacrifice (that 
being the most distinguishing office of a Priest in the 
sense of 'lepzvg) which is the only one under the Gospel. 

It is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from 
confounding together the two senses of the word Priest, 
and thence, the two offices themselves. 

I have enlarged accordingly on this subject in a Sermon, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 337 

preached before the University of Oxford, and subjoined to 
the last edition of the Bampton Lectures. See also Errors 
of Romanism, Chap. ii. 

REASON. — This word is liable to many ambiguities, of 
which I propose to notice only a few of the most important. 
Sometimes it is used to signify all the intellectual powers 
collectively; in which sense it can hardly be said to be 
altogether denied to brutes; since several of what we 
reckon intellectual processes in the human mind, are evi- 
dently such as some brutes are capable of. 

Reason is, however, frequently employed to denote those 
intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs from 
brutes ; though what these are no one has been able pre- 
cisely to define. The employment at will of the faculty of 
Abstraction seems to be the principal ; that being, at least, 
principally concerned in the use of Language. The Moral 
faculty, or power of distinguishing right from wrong, (which 
appears also to be closely connected with Abstraction,) is 
one of which brutes are destitute ; but then Dr. Paley and 
some other ethical writers deny it to man also. The de- 
scription given by that author of our discernment of good 
and bad conduct, (mm, as wholly dependent on expectation 
of reward and punishment,) would equally apply to many 
of the brute-creation, especially the more intelligent of 
domestic animals, as dogs and horses. It is in this sense, 
however, that some writers speak of " Reason" as enabling 
us to judge of virtue and vice ; not, as Dr. Campbell in his 
Philosophy of Rhetoric has understood them, in the sense 
of the power of argumentation. 

Reason, however, is often used for the faculty of carrying 
on the third operation of the mind; m*. Reasoning. And 
it is from inattention to this ambiguity which has been re- 
peatedly noticed in the course of the foregoing treatise . that 

z 



338 APPENDIX. 

some have treated of Logic as the art of rightly employing 
the mental faculties in general. 

Reason is also employed to signify the Premiss or Pre- 
mises of an argument; especially the minor Premiss; and 
it is from Reason in this sense that the word " Reasoning" 
is derived. 

It is also very frequently used to signify a Cause; as 
when we say, in popular language, that the " Reason of 
an eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed between 
it and the earth." This should be strictly called the cause. 
On the other hand, " Because" (i. e. by Cause) is used to 
introduce either the Physical Cause or the Logical Proof: 
and " Therefore," "Hence," " Since," " Follow," " Conse- 
quence," and many other kindred words, have a correspond- 
ing ambiguity : e. g> " the ground is wet, because it has 
rained ;" or " it has rained, and hence the ground is wet ;' 
this is the assignment of the Cause; again, " it has rained, 
because the ground is wet ;" " the ground is wet, and there- 
fore it has rained :" this is assigning the logical proof ; the 
wetness of the ground is the cause, not of the rain having 
fallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen. And this pro- 
bably it is that has led to the ambiguous use in all languages 
of almost all the words relating to these two points. It is 
an ambiguity which has produced incalculable confusion of 
thought, and from which it is the harder to escape, on 
account of its extending to those very forms of expression 
which are introduced in order to clear it up. 

What adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often 
employed as a Proof of the effect:* as when we infer, from 
a great fall of rain, that there is, or will be, a flood ; which 
is at once the physical effect, and the logical conclusion. 
The case is just reversed, when from a flood we infer that 
the rain has fallen. 

* See Fallacies. " Non causa pro causa." Book III. § 14. 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. JJjjg 

The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity, 
the more extensive and important its results will appear. — 
See Analytical Outline, § 2. 

REGENERATION.— This word is employed by Borne 

Divines to signify the actual new life and character which 
ought to distinguish the Christian ; by others, a release from 
a state of condemnation, — a reconciliation to God, — adop- 
tion as his children, <J*c.,* which is a necessary prel imina ry 

to the entrance on such a state; (but which, unhappily, is 
not invariably followed by it) : and these are, of course, as 
different things as a grain of seed sown, and " the full corn 
in the ear." 

Much controversy has taken place as to the time at 
which, and the circumstances under which, " Regeneration" 
takes place ; the greater part of which may be traced to this 
ambiguity. 

SAME (as well as " One," " Identical," and other words 
derived from them) is used frequently in a sense very dif- 
ferent from its primary one ; (as applicable to a single 
object) ; vis, it is employed to denote great shnilarifi/. 
When several objects are undistinguishably alike, One single 
description will apply equally to any of them ; and thence 
they are said to be all of one and the same nature, appear- 
ance, &c. : as e.g. when we say, " this house is built of the 
same stone with such another," we only mean that the stones 
are undistinguishable in their qualities ; not, that the one 
building was pulled down, and the other constructed with 
the materials. Whereas Sameness, in the primary sense, 

*".... Baptism, wherein / WQS marie a member of Oirist, a child 
of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven." . ..." A drain 
unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness. Ac" .... " We being 
regenerate, and made thy children by adoption and grnc. 

/ 2 



340 APPENDIX. 

does not even necessarily imply Similarity ; for if we say of 
any man that he is greatly altered since such a time, we 
understand, and indeed imply by the very expression, that 
he is One person, though different in several qualities, else it 
would not be he. It is worth observing also, that " Same," 
in the secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage, 
of degrees : we speak of two things being nearly the same, 
but not entirely: personal indentity does not admit of 
degrees. 

Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of 
Realism than inattention to this ambiguity. When several 
persons are said to have One and the Same opinion — 
thought — or idea, — many men, overlooking the true simple 
statement of the case, which is, that they are all thinking 
alike, look for something more abstruse and mystical, and 
imagine there must be some One Thing, in the primary 
sense, though not an individual, which is present at once in 
the mind of each of these persons : and thence readily 
sprung Plato's theory of Ideas, each of which was, according 
to him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and complete 
in each of the individual objects that are known by one 
name. Hence, first in poetical mythology, and ultimately, 
perhaps, in popular belief, Fortune, Liberty, Prudence, 
(Minerva,) a Boundary, (Terminus,) and even the Mildew 
of Corn, (Rubigo,) Sfc, became personified, deified, and re- 
presented by Statues ; somewhat according to the process 
which is described by Swift, in his humorous manner, in 
speaking of Zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) " how from a 
notion it became a word, and from thence, in a hot summer, 
ripened into a tangible Substance." We find Seneca 
thinking it necessary gravely to combat the position of some 
of his Stoical predecessors, " that the Cardinal Virtues 
are Animals : while the Hindoos of the present day, from 
observing the similar symptoms which are known by the 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. ;] j | 

name of Small-pox, and the communication of the like from 
one patient to another, do not merely call it (aa uc do one 
disease, but believe (if we may credit the accounts given 
that the Small-pox is a Goddess, who become> incarnate 
in each infected patient. All these absurdities are in fact 
but the extreme and ultimate point of Realism.— See Dis- 
sertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 

SIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual 
transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law, 
or of a positive divine precept. It has also, what may 
be called, a theological sense, in which it is used for that 
sinfulness or frailty, — that liability, or proneness, to trans- 
gression, which all men inherit from their first parents, 
and which is commonly denominated " original " Sin ;* in 
which sense we find such expressions as " in Sin hath my 
Mother conceived me." The word seems also to be still 
further transferred, to signify the state of condemnation 
itself in which the children of Adam are, " by nature 
born," in consequence of this sinful tendency in them : (or, 
according to some divines, in consequence of the very guilt 
of Adam's ofTence being actually imputed to each individual 
of his posterity.)f It must be in the sense of a " state of 
condemnation" that our Church, in her office for Infant 
Baptism, speaks of " remission of Sins," with reference to a 

* Of the degree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts are 
given ; some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the moral 
faculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake ; others making 
it to consist in a certain undue preponderance of the lower propensities 
over the nobler sentiments, fyc. But these Beem to bo not different x 
to the sense of the word, (with which alone we are here concerned) but 
as to the state of the far/. 

t I must again remind the reader that 1 am inquiring only into tin- 
senses in which each word has actually been used ; not into the truth or 
falsity of each doctrine in question. On the present question, - I 
on the Difficulties in St. Paul's Writing, Essay VI. 



342 APPENDIX. 

child, which is no moral agent : " following the innocency 
of children/' (/. e. of actual Sin) being mentioned within a 
few sentences. And as it is plain that actual Sin cannot, in 
the former place, be meant, so, neither can it be, in this 
place, man's proneness to Sin : since the baptismal office 
would not pray for, and hold out a promise of, " release' 1 
and " remission " of that <^p6vr\}ia oapKog which, according 
to the Article, " remains even in the regenerate." 

Though all Theologians probably are aware of these 
distinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted 
from their not being always attended to. 

THEREFORE.— See « Reason," and " Why." 

TRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to Propo- 
sitions, and to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity 
of the declaration made to the actual state of the case ; 
agreeably to Aldrich's definition of a " true " proposition — 
vera est, quae quod res est dicit. 

It would be an advantage if the word Trueness or 
Verity could be introduced and employed in this sense, 
since the word Truth is so often used to denote the " true " 
Proposition itself. " What I tell you is the Truth ; the 
Truth of what I say shall be proved :" the term is here used 
in these two senses. In like manner Falsehood is often 
opposed to Truth in both these senses ; being commonly 
used to signify the quality of a false proposition. But as 
we have the word Falsity, which properly denotes this, I 
have thought it best, in a scientific treatise, always to employ 
it for that purpose. 

In its etymological sense, Truth signifies that which 
the speaker " trows," or believes to be the fact. The 
etymology of the word AAH0ES seems to be similar; de- 
noting non-concealment. In this sense it is opposed to a 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 3 \:>, 

Lie: and may be called Moral, as the other may Logical, 
Truth. A witness therefore may comply with hi- oath to 
speak the Truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken 
in some particular of his evidence, provided he is fully con- 
vinced that the thing is as he states it. 

Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and in- 
accurate language, to arguments; where the proper ex- 
pression would be " correctness," " conclusiveness," or 
" validity." 

Truth again, is often used in the sense of Reality. 
People speak of the Truth or Falsity of facts ; properly 
speaking, they are either real or fictitious : it is the state- 
ment that is "true" or "false." The "true" cause of 
any thing, is a common expression ; meaning " that, which 
may with Truth be assigned as the cause." The senses of 
Falsehood correspond. 

"Truth" in the sense of "reality" is also opposed 
to shadows, — types, — pictures, Sfc. Thus, " the Law waa 
given by Moses, but grace and ' truth ' came by Jesus 
Christ:" for the Law had only a "shadow of good things 
to come." 

The present is an ambiguity of which the Romanist- have 
often availed themselves with great effect; the ambiguity 
of the word Church (which see) lending its aid to the 
fallacy. "Even the Protestants," they say, "dare not 
deny ours to be a TRUE CHURCH; now there can he 
but ONE TRUE CHURCH;" (which they support l>\ 
those passages of Scripture which relate to the collective 
body of Christians in all those several branches which also 
are called in Scripture Churches;) "ours therefore musl 
be the true Church; if you forsake us, you forsake the 
truth and the Church, and consequently shut yourself out 
from the promises of the Gospel. Those who are of i 
logical and accurate turn of mind will easily perceive th.n 



344 APPENDIX. 

the sense in which the Romish Church is admitted by her 
opponents to be a true Church, is that of reality ; — it is a 
real, not a pretended Church ; — it may be truly said to be 
a Church. The sense in which the Romanists seize the 
concession is, that of a Church teaching true doctrines; 
which was never conceded to the Church of Rome by the 
Protestants ; who hold, that a Church may err without 
ceasing to be a Church. 

WHENCE.— See " Why," and " Reason." 

WHY ? — As an interrogative, this word is employed 
in three senses: piss. " By what proof?" (or Reason) 
" From what Cause?" " For what purpose? " This last is 
commonly called the " final cause." E. G. " Why is this 
prisoner guilty of the crime?" " Why does a stone fall 
to the earth?" " Why did you go to London?" Much 
confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different 
inquiries. See Reason. 



N.B. As the words which follow are all of them con- 
nected together in their significations, and as the expla- 
nations of their ambiguities have been furnished by the 
kindness of the Professor of Political Economy, it seemed 
advisable to place them by themselves, and in the order 
in which they appeared to him most naturally to arrange 
themselves. 

The foundations of Political Economy being a few 
general propositions deduced from observation or from 
consciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, it 
might have been expected that there would be as little 
difference of opinion among Political-Economists as among 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 345 

Mathematicians; — that, being agreed in their premise*, 
they could not differ in their conclusions, but through some 
error in reasoning, so palpable as to be readily detected. 
And if they had possessed a vocabulary of general terms 
as precisely defined as the mathematical, this would pro- 
bably have been the case. But as the terms of this Science 
are drawn from common discourse, and seldom carefully 
defined by the writers who employ them, hardly one of 
them has any settled and invariable meaning, and their 
ambiguities are perpetually overlooked. The principal 
terms are only seven: viz. Value, Wealth, Laboi k. 
Capital, Rent, Wages, Profits. 

1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which 
Political Economy is conversant, we might expect all 
Economists to be agreed as to its meaning. There is no 
subject as to which they are less agreed. 

The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the 
word, is to signify the capacity of being given and received 
in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. The 
value of any one thing must consist in the several quantities 
of all other things which can be obtained in exchange for 
it, and can never remain fixed for an instant. Most writers 
admit the propriety of this definition at the outset, but they 
scarcely ever adhere to it. 

Adam Smith defines Value to mean either the utility of 
a particular object, or the power of purchasing oilier goods 
which the possession of that object conveys. The first lie 
calls " Value in use," the second " Value in exchange.* 1 But 
he soon afterwards says, that equal quantities of labour .it all 
times and places are of equal Value to the labourer, whatever 
may be the quantity of goods he receives in return for them : 
and that labour never varies in its own Value. It ifl dear 
that he affixed, or thought he had affixed, M>me other 



346 APPENDIX. 

meaning to the word ; as the first of these propositions 
is contradictory, and the second false, whichever of his two 
definitions we adopt. 

Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam 
Smith's definition of Value in exchange. But in the greater 
part of his " Principles of Political Economy," he uses the 
word as synonymous with Cost : and by this one ambiguity 
has rendered his great work a long enigma. 

Mr. Malthus* defines Value to be the power of pur- 
chasing. In the very next page he distinguishes absolute 
from relative Value, a distinction contradictory to his defini- 
tion of the term, as expressive of a relation. 

Mr. M'Cullochf distinguishes between real and ex- 
changeable, or relative, Value. And in his nomenclature, 
the exchangeable, or relative, value of a commodity consists 
in its capacity of purchasing ; — its real Value in the quantity 
of labour required for its production or appropriation. 

All these differences appear to arise from a confusion of 
cause and effect. Having decided that commodities are 
Valuable in proportion to the labour they have respectively 
cost, it was natural to call that labour their Value. 

2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth 
to be " all that man desires." Mr. Malthus, J " those 
material objects which are necessary, useful, or agreeable." 
Adam Smith confines the term to that portion of the results 
of land and labour which is capable of being accumulated. 
The French Economists, to the net product of land. Mr. 
M'Culloch§ and M. S torch, || to those material products 

* "Measure of Value," p. 1. 

f " Principles of Political Economy," Part III. sect. 1. 

X " Principles of Political Economy," page 28. 

§ " Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica," Vol. VI. p. 217. 

|| " Cours d'Economie Politique," Tome I. p. 91. Paris edit. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317 

which have exchangeable value; according to Colonel 

Torrens* it consists of articles which possess utility and 
are produced by some portion of voluntary effort M. Saj I 

divides wealth into natural and social, and applies the latter 
term to whatever is susceptible of exchange. It will be 
observed that the principal difference between these defini- 
tions consists in the admission or rejection of the qualifi- 
cations " exchangeable," and, " material." 

It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done 
no more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave 
birth to the mercantile system. In common language, to 
grow rich is to get moneij; to diminish in fortune is to lose 
money: a rich man is said to have a great deal of momem ; 
a poor man, very little: and the terms Wealth and Money 
are in short employed as synonymous. In consequence of 
these popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith) 
all the different nations of Europe have studied even means 
of accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries 
This they have attempted by prohibiting the exportation of 
money, and by giving bounties on the exportation, and im- 
posing restrictions on the importation, of other commodities, 
in the hope of producing what has been called a u favourable 
balance of trade;" that is, a trade in which, the Imports 
being always of less value than the exports, the difference i» 
paid in money. A conduct as wise as that of a tradesman 
who should part with his goods only for money; and instead 
of employing their price in paying his workmen's wages, or 
replacing his stock, should keep it for ever in his till. The 
attempt to force such a trade has been as vain, as the trade. 
if it could have been obtained, would have been mischievous. 
But the results have been fraud, punishment, and pn\ert\ 
at home, and discord and war without. It has made na- 
tions consider the Wealth of their customers ;i source of loss 

* " Production <>«' Wealth," i>. 1. 

t M Train- d'Economk Pol." Liv, II. Chap. ii 



348 APPENDIX. 

instead of profit; and an advantageous market a curse instead 
of a blessing. By inducing them to refuse to profit by the 
peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, possessed 
i y their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure 
to give up their own. It has for centuries done more, 
and perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to retard 
the improvement of Europe than all other causes put to- 
gether. 

3. LABOUR. The word Labour signifies both the act 
of labouring, and the result of that act. It is used in the 
first sense when we talk of the wages of labour; in the 
second when we talk of accumulated labour. When used 
to express the act of labouring, it may appear to have a 
precise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity. 
Say's definition* is, "action suivie, dirigee vers un but." 
Storch's,f "Taction des facultes humaines dirigee vers un 
but utile." These definitions include a walk taken for the 
purposes of health, and even the exertions of an agree- 
able converser. 

The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own eco- 
nomists in general, is the want of definitions. There is, 
perhaps, no definition of Labour by any British Econo- 
mist. If Adam Smith had framed one, he would probably 
have struck out his celebrated distinction between " pro- 
ductive" and "unproductive" labourers; for it is difficult 
to conceive any definition of Labour which will admit the 
epithet "unproductive" to be applied to any of its sub- 
divisions, excepting that of misdirected labour. On the 
other hand, if Mr. M'Culloch or Mr. Mill had defined 
Labour, they would scarcely have applied that term to the 
growth of a tree, or the improvement of wine in a cellar. 



* "Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 506. 
f " Cours," &c. Liv. I. Chap. iv. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 349 

4. CAPITAL. This word, as might have been expected, 

from the complexity of the notions which it implies, bai 
been used in very different senses. 

It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general 
meaning which he attached to it will however appear from 
his enumeration of its species. He divides it* into Fixed 
and Circulating: including in the first what the capitalist 
retains, in the second what he parts with. Fixed Capital 
he subdivides into — 1. Machinery; 2. Shops and other 
buildings used for trade or manufacture; 3. Improvements 
of land; 4. Knowledge and skill. Circulating Capita] he 
subdivides into — 1. Money; 2. Provisions in the hands of 
the provision-venders ; 3. Unfinished materials of manu- 
facture; 4. Finished work in the hands of the merchant 
or manufacturer; such as furniture in a cabinet-maker- 
shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller. 

The following is a list of the definitions adopted by 
some of the most eminent subsequent economists: 

Ricardof — " that part of the wealth of a country which is 
employed in production; consisting of food, clothing, tools, 
raw materials, machinery, &c, necessary to give effect to 
labour." 

Mai thus X — " that portion of the material possessions of 
a country which is destined to be employed with a view to 
profit." 

Say§ — " accumulation de valeurs soustraites a la eon- 
somption unproductive." Chap. iii. " Machinery, necessa- 
ries of the workman, materials." 

Storch|| — " un fonds de richesses destine a la production 

materielle." 

* Book II. Chap. i. 

f " Principles of Political Economy," ]>. 89, 3rd tdit 

j " Principles," &c. p. 293. 

§ " Train',"' &c.Tome EI.p W4. 

II " Cours." &C Liv. II. Chap. i. 



350 APPENDIX. 

M'Culloch* — "that portion of the produce of industry 
which can be made directly available to support human 
existence or facilitate production." 

Millf — " something produced, for the purpose of being 
employed as the mean towards a further production." 

TorrensJ — "Those things on which labour has been 
bestowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate 
supply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other articles 
of utility." 

It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coin- 
cide. Adam Smith's (as implied in his use of the term ; 
for he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessaries of 
the labourer, when in his own possession ; all the rest (and 
perhaps with better reason) admit them. On the other 
hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to be 
right) those things which are incapable of productive con- 
sumption, provided they have not yet reached their con- 
sumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps that of 
Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to the incon- 
sistency of affirming that a diamond, and the gold in which 
it is to be set, are Capital while the jeweller keeps them 
separate, but cease to be so when he has formed them into 
a ring; almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude know- 
ledge and skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, is that 
of Mr. M'Culloch, which, while it excludes all the finished 
contents of a jeweller's shop, would include a racing-stud. 

Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in 
his use of the word ; thus, in the beginning of his second 
book he states, that all Capitals are destined for the main- 
tenance of productive labour only. It is difficult to see 



* "Principles," &c. p. 92. 

f " Elements," &c. p. 19, 3rd edit. 

t " Production of Wealth," p. 5. 






AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 36] 

what labour is maintained by what is to be unproductive] v 
consumed. 



5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT. 

Adam Smith first divided revenue into Rent, Wages, 
and Profit; and his division has been generally followed. 
The following definitions will best show the degree of 
precision with which these three terms have been em- 
ployed. 

Adam Smith. 

1. Rent. What is paid for the licence to gather the 
produce of the land. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

2. Wages. The price of labour. — Book I. Chap. v. 

3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the person 
who manages or employs it. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

Say. (Traite cTEconomie Politique.) 4cme Edit. 

1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la 
terre.— Tome II. p. 169. 

2. Wages. Le prix de l'achat d'un service productif 
industriel. — Tome II. p. 503. 

3. Profit. La portion de la valeur produite, retiree par 
le capitaliste. — Tome I. p. 71, subdivided into interet, profit 
industriel, and profit capital. 

Storch. (Cours oVEconomie Politique.) Paris, 1883. 

1. Rent. Le prix qu'on paye pour l'osage dun fonds 
de terre. — Tome I. p. 354. 

2. Wages. Le prix du travail.-— p. 883. 



352 APPENDIX. 

3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by 
S torch, under the heads, rente de capital, and profit de l'en- 
trepreneur. The first he divides into loyer, the hire of fixed 
capital, and interet, that of circulating capital. The second 
he considers as composed of, 1st, remuneration for the use 
of capital ; 2d, assurance against risk ; 3d, remuneration for 
trouble. — Liv. III. Chap. ii. viii. xiii. 

Sismondi. (Nouveau Principes, %c.) 

1. Rent. La part de la recolte annuelle du sol qui 
revient au proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui 
Font fait naitre ; and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compen- 
sation du travail de la terre ; 2d, le prix de monopole ; 
3d, la mieux valeur que le proprietaire obtient par la com- 
paraison d'une terre de nature superieure a une terre 
inferieure ; 4th, le revenu des capitaux qu'il a fixes lui- 
meme sur la terre, et ne peut plus en retirer. — Tome I. 
p. 280. 

2. Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 91. 

3. Profit. La valeur dont l'ouvrage acheve surpasse 
les avances qui l'ont fait faire. L'avantage qui resulte des 
travaux passes. Subdivided into interet and profit mer- 
cantile. — p. 94, 359. 

Malthtjs. {Principles, %c.) 

1. Rent. That portion of the value of the whole pro- 
duce of land which remains to the owner after payment of 
all the outgoings of cultivation, including average profits 
on the capital employed. The excess of price above wages 
and profits. — p. 134. 

2. Wages. The remuneration of the labourer for his 
personal exertions. — p. 240. 



AMBIGUOUS TERM8 

3. Profit. The difference between the value- of the 

advances necessary to produce a commodity, and the value 
of the commodity when produced. — p. ^f);>. 

Mill. (Elements, §c.) 3rd K.I. 

1. Rent. The difference hetween the return made to 
the most productive, and that which is made to the least 
productive portion of capital employed on the land. — 
p. 33. 

2. Wages. The price of the labourer's share of the 
commodity produced. — p. 41. 

3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labour and 
stock which is received by the owner of stock after replacing 
the capital consumed. The portion of the whole annual 
produce which remains after deducting rent and wages. 
Remuneration for hoarded labour. — Chap. ii. iii. 

Torrens. (Corn Trade.) 3rd Ed. 

1. Rent. That part of the produce which is given to 
the land-proprietor for the use of the soil. — p. 130. 

2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the labourer 
receives in exchange for his labour. — p. 83. 

3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work 
possesses above the value of the material, implements, and 
subsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the 
cost of production has been replaced. — Production <>/' 
Wealth, p. 53. 

M'Cullocii. (Principles, §e.) 

1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth 
which is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use «>i 
the natural and inherent powers of the soil. p. 065. 



354 APPENDIX. 

2. Wages. The compensation paid to labourers in re- 
turn for their services. — Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1. 

3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by 
the expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that 
quantity of capital. — Principles, p. 366. 

Ricardo. (Principles, Sfc.) 3rd Ed. 

1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth 
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original 
and indestructible powers of the soil. — p. 53. 

2. Wages. The labourer's proportion of the produce. — 
Chap. v. 

3. Profit. The capitalist's proportion of the produce. — 
Chap. vi. 

The first observation to be made on these definitions, is, 
that the Rent of land, which is only a species of an exten- 
sive genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate species 
are either omitted, or included under genera to which 
they do not properly belong. Wages and Profits are of 
human creation : they imply a sacrifice of ease or imme- 
diate enjoyment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is 
indicated by the common expressions of " the rate of 
wages," and the "rate of profits:" a ratio which has a 
strong tendency to uniformity. But there is another and 
a very large source of revenue which is not the creation of 
man, but of nature ; which owes its origin, not to the will 
of its possessor, but to accident; which implies no sacri- 
fice, has no tendency to uniformity, and to which the term 
"rate" is seldom applied. This revenue arises from the 
exclusive right to some instrument of production, enabling 
the employment of a given amount of labour or capital to 
be more than usually productive. The principal of these 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 

instruments is land; but all extraordinary powers of body 
or mind, — all processes in manufacture which are pro- 
tected by secrecy or by law, — all peculiar advanta 
from situation or connexion, — in short, every instrument 
of production which is not universally accessible, affords a 
revenue distinct in its origin from Wages or Profits, and 
of which the Rent of land is only a species. In the classi- 
fication of revenues, either Rent ought to have been 
omitted as a genus, and considered only as an anomalous 
interruption of the general uniformity of wages and pro- 
fits, or all the accidental sources of revenue ought to have 
been included in one genus, of which the Rent of land 
would have formed the principal species. 

Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of 
Profit include the wages of the labour of the Capitalist. 
The continental Economists have in general been aware of 
this, and have pointed it out in their analyses of the com- 
ponent parts of Profit. The British Economists have 
seldom entered into this analysis, and the want of it has 
been a great cause of obscurity. 

On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to 
Profit and Rent is generally included under Wages. Al- 
most all Economists consider the members of the liberal 
professions under the class of labourers. The whole sub- 
sistence of such persons, observes Mr. M'Culloch,* is de- 
rived from Wages; and they are as evidently labourers 
as if they handled the spade or the plough. But it >h«»uld 
be considered, that those who are engaged in any occupa- 
tion requiring more skill than that of a common husband- 
man, must have expended capital, more or leas, OD the 
acquisition of their skill: their education must have COS* 
something in every case, from that of the handicraft 

• « I>rinri|>lrs." fcft p. 228. 

\ \ 2 



356 APPENDIX. 

apprentice, to that of the legal or medical student ; and 
a Profit on this outlay is of course looked for, as in other 
disbursements of capital ; and the higher profit, in propor- 
tion to the risk ; vi%. the uncertainty of a man's success 
in his business. Part, therefore, and generally far the 
greater part, of what has been reckoned the wages of his 
labour, ought more properly to be reckoned profits on the 
capital expended in fitting him for that particular kind 
of labour. And again, all the excess of gains acquired 
by one possessing extraordinary talents, opportunities, or 
patronage (since these correspond to the possession 
of land, — of a patent-right — or other monopoly, — of a 
secret, §c.) may be more properly regarded as Rent 
than as Wages. 

Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from 
the use of the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a 
quantity, sometimes as expressing a proportion. 

In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some 
commodity, generally of silver, given to the labourer in 
return for a given exertion ; and they rise or fall, as that 
amount is increased or diminished. 

In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the 
labourer's proportion of what is produced, supposing that 
produce to be divided between him and the Capitalist. In 
this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is dimi- 
nished; though, if the word be used in the other sense, 
they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly used 
the word " Wages," to express a proportion, the only 
inconvenience would have been the necessity of always 
translating this expression into common language. But 
he is not consistent. When he says,* that " whatever 
raises the Wages of labour lowers the Profits of stock," 

* " Principles," &c. p. 312. 



AMBlGUOl s i i.i; 3.— 

he considers Wages as a proportion. When he says,* 
that "high Wages encourage population;" lie consider! 
wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'Culloch, who hafl 
clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He 
has even suffered it to affect his reasonings. In liis 
valuable essay, " On the Rate of Wages,"f he admits thai 
" when Wages are high, the Capitalist has to pay a larger 
share of the produce of industry to his labourers." An 
admission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the 
word, as expressing the amount of what the labourer 
receives, which, as he has himself observed, ;£ may increase 
while his proportion diminishes. 

A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which 
attach to the seven terms that have been selected ; and 
these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous, 
but as the most important, in the political nomenclature. 
"Supply and Demand," "Productive and Unproductive," 
" Overtrading," and very many others, both in political 
economy, and in other subjects, which are often used with- 
out any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their 
requiring it, than the words "triangle" or "twenty," 
are perhaps even more liable to ambiguities than those 
above treated of. But it is sufficient for the purpose of 
this Appendix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a 
few of the most remarkable terms in several different 
branches of knowledge, in order to show both the fre- 
quency of an ambiguous use of language, and the im- 
portance of clearing up such ambiguity. 

* " Principles," &a p. 83. + P. 161. 

\ " Principles of Political Economy," |»- 365. 



APPENDIX. 



No. II. 

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
LEARNERS. 

N. B. In such of the following Examples as are not in a 
syllogistic form, it is intended that the student should 
practise the reduction of them into that form; those of 
them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound: 
viz. where it is impossible to admit the Premises and 
deny the Conclusion. Of such as are apparent syllo- 
gisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which 
it may be advisable to apply in the following order: 
1st. Observe whether the argument be Categorical or 
Hypothetical ; recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss 
does not necessarily imply an hypothetical Syllogism, 
unless the reasoning turns on the hypothesis. If this 
appear to be the case, the rules for hypothetical Syllo- 
gisms must be applied. 2dly. If the argument be cate- 
gorical, count the terms. 3dly. If only three, observe 
whether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe 
whether the Premises are both negative ; (i. e. really, 
and not in appearance only,) and if one is, whether the 
Conclusion be negative also ; or affirmative, . if both 
Premises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms are 
distributed in the Conclusion, and whether the same are 



EXAMPL] - 

distributed in the Premises. 6thly. If the Syllogism ii 

not a Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to thai 

form. 



1. No one is free who is enslaved bj bis appetito 
sensualist is enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sen- 
sualist is not free. 

& None but Whites are civilized: the ancient Germans 
were Whites : therefore they were civilized 

3. None but Whites are civilzed: the Hindoos are not 
Wliites : therefore they are not civilized. 

4. None but civilized people are Whites: the Gauls were 
Whites : therefore they were civilized. 

5. No one is rich who has not enough: no miser has 
enough : therefore no miser is rich. 

G. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they 
would be aggrieved: but penal laws against them are not 
enforced : therefore the Papists are not aggrieved. 

7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, the 
popish legends are to be believed: but the popish legends 
are not to be believed: therefore no testimony to miracles 
is to be admitted. 

8. Ifmenarenot likely to be influenced in the perform- 
ance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the 
oaths commonly administered are superfluous: if they are 
likely to be so influenced, every one should be made to 
take an oath to behave rightly throughout his lite; but one 
or the other of these must be the case: therefore either the 
oaths commonly administered are superfluous, or ever) 
man- should be made to take an oath to behave rightly 
throughout bis life. 

9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to 

truth; and the Church of England 18 roinfonnable to the 

Scriptures: A. B. is a divine of the Church of England; 



360 APPENDIX. 

and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments : there- 
fore it must be presumed to be true. 

10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture) 
pleased God ; but without faith it is impossible to please 
Him ; (for he that cometh to God must believe that He 
is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek 
Him): therefore, $c. 

11. "If Abraham were justified by works, then had he 

whereof to glory [before God:] but not [any one can have whereof 

to glory] before God;" therefore Abraham was not justified 
by works. 

12. " He that is of God heareth my words ; ye therefore 
hear them not, because ye are not of God." 

13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, 
without any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and 
interesting form : and therefore, though a treatise would 
deserve much attention which should possess such excel- 
lence, it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve 
much attention. 

14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for 
religious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory 
on us : but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for 
religious duties ; and hence it appears that the fourth com- 
mandment is obligatory on us. 

15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference 
to the divine institution of sacrifices : one of the precepts 
delivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood : 
therefore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained 
the divine institution of sacrifices. 

16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed be- 
fore the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of 
ceremonial sin (which could not then exist), but of moral 
sin : if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less 
efficacy ; and in that case, the atonements under the Mosaic 



EXAMPLES. 36] 

law would have " made the comers thereunto perfect 
pertaining to the conscience;" but this waa not the case: 

therefore, cjjc [Davison on Prophecy.] 

17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians, 

if we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israel- 
ites alone, but for all men: it was designed, however, for 
the Israelites alone, and not for all men: therefore the ado- 
ration of images is not forbidden to Christians. 

18. A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of 
the tenth commandment: all gaming, therefore, since it 
implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, involves 
a breach of the tenth commandment. 

19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscri- 
minate mixture of various kinds : those that were set aside 
and saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed : 
therefore those that were set aside, and saved as valuable, 
were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds. 

20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are 
arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the 
divine decree are the elect : therefore such persons as are 
arbitrarily separated from the rest of mankind by the 
divine decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this Conclusion 

generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major; the reverse would 
be the more sound and the more effectual objection.] 

21. No one who lives with another on terms of confi- 
dence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him: Brutus 
lived on terms of confidence with Caesar: therefore he was 
not justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him. 

22. He that destroys a man who usurp> despotic power 
in a free country deserves well of his countrymen: Brutus 
destroyed Cajsar, who usurped despotic power in Rome: 
therefore he deserved well of the Romans. 

23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is volimt.in : virtue i> 
voluntary: therefore so i> vice. [Arte. Eth. B, iii.J 



362 APPENDIX. 

24. A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards 
and punishments of a future state, or must be able to 
appeal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them 
regularly in this life ; Moses did not do the former : there- 
fore he must have done the latter. 

25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than 
the falsity of testimony can be fairly established by testi- 
mony: any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of 
less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony 
(that being very common) : therefore no extraordinary 
and unusual fact can be fairly established by testi- 
mony. 

26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely 
to be false : the evidence on which most men believe that 
there are pyramids in Egypt is testimony: therefore the 
evidence on which most men believe that there are pyra- 
mids in Egypt is very likely to be false. 

27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was 
a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions, 
credited by the vulgar and the weak, and maintained by 
the more enlightened, from selfish or political views : the 
same was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyp- 
tians: the same may be said of the Brahminical worship 
of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese : 
the same, of the romantic mythological system of the Pe- 
ruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and 
those of the Britons and of the Saxons : hence we may 
conclude that all systems of religion, however varied in 
circumstances, agree in being superstitions^kept up among 
the vulgar, from interested or political vilws in the more 

enlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap i. § 2. p. 234.] 

28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities ; 
a miracle is an impossibility : therefore no man can possess 
power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, p. 299.] 



EXAMPLES. 363 

29. A. B. and C. I), arc each erf them equal to L. I'.: 
therefore they are equal to each other, 

30. Protection from punishment la plainly due to the 
innocent: therefore, as you maintain thai this person ought 

not to be punished, it appears that you arc convinced of hi s 
innocence. 

31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious 
persecutions-i among the most bitter persecution- were 
those which occurred in France during the revolution: 
therefore they must have been religious persecutions. 

32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does, 
has neither merit nor demerit in his action: a liberal and 
benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he 
does in relieving the poor : therefore such a man has 
neither merit nor demerit in his action. [See Appendix, pp. 
314, 315.] 

33. What happens every day is not improbable : some 
things against which the chances are many thousands to 
one, happen every day: therefore some things against 
which the chances are many thousands to one, are not 
improbable. 

34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to 
the Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either 
from its professing to be his, and containing his name, or 
from its really being his; since, therefore, the former of 
these is not the fact, the Epistle must be Paul's. 

35. " With some of them God was not well pleased : for 
they were overthrown in the wilderness." 

36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications 
without satiety: it is impossible to enjoy perpetual grati- 
fications without satiety: therefore it is impossible for I 
sensualist to obtain his wish. 

37. If Paley's system is to be received, one who has DO 
knowledge of a future state has no means of QWtinguishing 



364 APPENDIX. 

virtue and vice : now one who has no means of distinguish- 
ing virtue and vice can commit no sin : therefore, if Paley's 
system is to be received, one who has no knowledge of a 
future state can commit no sin. 

38. The principles of justice are variable : the appoint- 
ments of nature are invariable : therefore the principles of 
justice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v.] 

39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness : 
therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. iii.] 

40. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which 
give contradictory accounts of it ; the story of the life and 
exploits of Buonaparte is of this description: therefore it is 

not to be believed. [Fide Elements, p. 28.] 

41. When the observance of the first day of the week as 
a religious festival in commemoration of Christ's resurrec- 
tion, was first introduced, it must have been a novelty: 
when it was a novelty, it must have attracted notice : when 
it attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry respecting the 
truth of the resurrection : when it led to this inquiry, it 
must have exposed the story as an imposture, supposing 
it not attested by living witnesses : therefore, when the ob- 
servance of the first day of the week, $c. was first introduced, 
it must have exposed as an imposture the story of the re- 
surrection, supposing it not attested by living witnesses. 

42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than 
the world could contain : the things related by the Evangelists 
are the miracles of Jesus : therefore the things related by 
the Evangelists would fill more books than the world could 
contain. 

43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been 
written without knowledge of the events of the time of 
Christ, they could not correspond with them exactly ; and 
if they had been forged by Christians, they would not 
be preserved and acknowledged by the Jews : they are 



EXAMPLES 3(51 



>.) 



preserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they corre- 
spond exactly with the events of the time of Christ: there- 
fore they were neither written without knowledge of those 
events, nor were forged by Christians, 

44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred: occasional 
turbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, 
is to be preferred to it. 

45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith 
in order to be acceptable to the Deity: now he who be- 
lieves all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must possess 
faith: therefore such an one must, according to theologians, 
be acceptable to the Deity. 

46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either 
by faith or by works: now he was not justified by faith, 
(according to St. James,) nor by works (according to St. 
Paul): therefore Abraham was not justified. 

47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it: 
all punishment is an evil : therefore no punishment should 
be allowed that good may come of it. 

48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in 
repentance [Arist. Eth. B. ix.]: therefore wicked men abound 
in what is good. 

49. A person infected with the plague will (probably) 

die [suppose three in five of the infected die]: this man i- pro- 
bably) infected with the plague [suppose it an even ehai 
therefore he will (probably) die. [Query, what u tin- amount off 
this prohahility ? Again, suppose the probability of the major to In- (in 

of -5-) i, and of the minor, (instead of -' ) to be What will In tin 

prohahility of the conclusion?] 

50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has 
been accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the 
condition of a slave : many of the negroes, however, may 
be happy in the condition of slaves, because they I 
never been accustomed to enjoy liberty. 



366 APPENDIX. 

51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: de- 
votedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that 
of gain in old age, are dictated by Nature [Arist Rhet. B. a.] : 
therefore they are allowable. 

52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that 
person's greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest 
good for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest 
lover of himself. [Arist. Eth. B. ix.] 

53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action, 
exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action: a 
good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue: therefore he 
who exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not a 
good man. [Arist. Eth. B. in] 

54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune 
who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual 
excellence : a true philosopher is independent of the ca- 
prices of Fortune : therefore a true philosopher is one who 
places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excel- 
lence. 

55. A system of government which extends to those ac- 
tions that are performed secretly, must be one which refers 
either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the 
rewards and punishments of another world : every perfect 
system of government must extend to those actions which 
are performed secretly : no system of government there- 
fore can be perfect, which does not refer either to a regular 
divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and punish- 
ments of another world. [Warburton's Divine Legation.] 

56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds 
by diligent study, the incitement of academical honours is 
unnecessary ; and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such as 
are indifferent to mental improvement: therefore the in- 
citement of academical honours is either unnecessary or 
ineffectual. 



EXAMPLES. 3g7 

57. He who is properly called an actor, does oof en- 
deavour to make his hearers believe that the BentimentB he 
expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are reall\ his own: 
a barrister does this: therefore he is not properly to be 
called an actor. 

58. He who bears arms at the command of the m 
trate does what is lawful for a Christian : the Swiss in the 
French service, and the British in the American service, 
bore arms at the command of the magistrate: therefore 
they did what was lawful for a, Christian. 

59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new- 
colony with the refuse of Jails: but this we must allow not 
to be improper, if our method of colonizing New South 
Wales be a wise one : if this be wise, therefore, Lord 
Bacon is not right. 

60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aris- 
totle is to be regarded as infallible: but he is not: Logic 
therefore is not worthy of being cultivated. 

61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man 
in life, or to increase national and private wealth: but the 
course of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency : 
therefore it is not useful. 

62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, 
tends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the 
same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have 
seen the most service, should have the most dread of death 
in battle: but the reverse of this is the case: therefore the 
former is not to be believed. 

63. If the everlasting favour of God i> not bestowed at 
random, and on no principle at all, it must bo bestowed 

either with respect to men's persons, or with reaped to 
their conduct: but "God is no respecter of persons : M 
therefore his favour musl be bestowed with reaped t«» 

men's conduct. [Sumner'i Apostolical Preach 



368 APPENDIX. 

64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment, 
it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime : if it is 
so felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking 
place at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even 
come to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is de- 
signed to deter ; but one or other of these must be the 
case: therefore transportation is not calculated to answer 
the purpose of preventing crime. 

65. War is productive of evil: therefore peace is likely 
to be productive of good. 

66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other per- 
ceptible purpose but to gratify the sight: many flowers 
have great beauty ; and many of them accordingly answer 
no other purpose but to gratify the sight. 

67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of 
sensuality is deserving of strong reprobation: but those 
do not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensu- 
ality who are hurried into excess by the impulse of the 
passions : such therefore as are hurried into excess by the 
impulse of the passions are not deserving of strong repro- 
bation. [Arist. Eth. B. vii.] 

68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate desires: 
to conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint 
of all inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to 
conform to the precepts of Scripture. 

69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemn- 
ing a book without reading it: some Reviewers do not 
refrain from this : therefore some Reviewers are not 
candid. 

70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a 
change of established laws, no laws could reasonably be 
maintained: but some laws can reasonably be maintained: 
therefore no objection that can be urged will justify a change 
of established laws. 



i:x implbs. 369 

71. If any complete tlieory could be framed, to explain 
the establishment of Christianity by Daman causes, Bucfa a 

theory would have been proposed before now ; but none 
such ever has been proposed : therefore no such theory can 
be framed. 

72. He who is content with what he lias, La truly rich : 
a covetous man is not content with what he has: no covet- 
ous man therefore is truly rich. 

73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the cir- 
cumstances of such an event as could not be conjectured by 
natural reason : this is the case with the prophecies of the 
Messiah contained in the Old Testament : therefore these 
are true prophecies. 

74. The connection of soul and body cannot be compre- 
hended or explained; but it must be believed: therefore 
something must be believed which cannot be comprehended 
or explained. 

75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone ; Red Sandstone lies 
above Coal : therefore Lias lies above Coal. 

76. Cloven feet belonging universally to horned animals, 
we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appears to 
have had cloven feet, was horned. 

77. All that glitters is not gold : tinsel glitters : therefore 
it is not gold. 

78. A negro is a man : therefore he who murders a negro 
murders a man. 

79. Meat and Drink are necessaries of lite : die reve- 
nues of Vitellius were spent on Meat and Drink: then- 
fore the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necc oaari cg 

of life. 

80. Nothing is heavier than Platina : feathers are heavier 
than Nothing: therefore feathers are heavier than Platina. 

81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother; 
she governed her husband: he governed Athena; Aih. 

I) 15 



370 APPENDIX. 

Greece ; and Greece, the world : therefore the child of 
Themistocles governed the world. 

82. He who calls you a man speaks truly : he who calls 
you a fool, calls you a man : therefore he who calls you a 
fool speaks truly. 

83. Warm countries alone produce wines: Spain is a 
warm country: therefore Spain produces wines. 

84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to 
freeze Quicksilver: the climate of Siberia is sufficient to 
freeze Quicksilver : therefore the climate of Siberia is 
intensely cold. 

85. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which 
is not a plant ; and every vegetable excrescence which is not 
a plant, is possessed of magical virtues : therefore Mistleto 
of the oak is possessed of magical virtues. 

86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (suppose 
a foot) before the minute-hand, this last, though moving 
twelve times faster, can never overtake the other ; for while 
the minute-hand is moving over those twelve inches, the 
hour-hand will have moved over one inch ; so that they 
will then be an inch apart; and while the minute-hand is 
moving over that one inch, the hour-hand will have moved 
over y? inch, so that it will still be a-head; and again, 
while the minute-hand is passing over that space of T ' T inch, 
which now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over -j-— 
inch; so that it will still be a-head, though the distance 
between the two is diminished; <$*c. fyc. $*c., and thus it is 
plain we may go on for ever : therefore the minute-hand can 
never overtake the hour-hand. [This is one of the sophistical 

puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achilles and a Tortoise;) 
but he is not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove the 
difficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would over- 
take the Tortoise : as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem 
proposed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing 
palpably impossible ; to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of 
the problem. 



EXAMPLES. 371 

I have heard the present example adduced M a proof that th,> ,„ 
of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demomtrmtioa 
may lead from true premises to an absurd conclusion. The rev 
truth: the example before us furnishes a confirmation of the utility of an 
acquaintance with the syllogistic form ; in which form the pretended demon- 
stration in question cannot possibly be exhibited. An attempt to do so will 
evince the utter want of connection between the premises and the con- 
clusion.] 

87. Theft is a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws of 
Sparta : therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime. 

88. Every hen comes from an egg: every egg comes from 
a hen : therefore every egg comes from an egg. 

89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn : therefore the son of 
Jupiter was the grandson of Saturn. 

90. All cold is to be expelled by heat : this person's dis- 
order is a cold: therefore it is to be expelled by heat. 

91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stimu- 
lants are hurtful, wine is hurtful. 

92. Opium is a poison ; but physicians advise some of 
their patients to take Opium : therefore physicians advise 
some of their patients to take poison. 

93. What we eat grew in the fields ; loaves of bread zrc 
what we eat : therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields. 

94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with : (as is 
shown by the practice of the Brahmins and of some monk- :> 
and vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed with (as is 
plain from the example of the Esquimaux and others;) but 
all food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food: there- 
fore all food may be dispensed with. 

95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it : a 
mining speculation is no trifling business : therefore a min- 
ing speculation will enrich those engaged in it. 

96. He who is most hungry eats most : he who rat- least 
is most hungry: therefore he who eats hast eats DDOft 

[See Aldrich's Compendium: Fallacia? : where tbil i< rightly id 

97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in 

B B 2 



372 APPENDIX. 

the place where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither 
of these is possible : therefore there is no such thing as 

motion. [In this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, Aldrich 
mistakes the character of the difficulty : which is, not to prove the truth of 
that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent demonstration militat- 
ing against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He says in this 
case, "solvitur ambulando;" but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all, 
but is the very thing which constitutes the difficulty in question ; for it is 
precisely because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of 
its impossibility produces perplexity. — See Introduction, p. 4.] 

98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the 
moon : hair is a vegetable : therefore hair grows most in 
the increase of the moon. 

99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to 
the improvement of the mind : all the works of the most 
celebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Ox- 
ford : therefore some of the works of the most celebrated 
ancients conduce to the improvement of the mind. 

100. Some poisons are vegetable : no poisons are use- 
ful drugs : therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable. 

101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which 
appeals to the evidence of observation and experiment: 
Craniology appeals to this evidence : therefore, if Cranio- 
logy be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. [Let 

the probability of one of these premises be 7 ; and of the other ± : Query. 
What is the probability of the conclusion ?] 

102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace ; he who 
is a favourite with the populace must understand how to 
manage them; he who understands how to manage them, 
must be well acquainted with their character: he who 
is well acquainted with their character, must hold them in 
contempt: therefore Wilkes must have held the populace 
in contempt. 

103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he 
should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties 



EXAMPLLS. 373 

are most fully developed; the civilized state is thai in 
which all man's faculties are most fully developed : there- 
fore, to discover whether man has any moral sense, he 
should be viewed in a civilized state. 

104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, §c. have 
been countenanced by public opinion in several coun- 
tries : all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery, 
Adultery, Infanticide, Sfc. : therefore, all the crimes we 
know of have been countenanced by public opinion in 
several countries. 

105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who 
are not well qualified to perform their part. None but 
veterans are well qualified to perform their part. None 
but veterans should be brought into the field. 

106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is bene- 
ficial to sugar-refiners: and of the corn-trade to corn- 
growers : and of the silk-manufacture to silk-weavers, 
8fc. Sfc. ; and thus each class of men are benefited by some 
restrictions. Now all these classes of men make up the 
whole community: therefore a system of restrictions is 
beneficial to the community. [&• Chap. iii. § 11.] 

107. There are two kinds of things which we ought 
not to fret about: what we can help, and what we cannot. 

[To be stated as a Dilemma.] 



APPENDIX. 



No. III. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 



Some have expressed much contempt for the mode in 
which Logic is usually taught, and in which students are 
examined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enu- 
meration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of 
them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already 
syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, if in- 
tended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly certain; 
though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic 
from all candidates for a Degree, has confined both lectures 
and examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to 
this elementary character. But the student who wishes to 
acquire, and to show that he has acquired, not only the 
elementary rules, but a facility of applying them in prac- 
tice, should proceed from the study of such examples as 
the foregoing, to exercise himself in analysing logically, 
according to the rules here given, and somewhat in the 
manner of the subjoined specimen, some of Euclid's de- 
monstrations, — various portions of Aristotle's Works, — the 
opening of Warburton's " Divine Legation," (which ex- 
hibits the arguments in a form very nearly syllogistic) — 
several parts of Chillingworth's Defence of Protestantism, — 
the concluding part of Paley's Horae Paulihae, — Leslie's 
Method with the Deists, — various portions of A. Smith's 
Wealth of Nations, — and other argumentative Works on 
the most dissimilar subjects. The latter part of § 1. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 375 

Chap. V. of the Dissertation on the Province of K< 
ing, will furnish a convenient suhject of a short analysis. 

A student who should prepare himself, in this manner, 
in one or more such books, and present himself for thit 

kind of examination in them, would furnish a good tesl 
for ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic. 



As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they 
have been exhibited at full length in the bare elemental) 
form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the 
mode of analysing and reducing to that form, any train of 
argument that maybe presented to us: since this must in 
general be the first step taken in an attempt to apply logical 
rules. * 

First then, of whatever length the reasoning may be, 
whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin witli the 
concluding assertion; — not necessarily the last sentence 
expressed, but the last point established; — and this whe- 
ther it be formally enunciated, or left to be understood. 
Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on what 
ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be 
your Conclusion; the ground on which it rests, your Pre- 
mises. The whole Syllogism thus obtained may he tried 
by the rules of Logic. 

If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed t<» 
take the premises separately, and pursue with each the same 
plan as with the conclusion you first Mated. A premiss 
must have been used as such, either because it required no 
proof, or because it had been proved. If it have Q0( been 
proved, consider whether it be so selt'-c\ideni a- to have 
needed no proof. If it have been proved, ?0U must regard 

* These directions are, in substance, and nearly, in rtracted 

from the Preface to Hinds'i abridged [ntrodus^on i«> I 



376 APPENDIX. 

it as a conclusion derived from other assertions which are 
premises to it: so that the process with which you set 
out will be repeated ; viz. to observe on what grounds the 
assertion rests, to state these as premises, and to apply 
the proper rules to the syllogism thus obtained. Having 
satisfied yourself of the correctness of this, proceed, as 
before, to state its premises, if needful, as conclusions de- 
rived from other assertions. And thus the analysis will 
go on (if the whole chain of argument be correct) till you 
arrive at the premises with which the whole commences; 
which of course should be assertions requiring no proof, 
or, if the chain be any where faulty, the analysis will pro- 
ceed till you come to some proposition, either assumed as 
self-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly deduced 
from other assertions.* 

It will often happen that the same assertion will have 
been proved by many different arguments ; and then, the 
inquiry into the truth of the premises will branch out ac- 
cordingly. In mathematical or other demonstrative rea- 

* Many students probably will find it a very clear and convenient 
mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, to draw it 
out in the form of a Tree, or Logical Division ; thus, 

[Ultimate Conclusion.] 

Z is X, 

proved by 



YisX, 

proved 

» by 






Zis Y, 

proved by 








AisY, 

[suppose 
admitted.] 


Zis A, 

proved by 
&c. 


the argument that 

B is X, Y is B 

&c. &c. 


ana by 
argument 

•' ! 

CisX, 

&c. 


the 
that 

YisjCT 

&c. 





PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 377 

soning, this will of course never take place, since absolute 
certainty admits of no increase: and if, Bfl ia often the 
case, the same truth admits of several different demonstra- 
tions, we select the simplest and clearest, and discard the 
rest. But in probable reasoning there is often a Cumula- 
tion of arguments, each proving the same conclusion ; /'. r. 
each proving it to be probable. In such cases therefore 
you will have first to try each argument separately; and 
should each of them establish the conclusion as in some 
degree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggre- 
gate probability. 

In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables 
us to place the several items of probability in the most 
convenient form. As the degree of probability of each 
proposition that is assumed, is a point to be determined 
by the reasoner's own sagacity and experience as to the 
matter in hand, so, the degree of probability of each con- 
clusion, (given, that of each of its premises,) * and also 
the collective probability resulting from several different 
arguments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arith- 
metical question. But the assistance afforded by logical 
rules in clearly stating the several items so as to prepare 
the way for the other operations, will not be thought tightly 
of by any who have observed the confusion of thought and 
the fallacy, which have often been introduced through the 
want of such a statement. 

Example of Analysis applied to the first part of Pah-fs 
Evidences. 

The ultimate Conclusion, that " The Christian Religion 
came from God" is made to rest (afl fa- a- '"the direct 
historical evidence" is concerned) on these two preim 

* Set- Fallacies, J I I. near the end. 



378 APPENDIX. 

That "A Religion attested by Miracles, is from God;" 
and that " The Christian Religion is so attested." 

Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the Minor 
seems to have been admitted, while the Major was denied, 
by the unbelievers of old : whereas at present the case 
is reversed.* 

Paley's argument therefore goes to establish the Minor 
premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely 
to be any question. 

He states with this view, two propositions : viz. 

Prop. I. — "That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, pro- 
fessing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed 
their lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily under- 
gone in attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely 
in consequence of their belief of those accounts ; and that they 
also submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct." 

Prop. II. — " That there is not satisfactory evidence, that 
persons pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar 
miracles, have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the 
accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of 
their belief of the truth of those accounts." 

Of these two propositions the latter, it will easily be 
perceived, is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by 

* It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient arguments 
against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian writers, and 
also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which are still extant, 
that the original opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were 
wrought, but denied that they proved the divine origin of the religion, 
and attributed them to Magic. This concession, in persons living so 
much nearer to the times assigned to the miracles, should be noticed as 
an important evidence ; for, credulous as men were in those days respect- 
ing magic, they would hardly have resorted to this explanation, unless 
some, at least plausible, evidence for the miracles had been adduced. 
And they could not but be sensible that to prove (had that been possible) 
the pretended miracles to be impostures, would have been the most deci- 
sive course ; since that would at once have disproved the religion. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 

Negation (Book II. Chap. ii. § *) of a universal aflinuaiiu- j 
the former proposition is the Minor. 

As a Syllogism in Barbara therefore, the whole will stand 
thus : 

"All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy 
of credit:" (byconversion, "none which are not worthy of credit 
are so attested.") 

" The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evi- 
dence :" Therefore "they are worthy of credit." 

The Minor premiss is first proved by being taken afl 
several distinct ones, each of which is separately esta- 
blished. — See Book II. Chap. iv. § 1. 

I. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity 
suffered; by showing 

1st. A priori, from the nature of the case, that they were 
likely to suffer: [because they were preachers <-t a 
religion unexpected and unwelcome: 1. to the Jews; 
and 2. to Gentiles.] 
2d. From profane testimony. 

3d. From the testimony of Christian writings. [And 
here comes in the proof of one of the premise- of 
this last argument; viz. the proof of the credibility, 
as to this point at least, of the Christian Writings.] 
These arguments are cumulative ; i. c. each separately 
goes to establish the probability of the one common conclu- 
sion, that "the first propagators of Christianity suffered" 

By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings 
were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to. 

II. It is proved that "What they Buffered for was 

miraculous story ;" by 

1st. The nature of the ease ; They could have had nothing 

but miracles on which to rest the claim- of the \w\\ 
religion. 



380 APPENDIX. 

2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the Resur- 
rection, both in Christian and in Profane Writers, as 
the evidence on which the religion rested. 
The same course of argument goes to show that the 
miracles in attestation of which they suffered were such as 
they professed to have witnessed. 

These arguments again are cumulative. 

III. It is proved that " The miracles thus attested are what 

we call the Christian miracles ; " in other words, that the 

story was, in the main, that which we have now in the 

Christian Scriptures ; by 

§ 1st. The nature of the case ; viz. that it is improbable 
the original story should have completely died away, 
and a substantially new one have occupied its place ; 

§ 2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, both 
Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those 
of our Scriptures, as the ones then received ; 

§ 3d. by The credibility of our Historical Scriptures : This 
is established by several distinct arguments, each sepa- 
rately tending to show that these books were, from the 
earliest ages of Christianity, well known and carefully 
preserved among Christians : viz. 

§ i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers, 

§ ii. with peculiar respect. 

§ iii. Collected into a distinct volume^ and 

§ iv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of 
respect. 

§ v. Publicly read and expounded, and 

§ vi. had connnentaries, fyc. written on them: 

§vii. Were received by Christians of different sects; 

Sfc. 8{c* 

* For some important remarks respecting the different ways in which 
this part of the argument is presented to different persons, See " Hinds 
on Inspiration," p. 30 — 46. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANAL! 

The latter part of the first main proposition, bra 
into two; viz. 1st, that the early Christian, submitted to 
new rules of conduct; 2d, that they did so, in cons* 
of their belief in miracles wrought before them. 

Each of these is established in various parts of the above 
course of argument, and by similar premta the 

nature of the case,— the accounts of heathen writers, -and 
the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, £c. 



The Major premiss, that " Miracles thus attested are 
worthy of credit," which must be combined with the former, 
in order to establish the conclusion, that " the Christian 
miracles are worthy of credit," is next to be established 

Previously to his entering on the second main propo- 
sition, (which I have stated to be the Converse by nega- 
tion of this Major premiss) he draws his conclusion (Ch. x. 
Part I.) from the Minor premiss, in combination with the 
Major, resting that Major on 

§ 1st The a priori improbability that a false story should 
have been thus attested : viz. 

" If it be so, the religion must be true.* These men could not 
be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might have 
avoided all these sufferings, and have lived quietly. Would men 
in such circumstances pretend to have Been what they never saw; 
assert facts which they had no knowledge of; go about lying, to 
teach virtue; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being 
an impostor, but having seen the snccvss of his imposture in his 
crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on; and so persist, as \<< 
bring upon themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledg 
the consequence, enmity and hatred, danger and death P" 

• This 1S the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premie, that 'it 
is attested by real Minahs ,• " which, in the pre-, nt da\ . oomei : 
same thing: since those tor whom he is writing IN ready at OHM t<> 
admit the truth of the religion, if convinced o( the reality of tin mn.i 



362 APPENDIX. 

§ 2d. That no false story of Miracles is likely to be so 
attested, is again proved, from the premiss that "no 
false story of miracles ever has been so attested;" and 
this premiss again is proved in the form of a propo- 
sition which includes it; viz. that " No other miraculous 
story whatever is so attested." 

§ This assertion again, bifurcates; viz. it is proved 
respecting the several stories that are likely to be, or 
that have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian, 
that either 

1 §. They are not so attested ; or 

2 §. They are not properly miraculous ; i. e. that admit- 
ting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow 
that any miracle took place ; as in cases that may be 
explained by false perceptions, — accidents, $c. 



In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest 
of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the 
argument which I have but slightly touched upon.* 

* When the Student considers that this is only one out of many 
branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet that there 
have been intelligent men who have held out against them all, he may 
be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in these arguments 
which he is unable to detect, or else, that there must be much stronger 
arguments on the other side than he has ever met with. 

To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to infidelity 
would be unsuitable to this occasion ; but I will notice one, as being more 
especially connected with the subject of this work, and as being very 
generally overlooked. " In no other instance perhaps" (says Dr. Haw- 
kins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition) " besides that of Religion, do 
men commit the very illogical mistake, of first canvassing all the objections 
against any particular system whose pretensions to truth they would ex- 
amine, before they consider the direct arguments in its favour." (p. 82.) 
But why, it may be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case? 
An answer, which I think would apply to a large proportion of such 
persons, is this : Because a man having been brought up in a Christian 
country, has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from 
their infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to 



PRAXIS OF LOCK \l. ANALYSIS. 

It will be observed that to avoid unnecessary prolixity, 
I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one 

regard an uninqtdring assent as a mark of commendable faith : and 
hence lie lias probably never even thought of proposing to himself me 
question, — Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revelation! 
Christianity being nothing new to him, lie is not stimulated to 
reasons for believing it, till he finds it controverted. And when it u 
controverted, — when an opponent urges — How do you reconcile this, and 
that, and the other, with the idea of a divine revelation ! these objections 
Strike by their novelty,— by their being opposed to what is generally 
received. He is thus excited to inquiry ; which he sets about, naturally 
enough, but very unwisely, by seeking for answers to all mete <>l>j« e- 
tions: and fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily 
ought not to receive the religion. "As if," (says the Author already 
cited) "there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable 
arguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections, numerous, 
plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are objections (said 
Dr. Johnson) against a plenum and objections against a vacuum ; hut 
one of them must be true." lie adds, that "sensible men, nallv de- 
sirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to 
examine first the argument in favour of that side of the question, where 
the first presumption of truth appears. And the presumption is mani- 
festly in favour of that religious creed already adopted by the country 

Their very earliest inquiry therefore must be into the direct arguments fot 
the authority of that book on which their country rests its religion." 

But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a strong 
temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded against, to adopt 
the opposite course ; — to attend first to the objections which are brought 
against what is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the 
mind from a state of apathy. 

When Christianity was first preached, the state of things m 
" Seeing that all these things cannot be tpoken agamU^ ye ought to be 
qidet," was a sentiment which favoured an indolent acquiescence in the 
old pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the nd 
those who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The fust inquiry 
of any one who at all attended to the subject, must have been, not, — 
What arc the objections to Christianity '— but, On what grounds do these 
men call on me to receive them as divine men And the same 

appears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom our Mission- 
aries arc labouring: they begin by inquiring. — Why should we receive 
this religion.' and those of them accordingly who have embraced if. 

appear to be Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction 



384 APPENDIX. 

premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply 
for himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it will 
easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumulative 
arguments to prove that the propagators of Christianity 
did suffer, would at full length stand thus; 

" Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to 

the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ; 
The Apostles did this ; 
Therefore they were likely to suffer," tyc. fyc. 

It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used 
in different syllogisms may require to be differently ex- 
pressed, by a substitution of some equivalent, in order to 
render the argument in each formally correct. This of 
course is always allowable, provided the exact meaning be 
preserved : e. g. if the proposition be, " The persons who 
attested the Christian miracles underwent sufferings in attes- 
tation of them," I am authorized to state the same assertion 
in a different form, thus, "The Christian miracles are attested 
by men who suffered in attestation of their reality," Sfc. 

Great care however should be used to avoid being mis- 
led by the substitution of one proposition for another, when 
the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equi- 
valent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other. 

Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to 
Chap. iii. § 1, p. 95, where I have treated of the statement 
of a proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all 
the rest, but differing in the division of the Predicate from 
the Subject. Of this procedure the above analysis affords 
an instance. 

than many among us, even of those who in general maturity of intellect 
and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders. 

I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious educa- 
tion ; but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accompany it. 
The Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices, greater difficulties 
to surmount, than ours ; but they were difficulties of a different kind. 



INDEX 



PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS. 



Absolute terms, page 123. 

Abstraction. — The act of " drawing off" in thought, and attend- 
ing to separately, some portion of an object presented to 
the mind, 128. 

Abstract terms, 124. 

Accident. — In its widest technical sense, anything that is attri- 
buted to another, and can only be conceived as belonging 
to some substance (in which sense it is opposed to " Sub- 
stance : ") in its narrower and more properly logieal Bense, 
a Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence 
of the Species remaining the same, 134. 

Accidental Definition. — A definition which assigns the Proper- 
ties of a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual; it is 
otherwise called a Description, 140. 

Affirmative — denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts 
the agreement of the Predicate with the Subject, 62. 

Analogous. — A term is so called whose Single signification 
applies with unequal propriety to more than one object, 
122, 1ST. 

Antecedent. — That part of a Conditional Proposition on which 
the other depends, 111. 

Apprehension (simple.)— The operation of the mind by which 

we mentally perceive or form a notion of some object, •'» I. 

« ( 



3S() INDEX. 

Argument. — An expression in which, from something laid down 

as granted, something else is deduced, 73. 
Categorematic. — A word is so called which may by itself be 

employed as a Term, 58. 
Categorical Proposition — is one which affirms or denies a Pre- 
dicate of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis, 

62. 
Common term — is one which is applicable in the same sense to 

more than one individual object, 47, 60, 123. 
Compatible terms, 124. 

Conclusion. — That Proposition which is inferred from the Pre- 
mises of an Argument, 25, 74. 
Concrete term, 124. 
Conditional Proposition — is one which asserts the dependence 

of one categorical Proposition on another. A conditional 

Syllogism is one in which the reasoning depends on such a 

Proposition, 111. 
Consequent. — That part of a conditional Proposition which 

depends on the other. (Consequens), 111. 
Consequence. — The connection between the Antecedent and 

Consequent of a conditional Proposition. (Consequentia), 

111. 
Contingent. — The matter of a Proposition is so called when the 

terms of it in part agree, and in part disagree, 64. 
Contradictory Propositions — are those which, having the same 

terms, differ both in Quantity and Quality, 90. 
Contrary Propositions — are two universals, affirmative and 

negative, with the same terms, 68. 
Contrary terms, 127. 
Converse — 70. 
Conversion of a Proposition — is the transposition of the terms, so 

that the subject is made the Predicate, and vice versa, 70. 
Copula. — That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the 

Predicate of the Subject ; viz. is, or is not, expressed or 

implied, 57. 
Definite terms, 126. 



INDEX. :;s; 

Definition. — An expression explanatory of that which is defined, 
i.e. separated, as by a boundary, from everything else, 139. 

Description. — An accidental Definition, 1 1<>. 

Difference (Differentia,) — The formal or distinguishing part of 

the essence, of a Species, 132. 

Dilemma. — A eomplex kind of conditional syllogism, having 
more than one Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and a 
disjunctive Minor, 10G. 

Discourse. — The third operation of the mind, Reasoning, 55. 

Disjunctive Proposition — is one which consists of two or more 
categoricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them 
must be true. A syllogism is called disjunctive, the rea- 
soning of which turns on such a proposition, 104. 

Distributed — is applied to a Term that is employed in its full 
extent, so as to comprehend all its significates, — every- 
thing to which it is applicable, 44, 76. 

Division, logical — is the distinct enumeration of several things 
signified by a common name ; and it is so called metapho- 
rically, from its being analogous to the (real and properly- 
called) division of a whole into its parts, 13G. 

Enthymeme. — An argument having one Premiss expressed, and 
the other understood, 115. 

Equivocal. — A Term is defined to be equivocal whose different 
significations apply equally to several objects. Strictly 
speaking, there is hardly a word in any language which 
may not be regarded as, in this sense, equivocal ; hut tin- 
title is usually applied only in any case where a word is 
employed equivocally; e. g, where the middle term is used 
in different senses in the two Premises; or where a Pro- 
position is liable to he understood in various senses, accord- 
ing to tin- various meanings of one of its terms, l,s.;. 

Essential Definition — is one which assigns, not the Properties 01 
Accidents of the thing defined, hut what are regarded as its 

lential parts, whether physical or logical, l 39. 

Extreme, — The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition .ire called 
its Extremes or Terms, being, as if were, the two boun- 



388 INDEX. 

dairies, having the copula (in regular order) placed between 
them. In speaking of a syllogism, the word is often under- 
stood to imply the extremes of the Conclusion, 57. 

Fallacy. — Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes 
to be decisive of the matter at issue, while in reality it is 
not, 146. 

False — m its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition 
which states something not as it is, 63, 342. 

Figure of a Syllogism — denotes a certain situation of its middle 
term in reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion — The 
Major and Minor terms, 83. 

Generalization. — The act of comprehending under a common 
name several objects agreeing in some point which we 
abstract from each of them, and which that common name 
serves to indicate, 128. 

Genus. — A Predicable which is considered as the material part 
of the Species of which it is affirmed, 129. 

Hypothetical Proposition — is one which asserts not absolutely, 
but under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction. An 
hypothetical Syllogism is one of which the reasoning depends 
on such a proposition, 1 00. 

Illative Conversion — is that in which the truth of the Converse 
follows from the truth of the Exposita, or Proposition 
given, 70. 

Impossible. — The Matter of a Proposition is so called when the 
extremes altogether disagree, 68 — Ambiguity of, 311. 

Indefinite Proposition — is one which has for its Subject a Com- 
mon term without any sign to indicate distribution or 
non- distribution, 64. 

Indefinite terms, 126. 

Individual. — An object which is, in the strict and primary sense, 
one, and consequently cannot be logically divided; whence 
the name, 136. 

Induction. — A kind of argument which infers, respecting a whole 
class, what has been ascertained respecting one or more 
individuals of that class, 228. 



INDEX. 389 

Infer. — To draw a conclusion from granted premises. 266, — Set 
Prove. 

Infitna Species — is that which is not suhdivided, except into 
individuals, 13*2. 

Inseparable accident — is that which cannot be separated from 
the individual it belongs to, though it may from the 
Species, 134. 

Judgment. — The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro- 
nounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two 
of the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, 54. 

Logical definition — is that which assigns the Genus and Diffe- 
rence of the Species defined, 139. 

Major term of a Syllogism — is the Predicate of the conclusion. 
The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major 
term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Pre- 
miss is called the Major, 78, 101. 

Middle term of a categorical Syllogism — is that with which the 
two extremes of the conclusion are separately compared, 
78, 83. 

Minor term of a categorical Syllogism — is the subject of the 
conclusion. The Minor Premiss is that which contains the 
Minor term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical 
Premiss is called the Minor, 78, 101. 

Modal categorical proposition — is one which asserts that the 
Predicate exists in the Subject in a certain mode or manner. 
62, 95. 

Mood of a categorical Syllogism — is the designation of its three 
propositions, in the order in which they stand, according to 
their quantity and quality, 81. 

Necessary matter of a proposition — is the essential or invariable 
agreement of its terms, ()8. — Necessary, ambiguity of, 880. 

Negation — conversion by (otherwise called conversion by contra- 
position), 71. 

Negative categorical proposition — is one which asserts the dis- 
agreement of its extremes, (>2. 
Vegative terms, 1*25. 



390 INDEX. 

Nominal Definition— is one which explains only the meaning of 
the term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the 
thing signified by that Term than is implied by the Term 
itself to every one who understands the meaning of it, 
141, 253. 

Opposed. — Two propositions are said to be opposed to each 
other, when having the same Subject and Predicate, they 
differ either in quantity or quality, or both, 66. 

Opposition of terms, 126. 

Part — logically, Species are called Parts of the Genus they come 
under, and individuals, parts of the Species ; really, the 
Genus is a Part of the Species, and the Species, of the 
Individual, 137. 

Particular proposition — is one in which the Predicate is affirmed 
or denied of some part only of the subject, 63. 

Per Accidens. — Conversion of a proposition is so called when 
the Quantity is changed, 71. 

Physical definition — is that which assigns the parts into which 
the thing defined can be actually divided, 140. 

Positive terms, 125. 

Predicate of a proposition — is that Term which is affirmed or 
denied of the other, 57. 

Predicable. — A Term which can be affirmatively predicated of 
several others, 130. 

Premiss. — A proposition employed to establish a certain conclu- 
sion, 74. 

Privative terms, 125. 

Probable arguments, 96, 261. 

Property. — A Predicable which denotes something essentially 
conjoined to the essence of the Species, 132. 

Proposition. — A sentence which asserts, i.e. affirms or denies, 61. 

Prove. — To adduce Premises which establish the truth of a 
certain conclusion, 266. 

Proximum Genus of any Species — is the nearest or least remote 
to which it can be referred, 132. 



i n i ) i \ 391 

Pure categorical proposition — is one which asserts simply that the 

Predicate is, or is not, contained in the Subject, 62, ?>.*>. 

Real definition — is one which explains the nature of the tiling 
defined ; viz. either the whole nature of it (as in Mathema- 
tics), or else something beyond what is necessarily under- 
stood by the Term, 141, 253. 

References — fallacy of, 206. 

Relative terms, 123. 

Quality of a Proposition — is its affirming or denying. This is 
the Quality of the expression, which is, in Logic, the essen- 
tial circumstance. The Quality of the matter, is, its being 
true or false ; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential 
only in respect of the subject-matter treated of, 62. 

Quantity of a Proposition — is the extent in which its subject is 
taken ; viz. to stand for the whole, or for a part only of its 
Significates, 63. 

Question. — That which is to be established as a Conclusion stated 
in an interrogative form, 73. 

Second intention of a term, 185. 

Separable accident — is one which may be separated from the 
individual, 134. 

Significate. — The several things signified by a Common Term 
are its Significates (Significata), 63. 

Singular term — is one which stands for one individual. A Sin- 
gular proposition is one which has for its Subject either a 
Singular term, or a Common term limited to one individual 
by a singular sign, e.g. "This," 60, 64, 123. 

Sorites. — An abridged form of stating a series of Syllogisms, of 
which the Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the succeed- 
ing, 116. 

Species. — A predicate which is considered as expressing the 
whole essence of the individuals of which it is affirmed, 129. 
— peculiar sense of, in Natural History, 284. 

Subaltern Species and Genus — is that which is both a Species of 
some higher Genus, and a Genus in respect <>t' the Species 
into which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, 18 between 



392 INDEX. 

a Universal and a Particular of the same Quality. Of these, 
the Universal is the Subalternant, and the Particular the 
Subalternate, 68, 132. 

Subcontrary opposition — is between two particulars, the affir- 
mative and the negative, 68. 

Subject of a proposition — is that term of which the other is 
affirmed or denied, 57. 

Summum Genus — is that which is not considered as a Species 
of any higher Genus, 132. 

Syllogism. — An argument expressed in strict logical form ; viz. 
so that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of 
the expression alone, without any regard to the meaning of 
the Terms, 73. 

Syncategorematic words — are such as cannot singly express a 
Term, but only a part of a Term, 58. 

Term. — The Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, 57. 

True Proposition — is one which states what really is, 63. 

Universal Proposition — is one whose Predicate is affirmed or 
denied of the whole of the Subject, 63. 

Univocal. — A Common term is called Univocal in respect of 
those things to which it is applicable in the same signifi- 
cation, 122. 



THE END. 



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